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Preface
Assemblages of Interconnection
On the plane en route to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to attend my first African 
Union (au) summits, I sat next to an American missionary about to launch a 
new church project in neighboring Kenya. Though excited about the newness 
of his contract, he was wary of the difficulties Americans encounter living in 
African cities. He was concerned that his way of life was different, and that he 
would have to shift his standards and become at one with his parishioners. 
Though he never used language that was explicitly shocking and derogatory, 
it was clear that he saw his role as bringing a much- needed form of humani-
tarian enlightenment to Africa. This was made palatable through the way he 
spoke of Africa’s cycles of violence and poverty.
And then came the discussion of my work. After the usual niceties, he 
launched with a pointed interrogative: “Has the International Criminal Court 
[icc] convicted Kenyatta and al- Bashir yet?” I paused, first out of shock from 
his presumption that I— another North American— was like him and in ideo-
logical conformity with his worldview. And though the charges against Presi-
dent Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto have since been dropped by the icc 
prosecutor’s office, at the time I responded with resignation about not know-
ing how things would play out. And, also with resignation, I offered a famil-
iar American trope, that “they were innocent until proven guilty.” To that, he 
insisted that if I wanted to talk about innocence, I should focus on the inno-
cent African victims who needed justice. Here the presumption was that the 
deceased and the survivors were innocent, and the African elite needed to be 
stopped, that blood was on their hands and wealth in their pockets. For him, 
convicting the sitting presidents of Kenya and Sudan would secure justice for 
the survivors of Africa.
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I could not resist turning to similarly troubling issues at home: at the time, 
America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have led to the death of thou-
sands of innocent civilians. But to my interlocutor, America’s war on terror 
was a just war— unlike what he saw as the irrational violence in Kenya and Su-
dan. He spoke with passion, and his assumptions about justice presumed that 
those two trials were key to ending impunity in Africa. As this soon- to- be res-
ident of Kenya spoke, I could not help but think about the kind of life that he 
was preparing himself for and how important the discourse of justice abroad 
was for him in explaining America’s place, his place, in improving the world’s 
future. I also thought about what the latent sense of feel- good humanitarian 
discourses did that were popular among many of the northern missionaries, 
ngo workers, and journalists that I have met throughout Africa. While on 
the plane that day I began to think about the words that my intimate stranger 
used, the images and feelings associated with the words, and the way they 
danced in our imaginations and became entangled by other histories and con-
solidated our different feelings of justice.
According to his notion of justice, understood as the legal protection of 
those victimized by violence, it was not necessary to extrapolate further— at 
least not beyond what he had already. He and I knew what he meant, and 
yet so much was partial and unnecessary to spell out. The rest was expressed 
through sentimentalized expressions— tone of voice, word emphasis, facial 
expressions, hand motions, and bodily responses. These nonverbal cues re-
flected the type of affective bodily responses that accompanied the aspira-
tional dreams of justice writ large, and through their passionate utterances 
they constituted our alliances. What was not as evident was how the feelings 
of what justice is were produced through particular educational knowledge 
domains and perpetrated through various emotional regimes that contribute 
to how feelings are embodied as legitimate.
A similar set of justice convictions also propelled through emotional dis-
courses was predominant during the course of my fieldwork in Nigeria, Ethio-
pia, and Kenya between 2013 and 2017 and highlighted the ways that alliances 
were formed through sentimentally uttered discourses. In those cases, it was 
not the benevolent missionary but the African civil society activist whose af-
firmations of justice- as- law were rooted in much more than prosecutorial 
justice. While carrying out research, my team and I traveled from place to 
place, soliciting reactions to the icc’s indictments of African leaders while 
also following icc cases, collaborating with thought leaders on various on-
line platforms, and serving in a consultancy capacity on various research and 
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policy strategies. What unfolded over the course of this phase of study was 
my reckoning with the complexities of international criminal law through as-
semblages that necessarily involved the foregrounding of embodied affects in 
relation to their regimes and hegemonic knowledge forms. This became ev-
ident through the collection of contradictory responses about the perceived 
culpability of African leaders. 
While many felt that various leaders of African states were corrupt and 
uncommitted to the life of the ordinary person, some still defended them be-
cause of their recognition of Europe’s history of extraction and underdevelop-
ment of Africa and the way that those histories are part of the contemporary 
plunder of the region. Others defended their leaders, insisting that the prob-
lems were structural— that although independence produced political free-
dom, it did not free African states of entrenched political, economic, moral, 
and religious formations that were part of the plunder of Africa’s resources. 
Those who refused to defend African leaders for various failures often turned 
to international bodies such as ngos or legal instruments as  the only solu-
tion to Africa’s postcolonial crises. Many no longer believed in the possibil-
ity of partisan politics solving Africa’s structural inequalities. With the sense 
that long- standing leaders like Robert Mugabe and Jacob Zuma were pillag-
ing Africa’s resources, they instead resorted to the promise of the law— with 
its aspirational mantra of certainty, promises of objectivity, and predictability. 
One response that characterized this retreat to law in the midst of ambiguity 
and dismay is best illustrated through the emotional plea of a colleague from 
an East African country working for a prominent African ngo. In response 
to a presentation at a meeting that sought to depict the icc as a political force 
characterized through a history of European colonial instrumentalizations, 
he immediately rose up in the audience and declared without hesitation, “I am 
a proud African. Yet, I have lived personally under a repressive regime, expe-
rienced the abuse of power, and have survived it.” 
Then he continued, “This debate [about the value of the icc] has been poi-
soned by our leaders. We should not replicate this misrepresentation at this 
forum. We must speak to each other through the letter of the law. We must 
stop posturing and debate frankly.” 
Claiming an eyewitness and insider standpoint, my colleague was impas-
sioned and compelling. He spoke with conviction and his voice trembled 
with frustration and anger. His statement reflected the conviction of some-
one who reveled in what his country has offered the contemporary world, but 
bitterness about its human rights failures. He was a member of its ethnic ma-
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jority and enjoyed the benefits of that class, but he worked tirelessly to ensure 
that those he saw as less fortunate would have a fighting chance. This was the 
spirit of his conviction; this was his expectation of contemporary democracy 
in Africa, and international law was the tool to address such injustice. Yet he 
remained dismayed and carried it in his words and his body, through his ut-
terances and work commitments. His leaders had not enabled democracy’s 
promise in his lifetime, and his mission was to address that. 
With legal justice as the solution for protecting Africans victimized by re-
pressive regimes, it was not necessary for my colleague to extrapolate— at least 
not beyond what he had articulated already. We all knew what he meant by the 
role of African repressive regimes abusing their power; that statement alone, 
and its delivery, articulated through familiar tones of anger and deep disap-
pointment, provided the opening for his claim that Africa needed legal solu-
tions to political problems.
A third prominent public throughout the African continent are those who 
insist on using structural inequalities connected to the Africa- and- icc debate 
and on both using the law and going beyond it. One public intellectual from 
a West African country spoke passionately about African attempts to extend 
the criminal jurisdiction of the African Court and create the African Court of 
Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in relation to a perceived double stan-
dard inherent in international legal spheres. As he declared in a public forum 
in Addis Ababa, “The desire for Africa to prosecute international crimes goes 
back to the 1970s. It was not just a matter of African leaders evading justice. 
Africans were concerned with the fundamental legal basis and the justifica-
tions for prosecuting crimes against Africans.”1 He made a sentimentalized 
plea to remind us that, as he said, “[The] desire to prosecute international 
crimes predates the icc and was motivated by the fact that Africa discovered 
that there were certain crimes that affected Africans (like Apartheid) but the 
rest of the world was not interested.”2 
This statement, articulated with passion and paradox, formed the basis for 
the speaker to talk about the inability of Africans to use criminal law to ad-
dress mass atrocities that were arguably related to colonial plunder of Africa, as 
well as the paradoxes related to the contemporary deployment of inter national 
criminal law to arrest African leaders. It represented a profound set of claims 
against international injustices argued passionately by African peoples of all 
class backgrounds and experiences, for it reflected a desire to highlight the 
complexity of African concerns within the larger histories of plunder and in-
justice. For those whose life worlds were compromised by colonization and 
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whose temporalities and spatial orientations reflect things African, the icc can 
look and feel like colonialism itself— what Hannah Appel called the “abdica-
tion of sovereignty” alongside the denial of colonial liability for violence on the 
African continent. From unsettled land dispossession to the absence of crim-
inal liability for corporate violence, the political decisions that shape the icc 
 involve making sense of how one lives with the sequel of colonialism.”3 
To all three interlocutors— the missionary from the United States, the civil 
society activist, and the public intellectual and scholar— law had the potential 
to provide a way out of the poisoned politics of the postcolonial state. Yet for 
others it has the potential to obscure political inequalities. They all spoke pas-
sionately and in animated ways about the importance of international legality 
for Africa’s future. For the first two, the senses of justice were connected to an 
organizing logic about liberal equality that tells us that everyone is entitled to 
rights and freedoms, and that the law exists to ensure that we get them. This 
justice narrative presumes that individual equality can be guaranteed judi-
cially. The third interlocutor was concerned with how structural inequalities 
can exceed the juridical and how related justice discourses can often conceal 
those realities. In all cases, legal knowledge and its tools, affects, and particu-
lar discursive strategies that were appropriately legible to the context at hand 
served as key component parts of the connection between the actors.
In keeping with these sentiments argued in Africa and beyond, Affective 
Justice is about the way that such justice discourses are brought into being 
through the sum of their parts— technocratic knowledge, affects, and emo-
tional regimes. It is concerned with how these assemblages of justice are felt, 
experienced, and institutionalized, such as the icc or the newly forming Af-
rican Court of Justice and Human Rights. For it was these related and com-
plex sentiments that on July 17, 1998, led 120 of the world’s leaders to sign 
the Rome Statute to establish the International Criminal Court. At the heart 
of this justice discourse was a legacy and set of sentimental commitments 
against mass atrocity violence that is said to have continued from various 
twentieth- century trials, including the Nuremberg tribunal of the late 1940s. 
Part of this discourse was the insistence that various publics, constituting the 
international community, have a responsibility to protect those victimized by 
such violence. Also central to it is a vehemently articulated anti- impunity dis-
course that insists that no one (high- ranking leaders, politicians, presidents, 
rebels, or ordinary citizens) should be beyond the reach of the law. 
Like the other examples I have opened with, these feelings about the im-
portance of justice are enabled through the law and communicated with var-
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ious narratives that perform a particular type of work. The icc anti- impunity 
narrative insists not only that justice means individual perpetrators should 
be punished, but that a perpetrator’s official capacity should not bar him or 
her from criminal investigation. Understanding justice not solely in relation 
to the visible application of the law at all costs, but also as negotiated assem-
blages of feelings about inequality and power, allows us to recognize how 
other narratives about the icc in Africa reflect people’s ambiguities about Af-
rica in relation to other spheres of global power. 
To understand the logic of the competing icc responses, we must think 
about the effects of the past on bodies and on people’s futures, and how those 
futures are mediated and institutionally represented as well as regulated and 
simultaneously itinerant. It requires that we explore how the past collides with 
the present to produce our bodies and our imaginaries, and it involves wres-
tling with the interplay between temporality and the role of sentimentalized 
narratives.4 These feelings of justice or injustice are complex and insist on 
including African independence and sovereignty aspirations alongside post- 
1960s histories of postcolonial despotisms, state failure, and embedded struc-
tural inequalities. In this regard, various African responses to the icc and 
related postcolonial justice projects emerged within an acute temporal and 
spatial awareness of Africa’s economic and political challenges in the world 
and the bodily responses to such inequalities. For while many hold various 
African leaders responsible for despotism and state failure, they also recog-
nize the inequalities that pervade the African postcolonial state— such as the 
reality that many economic and political decisions about African states are ac-
tually made outside of the geographical boundaries of those states. 
From agreements made during independence talks, to the role of economic 
speculation and investments, to structural adjustment, mineral extraction, 
and market competition with Chinese competitors and beyond, many see the 
way that modernity has prescribed a particular set of practices that already 
constrain the ability of the state to provide for its citizens. The stakeholders, 
informed by the recognition of some of these realities, also use particular af-
fective narratives to make their claims. From their ambivalence about African 
leaders to their accusations of international institutions as extensions of histo-
ries of imperial plunder, the articulated narrative responses reflect a particular 
way of expressing the complexities of justice through a rethinking of the polit-
ical. The narratives also produce expressions about who we are, what we stand 
for, what matters, and why; thus, they are vulnerable to be driven by our bodily 
affects. As expressive manifestations that involve particular enactments of feel-
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ings, these affects are expressed, understood, and ultimately sentimentalized in 
particular ways— using specific narrative tropes and related strategies for en-
forcement and alliance. 
These emotive narratives about justice are critical to this book, which takes 
as its point of departure an ongoing debate about whom the icc is indicting 
and why— and how individuals in social movements are engaging and institu-
tionalizing or contravening those developments. The book is about responses 
to judicial inequalities that do not always find expression in legal frameworks 
alone, as well as the social imaginaries that are shaped by perpetual campaigns 
for legal justice. Such campaigns are effective because of the techniques used 
to mobilize sentimentally shaped action.5 Time and time again, as we spoke 
with interlocutors on the African continent— politicians, academics, leaders, 
judges, investigators, diplomats, lawyers, children, survivors of violence, the 
homeless, and members of ngos and of civil society, it was clear that inter-
national law— with its temporal and spatial particularities— was seen as both 
a beacon of possibility and the basis for the continued plunder and inequality 
in Africa. But with justice articulated through the support or rejection of the 
icc or the support or rejection of an African court with criminal jurisdiction, 
it was also clear that the validity of my colleagues’ positions at the meeting 
that day, and many meetings before and after it, were not rendered legitimate 
because of their experience or facts, but because of the profound affective per-
formance and sentimentalism that accompanied their speech acts and the in-
stitutionalized forms that reinforced such narratives. 
Affective Justice explores both the subjective and agentive processes and 
the structuring fields through which individuals respond to social injustice. 
By examining the role of sentimentalized justice narratives manifested in and 
through bodily expressions, verbal utterances, biomediated hashtag cam-
paigns, international laws, and claims about justice, we can see how various 
affectively shaped social regimes determine what is acceptable and authorita-
tive, and what is not. The book is about the strategies of international justice 
brokers and the sentimentalized imaginaries of many of the African interloc-
utors with whom I conducted my research. 
Studying Affective Assemblages of Justice
How can transnational justice ethnographies explain the complex workings of 
postcolonial affects by what Bill Mazzarella describes as preserving the traces 
of past encounters and bringing them into the present as potentials? How can 
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political and legal anthropology be used to study the affective body by explor-
ing the “pragmatics of institutional practice”?6 How can the study of institu-
tional practice shed light on the workings of affective resonances and their 
sentimentalized deployments of international legal tools? To answer these 
questions, I had to begin and end the research for this book in the middle of 
things— feelings about the joys and horrors of the African past, aspirations for 
a new future, conversations on planes, disputes at conferences, observations 
of international court cases, incomplete responses to images of violence, suc-
cessful indictments after seven to eight years while survivors of violence still 
await assistance, heart- wrenching testimonies, and feel- good humanitarian 
gestures— all manifest in and through bodies but also inscribed and partially 
observable through institutional practices. The nature of these unsettling reali-
ties has led me to examine the manifestations of sentimentalized emotions that 
underlie rule of law assemblages. My goal is not only to study such assemblages 
ethnographically through their embodied practices, as many have done in the 
anthropology of affect literature. It is also to fill the gaps in the political and le-
gal anthropology literature as well as the international law and politics litera-
ture with a study of entanglements that focuses on how various approaches to 
justice, communicated through sentimentalized strategies and engaged in in-
stitutional practices, are expressed and have effects in daily life.
Research for this book began in the midst of public debates about whether 
icc justice was biased and involved the targeting of Africans alone. Questions 
of icc bias and selectivity pervaded anti- icc discourses and ranged from ac-
cusations that the court is racist to questions about how Africa’s “failed states” 
contributed to breeding grounds for wars, violence, and even more indict-
ments by the icc. These questions were sometimes met with public agree-
ment and at other times with laudatory responses from a range of icc actors, 
judges, stakeholders, academics, and civil society groups that all included a 
familiar refrain— that with its birth in the resolve to stop the arbitrariness of 
violence, and thereby protect victims, the icc’s justice is a blind justice whose 
sole objective is to end impunity. Yet over the past four years of data collec-
tion at and in relation to international criminal trials at the icc in The Hague, 
in civil society organizations, at au summits and meetings in Addis Ababa, 
at postviolence sites in Kenya and Nigeria, at the African Court in Tanza-
nia, the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal, and in the Assembly 
of State Party un annual meetings, conference rooms, and workshop halls, 
it became clear to me that in order to understand the challenges of the icc 
as an international justice institution, we must grapple with the paradoxes of 
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contemporary justice. And if, following Talal Asad, we see the public sphere 
not as an “empty place for carrying out debates” but as a space “constituted 
by the sensibilities— memories and aspirations, fears and hopes— of speakers 
and listeners,” actors and agents, then nowhere is there a better domain for 
exploring the making of justice than through affective practices and inquiries 
into their institutionalization, retractions, and, at times, waning popularity.7
In order to understand the ways that sentimentalized expressions of in-
ternational justice are manifest in various globalizing publics, I assembled a 
research team to work on this project from 2012 to 2014 and then, with new 
funding, took on a new cluster of short fieldwork trips and ongoing and en-
gaged consultancy project work from 2014 to 2018. Throughout 2012, my team 
spent eight months in phase 1 of the project in The Hague, exploring the many 
contours of icc justice in its first ten years of existence. In an effort to under-
stand the affective practices involved in the rise of the icc’s rule of law move-
ment, we trained a small group of interns and conducted interviews, archival 
work, media documentation, and trial observations. 
In 2013 we spent six months in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the African 
Union— the continent’s foremost Pan- Africanist organization concerned with 
fostering integration, collaboration, and a high standard of living for the cit-
izens of Africa— where we interviewed au staff, conducted participant ob-
servation at its events and summits, and set the terms for collaboration on a 
research project related to the emergence of the African Court. This was an 
important moment to work within the complexities of the au, as the organi-
zation was also undergoing exceptional transformation. At that time, it was 
developing a new architecture of peace and security, forming a political struc-
ture, and developing new institutions and treaty agreements. A general recon-
ceptualization of Africa’s responsibility for addressing growth, violence, and 
political turmoil was underway throughout the continent. Significant funding 
possibilities for civil society groups and talk of justice and strategy were un-
derway. We documented the aspirations and strategies for building a renewed 
Pan- African movement and how those hopes were manifesting in the newly 
evolving debates about the extension of the criminal jurisdiction of the Afri-
can Court as a way to take on transnational crimes in Africa, against Africans. 
Despite the pushback against the icc, the faith in international legality— this 
time in Africa— as a way to address political violence remained interesting to 
us. It highlighted the way that legal hegemonies travel and take shape not only 
through institutions of power, but also through emotional frameworks of ex-
pectation or emotional regulation— a notion that I take up later in the book.
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In 2013, we also set up a team of researchers in Kenya and Nigeria to work 
with survivors of violence, understand the complexities of postviolence con-
texts, and observe the postviolence rectification strategies underway. In Nai-
robi and its surrounding areas there were also significant mobilizations that 
involved judicial and nonjudicial approaches. I then traveled to northern Ni-
geria in 2014 to understand related fallout from postviolence attacks waged by 
Boko Haram, whose abductions of over two hundred girls from a boarding 
school led to a short- lived global protest mobilization to return the girls to 
their families. In both Nigeria and Kenya, our goal was to make sense of the 
meaning of justice for everyday people in two of the regions that are, for the 
icc, sites of ongoing interest. To the au, the icc’s interest reeked of the selec-
tive targeting of African cases— as many often exclaimed— and this discourse 
drove our inquiry and puzzlement. 
The final phase of this project involved closer research collaborations 
(2014–2018) with the au and African Court advocates. If my research team 
felt like classic anthropological interlopers during the first two phases, by this 
final phase the consultative practices became central to the form of partic-
ipant observation that underlined this work. I became part of an advisory 
team involved in the expansion of the criminal jurisdiction of the African 
Court tasked with contemplating the new judicial architecture and helping 
to critically assess and reshape its design. Through the formation of the Afri-
can Court Research Initiative, we provided technical assistance to the African 
Court, as the legal office labored to create a better and more responsive Afri-
can Court protocol for the African continent. We worked with international 
law experts and as partners with various organizations to ponder the chal-
lenges ahead for an African Court with jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal 
cases. Some of this work was based in cities such as Arusha and The Hague, 
as well as in various consultancy and advisory settings in Addis Ababa. It in-
volved working with scholars, lawyers, diplomats, advisors, and civil society 
groups to procure research data, assess negotiation documents, engage with 
and study the adoption of strategies, and do ongoing advisory work.
By the end of the last phase, we had spent over six years working at the 
heart of icc and Africa issues— a rhizomatic process that could not be ac-
complished by just one person and whose scope reflects the face of new global 
ethnographies. During the analy sis, we coded data and mapped particular 
emotional responses that shaped the data analy sis. By focusing on various 
sentimental emotions coded as anger, fear, vengeance, pain, sympathy, and 
victorious joy, we attempted to make sense of the emotional contours of in-
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ternational justice at the icc, the au, and in related spaces of international 
justice assemblages. We analyzed the manifestations of those affects and emo-
tional expressions through our readings of particular speech acts that allowed 
us to reflect on the way that various emotional expressions were articulated 
and institutionalized through various discourses and campaigns. In the end, 
our observations collected during all three phases of this research helped to 
ground my understanding of the management of violence, the sentimental 
fortitude that governs it, the contestations over how it should be managed, 
and what social regimes, historical imbrications, and institutional forms are 
involved in the shaping of the narratives and feeling rules through which the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of inter national justice is expressed. Ultimately, as 
Affective Justice outlines, recognizing the relevance of affects in shaping how 
justice is materialized is key to understanding how justice is made legible, in-
stitutionalized, disentangled, and also remade anew. This, I hope, will con-
tribute to the much needed development of an anthropology of international 
justice of the twenty- first century.
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Introduction
Formations, Dislocations, and Unravelings
On April 27, 2007, the International Criminal Court (icc) issued arrest war-
rants against Janjaweed militia leader Ali Kushayb and Sudan’s minister of hu-
manitarian affairs, Ahmed Harun.1 Then on July 14, 2008, the icc prosecutor 
requested an arrest warrant against Sudanese president Omar al- Bashir, which 
was issued on March 4, 2009.2 Since it came into force through the Rome Stat-
ute in July 2001, the icc, a court with jurisdiction among 123 member states, 
has implemented mechanisms for punishment of crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and genocide committed after July 1, 2002 (when the Rome Stat-
ute went into force), and also hopes to do so universally for the crime of ag-
gression.3 As one of many institutions engaged in the growth of the rule of 
law movement, the icc is constituted through a multilateral treaty order that 
enables the jurisdictional reach of international legal institutions and their as-
sociated liberalist principles. The court’s much- vaunted call for an end to im-
punity is represented in its moral discourse of supporting victims through the 
pursuit of those most criminally responsible, including heads of state. 
Under the Rome Statute for the icc, state actors under the jurisdiction 
of the court have agreed to suspend their sovereignty over the adjudication 
of particular international crimes and have instead ceded that responsibility 
to the icc. The popular expectation is that states under the icc’s jurisdiction 
will be held responsible for protecting the lives of their citizens from mass 
atrocity violence, thereby committing to ending the impunity of those who 
are seen as having evaded justice for too long.4 By attributing to high- ranking 
leaders (rather than lower- level actors) the responsibility for mass atrocity vi-
olence, the icc has perhaps done more than any other international institu-
tion to promote the need to end impunity. But it has also borne the brunt of 
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significant critiques in response to local controversies, all the while calling at-
tention to its selection strategies and legitimacy.5 One such controversy has 
emerged because court agents can trigger its jurisdiction through a state self- 
referral for investigation and possible prosecution under Article 13(a) of the 
Rome Statute. However, given that upper- level leaders are unlikely to investi-
gate their own actions honestly, jurisdiction can also be triggered through the 
prosecutor’s proprio motu (one’s own initiative) referral power (Article 13(c)), 
as well as through a referral by the United Nations Security Council (unsc) 
(Article 13(b)). The latter has been controversial because they can also involve 
referrals of nonstate parties that have not consented to the Rome Statute’s ju-
risdiction. More than half of the states that are permanent members of the 
unsc— the United States, China, and Russia— have refused to suspend their 
sovereignty and submit their states to the jurisdiction of the icc.6 This reality 
has been described by African publics as a cloak of equality in the midst of in-
commensurably unequal domains.
From its inception in 2002 until the fall of 2018, the icc has  pursued 
twenty- two cases in nine situations across several African states: Central 
African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Sudan, 
Uganda, Kenya, the Republic of Mali, and Libya. It has issued indictments 
for thirty- six individuals, including twenty- seven warrants of arrest and nine 
summonses to appear before the court.7 From the cases of alleged African 
warlords to the indictments of African leaders— such as President Uhuru 
Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto of Kenya, President Omar al- 
Bashir of Sudan (not a party to the Rome Statute), and Laurent Gbagbo of 
Ivory Coast— the predominance of African defendants has led to suspicion 
about the fairness of prosecutorial justice. Growing numbers of African and 
other postcolonial stakeholders have begun to see the anti- impunity/ rule of 
law discourse as highly biased and uneven.8 This was especially the case fol-
lowing the ICC judge’s refusal to accept the prosecutor’s request for autho-
rization to begin an investigation into whether crimes were committed in 
Afghanistan by the US military.9
In response to perceived structural injustice, some African leaders, such as 
Rwandan president Paul Kagame, have offered passionate utterances, as when 
he stated that the icc appears to have been “put in place only for African coun-
tries, only for poor countries. . . .  Every year that passes, I am proved right. . . .  
Rwanda cannot be part of colonialism, slavery and imperialism.”10 This com-
ment, made in the context of President al- Bashir’s indictment in 2009, reflects 
the perspective of many on the continent who have begun to perceive the icc 
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not as the mechanism for a more hopeful future, but rather as a force that 
seeks to continue a long and tragic history of exploitation, racism, and exter-
nal control of African states and economies.
When the icc prosecutor issued the arrest warrant for President al- Bashir 
in 2009, it marked the first time that the unsc had invoked its referral power 
under Rome Statute Article 13(b) to refer a particular situation to the icc pros-
ecutor.11 The referral was predicated on the unsc’s determination that the sit-
uation in Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and security under 
Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, and that the prosecution of the per-
petrators of the human rights violations in Darfur would help to restore peace 
and stability in the region.12 The government of Sudan objected to the exer-
cise of this jurisdiction, arguing that both the unsc and icc violated the coun-
try’s sovereignty given that Sudan had not ratified the Rome Statute for the icc 
and, therefore, had not consented to suspending its sovereignty.13 In immedi-
ate reaction to the arrest warrant against al- Bashir, the Sudanese government 
expelled more than a dozen humanitarian aid organizations and workers— 
 leaving more than one million people without access to food, water, and 
health care services— creating controversy and further complicating peace ne-
gotiations that were underway.14 In addition to the Sudanese government, the 
Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and some members 
of the unsc (most notably China) also objected to the arrest warrant.15 
For its part, the African Union (au) responded by requesting that the unsc 
defer the icc prosecution against al- Bashir, arguing that a legal process would 
“undermine ongoing regional peace efforts in which Mr. al- Bashir was ac-
tively participating.”16 The unsc responded minimally to the au request, con-
sidering it only briefly and declining to act on it.17 When the unsc refused, 
the au called on its members not to cooperate with the icc’s order.18
That the state agents of the au, initially strong supporters of the icc, have 
recently adopted an oppositional stance is especially telling. The au is the larg-
est Pan- African organization, with an expanding mandate to achieve greater 
unity, solidarity, political cooperation, and socioeconomic integration for Af-
rican peoples. In regard to President al- Bashir’s indictment, the au insisted 
that the “search for justice should be pursued in a way that does not impede 
or jeopardize efforts aimed at promoting lasting peace.”19 It also reiterated a 
concern about a possible “misuse of indictments against African leaders.”20 In 
the end, the unsc denied its request, resulting in the au’s 2011 decision not 
to cooperate with the arrest and surrender of al- Bashir to The Hague.  Until 
April 2019, when an army- led military coup in Sudan led to the end of his 
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thirty- year rule, he has been traveling to various African icc member states 
without arrest. After this period, African leaders continued to insist that they 
would not support ICC- led regime change. If al- Bashir is to be prosecuted, “it 
would not involve handing him over to outsiders.”21 As of summer 2019, the 
controversy is ongoing and is part of a broader debate about international 
justice— what institutions and people have the power to name it, deliver it 
and why— and is at the center of what I refer to as affective justice and that this 
book takes up.
How do justice institutions like the icc or the African Court for Justice and 
Human and Peoples’ Rights operate with effectiveness and force when they do 
not have universal jurisdiction, enforcement power, a police force or military, 
or the assumed loyalty of a citizenry, as a state does? In this book, I show that 
they can be explained through a practice theory in which embodied affects, 
emotional regimes, and technocratic forms of knowledge reflect the interplay 
among embodied and regimented practice that I call affective justice. This, I 
argue, is central to the power of such justice institutions and the justice for-
mations they seek to produce.
Affective Justice as a Theorization of Rule of Law Assemblages
Notions of justice have tended to be mapped out against three broad catego-
ries of understanding: philosophical, analytic, or practice oriented. The con-
tributions of Jacques Derrida and John Rawls have been especially important 
to developing a coherent philosophical understanding of justice as a do-
main by which fairness is established through rights and duties and in re-
lation to achieving justice through the law.22 As an analytic category, justice 
has been understood as an expressive domain through which people orga-
nize their ideas about what is morally right and fair as well as what is ethi-
cal.23 When understood in terms of practice, justice is seen as being produced 
and challenged by the materiality of people’s actions through which mean-
ings of justice are lived. Anthropologists have long engaged in document-
ing practice- oriented meaning making and how notions of appropriateness 
and inappropriateness are produced through sociocultural behavior. Yet phil-
osophical and analytic perspectives have been privileged in discussions of 
international justice, and the contributions of an anthropological focus on 
practice have been less prominent. This book begins to address that gap by il-
luminating how affects as embodied practices shape emotional responses and 
how those responses can, through the intensity of their force, produce inter-
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national justice in particular ways. Affective justice seeks to illuminate an im-
portant process that has remained obscure in the theorizing of international 
justice: that is, how various forms of legal, political, and economic instrumen-
talism have produced the force of law, sociomoral affects, and embodied prac-
tices that constitute international publics.
Affective justice is the term that I advance for understanding people’s em-
bodied engagements with and production of justice through particular struc-
tures of power, history, and contingencies. Central to it are the ways that 
affects, as embodied responses, constitute publics by dislodging identity from 
its classification domain and relocating it to a domain of practice and regi-
mentations of feelings. This approach allows us to highlight what people do 
with emotions and is connected not only to affects and their subjectivations, 
but also to the biopolitical strategies through which life and its human possi-
bilities are managed. As I show, this happens under regimes of knowledge and 
power, through which law and technocratic and capitalist processes are de-
ployed. Seeing justice through the workings of these affective embodiments, 
emotional regimes, and biopolitical processes demonstrates that contem-
porary international justice mobilizations do not gain their power through 
singular and formalized law- making processes, in relation to which people 
supposedly engage with and buy into meanings of justice. Rather, they gain 
their power through the conjunctures amongst legal ephemeral, and embod-
ied imaginaries. Affective Justice shows that this happens through technolo-
gies, particular legal feeling expressions and narrative devices that are used 
to expand, displace, and end injustice, thereby producing the basis on which 
justice is felt.
Affective justice as a practice reflects embodiments of feelings that are 
mani fest in feeling expressions and embodied practices, including the spoken 
word, legal actions and innovations, or electronically mediated campaigns. 
In an attempt to shape justice institutions and conceptions of justice, icc and 
au agents, nongovernmental advocates, and civil society activists vie for con-
trol of social norms or challenge those norms to produce new ones. Thus, 
seen through the remit of the icc, affective justice reflects the way that peo-
ple come to understand, challenge, and influence legal orders through the 
biopolitical instrumentalization of technocratic knowledge as well as through 
their affective embodiments, interjections, and social actions. The practices 
involved are infinite and span from treaty drafting, ratification, and adjudi-
cation to trial attendance, language negotiations, and joking, to refusals that 
involve rejections, withdrawals, and noncooperation declarations, as well as 
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the development of countercampaigns. What connects these practices to law’s 
power are the embodied feelings and emotional expressions that drive such 
acts and circulate them globally. It is these practices that are at the heart of this 
book and clarify the central role of affective justice in the making of contem-
porary international criminal law. 
Yet international justice, like other forms of justice, is often presumed to be 
outside the realm of these practices of construction. It is seen by many of its 
advocates as objective and nonprejudicial, with precedents that are external to 
sociocultural, political, and precognitive scrutiny. In the realm of cognition, a 
growing number of contemporary brain scientists have argued that the mind 
responds to precognitive sensory impressions and processes to produce cul-
turally appropriate emotional responses.24 Gaining inspiration from this lit-
erature, humans translate precognitive affect into hyperlocal cultural terms of 
understanding that are in turn expressed through emotions and regulated so-
cially and adopted into actionable concepts. Affective Justice posits that emo-
tional articulations of bodily processes constitute a critical link connecting the 
precognitive body to the making and unmaking of sociolegal and political in-
stitutions, and that this site of translation can be examined through observa-
tions of how affects are legally materialized, discursively and performatively. 
As the individual feels and expresses, social practices shape what ultimately 
counts as justice. By introducing a language for clarifying the assemblages of 
precognitive, sociopolitical, cultural, and moral processes through which jus-
tice is produced, Affective Justice explores how justice making is enmeshed in 
bodily affects that give rise to emotional expressions and various racialized 
iconic figures. It explores some of the ways that bodily affects and their emo-
tional potentialities are entangled in the constitution of international justice 
and focuses on the way that bodies, psychology, and social practices come to-
gether to produce the terms on which justice is materialized, disaggregated, 
ruptured, and made legible again. The lived material and/ or sentient body, the 
social body, and the body politic— each of these bodies, coproduced and in-
tersecting, is being mobilized through affectively propelled biosocial and so-
cial forms. What emerges is an illustration of how affects can shape, through 
emotional and institutional manifestations, the form that justice takes. It in-
sists that justice is a product of sets of competing practices that are shaped 
and expressed materially and socially. And constitutive formations of justice 
are represented within social feeling regimes and emotive performances that 
provide clues to how social relationships are deployed to enact what justice 
becomes. As a constellation of competing sensations, these feelings are mate-
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rialized socially and provide possibilities for theorizing justice through entan-
glements that include contingency and structural inequality.
At its base, Affective Justice argues that international rule of law formations 
such as the icc and, as I discuss later, the African Court do not produce legal 
processes that articulate justice in stable and predictable ways.25 Rather, such 
institutions reflect a complicated and precarious array of infinitely deterrito-
rialized interrelationships among a wide variety of actors who possess differ-
ential forms of power and privilege, including citizens, technocrats, judges, 
advertisers, investigators, evidence procurers, airlines, tourists, those victim-
ized by violence, those being investigated by prosecutors, and so forth. Inter-
national justice cannot be a sacrosanct, stand- alone space for justice making 
understood through identity categories such as “survivors” or “perpetrators.” In 
these realms, affects that emerge from a violation or perceived offense produce 
responses that are irreducible to a singular identity or action or delimitation of 
power. Rather, the icc— like other domains of justice making— exists within 
assemblages that are constituted by networks of emergent properties, manifest 
in what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari refer to as “component parts.”26 The 
components as part of international justice function through a set of factions 
that shape international criminal law moral imaginaries: the figures of the perpe-
trator, the victim/ survivor, and the international community that activate the af-
fective possibilities through which justice is articulated and embodied. In these 
imaginary spaces, invocations such as the “victim to be saved” and the “perpe-
trator to be stopped” are deployed as proxies through which law’s architecture 
is retooled, constantly resharpened, and remade anew— as needed. Thus, in or-
der to understand the international management of contemporary mass atrocity 
violence, we must account for how these affective domains actually constitute 
law’s power in ways that congeal but also redirect meanings of justice.
Characteristic of national and international law assemblages is the idea that 
social entities— their formations and their existence in practice— are compo-
nent parts of international criminal justice formations while also being en-
tangled in other relations. As one of a broad array of legal sites, inter national 
criminal justice functions within an assemblage of actions, emotions, linkages, 
reactions, connections, utterances, metaphors, and so forth. From the com-
plex worlds of investigators to the rulings of judges, lawyers, and those vic-
timized by violence, as well as those charged with the perpetration of violence, 
the assemblage is far reaching. It is more than the sum of its component parts. 
Through the combustion of those parts, international criminal justice is pro-
pelled through affects and emotional domains that communicate what justice 
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becomes. This way of orienting justice formations in the context of whole units 
being seen as “inextricable combinations of interrelated parts” departs from 
the idea that social relations are structured hierarchically or are reducible to 
other things.27 Rather, sets of relations and their practices— like international 
trials that involve attorneys, spectators, perpetrators of violence, security staff, 
prison guards, activities of media companies, images, the objects of violence 
such as land or political parties, botched trials, interpreters and misinterpreted 
translations, legal statutes, nongovernmental organizations (ngos), images 
that shape imaginaries, audiences, students, convicts, interns, news reporters, 
securitization companies, transportation companies, hotels, airlines, and so 
on— are component parts within a contingent patchwork of relationships. 
Central to this book, therefore, are these meta- formations, working along-
side micropractices that constitute the international criminal justice assem-
blage in the contemporary period. The formations do not exist through a 
universalizing global domain in which fairness and equality constitute inter-
national justice everywhere. Rather, international justice gains power through 
the various affects that are grounded in the deep- seated histories and inequal-
ities whose dispositions are sometimes already inscribed in people’s psychic or 
emotional worlds. Thus, when attempts to rectify injustice are dislodged from 
sites of suffering to sites of remediation, they have the ability to become aligned 
with already meaningful moral commitments, such as feelings of structural 
inequality that are emotionally expressed through anger and public protest. 
From the meanings of the Nuremberg trials for international justice advocates 
to the absence of international institutions intervening into colonialism and 
apartheid, it is through practices that are imbricated with histories of injustice 
that international institutions gain their power, that law gains its force. 
Examining the role of affects in theorizing “the global” requires, then, that 
we go beyond the fiction of the global as all- encompassing spaces in which 
competing forces are counterpoised. Making sense of the globalization of in-
ternational justice involves inserting into justice making the practices, em-
bodied feelings, and regimes of regulation that are constituted through it. As 
knowledge and media technologies proliferate and advertising and campaign 
strategies become more sophisticated, these various entanglements come to-
gether through deterritorialized component parts of international justice as-
semblages. As an intensified manifestation of law making and justice practices, 
this book shows that international justice involves globalizing processes not 
because there exists a domain called the global, but because its processes are 
imagined and practiced as global, and in the context of such imaginaries they 
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travel, dislodge meanings, and remake them in new spaces and contexts. This 
is how international justice travels— through embodied domains that inspire 
legal inventions, protests, and contestation and lead to their rearticulation in 
new ways. And it is precisely the dynamic basis upon which justice is embod-
ied that discusses the aspirational realities of international criminal law.
Conceptually inspired by Deleuze and Guattari, this patchwork of justice- 
making practices contains antigenealogical and irreducible components that 
interact with each other while also maintaining their properties.28 Applied to 
international legal spaces, such properties of the composite parts connected to 
technocratic knowledge involve authorial language, hierarchical relations, and 
temporal and spatial scales, as well as interactions that, while messy, present 
themselves as objective and honoring legal certainty. Thus, contemporary rule 
of law assemblages function through particular and often mundane affective 
regulatory mechanisms that are spread through a variety of institutions and 
discursive channels, including campaigns, indexes, slogans, and contemporary 
technological tools such as Twitter and Facebook. 
Ultimately, the prevailing methodological questions of this book concern 
the field at the scale of transnational ethnography that is rhizomatic in form 
but highlights the way that global linkages reflect nodular stems of knowl-
edge, practice, and sites of meaning making that spread rapidly through 
horizontal networks through a range of powerful legal, aesthetic and polit-
ical mechanisms, such as campaigns that motivate particular calls to action, 
even as they leave open itinerant possibilities. The key, following Deleuze and 
Guattari, is to make sense of these formations that defy not only linear lines 
of causality but also elude the traditional multisited ethnographic methods 
that have become popularized in contemporary anthropology.29 By introduc-
ing ways of articulating the complexities of international criminal law insti-
tutions and actors, Affective Justice provides a tool kit for making sense of the 
rhizomatic realities of culture and power that has shaped both the ICC and the 
Pan-Africanist pushback.
To make sense of such complexities, sociologists have explored justice 
through structural fields as a way to understand culture and power rela-
tions.30 Others have examined the way that legal processes work and shape 
their constituencies.31 And some, attempting to clarify the workings of global 
or transnational theories, have examined legal processes in relation to ver-
tical, horizontal, and structural approaches through their effects.32 Con-
cepts such as scales of justice and actor- network theory have been developed 
to make sense of the entanglements between law and the global and trans-
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national social spaces within which it operates.33 I present a way of studying 
international legal processes and practices by mapping various affects that are 
manifest in emotional practices that shape and are connected to the compo-
nent parts of international justice making, especially in relation to the mobi-
lization of the law through appeals to emotion.
As my methods suggest, the actions of judicial institutions, the emotional 
responses to which these actions give rise, and the sentimental articulations 
that seek to direct affects into action have no real beginning or end. Their time 
scapes start neither with the Nuremberg trials as the central marker nor with 
the 2002 temporal jurisdiction of the icc. Nor do they start with the acts of 
violence by which liberal legality identifies culpability. Studying international 
justice movements necessarily involves looking at the making of component 
parts, which exist through what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as “ceaselessly 
established connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and 
circumstances relative to . . .  social struggles.”34 The result is an understanding 
of the social field as an assemblage of different aspects of competing regimes 
of knowledge and sentimental expressions of this knowledge, which occupies 
different status designations and meanings depending on the site of inquiry 
and field of power.
In its focus on social practices fueled with emotional manifestations, Af-
fective Justice presents an approach to justice that considers technocratic 
knowledge production and its biopolitical domains, the role of affects and 
their emotional expressions, and the representational regimes that manifest 
through interpretive and institutional practices. While justice is knowable by 
social and humanistic scholars through its materialized forms, such as anger 
and joy, the subjective experience of international justice involves a constel-
lation of components that are not simply arbitrary. In other words, affective 
justice is not an essential form of justice that can be applied universally to dif-
ferent contexts and people. Nor is it a form of expression that binds particular 
social groups and not others. It is a product of immaterial and material prac-
tices that find their expressions in bodily or social meaning making. Materi-
alized through expressions, representations, discourses, and feeling regimes 
that shape the way that justice is embodied and expressed by people, affective 
justice is constituted by complex assemblages that communicate through con-
vergent, itinerant, and even divergent component parts. By introducing the 
concept of reattribution, which I use to describe a particular form of refusal 
that involves redirection, I offer an explanation for how those engaged in Af-
rican international rule of law circles are rethinking justice by dismantling its 
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meanings in time and place and embodying new formations, even as those 
new formations may one day become just as hegemonic as the ones they are 
protesting. These formulations call on us to think differently about the rele-
vance of mechanisms such as treaties and preambles. They open up new pos-
sibilities for understanding how legal architectures are historically confronted, 
challenged, and even dismantled. For example, the imposition of legal experi-
ments in Africa to constitute the colonial state and its contemporary modes of 
governance and sociality were constitutive of mass displacement and devasta-
tion of earlier forms of practices. That displacement involved imperial dom-
ination of Africa’s ancestral lands, the uprooting of the peoples from those 
lands, and the restructuring of social organizations, forms of governance, lan-
guages, and taxonomies that were foreign and lacked popular legitimacy.35 
This meant that so much of Africa’s relationship to legal justice enabled this 
pillage and was instrumental at best. Though it would be wrong to draw direct 
or facile linkages, it is clear that the continuity of violence and the plunder of 
Africa’s land and peoples are related to residual colonial inscriptions.36 Yet, the 
relationship between colonial injustice and contemporary violence is rhizom-
atically entangled. This is why we observe a wide variety of African responses 
to institutions such as the icc. Some involve ngo- and court- propelled social 
networks such as those engaged in anti- impunity advocacy. Others involve 
groups that are rethinking the causes and remedies of structural injustice.
As feelings of political actors are projected onto sites of legal action, those 
actors jockey for power to establish the core assumptions that underlie beliefs 
about why something like violence erupts or how it should be mitigated. What 
we see is that affective justice is a domain of practice, a psychosocial as well as 
conceptual domain for making sense of the way categories are assembled and 
people’s relationships to them are materialized, and how they are rendered vis-
ible through some actions and made invisible through others. This process of 
justice making operates within contested spaces by which people engage in 
forms of refusals and recalibrations. In the context of a Pan- Africanist push-
back, the book explores the way that refusals are generative of new component 
parts of the assemblage. Though there has been significant scholarly work at-
tempting to clarify the complexities of assemblage theory and to theorize large 
social entities and notions of global assemblages in different social universes, 
little attention has been given to the moral universes that shape justice prac-
tices in international rule of law regimes and how they combine with other in-
strumental and technocratic regimes.37 And even less attention has been given 
to the way that these new formations have led to the redesigning and repur-
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posing of emergent assemblages whose force is propelled by constant interre-
lations between history, personal memory, structures of legal instrumentality, 
and affective resonances, including refusals, reattributions, and endorsements. 
This negotiation is embedded in assemblages that are not neatly structured in 
relation to distinct micro-, macro-, and meso-formations. They are messily 
embroiled in structuring histories and impromptu manifestations that shape 
how international justice feels. This book presents case studies that emerge 
from multisited ethnographic research to show how regimented feelings about 
perceived injustice shape the opportunities and limits of international justice. 
In the first decades of its formation, the icc has been riddled with polit-
icized disagreement and struggles over its perceived legitimacy and institu-
tional power. In particular, some of the most vocal critics have focused on 
the icc’s anti- impunity sentiments, reified in the institution through frequent 
invocation of “victim” and “perpetrator” narratives. The terms for the rise of 
the sentiment of the duty to prosecute that emerged from the 1980s to 1990s 
were critical for deepening the emergence of the discourses that framed the 
contemporary rule of law movement. The same was true for the later African 
postcolonial advocates who joined forces with them to establish the deepen-
ing of the moral authority and power of legal accountability for mass atroc-
ity crimes committed by high- ranking leaders. However, this was followed 
by subsequent emotional refusals by African states because of the icc’s fo-
cus on prosecuting African leaders. African critics subverted this narrative 
by complicating the pursuit of the African perpetrator with the image of the 
anti- imperial freedom fighter, thus erecting a substantive challenge to the he-
gemony of the victim- perpetrator binary and its emphasis on individualized 
guilt over structural injustice.
In international law, the duty to prosecute serious international crimes was 
first established in a series of treaties recognizing specific atrocities as requir-
ing intervention. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) recognizes genocide as an inter-
national crime, imposes individual responsibility, and requires state parties 
to try to punish perpetrators of genocide.38 The Geneva Convention requires 
states to “search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to 
be committed, . . .  grave breaches [of the Geneva Convention], and . . .  bring 
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before [their] own courts.”39
Of late, the notion of a duty to prosecute has been recognized with such a 
high degree of prevalence that the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(icrc) asserts that there is an obligation under customary international law for 
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states to investigate and prosecute international crimes.40 Yet a vibrant Pan- 
African pushback against demands for legal accountability has also unfolded 
through the initiative of the au, which has refused to cooperate with icc ar-
rest requests and has built leverage through threats and actual withdrawals 
from the Rome Statute. In turn, a global network of progressives— including 
radical and mainstream members of the African and African diasporic eco-
nomic and cultural elite— have launched vehement demands for international 
institutions to pursue justice through accountability outside the confines of Af-
rican state influence. By organizing grassroots and networked struggles to end 
corruption, address decimated legal systems, and make perpetrators account-
able for mass atrocity violence, various members of the middle- and upper- 
class transnational elite have mobilized political support to attempt to rectify 
the perceived failures of African states. As these actors make evident, politi-
cally charged emotions are at the heart of contemporary international justice.41 
To understand these processes, we have to turn to how the emotional expres-
sion of feelings solidifies sociality in our globalized, contemporary world.
As illustrated, various stakeholders— international lawyers, judges, pros-
ecutors, victim- survivors, defendants, witnesses, African leaders, ngos, civil 
society organizations, and everyday citizens— use sentimentalized emotional 
appeals to contribute to how justice is imagined and the terms through which 
it is invoked. These affective expressions are not just peripheral. They perform 
a particular type of discursive work that takes shape through a range of mo-
dalities, such as biomediated campaigns, utterances, figures, and symbols that 
compel constituencies to act. These modalities are profoundly critical in that 
they shape not only the vocabularies for guilt and innocence, but also con-
tribute to the regimentation of social imaginaries that determine which ex-
pressions are deemed legitimate, appropriate, or unacceptable to particular 
audiences. By detailing the sentimentalized affects of publics for and against 
African leaders being adjudicated at the icc— representatives of the court, 
various ngos, icc intermediaries, the international community, and those 
victimized by mass atrocity violence— Affective Justice shows how emotional 
or feeling regimes are intimately linked to competing interpretations of jus-
tice. I explore how histories and structures of power shape, narrativize, and 
enforce sentimental affinities and practices, how those practices relate to the 
construction and reception of justice narratives, and how political and racial-
ized subjectivities are made in that process. I analyze these complex processes 
and document why such approaches to studying justice are critical for making 
sense of contemporary international justice and the range of responses to it.
14 INTRODUCTION
Situating Affective Justice through the Study of Emotional Affect
Sociocultural anthropology has long been interested in the study of emotion, 
and over the past decade, research on emotions in the field has recognized the 
various affective factors that shape the lives of individuals and, through emo-
tional embodiments, the structure of society.42 Despite the insights opened up 
by anthropologists theorizing the study of emotions, political- legal anthropo-
logical approaches have been slow to apply the study of affective embodiments 
to complex macro-global formations within which emotions circulate.43 In-
fluential political- legal anthropologists have explored how people make and 
remake their social worlds in conditions of conflict and instability, and much 
of this work examines notions of violence and social reconstruction through 
the focus on the daily texture of meaning making.44 However, these anthro-
pological studies do not take up the role of affects and emotions in mobilizing 
postviolence practices. Nor are they concerned with the larger global assem-
blages within which such sociopolitical practices circulate. 
Among legal anthropologists engaged in the study of transitional justice 
and international court institutions, even those texts that focus directly on 
emotively driven practices miss the opportunity to move beyond frames that 
individualize emotions and embed them in legal solutions. Richard Wilson’s 
Incitement on Trial: Prosecuting International Speech Crimes demonstrates this 
point. Incitement on Trial is about the type of speech practices, what he calls 
revenge speech, that can contribute to violent crime and examines how various 
armed conflicts are driven by racial, ethnic, national, or religious hatred. By 
demonstrating the need to address the relationship between speech acts and 
various mass atrocity crimes, the optic of analy sis is focused on how particular 
speech acts contribute to crimes against humanity and genocide. It highlights 
the role of ordering in the perpetration of mass atrocity violence and argues 
that incitement should be seen as a form of complicity, in turn leading to crim-
inal liability. In advocating a framework for monitoring political speech, the 
book rethinks notions of criminal liability as a measure for culpability.
Further work by Wilson also illustrates this focus on individualized crimi-
nal culpability.45 Wilson is concerned with criminal liability, hate speech, and 
post atrocity violence, and argues that not only have human rights become the 
central language of justice worldwide, but the survivors of mass atrocity vio-
lence want legal accountability for such atrocity violence. By mapping various 
approaches to the anthropology of international justice that reorient justice in 
broader terms, he argues that, given that survivors use human rights language 
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to advocate for the legal accountability of political leaders who commit those 
crimes, analysts need to pay attention to the calls for legal accountability for 
perpetrators of violence.46 Advocating the development of a framework for 
recuperating survivors of violence against various offending political elites, 
this kind of legal triumphalism depends on the presumption of a “victim/ 
 survivor” versus “perpetrator” dyad.
As morally important as it is to support the cause of survivors of vio-
lence, the dyadic “survivor” versus “perpetrator” construct advocated in Wil-
son’s approach actually works through affective and emotional practices that 
should not be disarticulated from what such emotions do in the world. To 
omit this analy sis and emphasize only survivors as the subject of inequality 
misses the importance of understanding not only what hate speech does to 
produce such constructs but also how such speech acts operate within larger 
domains of power and inequality. By focusing on individualization and rele-
gating to the margins an analy sis of the construction of perpetrators of vio-
lence as being outside macro analy sis, Wilson contributes to an anthropology 
of international justice through the production of a liberal and individuated 
moral universalism that disarticulates the conditions of its making. 
Where a rapidly growing body of critical scholarship has begun to explore 
the particular ways in which emotion and affects work through regimes of 
expression and practice to construct particular social logics, most studies re-
main at the micro level of the individual, as does Wilson’s concern with the 
“survivor” and the “perpetrator.”47 While this optic provides part of the story 
of violence propelled by hate speech in the contemporary period, it misses the 
ways in which the grammar of suffering disguises the structural conditions 
of its making. Focusing on hate speech without locating it within broader 
domains of emotional power makes it difficult to reckon with the complexi-
ties of justice in the contemporary period. This book demonstrates that it is 
critical to understand that those designated as both survivors and perpetra-
tors of violence exist within larger structures of inequality, and therefore both 
are part of the exercise and problem of power. Contemporary forms of inter-
national legalisms are part of a larger tyranny of violence that does not stop 
with the individualization of criminal responsibility and trial performance. 
They exist within colonial inscriptions of plunder and extraction that struc-
ture the forms of violence within which they circulate. They are constitutive 
of the continuation of empire in the contemporary moment, and their expres-
sion through affective registers is a manifestation of how affects constitute the 
emotional body and shape the basis on which contemporary justice alliances 
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are manifesting. Moving beyond the individualization of survivorship and to-
ward an analy sis that can detail actual assemblages of power and their em-
bodied manifestations will allow us to analyze features that have been widely 
neglected in the development of the anthropology of justice literature.
Following Sara Ahmed’s work on what emotions do in the world, Affec-
tive Justice explores what people do with those emotions through the study of 
a particular international criminal justice assemblage.48 I bring sociocultural 
theorizing of justice into the contemporary moment by considering how af-
fects shape sociopolitical consciousness and how they are practiced and ren-
dered visible, and also how they are deployed to reframe constituencies in 
relation to emotional alignments. This rethinking of the deployment of emo-
tions has critical implications for how we understand justice- making prac-
tices through visceral, heartfelt expressions, exclamations, and outbursts that 
conjoin people according to their emotional practices rather than according 
to their identities. With this point of departure, this book moves us toward 
an anthropology of international justice that takes seriously the role of affects 
by showing how they are embodied and how they manifest in emotional ex-
pressions. In an attempt to clarify the framework through which affective jus-
tice practices play out, I outline three component parts— legal technocratic 
practices, embodied affects, and emotional regimes— that shape international 
criminal rule of law assemblages. 
The first component is the domain of legal technocratic practice, which is 
primarily concerned with the biopolitical management of life and death. Bio-
politics is understood as exercising power over bodies, ranging from vari-
ous techniques of subjugation to the control of people and constituencies.49 
It involves the management of the population as a political problem, and, by 
extension, it involves the legal basis on which bodies are managed through 
particular legal technical classification measures. Following Foucault, eco-
nomic, political, psychological, and classificatory domains are key to the ways 
that the body and the population have been and continue to discipline cit-
izens.50 In inter national legal assemblages, biopolitics is involved in the im-
plementation of legal processes to manage the body and to train its stewards 
and publics to participate in the formal or informal implementation of legal-
ity. Legal technocratic classification is connected to biopolitical practices that 
combine relationships between biology, politics, and technocratic practice— in 
this case, legal practices.51 It is a form of disciplinary power that exists across 
different scales to classify populations juridically as well as to manage life and 
render some deaths acceptable. These legal technologies for managing life and 
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death are structured in relation to various scientific- legal rationalities that are 
at the heart of international justice landscapes. In icc assemblages, like other 
justice domains, the management of violence is also a biopolitical problem in 
which state leaders participate in the codification of laws in order to legally 
manage life and punish those who offend those laws. In the road leading to the 
Rome Statute for the icc, this process involved complex technocratic practices 
over many years— from the drafting of the treaty, to its negotiations, to its rati-
fication and legal promotion. This biopolitical process has produced the social 
fields in which regimes of international legal knowledge, like other justice do-
mains, have taken shape and circulated through particular narratives.
If we see this biopolitical process of making international criminal law as 
the production of a rationalizing regime in which determinants for victims 
and perpetrators are popularized, then it is also important to see this process 
as central to shaping the basis upon which international legal morality is be-
ing normalized and— by extension— how a biopolitics of feeling about those 
victimized by violence is established through narrative.52 
Central to such technocratic practices are the ways in which some justice 
practices (their ontologies and temporalities) displace other practices. This 
process of displacement is what I call legal encapsulation. Legal encapsula-
tion is an adaptation of Susan Harding’s notion of narrative encapsulation, 
which involves the production of dominant narratives that displace others.53 
It is a discursive technocratic practice that, in the negotiation of justice, turns 
attention from structural equality to the language of the law and the iconic 
survivor of mass atrocity violence. This biopolitical production of law works 
through technocratic institutions, such as courts, and morally driven protec-
tions of survivors or “victims,” leading to the displacement of the political 
basis upon which injustice might be addressed and replacing it with the cel-
ebratory belief in an international judicial order to save lives. In understand-
ing how legal order operates, it is important to note what it displaces and how 
those forms of displacement ignite affective responses to other conceptualiza-
tions of justice, such as redistributive justice or substantive equality.
Another nexus of such displacement, is the hegemonic production of le-
gal temporality, which is a particular way of structuring culpability and, thus, 
legal possibility. Legal temporality, or what I call legal time, is an organizing 
mechanism through which the culpability of the body is inscribed temporally 
and spatially and made relevant within particular biopolitical orders.54 While 
icc actors use a strictly defined temporal period to assess which acts of vio-
lence are eligible for prosecution, others seek to place those instances of mass 
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violence within the context of historically inscribed inequalities that have a 
much longer time line. Many people in Africa regard contemporary violence 
as a function of colonialism or postcolonial corruption that reflects a kind of 
collective complicity rather than the trespasses of charismatic leaders that the 
anti- impunity movement pursues. Accordingly, African critics of the icc have 
begun to reattribute culpability from high- ranking leaders to certain groups 
they deem responsible for underlying factors. Thus, legal time intersects with 
judicial space, such as how the strict post- 2002 temporal jurisdiction of the icc 
correlates to the centering of The Hague as the neutral site where icc- brokered 
justice is performed. 
The second component, embodied affects, represents the sensorial sphere 
within the psychological body through which particular affects are manifest. 
Rooted in the philosophical ideas of seventeenth- century philosopher Baruch 
Spinoza and later expanded by French theorists Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guat-
tari, the concept of affect continues to energize psychoanalysts, social scientists, 
and cultural theorists.55 From notions of affect as part of the “pre- subjective in-
terface of the body with the sensory world,” my approach to affect speaks to 
the visceral domain in which, following Charles Hirschkind, “memory lodges 
itself in the body.”56 With the recognition that such affects also involve forces 
and intensities, I approach embodied affects as experienced through bodily 
impulses yet propelled by particular sustained social sensibilities. In these 
domains, powerful and productive sentiments such as anger, pain, and hope 
are experienced bodily in relation to international justice controversies— 
 especially when people feel that justice is not delivered as promised.
This space of embodied affects is where itinerant and emergent justice po-
tentials are found. It is here that identity is called into question and alternate 
ways of making sense of human alliances are given life. What we see is that 
bodily responses are not necessarily tied to specific social identities. Rather, 
they are a product of complex neurological and physiological processes that 
make it possible to see affects in far more itinerant ways.57 The way that justice 
sensibilities are held and felt allow us to characterize people’s alliances based 
on their interior commitments. Following Brian Massumi, states of intensity 
that are nonlinear and unpredictable are open to creative potentials and possi-
bilities.58 This is an approach to understanding potentialities through a notion 
that affects are presocial and exist before human intentions and subjective be-
liefs. Affects reflect neurological and bodily brain functions and, in that re-
gard, they speak to complexities of the interior life of the individual.
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The third component part, emotional regimes, is connected to the first and 
second component parts but involves the domain of the social in the mani-
festation of affects. It has to do with the emotional displays of embodied re-
sponses through particular discursive tropes. Following William Reddy, an 
emotional regime is a “set of normative emotions and the official rituals, prac-
tices, and emotions that express and inculcate them,” and they are a “nec-
essary underpinning of any stable political regime.”59 I extend this concept 
to think about how emotional regimes shape emotional climates and un-
derpin popular, contemporary notions of justice and people’s emotional en-
gagement with them. Through certain kinds of representational practices, 
emotional responses circulate within sometimes related or competing net-
works of meaning production. These meaning domains are indexed by icons, 
words, utterances, color deployment, and hashtags often circulated through 
technologically driven campaigns. Through the encoding of bodily meanings 
and experiences, certain archetypal figures (e.g., “victims,” “perpetrators,” or 
“freedom fighters/ heroes/ heroines”) serve to reinforce the discursive appro-
priateness of images or symbols. For example, the icc’s oft- repeated mantras 
“Justice now” and “No one should be above the law” as well as the au’s Silenc-
ing the Guns campaign function in similar ways to appeal to the production 
of universalist imaginaries that seek to translate feeling into action.60 Appeals 
to sympathy or empathy mobilize the power to activate citizens, crafting the 
human rights citizen- consumer as an actor who has choices about what to 
prefer and how to engage.61 Feelings operate through agencies that are em-
bedded in particular historical inscriptions and are part of itinerant responses 
that are often collective but never fully predictable; they may or may not align 
with the emotional climate being produced by justice campaigns.
The public that resides in the emotional landscape produced by the icc and 
its allies can be glossed as the international community, to include celebrities, 
ordinary publics, and Africans on the continent and in the diaspora. Through 
similar strategies, the public that resides in the landscape produced by the Af-
rican Court and its allies can be glossed as the new Pan- African movement 
shaped by African leaders. In the contemporary period, these new publics 
are being constituted in person, at sites of judicial activity, as well as online, 
where humanitarian and legalistic concepts circulate and concretize through 
the emotional imaginary, producing particular feelings about justice that 
compel actors to participate in various ways. Their messages become effective 
because they represent contemporary institutionalized norms through which 
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expressions of emotional conviction are consolidated and regulated. Spec-
tacularized through legal rituals and grassroots mobilizations, various cam-
paigns and their afterlives have shaped epistemological frameworks of justice 
and law as modes of power, social ordering, and knowledge production.62 
These formations have led to the rise of a new class of mobile experts on the 
rule of law (judges, civil society activists, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, 
etc.) who are engaged in the exchange of techniques and transnational prac-
tices. While this outcome is well understood, little attention is devoted to the 
aesthetic and affective production of rule of law feeling regimes, which render 
the calls to action by these experts viable and compelling. Furthermore, what 
the framing of emotional regimes offers us is an opportunity to consider the 
dynamic interplay between embodied feeling, sociality, and power. Here we 
see the conjuncture of emotional responses with perceived senses of injustice 
that may be materialized through various sensory impressions. This, in turn, 
may produce forms of refusal or ways of reassigning the effects of displace-
ment. One of the central ways that these forms of reassignment occur as a re-
sult of perceived displacement from legal encapsulation is through what I call 
reattributive practices.
In analyzing how these competing discourses jockey for influence over the 
application of justice in African contexts, the existence of affective regimes 
and the tropes through which the materiality of emotions are manifest allow 
me to introduce the concept of reattribution. Reattribution is a process of re-
assigning guilt through rhetorical strategies that appeal to subjective and sup-
posedly universal emotions but that shift the ontological domain on which 
competing conceptions lie. In law, attribution refers to the determination of 
whether a particular act can be attributed to another entity, such as a person, 
corporation, or government. It emerges from the concept of liability and re-
lates to the determination of responsibility for wrongdoing. But my use of re-
attribution in this book extends it beyond an oversimplified tie to the legal 
parsing of wrongdoing. It relates to the affective dimension of justice making 
through the process of actively refusing, directing, and redirecting meanings 
of justice through sentimentalized discourses that, at times, shift how culpa-
bility is understood.
The distinct discourses described above— frameworks aligned with the icc 
or with its critics of public intellectual pragmatists (described in the  preface) 
— represent competing emotional domains that drive the way people com-
prehend and engage with notions of culpability and justice. These differences 
are mapped across particular spatial and/ or temporal landscapes and shape 
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the emotional fields and embodied responses that arise. Both temporality 
and spatiality shape the way that everyday relationships are experienced and 
felt, for they highlight the contours of affects that develop through the lay-
ered influences of history, culture, power, and individual agency.63 Reattribu-
tion, then, contributes to the production of affective justice through its role 
in the entanglement of complex bodily, biopolitical, and socially regimented 
configurations. 
These three interrelated domains— legal technocratic practices, psychoso-
cial embodied affects, and emotional regimes— come together messily through 
the rule of law movement to constitute affective justice. As the enmeshment of 
these component parts, an alliance between the instrumentalization of the law 
and expressive embodiments of its regimes propels us to articulate what justice 
is and to clarify meanings of justice through their materialization. Together 
these components form an international criminal justice assemblage that does 
not gain its power by focusing on justice for survivors alone. They come to-
gether through the production and combination of the figures of “perpetra-
tors,” “victims/ survivors,” and the “international community,” which produce 
compelling domains for the mobilization of affective justice. Defending sur-
vivors through legal arguments alone is not how international criminal law 
surpasses state sovereignty and gains its power. It gains its power through the 
fusion of its component parts with other contingencies that come together and 
constitute affective justice.
This book presents a theory of international justice in the twenty- first cen-
tury that departs from the atomized victim/ survivor/ perpetrator models or 
state- centric theories of sovereignty. Instead, it clarifies that international 
criminal justice as a site of contemporary contestations can only be under-
stood as an assemblage of component parts that are activated through com-
plex interrelationships.
This approach to justice allows us to advance a theory of justice as embedded 
in embodied and emergent forces, foregrounding affects and their operation-
alization within particular sociohistorical regimes. At the center of the rule of 
law movement are not only histories of proclamations, treaties, laws, categories 
like “victims” and “perpetrators,” and so forth; there is also the sensorium— 
 feelings, smells, sounds, historical narratives— that informs the work of inter-
national justice. They inspire feelings of righting past wrongs, which is at the 
heart of the international justice project. But how agents arrive there and come 
to align themselves with those engaged in similar expressions is where affective 
justice, as a site for the fusion of various component parts, exists.
22 INTRODUCTION
Assemblages of Justice Making in Practice
Following the au’s declaration of noncooperation with the icc’s call to ar-
rest and surrender President al- Bashir of Sudan, a number of developments 
unfolded in summer 2012 when the former president of Malawi, who had 
committed to hosting the next au biannual summit in Lilongwe, Malawi, 
died suddenly.64 The newly appointed president, Joyce Banda, aware of the 
icc’s call for the arrest and surrender of President al- Bashir, was expected 
not only to host the summit but to issue the final invitations to all fifty- three 
au member states and their presidents, including al- Bashir.65 As a new presi-
dent, Banda began her term by entering into partnerships with a range of in-
ternational donors. But many of her US- based donors threatened to cancel 
their financial commitments if President al- Bashir was allowed to come to 
Malawi without arrest. To them, a visit by him would signify Malawi’s unwill-
ingness to fulfill its good- governance commitments. With Malawi’s economic 
constraints in mind, President Banda announced to the au leadership that 
if President al- Bashir were to attend the nineteenth au summit in Malawi, 
her country would have no choice but to fulfill its icc obligations to arrest 
and extradite him to The Hague. According to Banda, “Malawi is already go-
ing through unprecedented economic problems and it would not be prudent 
to take a risk by allowing one person to come and attend the summit against 
much resistance from our cooperating partners and donors.”66 Rather than 
stopping at disinviting al- Bashir and affirming an obligation to arrest him, 
President Banda disinvited the leaders and advisors of all fifty- three au mem-
ber states. Within the next four days, the summit was relocated to the head-
quarters of the au in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and new invitations were issued 
to au heads of state, including President al- Bashir.
Ethiopia set a precedent that has been replicated at subsequent au sum-
mits. At the most recent summit in June 2015, South Africa declined to turn 
over al- Bashir to the icc. Given South Africa’s status as a brics country and 
its recent history of human rights promotion and constitutionalism, this de-
velopment was curious to many onlookers, who had expected the state to em-
brace its international treaty obligations.67 In summer 2016, the controversy 
around icc expectations of African states peaked at an au ministerial meet-
ing, when delegates discussed the contradictions of the duty to prosecute and 
the status of requested icc amendments. The ministers complained bitterly 
about what they saw as inequality in the icc related to its referrals through 
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the five permanent member states of the unsc, which lacks African represen-
tation. Articulating positions in animated and colorful language, they took 
issue with the overall focus of the icc on selecting African cases and insisted 
that this perceived bias has political consequences. To the chagrin of various 
African human rights civil society organizations working for predominantly 
Western- funded ngos, the debates were invigorated by angry civil society 
demands for checks and balances against unchecked African governmental 
power; leaders met this criticism by publicly calling out the imperial conti-
nuities of international legal injustice. The result inspired the call for a coor-
dinated strategy for African states to advance a collective withdrawal from 
the Rome Statute that established the icc. What unfolded were emotionally 
driven expressions of dissatisfaction, leading three African states to declare 
their intentions to withdraw from the treaty.
Burundi was the first state to formally announce that it would withdraw 
from the icc through a decree from its parliament. President Pierre Nku run-
ziza’s government began proceedings following the April 2016 opening of an 
icc preliminary investigation of violence in Burundi. The violence unfolded 
following a third- term presidential bid by President Nkurunziza. This led to 
imprisonment, torture, killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and 
disappearances. The un Independent Investigation on Burundi released a re-
port naming officials who, it claimed, orchestrated the violence against per-
ceived political opponents, and citing evidence of rape, disappearances, mass 
arrests, torture, and murder.68 The report estimated that large numbers of 
those victimized by violence were opposed to the proposed third- term man-
date of President Nkurunziza. The government of Burundi dismissed the 
report as biased and politically motivated, denying its allegations. Later, Bu-
rundi announced its withdrawal from the icc.69
South Africa was initially a visible champion of African state enthusiasm 
for the icc. Following the Burundi decision, however, it declared its inten-
tions to withdraw from the Rome Statute for the icc in a public announce-
ment stating that the Rome Statute’s treaty obligations were inconsistent 
with customary international law, which offers diplomatic immunity to sit-
ting heads of state. The declaratory statement sent to the un secretary- general 
read, “Under these circumstances South Africa is of the view that to continue 
to be a State Party to the Rome Statute will compromise its efforts to promote 
peace and security on the African Continent.”70 The statement incorporated 
language that suggested an alternative logic for justice on the continent:
24 INTRODUCTION
South Africa is committed to protection of human rights and the fight 
against impunity which commitment was forged in the struggle for liber-
ation against the inhumanity of colonialism and apartheid. . . .  South Af-
rica, from its own experience has always expressed the view that to keep 
peace one must first make peace. Thus, South Africa is involved in inter-
national peacekeeping missions in Africa and is diplomatically involved in 
inter- related peace processes on a bilateral basis as well as part of au man-
dates. In complex and multi- faceted peace negotiations and sensitive post- 
conflict situations, peace and justice must be viewed as complementary 
and not mutually exclusive.71
Following the release of this statement, ngos submitted a complaint to the 
South African high court rendering the icc withdrawal declaration unconsti-
tutional. The high court concurred and ordered President Zuma to retract the 
notice of withdrawal.
The Gambia was the third country to communicate its intention to with-
draw from the icc. Its announcement was made by its minister of information 
and promoted by former president Yahya Jammeh. Justification for withdrawal 
centered on what was seen as the icc’s practices of selectively focusing on Af-
rican human rights abuses. As noted, the minister announced that the icc was 
being used for “the persecution of Africans and especially their leaders while 
ignoring crimes committed by the West,” furthermore stating that “there are 
many Western countries, at least 30, that have committed heinous war crimes 
against independent sovereign states and their citizens since the creation of 
the icc and not a single Western war criminal has been indicted.”72 However, 
in a country shrouded by two decades of repressive rule and a contested elec-
tion, newly inaugurated president Adama Barrow pushed back against the au’s 
withdrawal strategy by canceling the notice of intention to withdraw from the 
icc and reaffirming his support for the institution.
Various organs of the icc, such as the presidency and the Office of the 
Prosecutor, are consistently responding to these controversies and challenges 
by shoring up and projecting the core logic of legal accountability as the sole 
appropriate and objective strategy for ending impunity. For the notion of sov-
ereignty remains at the center of state processes; participation in the Rome 
Statute treaty system is voluntary, but when states are seen as signing and 
then ratifying a treaty to establish an international criminal court, what they 
are doing is taking responsibility for pursuing the crimes under the jurisdic-
tion of the court as well as cooperating to adjudicate the crimes under the 
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Rome Statute.73 Article 17 of the statute lays out the basis for the admissibil-
ity of a case under the icc.74 It clarifies that if member states that have rati-
fied the Rome Statute are “unable and unwilling” to “genuinely” investigate 
a case under the jurisdiction of the court, the icc can claim jurisdiction of 
that case, thereby leading to what many see as the suspension of a state’s sov-
ereign right to adjudicate the alleged violence.75 This architecture provides 
the framework for the 123 states under the court’s remit that have ratified 
the statute— one- third of them being African states.76 But in order for this 
technocratic structure to work, the icc operates through ideas, convictions, 
willing membership, and some forms of coercion that travel, take root, and 
circulate in various ways. 
The icc is not simply its building or its capacity to host criminal trials. It is 
not just about a single location or a single set of founders or judges. Its work 
is far reaching and multifarious; its beginning and end go well beyond the 
Rome Statute. Its legal actions precede the making of the Rome Statute, and 
it follows violence as well as being constituted by it. This global circulation of 
the rule of law actors and “actants” (Bruno Latour) is centrally propelled by 
moral convictions to save victims and stop perpetrators of violence. Its mis-
sion operates through moral embodiments in which political commitments 
against impunity are central to how the component parts of the assemblage 
function. Yet the morality, emotion, and embodied feelings about injustice 
are core components of the movement’s power. The icc routinely individu-
alizes collective violence through the projection of the figure of the victim in 
relation to the perpetrator. For example, the Gambian lead prosecutor for the 
icc, Fatou Bensouda, has publicly asserted that the Rome Statute is her bible. 
“It’s not about politics but the law,” Bensouda explained at a public forum in 
Albany, New York, in April 2012, as she was transitioning from deputy prose-
cutor to lead prosecutor of the court. “I will use the law to uphold justice,” she 
asserted. In emphasizing that the court’s mandate for justice centers on serv-
ing victims through legal accountability, she later argued, “We should not be 
guided by the words and propaganda of a few influential individuals whose 
sole aim is to evade justice but, rather, we should focus on, and listen to the 
millions of victims who continue to suffer from massive crimes. The return on 
our investment for what others may today consider to be a huge cost for jus-
tice is effective deterrence and saving millions of victims’ lives.”77
Prosecutor Bensouda’s performative plea for icc justice was delivered in 
the name of the “victim.” Deploying what I call a sentimental legalism, her 
26 INTRODUCTION
narrative construction follows a liberalist legal discourse that works through 
legal encapsulation. It equates justice with the law and invokes a mission of 
protecting “victims” against powerful perpetrators who have enjoyed impu-
nity for too long.78 This discourse of “saving victims” by making high- ranking 
perpetrators individually responsible through judicial trials in effect links 
the notion of protection— and by extension prevention— to a very particu-
lar application of legal justice. It serves as a sympathizing strategy that neatly 
collapses the protection of victims with the rejection of impunity for perpe-
trators, and that reifies the legal tool of holding perpetrators accountable as 
the sole appropriate mechanism for justice. 
This narrative is similar to Judge Song Sang-Hyou’s plea for the icc at the 
Nuremberg Forum conference on the twentieth anniversary of the Rome 
Statue. In response to US President Donald Trump’s and then John Bolton’s 
2018 anti- icc United States protectionist speeches, he insisted that “the icc is 
a judicial instrument that operates in a political world. . . .  We need to keep 
the icc objective. . . .  We need to defend the rule of law from the interference 
of politics.”79 These narratives regale a celebratory story of the rule of law op-
erating through objectivity, predictability, and empowerment to end impu-
nity and, ultimately, to curb political violence. As obvious and appealing as 
this may seem in the abstract, attempts to map this logic onto particular Af-
rican contexts through legal actions have generated profound disagreement, 
dis- ease, and discord. 
The manifestations of icc justice also presume a color- blind racial indif-
ference as a fundamental operating principle that renders senses of race and 
racism unsayable in the international law landscape. This means that for the 
icc, the racial politics of African indictments are decentered from the pub-
lic discourse. Yet the visual practices of seeing race— however unconscious or 
conscious— are still part of the affective landscapes in that discursive and rep-
resentational politics of the “victim,” and the “perpetrator” have the impact of 
precluding certain kinds of claims. For if the “victim” looks like a Holocaust 
survivor, then “victims” of colonial violence cannot be recognized as they are; 
if the “perpetrator” looks like a black African man implicated in mass rape or 
torture, then particular North American or European heads of state may not 
look like perpetrators from their desks. These forms of representations serve 
to demand certain actions and priorities as well as wield military and enforce-
ment power in response to these representations. Such paradoxical presences 
and absences of racial difference highlight both the imaginary fiction of race 
and the lived experiences of structural violence that can surface in the “hid-
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den zones of the unconscious.”80 This dialectics of race is described by Achille 
Mbembe as an “operation of the imagination” in which he argues that it is in 
those zones of the unconscious that race is both a site of “reality and truth . . .  
of appearances” and a site of rupture and effusion.81 Its appearances are con-
stituted by the “very act of assigning race, and produced and institutionalized 
through the normalization of human racial typologies in which blackness has 
been stigmatized.”82 
These consequences of race are a function of modernity in which trans-
atlantic slavery led to the violation of particular black bodies, and later co-
lonialism solidified the ways that those bodies would become governed, 
resulting in the subsequent structures that produced and continue to produce 
the very forms of racial inequalities in the first place. Thus the accusations 
of icc racism by African leaders are not simply a fictional and strategic in-
vocation of an imaginary category; they are a resurrection of the fictive con-
struction of racial difference that is still felt to be shaping contemporary life 
in bodily and visceral ways. In the realm of icc indictments of black bodies, 
what is the relevance of the racialized body in relation to how international 
justice works through figures of “victims” and “perpetrators”? And what does 
studying certain reattributive affects through passionate utterances— such as 
anger— tell us about structural inequalities as well as particular responses to 
them? To understand these processes, we have to turn to how the emotional 
expressions of feelings link sociality and justice in our globalizing world.
Multiple traumas over generations elicit a broad and deep range of emo-
tional responses that show how international law has been complicit in the 
making of African injustice. Just as the agents engaged in the emergent rule 
of law movement seek to reattribute impunity with persistent justice, so too 
are Pan- African justice advocates engaged in the reattribution of its products. 
Through emotionally infused public refusals of icc justice, we see attempts to 
produce and express sentiments that neutralize criminal responsibility and 
reroute it to other domains of culpability. For some, this is because African 
leaders are often critiqued for their hypocrisy by proponents of international 
justice, whereas leaders of economically powerful states are not. The dialecti-
cal relationship between the figure of the African perpetrator indicted by the 
icc and the seeming hypocrisy of the West makes such emotionally propelled 
narratives both insidious and compelling. But some African populations also 
engage in the reassignment of justice against icc norms while simultaneously 
struggling with their emotional anger against African leadership for unleash-
ing tyranny and violence against their populations, which includes their com-
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plicity in enabling the economic extraction and plunder of African resources. 
These various and competing responses are rhizomatic and unstable, and they 
should not be dismissed or rendered invisible in scholarly inquiry.
Consistent patterns of controversy and conflict within justice narratives force 
us to reexamine the making of international justice frameworks. We need to 
understand what these justice projects do, how they do it, and in what way the 
desires and fantasies of their narratives emerge. When peoples’ aspirations pro-
duce counternarratives, vocabularies, and legal institutions, including new ge-
ographies within which to recalibrate justice practices, we must understand how 
particular affects make them possible and how they circulate to constitute new 
alliances that are regulated according to technocratic and social practice regimes.
Emotional Constructions and Deconstructions of Justice in African Contexts:  
Affective Justice and Affective Reattribution in Practice
When the icc was launched, advocates aspired to use international law as a 
beacon of emancipation and a solution to a perceived absence of justice across 
the African continent. The thirty- two African states that worked through 
their constituencies to ratify the Rome Statute in 1998 initially embraced the 
rule of law movement as an extension of their commitment to Africa’s devel-
opment. They did so publicly, with ceremonial acceptance and celebratory 
claims to membership. The memory of the violence that unfolded in Afri-
can regions in the 1980s and 1990s invigorated a moral conscience to act. In 
order to embrace the icc, African stakeholders also had to face and seek to 
transcend residual feelings of indignity and anger stemming from the inac-
tion of international publics during the Rwandan genocide, the injustice of 
South African apartheid, and the multiple impacts of European imperialism 
across the continent. In order to accomplish this emotional transition, many 
actors within African countries took moral leadership from luminaries such 
as Bishop Tutu, whose emphasis on truth and reconciliation in the South Af-
rican context had privileged the setting aside of public manifestations of anger 
in response to injustice in order to verbalize past wrongs and forge a pathway 
toward forgiveness. Forgiveness represented the emotional blooming of truth, 
which emphasized the institutional, not only personal, dimensions of apart-
heid’s violence. The truth and reconciliation strategy involved highly public 
and often exaggerated displays of emotion, including particular ways of artic-
ulating truth and of performing forgiveness in order to produce a new South 
Africa predicated on collective justice.
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In Rwanda, the shocking images and stories of the mass slaughter of over 
half a million Tutsis— black African bodies— and the inaction of international 
actors contributed to the eventual establishment of both the role of traditional 
justice known as gachacha (sitting under the tree) and the institutionaliza-
tion of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to adjudicate those 
deemed most responsible for violence. Gachacha involved its own cultural 
and performative articulations of justice, in which people were expected to 
articulate suffering, admit to their crimes, and perform reconciliation. In 
both examples, we see that emotional displays of forgiveness and reconcilia-
tion are not arbitrary. Nor are they necessarily insincere or always predictable 
in relation to people’s national standing. They exist in a domain of personal 
feelings and practices that operate within and serve to reify particular institu-
tions through which justice is negotiated. As I illustrate in chapter 1, emotion-
ally regimented conceptions of the “victim” and the “perpetrator,” as located 
within particular racialized bodies, are part of this reification; they are part of 
the moral imaginaries in contemporary rule of law landscapes.
A close analy sis of the work that they do reveals how international and 
other justice forms operate through emotional constructs and carefully 
crafted campaigns. For as I introduced above and elaborate in this book, le-
gal encapsulation involves legalistic processes that make legible the subjects 
of the law, and this is where technocratic international processes connect with 
micro- individual bodily affects and feeling expressions. In the case of interna-
tional justice, it is the “victim” and “perpetrator” as fictive constructs who are 
encapsulated within contemporary international legal frames.83 In African 
judicial spaces, a popular counterfigure— the Pan- African freedom fighter, 
male and black, and the victim of colonial injustices— is propelling the emo-
tional domains through which new justice formations are taking shape. What 
is interesting is how these modes of seeing, engaging, and feeling are work-
ing through a biopolitical apparatus involving the pursuit of economic crimes 
that are taking shape through responses to perceived injustice.
The Freedom Fighter within Pan- African Emotional Regimes
The key to understanding international justice in the contemporary period is 
to recognize how legal encapsulation produces displacements and how those 
displacements are leading to the erection of new institutions (in this book de-
scribed as the Pan-Africanist pushback). This jockeying to redefine justice en-
ables a dialectics of subjugation and emancipatory possibilities. For example, 
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various stakeholders might insist that African independence is a mis nomer 
because independence marked the beginning of neocolonial governance in 
which African markets adapted to world- market incentives, and that this pro-
cess not only fueled economic dependencies but also enabled corruptions of 
justice central to the crisis of the African neocolonial state.84 Falling prey to 
structural- adjustment development policies, African leaders dismantled so-
cial institutions and privatized the independence- era welfare state. In response 
to the challenges of postcolonial economic development a sentimentalized 
Pan- Africanist discourse is now being employed to reorient the terms of jus-
tice, from Western judicial mechanisms to politico- economic sites, to achieve 
a reorientation of structural justice. This push for new justice arrangements 
has reconfigured the basis on which international justice for survivors of vi-
olence has been articulated.85 For example, during Kenya’s anticolonial inde-
pendence struggle of the 1950s, Jomo Kenyatta— the father of Uhuru Kenyatta, 
Kenya’s president from 2012 to 2016— was indicted and charged for murder 
but also imprisoned for his efforts to free Kenya from British colonial rule. 
Although he was convicted as a perpetrator of criminal violence, his track 
record as a revolutionary inspired reverence from large numbers of Kenyans 
who viewed him as primarily a freedom fighter for Kenya’s independence.
This reorientation of justice focuses on the way histories of plunder and 
unequal political economic formations in African countries are encapsulating 
alternate iconic affects— not just the anticolonial freedom fighter but figures 
like the displaced villager as well. These are now being packaged and dissem-
inated through countercampaigning strategies and affective performances 
which insist that legal solutions must be firmly linked to a broader disman-
tling of neocolonial structures of oppression that Africans encounter at ev-
ery level, from the rural villager to the cosmopolitan head of state.86 Thus, 
through the power of reattribution, an emergent African geography of justice is 
developing as a counterpoint to what is seen as hegemonic structures of West-
ern approaches to international justice.
Reattribution through the Reorienting of the Terms of Justice
Various members of the African Union have pushed back against anti- 
impunity assertions of justice and have insisted instead on the relevance of 
histories of injustice. While the memory of the Jewish Holocaust and the 
Nuremberg trials haunts the historical imagination of various anti- impunity 
icc supporters, it is not necessarily seen as central to the historical imaginary 
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among those engaged in Pan- Africanist mobilizations. Instead, some of those 
angered by mass atrocity violence in African countries look to African co-
lonial and neocolonial tragedies, including long years of apartheid violence 
in South Africa and the genocide in Rwanda, for a countering set of affects. 
In his opening statement at the Thirteenth Ordinary Session of the Confer-
ence of the Committee of Intelligence in 2016, President Kagame aserted, “Ac-
countability for crimes is a principle that the African Union endorses, without 
ambiguity. But politicizing justice, and deploying it more or less exclusively 
against one continent, or pursuing it selectively for whatever reason, is not the 
answer. . . .  It is a form of ‘lawfare’ where international law is abused to keep 
Africa in a subordinate position in the global order.”87 This notion of the icc 
as lawfare— the use of law to engage in social, political, or military battles— 
 implies the deployment of law and its institutions to defeat African author-
ities through displacing perceived sources of violence. Similar responses of 
anger against lawfare have included direct accusations of racist and imperial 
motivations.88 For example, at the end of an au session in 2013, the Ethiopian 
prime minister and chairman of the au, Hailemariam Desalegn, argued that 
the “process [that the] icc is conducting in Africa has a flaw; the intention 
was to avoid any kind of impunity, ill governance, and crime. But now the 
process has degenerated into some kind of ‘race hunting.’”89
For many, then, the icc has come to embody evidence that colonialism 
still exists, now in a new form. And yet critiques of the icc can, in turn, serve 
to simplify the character of the critics, papering over their own public contra-
dictions. For despite President Kagame’s international reputation as a leader 
preaching reconciliation, a man who as a child escaped death during the killing 
of ethnic Tutsis and who is now seen as having led Rwandans to rise above age- 
old divisions and the horror of genocide, he is also popularly seen as having 
exploited Rwanda’s tragic history to produce a Tutsi- dominated authoritarian 
regime with a track record of suppressing opposition and covering up its own 
violence. As a strategy for managing this internal contradiction, he and oth-
ers have sought to attribute Rwanda’s violence to alternate sources, including 
colonial inequalities that led to the invention of ethnic and racial differences.
One form of reattribution has involved blaming European colonialism and 
invoking sentimentalized narratives in support of the villager displaced by 
colonial settlers or the anticolonial freedom fighter. Here, the sentimentalized 
narrative strategies foreground structural injustice as a corruption of the jus-
tice principle, thus resulting in sentimentalized expressions that its constitu-
encies were known to interpret as anger. It is with the presumption that justice
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must be extracted from structural injustice that some African actors display 
particular sentiments in arguing for political solutions. For example, echoing 
other angry performances, President Museveni of Uganda expressed his dis-
may with the icc’s indictment of Kenya’s president- elect, Uhuru Kenyatta, 
and the international pressure to influence Kenya’s elections against him. As 
Museveni said during Kenyatta’s inauguration in 2013:
I want to salute the Kenyan voters on one other issue: the rejection of the 
blackmail by the International Criminal Court and those who seek to 
abuse this institution for their own agenda. . . .  I was one of those that sup-
ported the icc because I abhor impunity. However, the usual opinionated 
and arrogant actors using their careless and shallow analy sis have now dis-
torted the purpose of that institution. . . .  In Uganda’s case between 1966 
and 1986 we lost about 800,000 people. How did we handle that sad his-
tory? Have you ever heard us asking the icc or the United Nations to come 
and help us deal with that sad chapter of our history?90
These sentiments, communicated to African constituencies and delivered 
with tones of anger and irony, reflect the perception that the rule of law move-
ment has little space for considering the longer histories of inequality that fab-
ricated underlying structures of violence on the African continent. They also 
encapsulate the resonant feeling of resentment that France and England (for-
mer colonial hegemons) as well as the United States (a contemporary empire) 
continue to maintain a patronizing relationship with their former African col-
onies, a relationship that is expressed, among other ways, through deep ties to 
military training, the use of force, and threats of regime change through inter-
national legality. This has manifested not only in military interventions and 
ngo funding to propel anti- impunity work, but also in judicial control through 
international courts. The predominance of African cases before the icc is caus-
ing many African heads of state and lawmakers to feel that the colonial man-
agement of Africa has returned in the form of international institutions such 
as the icc. Articulations of critique and dissent, even by African warlords, can 
gain strength and legitimacy because of a perception of underlying hypocrisy.
International law insists on an original presumption that justice should be 
universally protected and pursued for all, and not just for Africans. But the 
perception of a double standard in practice has led to the angry assertion by 
many Pan- Africanists that Western liberal, sentimental legalism— embodied 
by the anti- impunity movement— only serves to erase politics and fill vacant 
spaces with icons that inspire empty social actions (such as hashtag activism 
and “clicktivism”) without any material gains for African citizens.
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The perceived erasure of politics through legal encapsulation is seen as not 
only rendering invisible deep histories of past injustices but ignoring the po-
litical potential of judicial action to create the conditions for future peace and 
lived justice. Popular global governance mechanisms such as the icc are seen 
increasingly as tools for maintaining Western power. Some who are protest-
ing the encapsulation of justice and its effects in African postcolonial states 
are working to redefine it by retelling history and reattributing culpability. Yet 
within this dialectic, many contradictions and complexities persist. For ex-
ample, critics within and outside Africa and its diasporas recognize that it is 
contradictory for both Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and President 
Museveni to speak against the icc while they have been accused of crushing 
antiopposition movements, leading to the deaths of thousands of their citi-
zens in Ethiopia and Uganda, respectively.91
Such postcolonial state concerns, in which the leadership elite are blamed 
for African violence, are facing serious challenges. On the one hand, in deal-
ing with the internal practices of the state and its economy, they are embed-
ded in limited forms of sovereignty that are constrained by contemporary 
globalization. On the other hand, not only does the postcolonial state not 
control key decisions that impact its economy, but state agents have not been 
able to address its failed social institutions that leave the indigent underserved 
and offer corruption and illicit violence as viable alternatives to structural in-
justice. Various African publics approach these challenges and complexities 
in ways that demonstrate both their ambivalence toward their leaders and 
the recognition of deep structural inequality that gives rise to state failure. 
A new generation of African professionals and progressive activists recog-
nizes that the imposition of colonial structures of rule had a crucial deter-
minative effect on the postcolonial conundrum.92 They point to the myriad 
ways that, throughout postcolonial Africa, structural inequalities produced 
and still produce the conditions in which extreme forms of material violence 
take shape. Within this broader critique, there is a range of positions regard-
ing where to attribute culpability in relation to the unraveling of formal colo-
nialism, the reckoning with African complicity in mass atrocity violence, and 
the perpetual emergence of neocolonial structures.
Beyond the focus on who should be held accountable for mass violence, 
the implementation of the Rome Statute and the subsequent events related 
to the icc’s Africa indictments have also heightened additional debates and 
emotionally fueled arguments about the icc’s ability to provide justice to sur-
vivors, as they themselves define it, and to resolve political violence in Africa 
through judicial solutions. Many have come to resist anti- impunity argu-
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ments that the icc’s forms of legal justice are the best way to pursue justice, 
rejecting it as a mode of justice activism, citing other structural inequalities as 
the basis for African violence. 
However, by rethinking Wilson’s assumptions about the basis upon which 
survivors are relevant to the international justice project, the reality is that vari-
ous justice imaginaries— such as the “perpetrator” and the “freedom fighter”— 
 operate through emotionally infused icons that draw on deep- seated histories 
and psychosocial feelings that compel social action. The freedom fighter be-
comes an icon of justice, a redemptive body who preserves the traces of past 
actions and brings them into the present as potentials.93 As Brian Massumi 
writes, “The body doesn’t just absorb pulses or discrete stimulations; it in-
folds contexts.”94 Through the vehicle of the iconic body, constructed through 
sentimentalized affect, we experience the embeddedness of history in future 
sociopolitical effects. This imbrication of the past and the present through af-
fect shapes what Bill Mazzarella refers to as the “pragmatics of institutional 
practice.”95 Affects articulated through institutional practice emerge as emo-
tional appeals used to address larger sociopolitical concerns, such as racial 
targeting— feelings that the icc is an extension of a colonial disciplinary ap-
paratus. Some emotional forms invoke deeply known histories and reattribute 
what many see as illegitimate hegemonies of the past to reframe new justice 
narratives about contemporary events and actors. Similar to the noteworthy 
interventions like that of Jacques Vergés’s “rupture defence”— an attempt to 
challenge the court’s legitimacy by calling into question the basis upon which 
particular social truths and histories are narrativized— through disjunctural 
narratives in the legal defenses of Slobodan Milosevic at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or Khieu Samphan at the Cam-
bodian trials, we see how narrative ruptures inhere through the telling of dif-
ferent renditions of histories of violence.96 Similarly, various people who are 
suspicious of the legal power of icc- based justice have invoked European co-
lonialism as a continuity of icc justice. As anti- icc sentiments are articulated, 
particular component parts of affective justice are deployed to shape it. And it 
is here in the spaces of refusal that new legal- justice formations are being as-
sembled in particular ways.
What we are seeing is the formation of new domains of justice making that 
are not manifestations of an evolutionary progression of judicial justice cas-
cading toward a new, enlightened form.97 Rather, in response to the feelings of 
injustice in an unequal world, those pushing back against the justice- as- anti- 
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impunity discourses are reconceptualizing justice and attempting to differen-
tiate African approaches to international law by embedding them in renewed 
spaces for reasserting the terms by which justice is reembodied.
Institutionalizing New Spaces of Justice: The African Court, Transitional Justice,  
and Its Pan- Africanist Affective Regimes
In the pages that follow, I demonstrate how various postcolonial affects, em-
bedded in psychosocial responses to various forms of violence, function within 
particular Pan- Africanist emotional assemblages that— despite the construc-
tion of racial imaginaries— constitute the feeling expressions of various con-
stituencies, not always predictable racially or ethnically constituted groups. 
The dynamics of race making is also about sense- making imaginaries that are 
not objective or empty.98 These are lived experiences that foment emotional 
alignments with others who feel similarly. Embodiments of emotion con-
fer belonging not to social categories that map neatly onto traditional group 
identity markers as the anthropological field once knew them— Ashanti, 
Tutsi, Dinka, Kikuyu, male, or female, for example. Instead, by studying the 
ways that people communicate their senses of obligation through symbolic, 
verbal, bodily, and technocratic expressions, a focus on emotional responses 
that align with regional or global assemblages can show how particular alli-
ances are possible and others rendered unfeasible.99 One of the ways this is 
done is through feelings about culpability.
Concerted efforts to expand culpability to actions deemed criminal yet not 
legible within the Rome Statute’s legal architecture mobilize persons accord-
ing to particular feeling climates or personal commitments. The icc is also 
not the only tool for addressing mass atrocity violence, nor does it dominate 
the management of violence. In the case of the assertion of a new dominion, 
a set of African spaces that buffer the spread of treaty- driven prosecutorial 
institutions such as the icc, other domains are defined by the rallying call, 
“African solutions for African problems.” Through such calls to action, jus-
tice is reoriented spatially and temporally within deeply sentimental histories 
of African subjugation. These forms of reattribution highlight the way that 
emotional regimes function and create a biopolitics of feeling that shapes the 
emotional climate within which justice is articulated.
The attempt to establish an African court with criminal jurisdiction to ad-
judicate cases currently pursued by the icc is a striking example of how re-
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attri bution can generate structural transformation, as well as an illustration of 
how emotions are deployed through historic symbols to regulate sentiments 
and constitute community. The African Court is the product of spatial and 
temporal reconceptualizations of international criminal justice as it functions 
within African landscapes. It is the outcome of an effort to conjure an African 
geography of justice through sentimentalized invocations of Africa’s place in 
an increasingly interconnected world. But as we shall see, not only is the idea 
of international justice being reconceptualized in relation to how solutions to 
violence ought to be addressed, but, in an attempt to move beyond what is seen 
as the icc’s politically driven core crimes, stakeholders of the African Court 
project have introduced additional crimes— economic crimes— that they con-
sider to be symptomatic of the “true root causes of African violence.”100 These 
include piracy, mercenaries, terrorism, corruption, illicit exploitation of natu-
ral resources, money laundering, the unconstitutional change of government, 
and the trafficking of drugs, persons, and hazardous waste. The focus on pros-
ecuting these crimes reflects an effort to articulate a new understanding of 
what constitutes justice in an African context. It attempts a shift away from 
the icc’s framework that centers exclusively on individual criminal account-
ability toward a more expansive notion of culpability that includes corporate 
criminal liability. Within the logic of the African Court, corporate leaders 
could be held accountable for their role in seeding the underlying conditions 
that generate mass violence. The African Court is a concrete example of how 
a new Pan- Africanism operating at a regional scale is emerging at the site of 
justice making in order to make new claims on African governance in oppo-
sition to perceived neocolonial justice campaigns.
Pan- Africanism has been defined as a “movement of ideas and emotions,” 
reflecting an “underlying unity of emotions and ideas in the black world.”101 
At the roots of the movement are deep feelings of dispossession, oppres-
sion, persecution, and rejection that appear congruent with contemporary 
material conditions on the continent. The impetus for Pan- African mobili-
zation emerges from an emotional response to what Colin Legum refers to 
as a feeling of “loss [that] came [from] enslavement, persecution, inferior-
ity, discrimination and dependency. It involved a loss of independence, free-
dom and dignity.”102 Pan- Africanist philosophies originated in the late 1800s, 
and the first Pan- African Congress was held in London in 1900, spearheaded 
by a range of black intellectuals and African elite students in the diaspora. 
Pan- Africanism as a coherent political movement was formally launched 
in 1958 at the First Conference of Independent African States held in Accra, 
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Ghana, where Patrice Lumumba was a key speaker. The 1958 version of Pan- 
Africanism held as its prime objective the solidarity of black people around 
the world and the assertion of “Africa for Africans,” which involved the pur-
suit of independence and the rejection of colonialism in all its forms. Other 
features involved the aspiration for a United Nations of Africa— a continent 
unified through regional federations— as well as the reemergence of an Afri-
can renaissance to recover and recast African societies and cultural traditions 
into neo- indigenous forms.
One approach to the African renaissance involved drawing on the best of 
Africa’s cultural forms and combining them with contemporary ideas that 
were deemed desirable. Other viewpoints in the movement included an im-
pulse to construct and project African nationalism as an alternative to tribal 
and territorial affiliations; the rejection of communism and the reinvigoration 
of African economies as engines to replace colonial economic markets; the in-
sistence on African societies rather than colonial metropoles as the necessary 
beneficiaries of development; an adoption of contemporary democratic prin-
ciples; a rejection of violence as a viable method of struggle; and the adoption 
of a notion of positive neutrality, which involved the development of what was 
referred to as a nonalignment movement of African states with global pow-
ers, in particular China, the United States, and the former Soviet Union.103 
Thus, it is critical to understand the multifaceted history of Pan- Africanism 
in order to make sense of its contemporary revivals (such as “African solu-
tions to African problems”). Yet Pan- Africanism, it is important to note, did 
not critique the myth of racial homogeneity. It contested its inscriptions of in-
feriority. The paradox of Pan- Africanist narratives is that they produce both 
a language for the rearticulation of black pride and also reinstate the myth of 
African unity. The production of Pan- Africanism, then, entails a fiction of ra-
cialized and experiential unity and because of this, the terms that define Af-
ricanness exist within domains of historical subjugation that shape the ways 
that postcolonial anti- imperial sentiments emerge and how their related col-
lectivities come into being.
The historically rooted variations in such emotively articulated sentimen-
talisms foreground the multiple ways African critics of Western liberalism 
understand culpability. Some African political actors emphasize the injustices 
of inequality while others call out the indignities of racism. Many foreground 
a sense of pride in African control of Africa’s own future and lift up the Af-
rican Court as an example of self- determination over matters of criminality 
and justice. While these points of view are distinct and particular in relation 
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to each other and to the history of Pan- Africanism, they work in concert as 
they attempt to rectify the legacy of Africa’s structural inequalities and shape 
the contours of new African judicial spaces.
The Work of Affective Justice in the Making of International Justice
As noted, in contemporary international justice circuits, popularly articulated 
within anti- impunity social movement circles, the “victim to be saved” and 
the “perpetrator to be stopped” have come to constitute the moral basis upon 
which action for justice can occur. When the humanitarian and inter national 
justice movement uses aesthetic imagery of bodies to be saved in order to as-
sert strategies of rescue, we see a professional human rights class seeking to 
crystallize and activate an international citizenry around the idea of ending 
impunity as the preeminent deterrence for violence and suffering. This nar-
rative moves us beyond the direct experience of suffering and into a disem-
bodied, mediated experience where contemporary justice needs an exemplary 
judicialized “victim” (also see Sara Kendall and Sarah Nouwen, 2013).
Law garners its authority through emotional affects that produce various 
forms of encapsulation, and through this process power is made real through 
various emotive appeals. These expressive practices reflect utterances that al-
low relevant components of justice assemblages to exercise their related capac-
ities yet retain their component properties. In maintaining their properties, 
new discursive domains are produced and used to further concretize preexist-
ing forms of segmentation. Those victimized by violence who have particular 
personal stories, captured in sound bites and captions, represent a hyper-
embodi ment of suffering that can be acted through a biopolitics of protection-
ism through which the international community engages. The emotive figures 
for invoking suffering are increasingly racially embodied as black or brown, or 
Muslim and male, and the responses to such racialized justice sensoria have 
come to look and feel a particular way. But this is not because of something 
endemic to race or ethnicity or gender. Rather, because of the way that the 
symbolics of race operates within particular assemblages of cultural meaning 
making, power, and possibility, the fiction of difference is reproduced accord-
ing to particular modes of seeing, feeling, engaging, and speaking. And, as 
such, in various international justice assemblages involving African constitu-
encies, the manifestation of justice may look different because of the structur-
ing fields, such as various legacies from colonial institutions or the structure 
of legal temporalities that shape how justice feels in particular spaces. But, 
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again, key here are the ways that human suffering is decoupled from particular 
spaces and reproduced through moral obligations that shape justice practices 
in the contemporary period. By exploring how historically formed social loca-
tions, personal commitments, experiences, and affective practices that shape 
people’s relationships to institutions like the icc and the African Union are, 
as I have argued, regimented through particular structuring devices, such as 
figures of “victims,” “perpetrators,” and “freedom fighters,” we can tease out 
the institutional, historical, and moral orders that popularize various inter-
national justice emotional regimes.
As a conceptual framework for clarifying international justice assem-
blages, affective justice resonates at the level of both the individual (subjec-
tive) and the collective (social) consciousness. It is both the performative 
dimension of sociolegal claims to justice— what Marianne Constable, quot-
ing Stanley Cavell, has termed “passionate utterances”— as well as the embod-
ied responses operating through particular regimes of feeling that shape what 
Justin Richland calls law as both ideation and materiality.104 These forms of 
segmentation are manifest in a range of ways, including constructions of ra-
cial difference through which particular bodily inscriptions are made mean-
ingful. For the contemporary period represents, as Achille Mbembe argues, 
the manifestation of black bodies fluctuating between human and object as 
the defining feature of the modernity of black life.105 If this has relevance for 
how we understand suffering bodies and invocations of justice for those bod-
ies, then the larger questions are: What imaginaries have emerged at this junc-
tion in the production of international justice? What does it tell us about the 
modes of seeing, engaging, feeling, and speaking about both perpetrators and 
those victimized by violence? How do these modes manifest in the embodied 
affects that emerge in the field of international criminal justice? And what do 
those affects and their emotional responses tell us about structural inequal-
ities as well as particular responses to them? To understand these processes, 
we have to turn to how the emotional expressions of feelings link sociality and 
justice in our globalizing world.
Affective Justice explores such restructuring processes ethnographically, 
revealing how they are expressed through sentiments, spread institutionally, 
and work to enforce the contours of emotional expression in particular ways. 
In legal studies and studies of humanitarian formations, interrogating affect 
can be a generative way to make sense of what feeling can tell us about the 
outcomes of various legal rituals— such as trials, testimonies, or political set-
tlements. In the context of violence and its remedies, studying the deployment 
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of emotional affects can help us to understand which emotions are likely to 
mobilize support and with what discursive strategies.
By bringing together complex transnational processes with the study of 
private, interior microprocesses such as individual emotions and the regu-
lation of public sentiments, Affective Justice invites us to reconceive interna-
tional justice through assemblages of psychosocial and political meanings 
that are shaping new and old publics. Taking the products of the international 
social imaginary as key modalities for understanding the enmeshment of in-
dividual sentimental responses and larger entanglements with history and 
power, this book explores how the breakdown of particular social rules leaves 
open a space for contesting the terms on which feeling rules are negotiated 
and justice expressions are regulated in daily life.106 These attempts to rectify 
injustice make explicit the way that feelings of justice are expressed in daily 
encounters with international legality and, as such, how their reattributive 
rectification highlights the way that new remedies are put into tension.
What are the effects when international justice regimes invoke the figure 
of the perpetrator as black, African, male, and/ or Muslim, and the figure of 
the victim as female, black or brown, and with child? There is a pressing need 
to contemplate the role that affects play in justice projects and what imag-
inaries sustain these formations. And this is where the challenge of global 
ethnography emerges: the complexities of transnational alliances require that 
we remain analytically vigilant in our assessment of the categories and scales 
within which we map these connections and through which we determine 
the purpose. Through a chapter- by- chapter examination of the making, man-
ifestation, transfer, and institutionalization of feelings about justice, this book 
explores the interpretive authority of legal stakeholders and publics as influ-
encers of the contours of various body politics. While new rule-of-law insti-
tutions are emerging as manifestations of new justice/ governance projects, 
the responses of stakeholders to these institutions are also providing alter-
natives for reconceptualizing justice and governance that are linked trans-
nationally yet play out in locally complex ways. The practices involved are 
infinite and span from treaty drafting, ratification, and judicial application to 
trial attendance, nomenclature adoption, and joking practices, to refusals that 
involve rejections, withdrawals, and noncooperation declarations, as well as 
the development of countercampaigns. What connects these practices are the 
embodied feelings and emotional expressions that drive such acts. It is these 
practices that are at the heart of this book and that clarify the central role of 
affective justice in the making of international criminal law.
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Affective Justice is organized into six chapters that explore various aspects 
and illustrations of the three dynamic components we have articulated: tech-
nocratic practices, psychosocial embodied affects, and emotional regimes. 
Chapter 1 opens our inquiry into affective justice by exploring the techno-
cratic workings of legal encapsulation and its genealogies. It analyzes how a 
particular narrative of justice as law has influenced the definition and protec-
tion of victims, as well as the judicialization of politics in the late twentieth to 
early twenty- first centuries. As the justice discourse progressed, “the victim” 
was invoked not only as the subject to be saved by new judicial mechanisms, 
but also as the basis for protection through moral responsibility. By explain-
ing the rise of anti- impunity narratives and rethinking the unproblematized 
notions of the “victim” and the “perpetrator,” this chapter maps a particular 
set of formations through which to make sense of the rise of legal encapsula-
tion as a component part of contemporary rule of law assemblages. It explores 
the conditions under which humanitarian discourses have gained traction us-
ing forms of sentimental attachment to produce the establishment of interna-
tional justice. Through that mapping it details the ways in which particular 
campaigns have been deployed to substantiate such imaginaries.
Chapter 2 turns from the technical mechanisms of legal order to the  inter- 
subjective. It explores the role of passionate utterances and sentimentalized or-
igin stories, on the part of both icc advocates and critics, to consolidate con-
temporary alliances for and within institutions. By illuminating the workings 
of affective regimes and their institutional expressions, the chapter explores a 
key result of reattribution, that of affective transference, which produces par-
ticular forms of sentimental attachments in situations that could be argued to 
have otherwise unrelated causality. The connection between one distinctive 
national or military trial and a criminal tribunal, or the attempt to connect co-
lonial indictments to the icc’s charges for Kenya’s postelection violence, pro-
vide examples of the sentimental language and strategies by which these social 
imaginaries of justice are alternately internationalized and regionalized for in-
stitutional purposes. In this chapter, we see examples of how protest speech 
and celebratory rhetoric have harnessed particular sentimental histories and 
icons to consolidate communities and institutionalize feeling expressions. 
We also see how audiences respond to these rhetorical strategies. This moves 
us closer to understanding the affective politics of social protest through the 
strategy of reattribution and its unifying and galvanizing potential.
Chapter 3 explores another key affective formation in the international jus-
tice assemblage: the ways in which online justice campaigns are deployed to 
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produce a highly diversified international community with newly mediated 
victims. The Kony 2012 campaign that anti- impunity activists used to bring the 
leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda to justice is illustrative. These 
kinds of campaigns are increasingly propelled by biotechnology and senti-
mental discourses designed to mobilize publics through new moral regimes 
of saving people and preventing suffering. The deployment of the  #Bring Back 
Our Girls campaign a few years later also reflects these strategies. In this case, 
the global  #Bring Back Our Girls campaign was mobilized by concerned citi-
zens, celebrities, activists, and governments worldwide to try and save hun-
dreds of girls abducted in Chibok, Nigeria, and to pursue the prosecution of 
Boko Haram as perpetrators of that violence. This campaign is a particularly 
striking example of how political action can be spectacularly driven by emo-
tional reactions and aspirations. Such justice campaigns drive and shape re-
sponses to international legality but are not always the most useful or effective 
ways of understanding real individuals and their social worlds.107 These cam-
paigns often reveal more about the Western professional class than they do 
about African victims; they are emotional lenses through which we see only 
certain positions, and they reflect the traditions of practice through which 
particular attachments and commitments are emotionally embodied. 
This chapter also examines how the temporal immediacy of “the now” 
structures the demands and expectations about equality, such as how the im-
agery of girls denied an education by radical Islamic militants became the 
object of global empathy. However compelling, this popular temporality of 
justice with its aesthetics of care, compassion, and narrowing sense of time 
to the urgent now has not added up to its promise of delivering justice. Some 
of its subjects are pushing back, resisting the hegemonic narrowness of legal 
time and urging a historical understanding of the root causes for Boko Ha-
ram’s terror.
In Chapter 4, I extend the previous discussions to consider the workings 
of reattribution in response to technocratic legal considerations having to do 
with legal time as an ordering modality of legal encapsulation. By examining 
how the figure of the perpetrator is produced through the convergence be-
tween space/ time, culpability, and sentimentality, we see how international 
rule of law assemblages shape the domain within which emotional regimes 
propel particular understandings of justice. With its strict understandings 
and juridical demarcations, legal encapsulation concretizes a sense of stability 
about who is a perpetrator and how such a figure should be understood and 
contained. Yet this legal temporality is immediately challenged by questions 
FORMATIONS,  DISLOCATIONS,  AND UNRAVELINGS 43
about jurisdiction, admissibility, and evidence, as well as competing feelings 
about the reattribution of culpability. The question of who is responsible for 
violence against those victimized by violence automatically raises ambiguities 
about how we measure culpability, particularly in relation to political, social, 
and historical contexts.108 This chapter explores these issues through the case 
of Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, whose icc indictments cohere 
with and confirm the international image of the African perpetrator. Kenyatta 
and Ruto deflected and challenged that imagery with their own slick, techno-
logically mediated campaign that used reattributive approaches to reconcep-
tualize culpability through a colonial- postcolonial continuum. Further, many 
survivors protest the designations of criminal responsibility strictly in relation 
to individual responsibility, especially when they connect historical inequality 
with contemporary feelings that justice has been corrupted. This chapter also 
examines temporality and the reattribution of culpability from the perspective 
of survivors of the type of violence the icc attributes to Kenyatta and Ruto.
Chapter 5 follows the discussion of affective politics of social protest and 
campaigns by exploring how new cartographies of transitional justice are be-
ing drafted to reframe the debate around the judicialization of African vio-
lence. With reattribution as a core component of affective justice, I begin by 
showing how au advocates have built key campaigns, such as their “Silenc-
ing the Guns” and “I am African, I am the African Union” fiftieth anniversary 
branding, in order to reattribute justice in Africa. These campaigns operate to 
reroute emotional sensibilities through new geographical justice imaginaries 
shape the material and psychosocial body. These imaginaries, in turn, shape 
Pan- Africanist emotional regimes and mobilize the imagery of Pan- African 
histories to produce juridical, democratic, and economic possibilities on the 
African continent. By linking histories of Pan- Africanist sentiments to the af-
fects that shaped the work of the Malabo Protocol— the treaty that amends 
the African Court of Justice protocol to establish a new African court with ju-
risdiction over human rights and general and criminal matters— the chapter 
shows how its formation involved attempts to gain authority by incorporat-
ing the relevance of deep inequalities in Africa’s history. This unfolded as the 
drafters of the protocol also innovated new ways for political actors to navi-
gate the relationship between legal and diplomatic strategies. Ultimately, the 
chapter rethinks the classic tribunal- centric purview for understanding vio-
lence and its causes and instead explores the remaking of African regional in-
stitutions as an example of affective justice.
Institutionalized affects are central to how the judicialization of politics is 
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taking shape in the contemporary period, and, in this light, chapter 6 explores 
what technocratic legal instruments are being envisioned as alternatives when 
icc justice approaches are deemed inappropriate or do not work in the con-
texts in which they are intended. By examining various judicial possibilities 
and limits, this final chapter highlights various African actors and their at-
tempts to manage the judicialization of justice. These have manifested in an 
effort to expand the list of actionable crimes to include those that have en-
abled violence in Africa, as well as modes of responsibility that include corpo-
rate criminal liability. This introduction of new modes of liability represents 
particular attributions of culpability that go well beyond the individualiza-
tion of criminal responsibility. Rather, they highlight attempts to reattribute 
the terms for justice through legal and overt forms of political rearticulation. 
The crimes adjudicated per the African Court’s Malabo Protocol and the pro-
vision that grants immunity to sitting heads of state— contrary to the Rome 
Statute’s insistence on the irrelevance of official capacity— highlight how im-
portant it is to include the history of Europe’s plunder in Africa, its legacies of 
inequality, and the perception that the icc continues to control the terms of 
African subordination in how judicialized justice is both resisted and strate-
gically used through the African Court.
These issues lie at the core problematic of the formation of the African 
Court, especially in relation to the icc. For, ultimately, the emotions that have 
produced the responses to legal encapsulation are not unrelated to the goals, 
objectives, strategies, and deliberations of the project of liberalist lawmaking 
itself. They are constitutive of it and require that we uncover the structures of 
social politics that shape how individuals express emotional responses. Ul-
timately, we see that feelings of justice are not separate from power and its 
interpretive impetus for legitimizing social action. They are fundamentally 
expressed through histories of meaning making around inequality, equality, 
and the regulatory body politics that shape how sympathies are conjured and 
produced. The aesthetics of expressions, reactions to perceived racism, and 
claims of inequality highlight the extent to which emotions are a function 
of power, legality, hierarchy, authority, and legitimacy, as well as sites for ex-
ercising and enforcing feelings and feeling structures through their alliance 
with various institutions. 
In the pages that follow, Affective Justice aims to show how international 
justice works through attempts to regiment itinerant emotions and regulate 
particular social imaginaries. This is how liberal legality gains its power and 
how alternatives are produced. Through these domains of power, affective jus-
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tice practices are mobilized through the law as tools of legitimation and its 
various component parts to create the sense of immediacy, urgency, and inter-
national priorities. These affective justice mechanisms are powerful because 
they shape public feelings and have the power to erase some forms of political 
violence while placing others at the center of global moral concern. Under-
standing contemporary violence and its management by international justice 
projects, such as rule of law assemblages, should involve thinking about the 
way that international justice institutions are imbricated in complicated his-
tories and networks and, as a result, how unsettling emotions emerge from 
those imbrications.
Is there unity to this justice formation? The context of mass atrocity vio-
lence has no unifying metaphor. The coming into force of the icc has pro-
duced an assemblage of intensities, spatial and temporal, whose affects are 
rhizomatic and conflictual, turbulent and nonuniform. Ultimately, the com-
ponent parts of affective justice come together to constitute the nexus of le-
gal technocratic practice, emotional affects, and particular emotional regimes 
and provide a promising site for understanding the relationships between law, 
discourse, and feeling and between knowledge and power. The practices that 
produce justice making are often invisible and may only become evident long 
after tensions are documented. An investigation of affective justice makes 
these practices visible in real time. 
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component parts of the 
 international criminal law 
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CHAPTER 1
Genealogies of Anti- Impunity
Encapsulating Victims and Perpetrators
I cannot and will not forget the innocent Kenyans who are no longer alive to tell their 
story. I will not forget those who did live to tell their stories of survival— and who 
have waited too long for justice. These survivors are crying out for more justice, not 
less. I will continue to fight for the justice they deserve.
— Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor for the International Criminal Court
The words above, articulated by the prosecutor for the icc, were part of Fa-
tou Bensouda’s closing remarks at a press conference on the opening of the 
trial of William Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang. With determination to address 
injustice against those victimized by Kenya’s 2007–2008 electoral violence, 
her words index how the rule of law, in this case the Rome Statute for the icc, 
has become a proxy for the defense of those victimized by violence. But do 
all political actors invest confidence in the law as a primary mechanism for 
justice? Consider Bärbel Bohley, a prominent East German opposition activ-
ist who famously observed, “We wanted justice, and we got the rule of law,” 
in critique of the contemporary conflation of justice with law.1 Consider Wil-
liam Ruto, the deputy president of Kenya, who during his pretrial hearing for 
crimes against humanity attempted to broaden the bid for justice by expand-
ing the terms of victimhood. In a conciliatory, reflexive, and assertive tone, he 
argued that there were two types of “victims” following Kenya’s postelection 
violence, casting himself within one category. According to Ruto, there were 
“the post- election violence victims, whose lives and property were destroyed 
and deserve justice and truth; and another set of victims which I belong to, 
victims of a syndicate of falsehood and a conspiracy of lies choreographed by 
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networks that are obviously against truth and justice.”2 Ultimately, he claimed, 
he was a victim of structural violence at the hands of the icc.
Some people received Ruto’s remarks sympathetically and affirmed his plight. 
To others, his claims were laughable and defiled the very idea of suffering. The 
executive director of the ngo Coalition for the icc responded to Ruto’s invoca-
tion of victimhood by insisting, “States should not be distracted by the efforts 
of certain leaders to portray themselves as victims when the Court guarantees 
fair trial rights. The Assembly should stay focused on strengthening the Court’s 
work and impact so that the actual victims of icc crimes receive redress.”3 A year 
earlier, then–deputy prosecutor Bensouda had responded to a similar sentiment 
in which members of the African elite claimed the icc had victimized them:
What offends me most when I hear criticisms about the so- called African 
bias is how quick we are to focus on the words and propaganda of a few 
powerful, influential individuals and to forget about the millions of anon-
ymous people that suffer from these crimes . . . because all the victims are 
African victims. Indeed, the greatest affront to victims of these brutal and 
unimaginable crimes . . . women and young girls raped, families brutalised, 
robbed of everything, entire communities terrorised and shattered . .  . is 
to see those powerful individuals responsible for their sufferings trying to 
portray themselves as the victims of a pro- western, anti- African court.4
The language Bensouda uses reflects a juridified notion of justice in which 
agents of the court equate justice with legal accountability and claim moral 
responsibility as its motivation.5 In this case, the narrative construction of 
justice as law invokes the mission of protecting survivors against powerful 
“perpetrators” of violence who have engaged in the exemption from punish-
ment for too long.
The icc’s legal mission presumes that in order to protect those victimized 
by violence, justice must be understood as the objective manifestation of law. 
Bensouda’s remarks also privilege contemporary definitions of suffering. For 
her, survivors of “brutal and unimaginable crimes” occupy a category of per-
sons whom the law must protect. The sacred space of victimhood must not be 
open to expansion. But Ruto’s remarks, however controversial in context, do 
open up space for noticing how the notion of the “victim” in Kenya’s postelec-
tion context has become popularized to refer specifically to those subjected to 
violent physical attacks on the body. While ideas about structural, political, 
and economic violence once had a place in progressive politics on the African 
continent, Ruto’s remarks cast in relief the narrowing of definitional spaces 
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within which judicial processes are playing out. This delimitation of who is 
a “victim” and what constitutes victimhood has been accomplished through 
the popularization of a victim- protection discourse and is not unrelated to the 
rise of the construction of the perpetrator, to which I return later in this chap-
ter and in the subsequent chapters.
It is presumed today that to utter the words “victims want justice” is to as-
sume that victims want adjudication. We can see this illustrated at a February 
2014 status conference in the icc case against Uhuru Kenyatta, now president 
of Kenya. Fergal Gaynor, the victims’ case representative, told the following 
story about the survivors he represents:
I referred earlier to a woman I met who was gang- raped by Mungiki at-
tackers and then doused in paraffin and set alight. She was lucky to be res-
cued. Nine months later she gave birth to a little boy. His biological father 
is a Mungiki rapist. The woman explained all of this to her husband— who, 
as you will recall, was himself hacked repeatedly by the Mungiki and left 
for dead that same day. He understood his wife’s hellish predicament. And 
today they are raising together that little boy. Conceived through rape he 
is being raised in love. What does he [the husband] want— taking into ac-
count the horrors that he and his wife were subjected to? His answer is jus-
tice. With justice, he told me, “There can be reconciliation.” But if there is 
no justice he won’t be able to find it in his heart to forgive.6
Gaynor concluded with the following: “For there to be true reconciliation 
there must be truth. For there to be truth, there must be evidence— all the ev-
idence that is necessary to uncover the truth. For there to be evidence, there 
must be state cooperation and for that, the accused must give the order. . . .  
Justice ultimately is truth. It is the whole truth in all its measures. It is the re-
jection of those who try to create obstacles for reaching those truths. . . .  They 
say in Kiswahili, ‘Haki huinua taifa.’ In English, ‘Justice elevates a nation.’”
In this passage Gaynor connects the notion of true reconciliation with 
justice, which is fundamentally achieved through legal measures. The impli-
cation is that one may uncover the truth of violence only through juridical de-
liberations. This concept of justice, he argues, will produce the conditions for 
an elevated nation. This reduces justice to legal justice or legal accountability 
as the precondition for reconciliation. The language of legal encapsulation un-
derlies this veneer of justice as law, erasing the political and economic realities 
of violence by judicializing them. The impacts of this reduction are especially 
notable in cases where poverty has contributed significantly to the conditions 
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for and vulnerabilities to violence, such as in Kenya, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, and the Central African Republic— all countries where the icc 
has intervened.7 Gaynor’s rhetorical strategies appeal to the listener’s sorrow 
and sense of righteous indignation when faced with innocent civilians whose 
personal lives have been destroyed by violence.
The form of sentimentality that we see in Gaynor and Bensouda’s speeches 
has its roots in the humanitarian ethos of giving, holding accountable, pro-
tecting, and saving. Seemingly benign and benevolent, the judicialization of 
justice has been used to justify and enable mechanisms that safeguard the 
property of elites and protect foreign investments. Even as practices of affec-
tive justice are aligned with particular assemblages that include emotional re-
gimes and technocratic legal knowledge, the exercise of power includes the 
state security apparatus, which has also been shaped by biopolitical mecha-
nisms, including external state intervention, military action, economic assis-
tance, and health aid.8 Neocolonial systems of dependency, in turn, reinforce 
Western legal approaches, creating a feedback loop of assemblages that guar-
antee particular forms of control and contestation. Through the coupling 
of emotional incitement and material intervention, the individualization of 
criminal responsibility in relation to the defense of a certain kind of “victim” 
has become central to discourses of justice in the contemporary period. Hold-
ing a figurehead such as William Ruto responsible for mass crimes under his 
watch (and possibly at his behest) is one example of this discourse in action. 
Legal encapsulation can be brought to bear on explanations of how displace-
ment functions and why it is not easily measured as an outcome of justice but 
comes into view with attention to emotional affect. Through these displace-
ments others are also refusing hegemonic justice forms of legality and engag-
ing in counterprocesses that, while they involve the application of the same 
legal doctrines, are reconceptualized and propelled through a spirit of refusal. 
This happens through narratives that are personally or publicly communi-
cated and that become aligned institutionally with specific emotional com-
munities, such as those that icc prosecutor Bensouda constituted through 
anti- impunity organizing. As such, the particular figures that emerge are nar-
rativized in particular emotional registers. In this case, Bensouda’s liberal-
ist legal discourse emerges through particular ways of organizing subjects 
and then erasing the conditions of their making. Yet those engaged in the 
instrumentalization and dissemination of this discourse do not necessarily 
recognize how their speech acts depend on affect. Indeed, on the contrary, 
liberal legality requires a belief in its predictability and objectivity as well as 
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the power to exercise its principles. In theory, feelings are disavowed and dis-
appeared because they signal subjectivity. However, if we recognize that, in 
practice, emotions respond to particular types of social experiences, then we 
can see how particular sentimentalized feelings can be mobilized to place 
emotion in the service of a differentiated objective. 
Let us turn to another example to highlight the contested and divergent 
nature of the victimhood discourse. In this case, Kiamu is a survivor of the 
effects of postelection violence in Kenya. He claims the category of victim-
hood in terms that question the ability of the icc to secure a reparative form 
of justice:
One of the biggest weaknesses of Kenyan criminal law is that we do not 
have a scheme for compensating victims of crime and the idea that these 
people of the 2007 violence are the only victims of crime. They’re not the 
only victims of crime. I’m also a victim of crime. I lost ten teeth— I nearly 
died; the state isn’t compensating me. The best the state will do if they find 
the guys who beat me, they might even hang them, but they’ll never pay 
me a coin for the injuries I’ve suffered. We’ve had victims in this country 
since the colonial times, so if you’re going to address the system of victims 
of political violence in Kenya we do it holistically. We begin with the day 
the British landed here, the evictions that the settlers did— today the big-
gest landowners are settlers. All of these issues need to be addressed.
Here we see not only a strong conviction about the limits of culpability in 
domestic and international criminal law, but also a critique concerning the 
inability of international law to adequately protect or compensate those vic-
timized by violence.9 Kiamu claims the status of a victim not only by talking 
about his social category but also by invoking narratives of loss, suffering, and 
the pain of erasure. In doing so, his narrative establishes and reproduces par-
ticular rhetorical structures that invoke the listener’s sympathy and have the 
potential to secure emotional affinities. Kiamu does this while also problema-
tizing the legal encapsulation of “victims.” 
Today, some of those victimized by violence are popularly understood to be 
individuals we have a responsibility to protect. And various people engaged in 
the production of sentiment about victimhood often invoke justice in relation 
to narrowly tailored legal processes. As this narrative becomes normalized, 
law is increasingly seen as the proper domain for vetting sociopolitical issues. 
The figures of both the “victim” and the “perpetrator” are central to the pro-
duction of an emotional domain of action around which the rule of law, hu-
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man rights law, and humanitarianism have come into being alongside larger 
biopolitical processes.10 Thus, what is important is not so much that those fig-
ures have emerged, but that the law can only rescue someone who has already 
been victimized ex post facto— after the fact. This makes it impossible to pre-
sume that legality can end suffering in and of itself. Rather, this chapter shows 
how law’s biopolitical techniques contribute to the technocratic management 
of violence through its emotive and aspirational force. Seen as such, what in-
ternational legal invocations of the victim to be saved do, as I have shown 
elsewhere, is to produce imaginative hauntings of a “victim,” like a specter or 
a ghost.11 The figure of a victimized body has both a presence and absence 
that structures international justice projects in particular ways. As such, the 
idea of an individual “victim” has been, in turn, reduced to someone who suf-
fered physical violence perpetrated against their individual body. Structural 
forms of victimhood caused by deep and persistent conditions of economic 
or political disenfranchisement fade from the new justice discourse. This de-
velopment reflects a new international order in which the desire to manage 
violence and the need to mobilize extrastate support for the defense of partic-
ular survivors have become part of a critical narrative triangulation— victims, 
justice, law— that is deployed through affective justice. 
In an attempt to understand how the biopolitics of justice has gained in-
fluence in the definition and protection of survivors as well as the articulation 
of action against “perpetrators” of violence, this chapter explores the ways 
in which legal encapsulation has taken shape and has regimented particu-
lar emotional expressions of justice. In this regard, the language of justice as 
law has been deliberately crafted over time. As the language of individualism 
rose in significance, the focus on the individual criminal responsibility of state 
commanders became central. And alongside that narrative circulation is also 
the relevance of historical, colonial, and postcolonial developments in Afri-
can landscapes in which global domains of structural inequality have become 
manifest in a range of sentimentalized justice practices. 
A significant part of European involvement in Africa over the past few 
centuries was founded on and structured by the interrelationship of settler 
colonialism and the emergence of capitalism. When the management of Af-
rican violence is understood in relation to the workings of white supremacy, 
patriarchy, and particular legal logics, we see how the twenty- first- century 
emergence of justice as law sentiments is not unrelated to the structural in-
equalities within which postcolonial Africa’s violence is unfolding. From the 
postindependence failures of African state experiments in the 1960s through 
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the 1990s, African dependencies on International Monetary Fund (imf) and 
World Bank projects contributed to states becoming increasingly economi-
cally and politically vulnerable to neocolonial forms of extraction and con-
trol. By the early twenty- first century, a highly orchestrated and carefully 
designed international campaign of human rights law, humanitarian law, and 
international criminal law emerged with Africa as its focus. Postconflict Af-
rican states became experimental sites for a new generation of technocratic 
knowledge— including legal scholars and practitioners (mostly from North 
America, Europe, and Australia), who amassed armies of interns and grad-
uates eager to deploy the tools of legal education while launching and ad-
vancing international careers.12 These actors alongside freshly minted legal 
professionals in Africa and other parts of the Global South (all of whom I later 
describe through the figure of “the international community”) participated in 
the development of international legal practice and scholarship and collabo-
rated with— at times were led by— northern technocrats committed to using 
law, such as domestic and international prosecutions, to rectify violence.
In The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World 
Politics, Kathryn Sikkink argued that the enactment of international and do-
mestic judicial prosecutions across the globe constitutes a new trend in world 
politics. It signals a turn toward holding state officials criminally accountable 
for human rights violations. By examining how prosecutorial justice is estab-
lishing a new basis for morality, she charts a trajectory of increasing demand for 
individual prosecutions and argues that they reflect a radical change toward so-
cial insistence on accountability through prosecution. This development reflects 
what she calls justice cascades. From the Nuremberg tribunals and Tokyo trials, 
to the prosecutions of Pinochet and Milosevic through ad hoc tribunals, to the 
coming into force of the icc, Sikkink argues that a new norm that centers indi-
vidual accountability has spread across the world. She favors an explanation that 
focuses on the accumulated impact of a growing body of advocates across the 
world who have embraced this framework for justice. Thus, justice cascades as a 
metaphor for the emergence of legal encapsulation in the contemporary period 
reflect the shift in the transformation of the legitimacy of the norm of holding 
high- ranking leaders accountable for various international human rights crimes. 
As she argues, “Norms are intersubjective, that is, they are held by groups of peo-
ple. But norms start as ideas held by a handful of individuals. These individuals 
try to turn their favored ideas into norms. . . .  When these norm entrepreneurs 
succeed, norms spread rapidly, leading to a norms cascade.”13 
While it is empirically true that we have seen an increase in the number of 
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judicial mechanisms in the contemporary period, there are in fact many ways 
to account for their rise. To suggest that a widespread and enthusiastic accep-
tance of new justice norms is the primary factor is to miss the significance of 
the consolidation of technocratic knowledge, affects, and emotional regimes 
in shaping the terms by which affective justice has emerged to constitute in-
ternational rule of law assemblages. For Sikkink, the expansion of demands 
for accountability and the spread of new norms are being applied equally 
across the board, but I argue that these realities continue to be asymmetrical 
because they are infinitely varied and temporally explosive. They are shaped 
and guarded by persistent structural inequalities between the Global North 
and Global South. As the icc indictment statistics show, and as we have al-
ready seen some of their critics argue, prosecutorial justice is practiced differ-
entially according to geography, with postcolonial regions— characterized by 
deep underlying economic difficulties and evacuated institutions— deemed 
more in need of international judicial intervention. 
Furthermore, to presume that the rise and spread of criminal trials is in-
dicative of new forms of justice patterns that are cascading and producing 
new norms is to misrepresent the actual rise and spread of the rule of law 
mechanisms that various stakeholders are deploying. What I aim to show is 
that the judicialization of politics and the manifestation of what Sikkink refers 
to as justice cascades are not arbitrary or objective. Nor are they reflections of 
the natural progression of prosecutorial justice in the contemporary period, 
as Sikkink suggests. Their contemporary manifestation structures the possi-
bilities around which legality functions and is a result of various processes of 
delimitation. The justice outcomes highlight the limits of legality in politically 
shaped conditions of turmoil. In an attempt to demonstrate how forms of 
technocratic power circulate and combine with particular emotional regimes 
to constitute affective justice, it is important to understand how contestations 
over notions of justice respond to various forms of displacements by anti- 
impunity activists that lead to reattributions of justice. As central promoters 
of legal accountability in the name of survivors, anti- impunity discourses are 
often divorced from the actual biopolitics of the rule of law movement. How-
ever, the separation of political- economic and legal processes from affects and 
regulatory regimes of power misses the way that histories of plunder and cor-
ruption are deeply bound up in histories of inequality and institutional desta-
bilization in the African postcolony. This disconnect also misses the way that 
articulations of the rule of law have become naturalized and how the particu-
larities of African postcolonial contexts are deeply tied to Western imaginar-
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ies that situate African populations or leaders as lacking order, susceptible to 
violence, or simply evading justice.
Similar gaps are evident in the prominent counterarguments related to po-
litical and legal issues raised in the contributions of political scientists Kath-
ryn Sikkink and Beth Simmons in The Future of Human Rights, where they 
argue that there is no evidence that the dominant approach to justice under-
way in criminal tribunals actually displaces other ways of thinking about jus-
tice. However, when we demonstrate how such forms of legal justice represent 
the encapsulation of justice through the figure of the victim, we see how this 
displacement functions as an erasure of other justice mobilizations. Thus, 
quantifying the trial as a measure of justice cannot be easily measured as an 
outcome; instead, what comes into view is what other justice modalities come 
into play.
This chapter seeks to explore a key component part of affective justice— the 
deployment of international law’s technocratic power and its embeddedness 
in particular structures of emotion. It seeks to show how a particular hege-
monic rule of law discourse of justice and individual criminal responsibility 
has, through an assemblage of component parts, narrowed the category of 
“victim” in particular ways. This narrowing has resulted in a substantive dis-
juncture in which a new (post- 1999) conception of justice is being propelled 
through particular emotional regimes aligned with the emergence of neolib-
eral forms of economic and political governance. International rule of law for-
mations combined with the emergence of transitional justice as a concept and 
gave rise to an ngo- led movement of anti- impunity that centers the court as 
the site of justice. By reifying the act of holding perpetrators accountable for 
mass violence, the anti- impunity movement has introduced and defended a 
logic by which structural inequality is addressed through judicialization. The 
emotional push-back from various Pan-Africanists is invigorated by ques-
tions about what this says about the politics and geographies of violence. 
To understand how this has come about, we must pay attention to the ways 
in which emotional regimes have been deployed in the post–Cold War era. In 
this moment, the reorganization of sovereignty, democracy, and various neo-
liberal forms of economic expansionism with the defense of the victim at its 
base is not accidental. This construction represents a particular alliance be-
tween economics, politics, morality, and the law, which reflects the link be-
tween affective sentiments and liberal legality. With these developments, the 
passionate, sentimental mobilization of what I call anti- impunity demands 
has been key to the establishment of new norms in support of criminal pros-
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ecutions as the solution to mass atrocity violence. The affects that augment 
these justice forms have come to be seen as legally necessary, and, following 
Karen Engle, they are central to the perceived relevance of criminal prosecu-
tions as appropriate mechanisms for holding “perpetrators” accountable for 
violence in the twenty- first century.14
When we foreground the deeply political and historical nature of vio-
lence in Africa and point to the importance of recognizing that Africa’s con-
temporary violence is deeply embedded in its histories of destabilization and 
plunder— a process that continues even today, in subtle form but nonetheless 
damaging— we see that the story about prosecutorial justice takes on differ-
ent forms of relevance. Instead, a particular discourse of ending the impunity 
of African leaders has emerged as the triumphant call of the twenty- first cen-
tury without regard to the conditions of inequality and the histories of inhu-
manity and structural violence that pervaded black life prior to and during 
colonialism and well after it. This discourse is symptomatic of a deep- rooted 
problem in the African postcolony; as we shall see, the structural conditions of 
inequality— what Thabo Mbeki and Mahmood Mamdani have referred to as 
the political nature of African violence— are rendered secondary.15 This mar-
ginalization has contributed to the legal encapsulation of the victim and the 
perpetrator— developments that are not seen as solutions by everyone, includ-
ing some of the “victims” that trials are meant to help. And, as I show, what 
we see is how the black body or the discourse related to the African woman or 
child to be saved becomes part of the way that both the imaginary and its re-
lated sensorium are playing out in new internationalist biopolitical regimes.
Neoliberalism, the Washington Consensus, and the Rule of Law
The history of the contemporary state form with its new international justice 
mechanisms, like the history of the African state, is a modern experiment. The 
origins of contemporary transitional justice can be located in World War I and 
then traced through the Cold War.16 This phase saw the emergence of the De-
cember 11, 1946, un General Assembly, which affirmed the principles of inter-
national law recognized by the charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as 
the December 10, 1948, un General Assembly, which adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.17 Many scholars have characterized the post–
Cold War period as a phase of accelerated democratization in which new de-
mocracies flourished after the collapse of repressive leaders.18 This period saw 
the application of the universal exercise of international law through the ex-
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tradition of Chilean ex- dictator Augusto Pinochet, arrested in London after 
being indicted by Spanish lawyer Baltasar Garson. Through this narrative, le-
gal scholars like Ruti G. Teitel, among others, have identified a third phase— 
 post- 1990s— characterized by heightened political instability and violence 
and the subsequent increase in international peace strategies that feature 
pressure to institutionalize criminal prosecutions. The progression of these 
three phases has resulted in prosecutorial justice as the new norm.
And where the state experiment in the Global North led to the establish-
ment of democratic institutions, the establishment of states in Africa followed 
not only colonial forms of governance that were fundamentally extraction 
oriented, but forms of governance with diminishing institutional capacities. 
Independent African states retained colonial boundaries and began to estab-
lish their institutions in keeping with these archetypes for the new postcolo-
nial experiments. But there were challenges that primarily had to do with the 
production of national and homogenous unity in the midst of heterogeneous 
sovereignties and competitions over governance. 
From Africa to Latin America and from East Asia to South Asia, the for-
mer colonies tried various governance experiments following independence. 
By the 1960s, newly postcolonial African states began to struggle to establish 
new democratic models that reflected new constitutions. Even as constitu-
tional democracies were being birthed in Africa, Western states were tran-
sitioning to the market economy as the basis for state governance. Even as 
new African independent states attempted to establish social market princi-
ples carried over and adapted from imperial governments, former colonizers 
were embracing neoliberal economic reforms involving deregulation and the 
reduction of state influence, the elimination of price controls, and the dimin-
ishing of trade barriers in favor of market freedom.
Neoliberal reform had profound consequences as African states, with their 
nascent institutions, were pulled into the international economy and com-
pelled to negotiate terms of extraction and compensation with their former 
colonial powers. As imperial forms of colonial protectionism were withdrawn, 
many African states experienced chaos even as economic extraction persisted 
in new forms. The shift to independence signaled a precarious period for 
postcolonial states, in which they were “exposed, weakened, and stripped of 
their monopolies on violence.”19 One result was a vulnerability to attacks from 
dissident groups from within nation- states and regions. When conflicts in Af-
rica erupted after the end of the Cold War, there was no remaining impera-
tive for Western powers to intervene in defense of Western interests.20 In the 
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absence of century- old institutions of colonial power, new domains of power 
emerged through, at times, the exercise of brutal force. Extreme forms of vi-
olence manifested in brutal dictatorships, such as former president Hissène 
Habré’s regime in Chad. This had the effect of widening gaps between the state 
and various constituent communities, and further weakening the governance 
systems that were in place. 
The recent histories of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, 
Liberia, Kenya, Nigeria, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Congo- Brazzaville all fit this 
trajectory. Each has a history of authoritarian dictatorships, rebel groups, and 
various international companies and governments deeply embroiled in con-
trolling land and or extracting resources. This dangerous interplay has deep 
roots. During the scramble for Africa, Western powers dictated mineral and 
resource extraction. Over time, the colonization process led to the creation, 
institutionalization, and exacerbation of various ethnic or religious tensions 
that persist today. Colonization, the conditions of decolonization, and the re-
assertion of neocolonization form the bedrock of instability and mass vio-
lence that has given rise to most of the contemporary cases being taken up 
by the icc.21 
Given this history, it is no surprise that the contemporary period (1980s 
to the present) has been rife with the eruption of challenges over governance. 
Electoral disputes in Kenya, Ivory Coast, and Sudan, for example, led to mass 
violence. Accordingly, the rule of law has emerged as the barometer for the 
measure of progress in Africa, without regard for the deeper work of rebuild-
ing the social, political, economic, and legal institutions decimated by gen-
erations of extraction and exploitation. There is now a persistent impasse 
between what is legible to rule of law mechanisms, which individualize mass 
atrocity violence, and the more complex and far- reaching explanations and 
solutions that acknowledge the tumultuous impact that Western powers have 
had in Africa.
Over the past twenty years, Africa has suffered ten civil wars directly re-
lated to struggles over land redistribution and mineral extraction. These con-
flicts have caused widespread destruction and untold numbers of killings 
and rapes, ultimately leading to the militarization of everyday life. This vi-
olence is traceable to colonial legacies and the ways in which postindepen-
dence states attempted to control their capital cities and rural regions— with 
minimal success in the latter— through military takeovers and the autocratic 
suppression of opposition movements and democratic constitutionalism. In 
what is known as Françafrique, France is seen as being in a neocolonial rela-
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tionship with its former African colonies. In Anglophone Africa, we see the 
deployment of British and American military interventions that seek to shape 
the management of African political stability and economic growth, the most 
dramatic of which was the use of military operatives to accomplish successive 
coups throughout Africa in the 1960s, ’70s, ’80s, and ’90s.22 In Nigeria, for ex-
ample, the discovery of oil in 1966 (just ten years after independence) led to 
decades of struggle over control of petroleum wealth. This contributed to the 
formation of a highly centralized federal body and minimal long- term devel-
opment of state institutions. Uneven distribution of power between federal 
and regional/ local governments led to the development and maintenance of 
patronage politics that saw the political sphere as the central site of social ad-
vancement. This led to the autocratic tightening of political power and a series 
of military coups as the primary mechanism through which political compet-
itors could agitate for power. 
By the 1980s, a new international liberal economic order arose to advo-
cate for deregulation, privatization, and the enhancement of private- sector 
development. In 1981 the World Bank published what became known as the 
“Berg Report” (named after author Elliot Berg) on accelerated growth in sub- 
Saharan Africa.23 Among the key recommendations were market- oriented 
policies and reductions in government expenditures. These recommenda-
tions were soon reflected in World Bank and imf lending practices; loans 
were granted in exchange for commitments to market- stimulating reforms 
(structural adjustment policies).
In 1989, English economist John Williamson coined the term Washing-
ton Consensus to refer to a strongly market- based approach to development. 
It highlights ten relatively specific economic policy prescriptions consid-
ered central to the standard reforms for the economic and political crises in 
the Global South. This framework was promoted by the imf, the US Trea-
sury Department, and the World Bank. Its prescriptions dictated policy ap-
proaches to macroeconomic stabilization, economic opening with respect to 
both trade and investment, and the expansion of market forces within the do-
mestic economy. Themes such as “stabilize, privatize, and liberalize” became 
the mantra of a generation of Western consultants who came of age travel-
ing to meet with political leaders in southern countries to offer economic de-
velopment advice.24 These technocrats inspired a wave of reforms in Latin 
America and sub- Saharan Africa that fundamentally transformed the policy 
landscape in these regions toward privatization, deregulation, and trade lib-
eralization.25 The market- driven reforms proved to be ill suited to deal with 
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public health emergencies, poverty, and social inequality that were in fact ex-
acerbated during this period.26 This resulted in a cycle of underdevelopment 
in which the poor grew poorer and the only avenues for profit were extractive 
industries such as oil, mining, or plantation agriculture— industries that are 
characterized by violent and exploitative labor conditions. Meanwhile, state 
institutions ranging from the police and military to schools and hospitals 
were underfunded, with workers generally under- or even unpaid. 
Given these conditions, it is not surprising that contests for political con-
trol (i.e., access to wealth) have triggered electoral violence in many post-
colonial states, and that in some cases intra- and interstate rebel groups have 
emerged to vie for political influence and the control of extraction industries. 
In the midst of political strife, international organizations have generally bro-
kered structural changes that ultimately benefit Western states and corpora-
tions in negotiating and sustaining agreements that continue to funnel most 
of Africa’s extracted wealth out of the continent. 
In short, neoliberal policies failed to result in economic development and 
actually did the opposite, exacerbating inequality.27 In evaluating the failures 
of the dictates to stabilize, privatize, and liberalize, the World Bank turned 
its focus from African states to institutions. What resulted was the merger of 
mainstream development theory with the ideology of the rule of law. Those 
technical experts engaged in development praxis recognized that economic 
growth also required the institutional transformation of property rights, le-
gal institutions, and the judiciary. They worked through Western- rooted in-
ternational institutions such as the World Bank to articulate a new rule of 
law discourse in which good governance meant a new set of policy strategies 
aimed at securing economic growth not so much through market efficiency 
crafted by structural adjustment as through the consolidation of democracy, 
the upholding of human rights, and the reduction of corruption.28 In fact, 
the 2004 World Bank rule of law definition, which was part of the unveiling 
of its twenty- first- century development policies, centered the need for legal 
predictability and property rights protection as requirements for good gover-
nance.29 The assumption was that if neoliberal policies had failed, it was be-
cause of the absence of a secure institutional environment, rather than flaws 
in the policies themselves.
The law and legal institutions— component parts of international rule of 
law assemblages— were central to this new discourse, which signaled that 
transparent legislation, fair laws, predictable enforcement, and accountable 
governments would be essential to maintain order, promote private- sector 
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growth, fight poverty, and achieve legitimacy.30 The ultimate strategic goal 
was to ensure predictable market conditions. The challenge was to measure 
governance and commitment through the development of predictive indica-
tors. The World Bank developed a Worldwide Governance Indicators ranking 
system in which it categorized countries in relation to six aspects of good gov-
ernance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of cor-
ruption.31 The World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index is said to measure 
how the rule of law is experienced in daily life in a cross section of households. 
Based on data collected from over 100,000 households and 2,400 expert sur-
veys in ninety- nine countries worldwide, it highlights forty- seven indicators 
that are said to index the following themes: constraints on government pow-
ers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and 
security, regulatory enforcement, and civil and criminal justice.32 It also pro-
duces data for analyzing various challenges, regional strengths, and best and 
worst practices.
These indicators were used by foreign- aid donor agencies to allocate fund-
ing according to various predictions of compliance.33 As Sally Merry and oth-
ers have described, “An indicator is a named, rank- ordered representation of 
past or projected performance by different units that uses numerical data to 
simplify a more complex social phenomenon, drawing on scientific expertise 
and methodology. The representation is capable of being used to compare 
particular units of analy sis (such as countries or persons), and to evaluate 
their performance by reference to one or more standards.”34 Indicators are 
said to produce systems of knowledge in which various phenomena are or-
dered, even as particular claims are asserted according to legal, moral, and 
scientific measures.35 Indicators have thus become part of the new democracy 
of the twenty- first century. They purport to measure compliance as well as 
predict volatility, risk, and economic viability. 
The shift to the rule of law, and the associated support for its principles, 
institutions, and measurable indicators, opened up space for the unsc to op-
erationalize the notion of international justice through the establishment of 
various ad hoc tribunals and, subsequently, the icc. In addition to serving as 
a measure for various state conditions and a predictor of a range of outcomes 
(including state stability, fragility, and the probability of violence), the new 
rule of law indicators mattered greatly in postcolonial Africa because they 
played a critical role in the renewal of imf and World Bank loans, as well as 
in ensuring the ongoing support of international donors.36 It is not only that 
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historic patterns of structural inequality are illegible to these judicial frame-
works, but also that they are used, via the mechanism of indicators, to justify 
the perpetuation of neocolonial dependency and disparity at the institutional 
level. 
The Limits of Transitional Justice: The Transition from Forgiveness  
to Legal Accountability 
Even as international institutions were reconfiguring economic neoliberal-
ism and associated pro- democracy institutions, they were also articulating 
new humanitarian principles embedded in various un resolutions and inter-
national treaties. This new discourse reconfigured the reach of law and lo-
cated the individual at the center of foreign affairs. The figure of the individual 
was cast in two key roles: the high- level “perpetrator” criminally responsible 
for mass atrocities, and the “victim” to be saved from the perpetrator’s vio-
lence. This rule of law discourse centered on the individualization of crimi-
nal responsibility became known as transitional justice, which can be defined 
as a form of justice that is associated with political change and, in particu-
lar, can serve as a legal response to the violence of repressive regimes. It is 
a post facto measure used to enable postviolence transitions to peace once 
conflicts are over. It advocates for justice strategies to redress mass violence, 
especially when it is state sponsored or connected to armed conflict aimed 
at overthrowing government regimes.37 The tools of transitional justice were 
developed through the spread of truth commissions, the formation of quasi- 
judicial mechanisms that document past abuses through truth telling, all with 
the goal of achieving a political transition.38 The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (trc) was among the first to popularize the po-
tential of transitional justice. 
In the aftermath of widespread systematic violence in South Africa, emo-
tional discourses of forgiveness were everywhere in the public sphere, and 
people were being compelled to display bodily suffering by performing for-
giveness. In 1995, following the toppling of South Africa’s apartheid regime, 
the new government established the trc to document “the truth” about the 
past violence of the ruling apartheid government and repair the consequences 
of race- based exclusions that structured South African life. The objective was 
to lead the nation through a collective transition from the wounding and an-
ger under apartheid to forgiveness and restoration. It was assumed that those 
who were able to forgive were ultimately better off than those who were not 
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able to do so.39 Chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the trc centered 
themes of individual guilt, forgiveness, and reconciliation, rather than on in-
stitutional change and reparations, deploying a religiously infused logic built 
not only on a moral basis but also on a deeply emotional one. As noted by the 
former minister of justice, Dullah Omar, the commission was “a necessary ex-
ercise to enable South Africans to come to terms with their past on a morally 
accepted basis and to advance the cause of reconciliation.”40 Apartheid had 
oppressed generations of South Africans and led to the escalation of conflict, 
resulting in violence and human rights abuses. No section of society escaped 
these abuses. As a response to the far- reaching consequences of apartheid, 
the trc forums required moral and emotional performances of a necessary 
forgiveness in order to usher in social buy- in to a postapartheid landscape.41 
Albie Sachs, a former African National Congress activist, explained that 
the trc’s open hearings were central to its effectiveness: “To me, the most im-
portant part of the truth commission was not the report, it was the seeing on 
television of the tears, the laments, the stories, the acknowledgements.”42 This 
utterance highlights the way that emotional displays related to experiences of 
violence are central to the conversion of those experiences of violence into 
new states of reconciliation. 
Bishop Tutu took the opportunity to preach that forgiveness should in-
habit the spaces opened up by truth telling. As he has uttered passionately, 
time and time again, the wounds of hatred and anger created by the apartheid 
system must not overtake society. He said, “There was no place for retaliation 
in the new society that emerged after independence.”43 Describing the trc as 
an “incubation chamber for national healing, reconciliation and forgiveness,” 
he insisted, “When I talk of forgiveness I mean the belief that you can come 
out the other side a better person. A better person than the one being con-
sumed by anger and hatred. . . .  If you can find it in yourself to forgive then 
you are no longer chained to the perpetrator. You can move on, and you can 
even help the perpetrator to become a better person too.”44 Many of the sto-
ries told at the trc reflected a progression from truth to forgiveness. Though 
affectively embodied and reflecting the angst and pain of subordination, they 
also emerged in the context of sentimental forgiveness strategies that con-
ferred legitimacy on new forms of South African governance. These strategies 
were also deployed to attempt a postviolence transition in the aftermath of the 
Rwandan genocide (April to July 1994) and were articulated in keeping with 
predominant regimes of expression and feeling.
The period following the Rwandan genocide saw the deployment of pas-
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sionate discourses that centered the practice of saving victims and holding 
perpetrators accountable at the core of justice. For example, the musician and 
peace activist Jean Paul Samputu spoke about how God had shown him the 
way and that he was surprised that people found it hard to forgive Christians 
(because of the church’s moral and political culpability during the genocide). 
He stressed that, for him, “forgiveness had nothing to do with the perpetrator 
but rather meant a release from the bondage of hatred.”45 Samputu reminded 
his constituencies that “it was human- beings who did this— the world should 
learn from Rwanda. . . .  We live in a world where the culture of revenge reigns, 
forgiveness should be our permanent attitude.”46 
A woman on the same podium added that sometimes being a Christian 
can complicate forgiveness because of the undue pressure on Christians to 
forgive others. But in clarifying different forms of forgiveness, she drew a dis-
tinction between psychological forgiveness (promoting improved health and 
well- being) and Christian forgiveness, which she described as being “based 
on the fact that God has forgiven me.” Then, after a short silence she reflected, 
“That’s quite overwhelming for me. If God can forgive me, who am I not to 
forgive others?”47 
What became clear was that forgiveness also required the acknowledg-
ment that a “perpetrator” had committed an offense. And while some vic-
timized by the brutalities of the apartheid regime did offer forgiveness, the 
overall “perpetrators” of such violence did not generally acknowledge their 
wrongdoing.48 The forgiveness projects that were generated through transi-
tional justice projects provided a wealth of testimonies in which ordinary cit-
izens shared their experiences in dealing with forgiveness, always structuring 
them in relation to particular emotional structures of expectation. But the fig-
ure of the “perpetrator” remained elusive. The “oppressor role” was glossed 
as the apartheid system writ large, white racism, histories of inequality, and 
President de Klerk as a symbol of a racist minority, but with no particular 
person or people from whom to extract accountability. For example, during 
a South African trc hearing, one witness, a teenage daughter of one of those 
victimized by apartheid’s violence, described the incident in which her rela-
tives were murdered: “The police ambushed their car, killed them in the most 
gruesome manner, set their car alight.” When asked whether she would be 
able to forgive the people who did this to her family, she answered, “We would 
like to forgive, but we would just like to know who to forgive.”49
The absence of an individualized “perpetrator” was seen as a weakness of 
the South African trc. Critics argued that, as a quasi- judicial mechanism 
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with no adjudicatory power, the trc placed a burden on the forgiveness of 
survivors rather than holding the “perpetrators” accountable and offering re-
course for what was seen as some of the worst kinds of structural and physical 
violence.50 The International Center for Transitional Justice (ictj) was estab-
lished in light of this critique. The development of the ictj signaled a key shift 
in the advancement and transformation of justice strategies in the last decades 
of the twentieth century. As advocates in a right- to- truth movement, survi-
vors of violence began demanding investigations into human rights violations 
to unearth information about the fate of survivors as well as identification of 
“perpetrators” of violence.51 Citizens demanded that their leaders and gov-
ernment institutions had a responsibility to locate them and facilitate trials 
to adjudicate wrongdoing. This movement shaped a new consciousness about 
people’s right to rectify atrocity through legal remedies.52 New legislation was 
crafted in response to this assertion of rights. In cases of international crimes 
(crimes against humanity, genocide, and certain crimes of war), formal am-
nesties as seen in South Africa or Rwanda would no longer be seen as a legit-
imate political solution to mass violence.
This paradigm shift from forgiveness to legal accountability laid the 
foundation for the institutionalization of the anti- impunity movement that 
proposed legal trials and convictions as tools for change. International tribu-
nals that hosted multiple trials of named “perpetrators” became the testing 
grounds for determining whether the deployment of criminal justice in post-
war contexts could be used to advance political transitions. As a vehicle for 
those victimized by violence to reconcile past harms, it led to the emergence 
of the emotionally infused category of the “victim” of violence as a problem to 
be addressed in legal as well as moral terms. However, it was the moral regis-
ter that had become critically relevant for African states following the Rwan-
dan genocide, the long history of antiapartheid struggle in South Africa, and 
Liberia and Sierra Leone’s civil wars, in relation to which international inter-
vention was late, marginal, and ineffective. In that regard, much of my earlier 
research on the making of the icc documented that African state diplomats 
signed on to the Rome Statute with the expectation that judicial mechanisms 
should ensure that the “international community” would never again stand 
by and watch genocidal violence on the African continent.53 
The notion of the “international community” is itself an important site of 
discourse that merges humanitarianism with foreign policy making and in-
ternational criminal law mechanisms that are sustained by a responsibility to 
protect discourse.
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“We Wanted Justice, and We Got the Rule of Law”:  
The Core Responsibility of the “International Community”
In September 1999 in The Hague, Netherlands, on the centennial of the first 
international peace conference, Kofi Annan, then secretary- general of the 
United Nations, delivered a critical speech in which he challenged states to 
address “two equally compelling interests” at once.54 Titled “The Effective-
ness of the International Rule of Law in Maintaining International Peace and 
Security,” Annan’s speech called first for the production of an effective re-
sponse to human rights abuses. The second interest was concerned with the 
development of a mechanism through which states could act with universal 
legitimacy.55 Galvanized by this challenge and the movement it represented, 
the Canadian government established the International Commission on In-
tervention and State Sovereignty to reconcile the relationship between state 
sovereignty and the responsibility of the international community to act in 
the face of “mass violations of humanitarian norms.”56 It published a report 
in December 2001 titled “The Responsibility to Protect,” which introduced a 
critical doctrine for the development of key principles of legality related to the 
protection of survivors.57 
Following the 2001 failure of the international community to act to pre-
vent or stop the Rwandan genocide, the African Union reinforced the idea 
that the international community had a responsibility to protect populations 
in crisis situations.58 Article 4 of the au’s constitutive act asserts “the right of 
the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the As-
sembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity.”59 Some four years later, the un General Assembly 
produced a declaration called “Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Hu-
man Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.” 
This declaration articulated a universal set of guidelines for survivors. Also by 
2005, the au had adopted the Ezulwini Consensus, which provided African 
states with an African regional tool to address mass atrocities.
A foundational pillar of these declarations was the right to protect, the 
idea that states have a responsibility to protect populations from gross hu-
man rights violations including crimes against humanity, war crimes, geno-
cide, and ethnic cleansing. Where states fall short or in fact perpetrate crimes, 
then the international community has a responsibility to step in to assist or 
usurp states in fulfilling this primary responsibility to protect a population. 
GENEALOGIES OF ANTI-  IMPUNITY 69
If a state fails to protect its citizens from the four crimes of concern, and if it 
has failed to maintain peaceful measures, the international community has a 
responsibility to intervene using the most effective and appropriate means, 
ranging from coercive measures to economic sanctions, with military inter-
vention as a last resort.60
The discourse of a right to protect is not simply a moral architecture con-
structed in the contemporary period. The notion of an obligation to protect 
those victimized by violence was driven by a force of law deployed across 
sovereign borders through international institutions afforded expanded juris-
dictional reach. This expansion of activity reflected a fundamental shift from 
the regulated affairs of the state to the expansion of global governance mech-
anisms known to operate from the north to the south, particularly in Africa 
and Latin America. This geospatial dynamic reflects the continuity of eco-
nomic dependencies and a persistent need to manage political compliance 
through legal means. The establishment of new ad hoc tribunals, international 
treaties, decrees, and charters promoted the legal frameworks that made this 
possible. The notion of the individual to be protected joined with new inter-
national humanitarian and judicial mechanisms that provided the vocabulary 
for popularizing radically new and fundamentally transformative forma-
tions.61 Key to the development of these mechanisms was a deeply retributive 
justice system focused on punishing the guilty, but with minimal powers to 
confer reparation and restoration for the survivors.
As the second decade of the twenty-first century progresses, the plight 
of survivors in postviolence conflict situations remains within the realm of 
retributive justice approaches, such as criminal tribunals but has been in-
stitutionalized in only particular places, such as the Global South, and not 
other places. International discourses about victims of violence were critical 
in establishing a profoundly astute justice discourse. The formation of judicial 
mechanisms to protect “victims” was only part of the story. In shifting from 
development priorities to judicial measures, not only were the sites for adjudi-
cation deeply selective, but the popular definition of justice became narrower 
and far more restrictive and, with it, who counts as a “victim” deserving of 
that justice, and the discourses surrounding it, were articulated through the 
dialectical pinning of an individual “perpetrator” whose impunity was to be 
stopped at all cost. And yet, the complication is that in the African region, a 
differentiated form of inter national justice was developed through the Afri-
can Union Commission and related bodies. The rise of a new hegemonic anti- 
impunity justice trend requires that we consider these emergent formations 
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and the pro- accountability discourses that sought to override African cultur-
alist forms of justice differentiation through an emotively moral individual-
ization of criminal responsibility that insisted on a justice stance that required 
criminal trials as the optimal approach to ending impunity.
The Emergence of International Criminal Justice and Its Differentiated Formations
In an age characterized by neoliberal precarity and a post- 1968 disenchant-
ment with the potential of radical politics, notions of saving victims and 
ending impunity have become predominant throughout the Global North. 
Increasingly, campaigns to project these ideas globally are reflected in the dis-
courses and actions of citizens in the Global South and connected diasporas. 
From Palestine to Mali, and from the Philippines to Chile, anti- impunity ac-
tivists are engaged in missions to save those victimized by political violence.62 
The rise of various national and international concerns about how to man-
age violence has led to the development of solutions forged within a paradigm 
of global security and protectionism. Some of the solutions have prioritized 
the essential role of anti- impunity, insisting on the radical dismissal of the im-
munity of heads of state, a core principle that has long pervaded international 
customary law. Known as the exemption from punishment or freedom from 
the injurious consequences of an action, the notion of impunity galvanized a 
movement intent on eradicating the differential and unequal application of 
justice.63 Activists insisted that no one is above the law. Stamping out the ex-
ceptionalism of leaders whose actions contribute to mass atrocities, interna-
tional criminal law took shape as a viable mode of justice that renders official 
authority irrelevant in the eyes of the law. This core value of anti- impunity 
that is enshrined in the Rome Statute dates back to the World War I era. In 
March 1919, in the war’s aftermath, the Commission on the Responsibility of 
the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties recommended the 
formation of a high tribunal. Built into its architecture was the rejection of im-
munity for all— including leaders and governmental heads of state.64 
With a commitment to ending impunity, this contemporary movement is 
driven by the foundational icc dictum that no one is above the law. This has 
contributed to the individualization of criminal responsibility through which 
a vociferous anti- impunity movement has taken shape. After World War II, 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo international tribunals built their case law around 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Under Article 7, the char-
ter stated, “The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or 
responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as 
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freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”65 A subsequent 
decision by the tribunal in a Nuremberg case reaffirmed this principle in an 
October 1946 judgment; it noted that “the principle of International Law, which 
under certain circumstances protects the representative of a State, cannot be 
applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by International Law.”66 This 
was echoed by the International Military Tribunal sitting in Tokyo. In 1950, the 
un General Assembly adopted the Principles of International Law Recognized 
in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Principle 3 of this document states, 
“The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime un-
der international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official 
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.” 
A further example of this early judicial development that I highlight as 
an example of technocratic knowledge is illustrated by the words of Robert 
Jackson, a leading American lawyer, judge, and writer of the twentieth cen-
tury who served as a US Supreme Court justice from 1941 until 1954. During 
1945–1946 he was the architect of the international trial process and then the 
chief prosecutor of the surviving Nazi leaders at Nuremberg, Germany. In the 
absence of precedent for legal individual criminal prosecution in European 
states, he, among other analysts, invoked emotionally charged moral grounds 
for pursuing legal accountability for victims of Nazi mass atrocities.67 As part 
of his opening statement at the Nuremberg trials, he articulated a goal of 
achieving justice for survivors by punishing those who bear greatest responsi-
bility for crimes against the peace:
The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against the 
peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs which we 
seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so 
devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it 
cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations, flushed with 
victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily 
submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most 
significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.68
Here the opening is focused on the condemnation and punishment of 
those whose actions led to mass violence and required that other nations in-
tervene and sacrifice their citizens in the interest of humanity. To further but-
tress the moral force of his emotional plea, he locates the neutrality of allied 
nations as victorious but resulting in mass injury. He highlights the signifi-
cance of legal action as subjecting captive enemies to the judgment of the law, 
clear- eyed and devoid of retaliatory impulses. The invocation of sacrifice and
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moral duty is clearly articulated throughout his opening, which utilizes emo-
tionally charged expressions of feeling and conviction. Later in his statement, 
in reflecting on the collective responsibility of the German people, Jackson in-
dicates, “A second paralyzing force involves a mental conflict involving moral 
values; before which we Americans stand a bit baffled. We have long been 
taught, and still believe, that might does not make right. And yet we see that 
all we hold to be morally right is in jeopardy wherever it does not also possess 
physical might.”69 The call for a moral impetus to “confront evil” that echoes 
in his statement resounded throughout the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. Its relevance was foregrounded at the commemoration of the seventi-
eth anniversary of the Nuremberg trials on September 29, 2016, during which 
then US Attorney General Loretta Lynch declared, 
Certainly the onslaught of evidence of man’s inhumanity to man can leave 
one dispirited and discouraged. But we cannot— and we should not— give 
in to despair, because the legacy of Nuremberg is that when we are called 
to confront the evil that walks this earth, we turn to the law. When we 
need to mete out justice to those who have reaped the whirlwind and revel 
in the chaos resulting therefrom, we turn to the law. And through the law 
we give voice to those shattered souls who seek redress, and we provide a 
reckoning to those who trade in fear and trembling. Let us never forget 
that within these walls, evil was held to account and humanity prevailed.70
Feelings of fear and impassioned responses that result in bodily trembling 
are both affective responses to perceived injustice materialized through sen-
timentalizations to justify the introduction of legal rituals as remedies. How-
ever, there is an irony in the attempt to individualize criminal responsibility 
as well as render insignificant the official capacity of those who acted in the 
interest of evil: it can result in the obscuring or erasure of the structural un-
derpinnings of institutional violence. We see this materialized in later tribu-
nals that insisted on official capacity as irrelevant, including the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (icty) and, later, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ictr). 
Article 7(2) of the icty statute stated that “the official position of any ac-
cused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible 
Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility 
nor mitigate punishment.”71 The icty asserted that Article 7(2) was declar-
atory of customary international law. In its Article 6(2), ictr replicated the 
sentence, as did the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.72 
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Innovations that came with the establishment of new and budding in-
ternational legal institutions presented challenges to the legitimacy of the 
icty. These challenges required that its champions constantly affirm the na-
ture of justice under construction and the moral basis on which it operates. 
For example, icty registrar John Hocking, in discussing the function of the 
tribunal, clarified the domain of justice as not simply the creation of indi-
viduals, but instead as a moral force represented in the shared conscience of 
humanity:
Of course, the principal function of the Tribunal is judicial, as indeed it 
is of the special courts in the region. . . .  The Tribunal views the continua-
tion of its work by national jurisdictions as a central element of its legacy 
and it remains committed to transferring its experiences and knowledge 
to the domestic justice systems in the former Yugoslavia.  .  .  .   In parting, 
allow me to leave you with the words of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: Justice is 
conscience, not a personal conscience but the conscience of the whole of hu-
manity. Those who clearly recognise the voice of their own conscience usually 
recognise also the voice of justice.73
Time and again, the moral force of the work of hybrid courts was artic-
ulated as representing the will of the collective whole. This narrativization 
of society as speaking through the work of international courts was further 
adumbrated by the tones of voice and the body language of legal actors as 
they solemnly recounted the horrors of violence. The emotive pleas that sur-
rounded public testimonies are not incidental. They follow particular regimes 
of expression that are structured by law’s logic and the larger political frame-
works that propel its interest. The forms of defiance that are often performed 
in public speeches take their cue from principles of law that have been histor-
ically crafted. 
As unpacked above, the movement toward anti- impunity is based on the 
principle of the irrelevance of official capacity with origins in the Nurem-
berg and Tokyo tribunals and the subsequent work of the International Law 
Commission that was directed to work on a statute to establish a permanent 
court.74 Yet, though the Nuremberg tribunal operated on the principle of ir-
relevance of national capacity, the draft statute for the icc did not contain this 
principle. After the first draft of the Rome Statute was released, a preparatory 
committee of state representatives formed to discuss it. At a committee meet-
ing in February 1997, the concept of the irrelevance of the official position was 
approved and consolidated in the draft statute. The suggested article read:
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Irrelevance of official position
This Statute shall be applied to all persons without any discrimination 
whatsoever: official capacity, either as Head of State or Government, 
or as a member of a Government or parliament, or as an elected repre-
sentative, or as a government official, shall in no case exempt a person 
from his criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it [per se] 
constitute a ground for reduction of the sentence.
Any immunities or special procedural rules attached to the official capac-
ity of a person, whether under national or international law, may not be 
relied upon to prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction in re-
lation to that person.75
This recommendation was added to Article 24 of the Draft Rome Statute. At 
its second meeting on June 16, 1998, the Committee of the Whole decided to 
refer to the Working Group on General Principles of Criminal Law, among 
which was Article 24— Irrelevance of official capacity, paragraph 2. However, 
its wording was not altered.76 The committee then approved the articles as 
they appeared in the document, and the Rome Statute was approved on July 
17, 1998, with the immunity provision dismissed. 
Upon signing the Rome Statute, one- third of un member states had to rat-
ify it in order to establish a permanent court. Over the course of the next few 
years, neither the preparatory commissions nor the Assembly of States Par-
ties addressed issues of immunity until various African states presented an 
amendment. At the assembly’s twelfth session, the Article 27 passage concern-
ing the irrelevance of the official position of the “perpetrator” was considered.
The first two paragraphs in Article 27 have different functions.77 Para-
graph 1 denies a defense of official capacity. It concerns functional immunity 
and is derived from texts in the Nuremberg Charter, the Genocide Conven-
tion, and the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. In contrast, Paragraph 2 outlines 
that no exception exists for “core crimes” under personal immunity. Para-
graph 2 of Article 27 concerns immunities that exist by virtue of customary 
international law, and that protect heads of state and other senior officials by 
virtue of their particular office or status. Immunity rationae personae, or per-
sonal immunities, describe those immunities that attach to an office or status. 
This type of immunity is limited to only a small group of senior state officials, 
especially heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, diplomats, 
and other officials on special mission in foreign states. It is conferred on those 
with primary responsibility for the conduct of the international relations of a 
state, and it is possessed only as long as the official is in office. State officials 
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to whom this type of immunity applies are immune from prosecution for of-
ficial acts as well as those carried out in their private capacity, whether the act 
in question was committed while the official was in office or before his or her 
entry into office. Such immunities stem from the recognition that state affairs 
are hindered by judicial interference from foreign governments, and the view 
that immunities are necessary for the maintenance of peaceful cooperation 
and coexistence among states.
Ultimately, Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by state parties to the 
Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own heads of state to which they are 
entitled by virtue of customary international law. It concerns personal immu-
nity and is without precedent in international criminal law instruments. It 
outlines that the statute applies “equally to all persons without any distinction 
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or 
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected represen-
tative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this statue.”78 
With this key development underway, international criminal law as a 
technical legal strategy for addressing mass atrocity violence took shape. But 
what is important to note is that these legal developments could not take root 
without particular emotional assertions about the form of morally driven in-
terventions articulated as being on behalf of “victims/survivors” and “perpe-
trators” at play. Through the mobilization of members of political and civil 
society, international and nongovernmental organizations, and social move-
ment activists, the icc has been advocating for national judicial solutions to 
mass violence. These developments, with their moral and juridical foci, have 
moved from a focus on the sovereignty of states and state protections to the 
protection of individual persons, groups of peoples, and membership in a net-
work of treaty obligations.79 
This anti- impunity movement emerged against a backdrop in which state 
actors were seen by their publics as exercising impunity at will. As in the 
twentieth century, members of the movement responded to widespread hu-
man rights abuses— rape and torture, for example— by demanding that in-
stitutional mechanisms be deployed to hold leaders legally accountable for 
criminal actions. This call to end impunity was a call to ensure that no leader 
would be above the law. And thereby grew the rule of law movement to put 
in place a legal infrastructure to support legal accountability. However, anti- 
impunity movement organizers encountered an inherent problem in that de-
spite the institutionalization of the icc, as described in chapter 6, it lacked 
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institutional enforcement powers. As such, the icc’s anti- impunity princi-
ples become effective through the amplification of its affective and emotional 
practices engaged by ngo advocates, such as the Coalition for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (cicc). 
In communicating the anti- impunity principles at the core of the cicc’s 
mission, ngos evoked feelings of empathy in response to human suffering 
through technologically savvy pro- justice campaigns that featured the image 
of the victimized African body. For example, in 2016, the cicc launched an 
ongoing campaign in support of the icc called United by Common Bonds. 
The website features “ways to get involved,” including sharing content on so-
cial media, a way to donate to the campaign, videos, and information about 
the court and the issues it addresses. Sophisticated design and carefully cho-
sen colors seemingly aim to compel visitors to join the fight for justice. With 
the goal of underlining what they call “the global nature of the Court’s man-
date and mission,” messaging on the site highlights the “continuing desire to 
see it deliver justice to victims in all parts of the world.”80
Through the work of civil society and ngos like Amnesty International, 
African Legal Aid, the cicc, the Coalition for the African Court, and Hu-
man Rights Watch, to name a few, competing notions of justice are being pro-
pelled by demands for immediate forms of judicial accountability in order 
to insist upon forms of liberal legality that are legible to other missions. But, 
as we will see, to assess the impact of these demands we need to look well 
beyond their mission statements or Twitter characters. Their power is tied 
to their work within the complex assemblages of anti- impunity formations, 
and their effects are felt through the impact of legal encapsulation, through 
which similarly constituted emotional constituencies are formed. This forma-
tion can be measured through the way that groups of people deploy figures 
of those victimized by violence as the key domains by which anti- impunity 
sentiments are expressed and by which moral subjects and bodies politic are 
shaped through history and power. And when combined with a particular ex-
amination of legalistic products such as indictments, which are seen by some 
as representing constricted international justice apparatuses, structuring de-
vices such as space and time come into precise focus.
Various ngos engaged in articulating their work through anti- impunity 
sentiments have established regional offices both at home and abroad and are 
working to universalize this discourse, drawing linkages among victims ev-
erywhere and presenting a universal legal remedy. As projected by the im-
ages in the backdrop of the cicc homepage, the global justice movement 
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is discursively built upon images of the most vulnerable: black and brown 
women, elders, and children. This contemporary imagery and the discourses 
invoked in international law circles can be traced in large part to the influen-
tial worldview of Ben Ferencz, the former investigator of Nazi war crimes for 
the Nuremberg trials who himself fled persecution as a small child and iden-
tifies himself as motivated by affiliation with the victim population. Popularly 
billed as “the only living prosecutor from the war- crime trials that followed 
the Holocaust,” his “victim”- oriented, pro- judicial- accountability stance has 
contributed to the mobilization of an assemblage of justice ngos, such as what 
was then the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights (now Human Rights 
Watch) as well as Amnesty International and the cicc.81 Ferencz’s collabora-
tors worked with governments and built citizen support for a 1998 Rome con-
ference for the formation of the International Criminal Court, which led to 
the signing of the Treaty of Rome. This occasion marked the institutionaliza-
tion of a movement for which the narrative of anti- impunity— that no one is 
above the law— and the importance of the duty to prosecute reached far and 
wide. This narrative was propelled by many who suffered abuses at the hands 
of violent government regimes and became influential advocates of interna-
tional criminal justice, including Thomas Buergenthal and Juan Mendez in 
Argentina, or African civil society workers like Netsanet Belay, the Africa di-
rector for research and advocacy at Amnesty International, who previously 
spent over two years in an Ethiopian prison as a prisoner of conscience. These 
activists working through the law or with large ngos or human rights in-
stitutes engaged in affective justice strategies that shaped the rise of a duty 
to prosecute during the 1980s and ’90s. This shaped the moral authority and 
power associated with appeals from those victimized by violence at the hands 
of their governments.
As discussed in the book’s introduction, the radical impacts of the duty to 
prosecute that became popularized at the Nuremberg trials led to the reclas-
sification of criminal culpability in the post- 1990s treaty construction period 
and the assignment of guilt to individual leaders, especially African leaders. 
Central to the notion of anti- impunity for those indicted for mass atroci-
ties was a form of reattribution of guilt articulated through an emotionally 
charged dictum, uttered publicly and privately in both formal and informal 
contexts, that no one is above the law. Also known as the “irrelevance of one’s 
governmental capacity,” this dictum is often articulated with absolutist dec-
larations that everyone— from powerful state leaders to impoverished mem-
bers of rebel groups— must be held accountable equally to the standards of 
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prosecutorial justice. In the post- Nuremberg era, advocates refined and dis-
seminated passionate convictions that the rule of law cannot be questioned or 
overturned, and they deployed a related justice narrative that “you’re either 
with us or against us” to condemn any public critique. Ferencz himself en-
gaged in political negotiations and strategic lobbying at the Rome conference 
for the establishment of the court. In his public speeches and private conver-
sations throughout the development of the ngo anti- impunity movement, he 
and many others contributed to the iconic continuities that linked the icc to 
a post- Nuremberg social imaginary. To accomplish this, Ferencz was known 
to draw on his moral authority not only by claiming to have seen the results of 
Nazi violence against victims, but by narrating how he played a central role in 
holding some of its commanders judicially responsible for crimes. As he re-
called in an article for the popular magazine The Atlantic,
I saw crematoria still going, the bodies starved, lying  .  .  .   dying, on the 
ground. I’ve seen the horrors of war more than can be adequately de-
scribed. . . .  The capacity to destroy life on earth has grown incredibly in 
the course of my lifetime, which increases the need to set up a mechanism 
to try to prevent that from happening. . . .  There are perpetrators of crimes, 
and there are victims of crimes. They are ready to fight and die for their 
ideals; they cannot have a fair judgment. You need a third party— a court— 
 in order to determine the facts.82
Ferencz’s worldview assumes that the solution to mass violence is a third- 
party institution, namely an international court that is autonomous and has 
the power to determine the facts of horrific violence. Here, justice is under-
stood as being exercisable through legal methods and through the call to ac-
tion to “protect victims wherever they are.”83 A call to action is a particular, 
regimented strategy. It reconfigures the spatial authority of international jus-
tice, in which citizens who are victimized by mass violence are within the 
reach of the objective redemption that international justice renders possi-
ble. This has engendered a popular discourse that supports the reformulation 
of the contemporary sovereignty principle through a movement that claims 
moral responsibility beyond borders.
By insisting that international publics have a moral responsibility to pro-
tect victims everywhere, the component parts of affective justice are high-
lighted through advocates’ use of this narrative. For example, introducing 
particular sentiments of saving alongside the moral responsibility to act, anti- 
impunity advocates established the building blocks to produce a legal solution 
GENEALOGIES OF ANTI-  IMPUNITY 79
out of a twentieth- century sociopolitical process. It is this legal solution, senti-
mentalized through saving and holding accountable, that liberal legality rep-
resents. Supplemented by a linear narrative of activism from Nuremberg to 
Rome, Ferencz communicated a universalist and color- blind mission shaped 
by the Rome Statute’s preamble: that all peoples are united by common bonds 
that could be shattered at any time by violence, and that millions of children, 
women, and men have been “victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply 
shock the conscience of humanity.”84
As a key icon of international justice, over the past fifteen years Ferencz (and 
his family, including his son, Don Ferencz) has been called on to open and close 
key icc events and to speak at receptions. He also delivered the Office of the 
Prosecutor’s closing argument for the icc’s first trial, that of Thomas Lubanga, 
with a statement that included invocations of “ending impunity” through the 
legal pursuit of individuals responsible for what is often articulated as the worst 
crimes against humanity. This emotional enactment of justice through the en-
folding of those victimized by violence into the core justification for interna-
tional legal action reflects legal encapsulation in its most hegemonic form. This 
domain of biopolitical technocratic practice is most vividly seen in the anti- 
impunity movement and manifest in the use of international law to save the 
“victim” from “perpetrator” impunity.85 While legal encapsulation was once 
a response to the blatant and brute power of worldwide state practices and 
violence with impunity by their leaders, today the assemblage has shifted its 
entanglements and produced a highly vocal and institutionalized response to 
state violence. Within this structuring field, then, affects are felt bodily and are 
knowable when they converge with particular feeling expressions.
From Technocratic Knowledge to Postcolonial Emotional Regimes 
With the combined expressive and instrumental impetus behind Africa’s par-
ticipation in the Rome Statute system, as well as the adoption of a range of 
other international treaties, African state agents inserted themselves and mo-
bilized to build new institutions. These included the signing of international 
law treaties and the erecting of international crime and investigation divisions 
that wedded domestic state action with the expansion of human rights and in-
ternational criminal law institutions, shifting the focus from states and state 
protections to the protection of persons and peoples.86 In doing this, emo-
tional expressions of justice were articulated through anti- impunity activists’ 
reinforcement of regimes of suffering and protection. In other words, though 
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protections for minorities and those from the Global South were differential 
and uneven, discourses invoking the responsibility to protect citizens from vi-
olence and the rights of survivors were seen as a means to support the increas-
ing responsibility of state actors to protect citizens. 
Since the early 1990s, African sites of violence have continued to provide 
the spaces and subjects for new policies to address violence, seek truth and jus-
tice, and enable reconciliation in fractured societies. As evidenced by the im-
plementation of international criminal tribunals such as the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to the ictr in Arusha, Tanzania, to 
the Extraordinary African Chambers in Dakar, Senegal, to the Hybrid Court 
for South Sudan, it is clear that the emergence of the rule of law has not only 
involved African actors, but has also left deep imprints throughout the conti-
nent. However, the justice approaches did not emerge only as a result of the rise 
of legal accountability mechanisms or the cascading of criminal prosecutions. 
African Union–driven approaches to anti- impunity in African contexts have 
also been shaped by disappointments that led to alternate possibilities through 
which new policy frameworks touted as reflecting African traditions were in-
stitutionalized. One such domain of invention driven by particular emotive 
histories was the development of the Transitional Justice Policy Framework, 
shaped by a group of elder statespeople who were a part of the African Union’s 
establishment of a group of a small number of high profile African leaders 
named the Panel of the Wise. This group of recognized leaders approached the 
management of violence with the assumption that peace and justice are inter-
related and that those engaged in justice work should be sensitive about the 
timing of indictments, especially where peace talks are underway. 
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the euphoria following the end of apart-
heid in South Africa and the promise to rectify the international community’s 
failure to intervene in the genocidal violence in Rwanda gave many the feeling 
that the icc could provide redemption for histories of violence. Many African 
state negotiators and political actors participated earnestly and enthusiasti-
cally, offering technocratic cooperation and public advocacy to help establish 
and ratify the Rome Statute of the icc. They were committed to the rule of 
law’s potential as a protective device for the future. For stakeholders in several 
engaged African countries, the transformative potential of law was less about 
the symbolism of international justice that Nuremburg represented for so 
many anti- impunity icc advocates in the Global North than about the hope 
that international legal justice might finally offer a possibility for deterring 
future violence in Africa, a continent that has long suffered violent plunder 
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from external and internal agents. Motivated by this vision, African govern-
mental representatives participated earnestly in the adoption of a movement 
that equated legal accountability with justice. In turn, the icc’s predominantly 
European and North American staff worked in concert with African civil so-
ciety, and under the expectations of primarily Western donors, to cement the 
icc as the key modality for constraining the arbitrary abuse of power where 
states are deemed unwilling and unable to do so. However, the icc’s frame-
work is structurally limited. It does not have universal jurisdiction and can act 
only in those states that have signed and ratified the Rome Statute. This means 
that at the time the icc was unable to pursue perpetrators of violence in places 
like Iraq, Afghanistan, the United States, and Syria. This had implications for 
the appearance of icc justice and made the court vulnerable to accusations of 
inequality, racism, and selectivity in favor of African countries. 
In response, the Panel of the Wise contributed to the formal development 
of an African Transitional Justice Policy Framework that foregrounded what 
are seen as shared African values on democratic governance, human rights, 
peace and security, and rule of law. In this formulation of African values, 
strengthening the rule of law is just one component of a larger transitional 
justice modality for addressing impunity and armed violence in Africa. Cen-
tral to the emergence of an African justice discourse is the production of an 
affectively claimed African geography that is Pan- African in scope and ex-
pression, and that seeks to differentiate international justice through a sense 
of African shared values. Such values presume that African justice requires 
an understanding of the contexts and deep histories within which such vio-
lence has unfolded. Cultural and political considerations can be factored into 
justice solutions alongside a range of other priorities, such as various issues 
concerning national cohesion, socioeconomic rights, African solidarity and 
cohesion, and transformative development.87 The case of South Sudan’s Com-
mission of Inquiry and the subsequent establishment of the Hybrid Court for 
South Sudan are examples of this approach and of the role of sequencing in 
allowing peace talks to play out. The strategy is said to involve the invocation 
of a Pan- Africanist logic that is differentiated from dominant assemblages of 
anti- impunity and rule of law.88 
Contrary to the icc prosecutor’s choice to request an arrest warrant against 
Sudanese President Omar al- Bashir on March 4, 2009, the Sudanese govern-
ment, the au, the Arab League, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
objected on the grounds that such an action by the icc was destabilizing for 
peace talks, which were to be revived in Doha, Qatar.89 Several African and 
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Arab members of the unsc, supported by permanent members China and 
Russia, proposed a resolution to renew the United Nations–African Union 
Mission in Darfur, the joint au- un peacekeeping mission formally approved 
by unsc Resolution 1769 on July 31, 2007, to bring stability to the war- torn 
Darfur region of Sudan while peace talks on a final settlement continued.90 
Using Pan- Africanist language to invoke the need for an African approach, 
the au called on the unsc to invoke Article 16 of the Rome Statute to defer 
the processes initiated against Bashir on the grounds that a prosecution of the 
president could impede the prospects for peace in the region.91 
To contain the broad backlash against the icc in Africa, the au established 
the High- Level Panel on Darfur in March 2009, headed by Thabo Mbeki, with 
a mandate to recommend approaches for reconciling the demands of peace, 
justice, and reconciliation.92 The report, released in October 2009, recom-
mended balancing these demands by establishing a hybrid court composed 
of Sudanese and non- Sudanese judges and legal experts, introducing legisla-
tion to remove immunities for state actors suspected of crimes in Darfur, and 
forming a “Trust, Justice and Reconciliation Commission.”93 
In May 2011, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (ddpd) was finalized 
at the All Darfur Stakeholders Conference.94 The government of Sudan and the 
Liberation and Justice Movement then signed a protocol agreement on July 14, 
2011, committing themselves to the document, which established the frame-
work for the comprehensive peace process in Darfur. The ddpd was the culmi-
nation of two and a half years of negotiations, dialogue, and consultations with 
the major parties to the Darfur conflict, including all relevant stakeholders and 
international partners. The un- au Mission in Darfur lent technical expertise to 
the process and continues to support the dissemination of the ddpd as well as 
to urge nonsignatory movements to sign on.95 Many argue that the establish-
ment of the ddpd and the threat of prosecution have led to serious delays in the 
overall implementation of the accord and the lack of a permanent ceasefire.96 
As one au negotiator, whom I will call Abdul, shared with me, “The issue 
is complex and the threat of prosecution and the creation of an international 
judicial solution is part of the problem. We have tried to insist on an African 
approach, a staggered approach that is politically savvy, in order to achieve 
peace first and justice later.” By emphasizing the sequencing of peace and jus-
tice as an “African approach,” Abdul attempted to attribute to Africanness not 
only an interest in prioritizing peace and the end of violence first but also a 
commitment to judicial justice at the appropriate time. This sequencing has 
led to the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan as an African 
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approach that is attentive to establishing peace, addressing political injustice, 
and investigating and prosecuting individuals bearing the most responsibil-
ity for violations of international law and applicable South Sudanese law com-
mitted from December 15, 2013, through the end of the transitional period. 
Though the court is not yet functional, it is controversial, and there are 
many who object to criminal prosecutions as a way to address deep- seated 
historical and political projects. Yet, in keeping with legal technocratic for-
mations as a component part of the international criminal legal assemblage 
under examination, under the August 2015 agreement, the au Commission 
established it as an extension of the sequencing directives outlined in the re-
port from the un Panel of Experts on South Sudan (otherwise referred to as 
a Commission of Inquiry).97 Part of this au commission of inquiry approach 
is an affective articulation of justice for South Sudan that is being described 
as an African- led and African- owned process. As such, discourses abound 
that highlight particular imaginaries, such as African geographies of justice, 
through which various au actors participate in the reattribution of justice.98
In contrast, the emergence of an anti- impunity movement most signifi-
cantly active in European states has involved ensuring that powerful leaders 
responsible for mass atrocity violence do not use peace talks or quasi- judicial 
mechanisms (including the law of immunity) as a shield. Also relevant to 
the component parts of such technocratic legal tools is the role of the United 
States in offering diplomatic pressure and millions of dollars in funding.99 
Assemblages of Justice Feelings: Saving the “Victim,” Stopping the “Perpetrator”
The component parts of advancing anti- impunity discourses through the icc 
are also relevant to the way that emotionally propelled justice discourses are 
being fueled. Building on the principle that no one is above the law, the new 
justice formations have involved particular checks on national power. Luis 
Moreno- Ocampo, the first icc prosecutor, has commented on the importance 
and roles of courts: “People have to understand, before the icc, the way to 
control crimes was to negotiate.”100 Now that the icc exists, he explained, 
“some people were thinking the icc could be like a new threat for force nego-
tiations; one that could be taken away. This is not the icc. The icc is a judicial 
system.”101 Moreno- Ocampo has also sought to clarify a misconception con-
cerning the role of the icc in peace processes. “It’s not us affecting the peace 
process. The criminals are affecting the peace process, because what they like 
to do is to use the negotiations to protect themselves.”102
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A number of key figures in the creation and development of technocratic 
legal theories in the International Criminal Law School also moved inter-
national law jurisprudence beyond earlier twentieth- century principles of 
state sovereignty.103 One such figure was Antonio Cassese, who, as president 
of the icty and one of the architects of the doctrine of the criminal responsi-
bility of the offender, documented what he saw as a fundamental moment of 
rupture in international law. In International Criminal Law, he argued for the 
expansion of criminal responsibility of an offender. To do this, he expanded 
the term “culpable negligence” (culpa gravis) to include unconscious negli-
gence, to move international criminal law to the objective responsibility of an 
offender for strict liability. However, this also resulted in making individuals 
and not states sole legal subjects of criminal law. This, he argued, provided a 
sufficient legal basis for an interpretation of international criminal law that 
would not disregard the legal concept of state sovereignty.104 
Cassese and other figures such as Judge Theodor Meron and Professor 
Cherif Bassiouni idealized international criminal law as capable of replacing 
state sovereignty. Cassese had been a critical figure in the creation of the icty 
and author of the Tadić decision that established the basis for individual crim-
inal jurisdiction.105 And Bassiouni was central in shaping the individualiza-
tion of criminal responsibility. Known as the father of the icc, he championed 
the driving of the icc process forward. For Bassiouni, the “absence of the in-
dividual in international law” was an unfortunate development in the history 
of law. With precedents such as the Tadić decision, international law recog-
nized individual criminal jurisdiction and shaped the formation of a corpus 
of international criminal law that combined human rights and humanitarian 
law with criminal law. With the already established moral force under which 
the notion of the individual “perpetrator” was rendered a subject of the law, 
and the shift to individuals as a core concern, the idea of the “victim” to be 
protected also emerged with a vengeance. 
The international victims’ rights movement took shape with great moral 
force. It was based on a parallel humanitarian regime guided by the law of 
war.106 Like laws of acceptable justifications to engage in war that incorpo-
rated dimensions of democratization and political and social transformation, 
the law of war emerged alongside the legal protection of the “victim.” The 
pressures of laissez- faire globalization affected the ways in which state sover-
eignty and state borders were being reconfigured. They also had implications 
for how domestic laws were reformulated through the incorporation of inter-
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national treaties, and how national laws were reworked with the introduction 
of bilateral agreements and new regional conventions and formations.
Institutionalizing Compensatory Possibilities for “Victims” as Performative Acts
At the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, as well as the ad hoc tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the interests of survivors were to a large ex-
tent overlooked; their role was generally restricted to that of witnesses. How-
ever, as a result of the shift of the new governance architecture, there has been 
a growing movement, supported by a range of ngos as well as some states, to 
recognize the role of international justice in providing not only retributive 
justice but also restorative justice by permitting survivors to participate in 
proceedings and receive reparations for the harms they have suffered. 
In 1985, the un General Assembly first adopted the Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (the Victims’ 
Declaration), which revolutionized the ordinary usage of the term victim. 
This declaration has been the cornerstone of legal rights for “victims” under 
international law. It established victims’ rights in the criminal- justice process, 
including the right to access justice, to be treated with basic respect and dig-
nity, to protection and assistance, and to reparation. The restorative dimen-
sion came further into play in 1991, when a compensation system for victims 
of war was created. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the un Security Coun-
cil set up a commission to deal with the requests for compensation stemming 
from the occupation of Kuwait.
The Victims’ Declaration contributed to laying the foundation for nego-
tiations during icc Preparatory Committee discussions about how victim 
should be defined. Interestingly, after extensive debates about whether legal 
entities could be included in the definition of the term, a compromise was 
reached in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to establish that it may in-
clude organizations or institutions.107 Despite this, the definition popularized 
by the icc and the ngo Coalition for the icc represents the consolidation of 
the notions of “victims,” justice, and law. During the negotiations on the stat-
ute, emphasis was placed on ensuring that the core values of the court— to 
promote greater peace and security through accountability for crimes, as well 
as the rights and the dignity of the “victims”— would be respected.108 This is-
sue was crucial, given the clear recognition by states that the icc should be 
not only retributive but also restorative.
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In keeping with the rule of law momentum, the Rome Statute provides 
for the possibility of granting reparations to victims. In the negotiations that 
led to its formation, two principal institutions were conceptualized: the Inter-
national Criminal Court and the Trust Fund for Victims (tfv). These two in-
stitutions were propelled by a ten- year campaign called “A Universal Court 
with Global Support.” Through its goals of state enlistment through ratifi-
cation and implementation of the Rome Statute, the signing of cooperation 
agreements and enhancement, and the recruitment of top icc staff, the long- 
term campaign involved ongoing advocacy, networking, strategy building, 
lobbying, and the use of language that reproduced particular affective com-
mitments to “victims everywhere” as the basis of their work. It was against 
this backdrop that the tfv was established in September 2002 by the Assem-
bly of States Parties to complement the reparations functions of the court. Its 
mission was to provide advocacy and mechanisms for mobilizing physical, 
material, or psychological resources for individuals victimized by violence. 
Today the tfv is administered by the Registry but is independent from the 
icc and is supervised by a board of directors. Articles 75 and 79 of the Rome 
Statute lay the foundation for this restorative, victim- centered element.109
The tfv, supported through court- ordered forfeitures and fines as well 
as voluntary contributions by states, has a two- pronged mandate. The first 
aspect is the provision of general assistance to survivors or communities of 
survivors in icc situation countries. The second mandate involves the man-
agement and implementation of reparations for survivors. In a novel phe-
nomenon in international criminal proceedings, Article 68(3) of the Rome 
Statute grants that victims of crimes under the jurisdiction of the court may 
also make their views and concerns heard during a trial. Accordingly, the Of-
fice of Public Counsel for Victims was established in 2005. As of July 2010, the 
office had represented approximately two thousand victims and filed approx-
imately three hundred submissions in various proceedings before the court. 
The office has also assisted thirty external legal representatives in all situations 
and cases, and provided close to six hundred legal advisors to them.
The Victims’ Rights Working Group was created in 1997 under the auspices 
of the ngo Coalition for the icc in order to work with various survivors’ rep-
resentatives to help them participate in the proceedings or to inform them of 
judicial developments as they relate to their case. The Victims Participation 
and Reparations Section of the icc’s registry conducts regular assessments and 
evaluations of its work, and sees itself as committed to a reflective learning 
process as its staff implements the court’s mandate in situation countries. The 
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mission is communicated in a prevailing discourse of defending survivors and 
ending impunity through the rule of law. The centrality of survivors in the trust 
fund’s work is enabled through the mobilization of icc judicial proceedings.
Despite initial presumptions that the formation of the tfv signaled a rev-
olutionary turn toward centering the oppressed, various stakeholders on the 
ground have come to rigorously debate whether international criminal trials 
should be subordinated to other justice- producing mechanisms available on 
the African continent, as I touched on in the introduction. Their arguments 
are broad and reflect concerns about the viability of the icc and its ability to 
achieve justice, especially if driven by retributive motivations. While the icc 
is essentially a punitive institution, the drafters of the Rome Statute and a sig-
nificant civil- society lobby attempted to include elements of restorative jus-
tice that focus on social repair and reconciliation.110 Yet various victims of 
violence, once enthusiastic about icc adjudication, are also ambivalent about 
the extent to which the icc is able to achieve the sort of justice real survi-
vors imagine for themselves and their communities.111 Two large questions 
emerge: (1) How are we to define whom the court is working for? (2) Has it 
been able to deliver on the expectations of justice for survivors?112 
The inclusion of those victimized by violence as a key component of inter-
national trials has become one of the main organizing principles underlying 
the development of twenty- first- century international criminal justice. The 
limitations and tensions in practice have also become apparent. Accommo-
dating the participation of survivors of extreme forms of physical, sexual, and 
psychological violence through the structure of trial proceedings and as ben-
eficiaries of reparations through the tfv were heralded as significant achieve-
ments. Yet survivors’ applications to participate in trials have at times been so 
voluminous that those involved in data management and registration systems 
have struggled to cope with the bureaucratic burden. And though the court’s 
promise has been articulated in the name of survivors, many survivors of vi-
olence complain of the lack of proportionality between its institutional force 
and its ability to produce substantive and tangible reparation for those in on-
going need. While on one hand the discourse of victimhood has produced 
emotional sympathies, on the other hand the identification of certain viola-
tions has set the terms by which sympathetic protective action can take place, 
often limiting the possibilities to certain prescribed channels and outcomes. 
Judge Christine van den Wyngaert of the icc has described the lengthy 
and cumbersome process of survivor registration at the icc as a terrain for 
contending with the aspirations of survivor inclusion and the difficulties of 
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necessary exclusion.113 She concluded that the “number of victims is becom-
ing overwhelming.  .  .  .   The Court may soon reach the point where this in-
dividual case- by- case approach becomes unsustainable. It may well have to 
consider replacing individual applications with collective applications.”114 
Judges have, since the start of icc trials, been grappling with a way to bal-
ance considerations of restorative justice for survivors with expeditious and 
fair retributive justice. Indeed, a ruling by the judges of Trial Chamber V has 
led to the overhauling of survivors’ participation and representation in the 
case against Uhuru Kenyatta, and is an example of the need for rethinking the 
icc’s restorative mandate.115
Despite the rhetoric, the nature in practice of retribution- driven judicial 
proceedings may at times deliver undesirable or even incomprehensible re-
sults where survivors are concerned. Due to a recharacterization of charges, 
or a change in the temporal scope of cases, it is possible that, from one day 
to the next, survivors may find themselves ineligible even for participation, 
let alone reparations. Organs of the icc working with survivors or the legal 
representatives of survivors must deal with the challenges of communicat-
ing changing judicial decisions about who is considered a “victim” or whose 
changing status has caused new forms of exclusion. Competing demands con-
tinue to highlight the challenges as they relate to maintaining the equilibrium 
between the restorative mandate and the retributive criminal justice mandate 
of the icc. 
What we see from this tracing, in which the emergence of the anti- 
impunity movement led to a particular conception of individualized “victim” 
and “perpetrator,” is that the increasing judicialization of postconflict transi-
tions actually delimits the potential for deep and pervasive societal repara-
tion. By analyzing the nature of violence being adjudicated in the first place, 
and linking it to historical processes that have organized subjects in particu-
lar ways, we see that the rise of prosecutorial justice has been part of a larger, 
complex set of histories tied to deeply felt attachments in the Global North 
to core ideas about society, law, the economy, the individual, and freedom. 
These attachments have been deployed strategically in the Global South and 
have been central to the development of a moral impetus around which the 
rule of law’s anti- impunity movement has gained its force, ultimately shifting 
the justice terrain to a popularly articulated individualization of criminal re-
sponsibility. Ultimately, this move to individuating criminal responsibility in 
the name of “the victim” is also tied to the circulation of an aesthetic that is 
built on the moral fortitude of saving predominantly black and female bodies. 
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These aesthetics undergird international justice through a biopolitics of senti-
mentality in which it is not just an individual universal subject that is invoked 
in the international psychic but rather a raced, sexed figure that occupies the 
moral imagination. 
As discussed in the introduction, the ordering of liberal legality is also 
built on an aesthetics of the “perpetrator” to be held accountable. This perpe-
trator figure, individualized and gendered as mostly male, provides the inter-
national imaginary with a sensory depiction within which notions of justice 
are nested. How did these black and brown bodies come to be seen as the pro-
totypical “victim” and “perpetrator” in international rule of law circuits? As 
we shall see in the chapters that follow, the technologies of legal power that 
unfolded alongside the institutionalization of liberal legality did so through a 
moral call to individualize responsibility for violence that in most cases has its 
roots in histories of colonial plunder and structural inequality, economic re-
structuring, and the consequent absence of institutional alternatives in fledg-
ling African postcolonies. These formations point to a moral aesthetics of the 
“victim” and the “perpetrator” whose sensory depictions appear illegible to 
liberal legality but are felt among those who identify with its racialized and 
nationalized aesthetics.
Making Sense of Liberal Legality and Its Sensory Depictions
In the international adjudication of mass atrocity crimes, liberal legalism 
substitutes collective responsibility for mass crimes with the individualiza-
tion of criminal responsibility. We see this most clearly in the cases involv-
ing icc indictments of African leaders— black, male, middle aged, powerful. 
These indictments of individuals being held criminally responsible are not 
simply to be read as unraced perpetrators. They present black and brown bod-
ies whose presence involves the transmission of sensory impressions about 
race but whose imagery is often said to represent that violence. The public re-
sponses by defiant African leaders about the icc as racist— as we saw in the 
introduction— is a statement about racialized embodiments and the emergent 
feelings that have followed related to its histories of injustice. 
Despite its disavowal of subjective affects, the reality is that justice, ex-
pressed through liberal legality, relies on emotional affectivities in order to 
be established as seemingly legitimate. The central dilemma is the dialectic 
between the work of emotion and the way that emotional inscriptions play 
out through racial and gendered politics. Because of the incommensurabili-
90 CHAPTER 1
ties related to the exercise of international criminal justice, the reality of these 
justice formations is not adequately explained by Sikkink’s “justice cascade,” 
which imagines organic and widespread calls for prosecutorial justice as the 
drivers of its manifestation. Rather, as I have begun to show, the technocratic 
production of legal justice alongside emotive discourses and the regimes that 
propel them have combined to produce the tools through which law regu-
lates possibility, and those possibilities in international justice domains are 
propelled through affective expressions. Thus, articulations of justice do not 
spread evenly across geographies of time and space. More often they reaffirm 
sites of inequality, in turn giving rise to novel contestations that mobilize new 
forms of emotional and conceptual expression. 
What is the relevance of examining affective justice in these spaces of 
structural inequality? In these spaces we see the manifestation of biopolitical 
legality. This involves considering how the emergence of the African state was 
always a project of material extraction, economic opportunism, and political 
and legal impositions but also a project that reinforced particular aesthetic 
imaginaries for particular purposes. In chapter 2 I begin to take a closer look 
at the way that technocratic knowledge puts in place the conditions of possi-
bility in which emotional expressions are regimented and fueled. As I will go 
on to show, sociocultural norms unfold through specific ways of talking, sig-
naling, expressing reaction, or producing practices that enable new priorities 
to develop. Feelings about and perceptions of justice manifest moral codes 
that are expressed through particular emotional performances. Certain rhe-
torical strategies, such as affective transference, are used both to champion 
international justice formations, like the icc, and to critique them. In the pro-




Shaping Publics through Sentimental Narratives
If affective embodiments and the working of reattribution reflect both sub-
jective technocratic and political processes that shape and are shaped by vari-
ous structuring fields of expression, then how do justice leaders, international 
lawyers, judges, bureaucrats, and members of various publics who are per-
forming, observing, witnessing, and refusing legal encapsulation tap into 
prevailing emotional regimes and deploy sentiments that become institution-
alized? And how do those emotional expressions become entrenched within 
institutions like the icc, ngos, and the African Union’s regional courts, such 
as the African Court? How are they transferred within constituent publics— 
 from person to person, leader to constituency— and deployed to make new 
sociohistorical narratives feasible? And, as Sara Ahmed asks, how do emo-
tions align subjects with each other and against others?1 This chapter explores 
the way that feelings of alliance and compassion are generated through polit-
ical speeches and legal narratives that not only make various anti- impunity 
icc and Pan- Africanist justice discourses real, but also constitute social align-
ments through which emotional regimes play out. I begin here with two brief 
examples to illustrate this process, and then delve more deeply to analyze the 
different contours of affect that both structure fields of expression and are 
conditioned by history and individual emotional responses. Taken together, 
they are transmitted through the production of feeling regimes, and through 
affective transference, a process felt bodily, their meanings travel and can be-
come manifest through emotive practices.
In 1952 Jomo Kenyatta, the father of independent Kenya and of Uhuru Ken-
yatta, was arrested by the British colonial army following a state of emergency 
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declared by the British administrators of colonial Kenya. Kenyatta had been 
indicted the year before, together with five others known as the Kapenguria 
Six— Achieng’ Oneko, Bildad Kaggia, Fred Kubai, Kung’u Karumba, and Paul 
Ngei.2 By April 1953, all six were incarcerated for their membership in and 
organization of the Mau Mau freedom fighters. Kenyatta denied the accusa-
tions but was convicted of what many believe were “trumped- up charges.” He 
served six years as a political prisoner until 1960, when the demands for his 
release grew and native Kenyans gathered daily in the town square to protest 
the injustice. This mobilization succeeded, and Kenyatta was released. As the 
story goes, once released, Kenyatta led his people in petitioning for Kenya’s in-
dependence from British colonial rule. When the first Kenyan elections were 
finally held in May 1963, Jomo Kenyatta was elected prime minister of the 
Kenyan African National Union, and it was in that context that he and his ad-
visors negotiated the terms for Kenyan independence on December 12, 1963.
Approximately fifty years later, Jomo Kenyatta’s son, Uhuru Kenyatta, be-
came the president of the Republic of Kenya, and with his deputy presidential 
partner, William Ruto, established their landmark consolidation of two previ-
ously antagonistic political groups aligned along competing ethnic cleavages. 
This consolidation is related to the 2012 indictment of Uhuru Kenyatta and 
William Ruto by the icc, which of course did not prevent them from winning 
the highest seats in government (a situation I explain in more detail in chap-
ter  4). Their election campaign tapped into various emotional sensibilities 
related to anticolonial struggle and postcolonial Pan- Africanism in order to 
mobilize the sympathies of the Kenyan people. They did so by presenting the 
icc’s indictment of Uhuru Kenyatta as a historical continuity of Jomo Ken-
yatta’s political struggle for independence against imperial rule. Kenyatta’s 
popularly hailed 2013 Heroes’ Day speech provides an example of postcolo-
nial emotional regimes that celebrate the freedom fighter discourse deployed 
to cultivate emotional sympathies for Pan- African anticolonial struggles. 
On October 20, 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta presided over his first Heroes’ Day 
(known as Mashujaa Day in Swahili), a national public holiday to collectively 
honor all those who contributed to the struggle for Kenya’s independence.3 
That day, Kenyatta’s speech began with a characteristic unifying call to the 
ethnically divided nation and immediately highlighted the importance of cel-
ebrating the past. Upon establishing a sense of a shared political community 
that long struggled for independence from Europe, he went on to reinforce 
the aftereffects of colonialism and its impact on social and economic inequal-
ity. In an attempt to celebrate their independence journey, he highlighted the 
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material and psychological consequences of the colonial project and its im-
pact on their Kenyan forefathers:
Fellow Kenyans, we are here to commemorate the sacrifice and heroism of 
many Kenyans whose vision and conviction won us freedom and sover-
eignty. Colonialism had stripped all Kenyans of their fundamental rights. 
They had no land, and were considered inferior in their own home. There 
was neither dignity nor freedom for Kenyans then. Our forefathers waged 
a struggle of conviction and principle, supported with no resources except 
the burning fire of humiliation and the indefeasible yearning for indepen-
dence and respect.
They were brave and noble. Many took up armed struggle in the forests, 
as others formed and led movements for the civil agitation for indepen-
dence. The colonial reaction was repressive and brutal. Heroes were killed 
and imprisoned, while the rest were stigmatized and hunted down like an-
imals. The cost of the struggle was painful, because the settlers did not con-
sider Africans equal human beings worthy of rights.4
Kenyatta’s narrative about the humiliation of Africans at the hands of co-
lonial administrators and settlers, and the subsequent freedom struggles that 
ultimately led to Kenyan independence, set a particular emotional climate 
that formed the backdrop for his audience. He went on to describe how Afri-
cans suffered at the hands of colonialists and emerged victorious in their fight 
against those forces:
This day marks the official beginning of the worst phase of colonialism, 
and the most harrowing period of our struggle for independence. The bru-
tality our independence heroes underwent from twentieth October 1952 
until the attainment of self- government ten years later defies imagination. 
It is the reason that we have reverently emblazoned our national flag with 
the red of their sacred blood. That is why our constitution states that, we 
the People honor those who heroically struggled to bring freedom and jus-
tice to our land. In history, Mashujaa Day is a day written in blood by the 
hand of our heroes.5
After discussing the “brutality” that their “independence heroes” en-
dured, Kenyatta went on to liken his judicial indictment by the icc to his 
father’s indictment by the British colonial administration in Kenya, thereby 
connecting the brutality of the colonial past to contemporary international 
law. The audience— seasoned and acutely aware of Africa’s history of colo-
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nial domination— was invited to share sentiments of horror about colonial in-
justice and make a symbolic connection to the other, current injustice: “Our 
forefathers rejected colonialism and imperial domination in their time. We 
must honor their legacy, and stay true to our heritage, by rejecting all forms of 
domination and manipulation in our time. Let us confront without flinching 
those external forces seeking to thwart our collective aspirations. They may be 
powerful and rich, but so were the colonialists. They may disrespect and even 
hate us; we have defeated their ilk before.”6
When those who attended the event that day and others who watched it 
on television described their interpretation of the opening of the speech, time 
and time again they told us that Kenyatta’s references to external (read colo-
nial) domination reflect colonial defiance at work. Their reaction reflects the 
way that popular feelings about Kenyan postcolonial futures are bound up in a 
particular form of rejection of colonial degradation. What we see is that these 
sentiments are made real as a result of particular a priori events that shape 
what the present and future become. 
Through the use of partial invocations, Kenyatta succeeds in getting his au-
dience to connect contemporary justice to selective histories of colonial sham 
trials. The logic is that the political histories of subordination that created 
Kenya as a colony were the same histories that led Uhuru Kenyatta to a subor-
dinate place in the realm of international justice and politics. These historical 
logics highlighted the way that morally coherent causalities can be mobilized 
to produce moral sentiments that celebrate the fetishized victim- survivor. 
And through the deployment of certain linguistic tools, political speech acts 
and the sentiments that they conjure articulate partial concepts while still 
communicating full ideas. In other words, the existence of the violation is so 
commonly understood that it is unnecessary to spell out. Rather, the listener 
is made to call on his or her own sense of inequality in order to fill the gaps.
The forms of sentimental emotions involved in such postcolonial justice 
discourses represent what Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin calls “di-
alogic” to refer to the ways that contemporary imaginaries are continually 
informed by past conceptions.7 This approach to the social retelling of rele-
vant events in daily life can help us make sense of how emotive expressions 
about the colonial past, as temporally shaped manifestations of social reality, 
guide how feelings of injustice are understood and attributed through narra-
tive strategies. In this particular example, emotional regimes shape emotional 
climates through passionate utterances and narratives about stigmatization. 
As social constructions, these collective feelings reflect individual perceptions 
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but are actually manifestations of how discourses produce groups and how 
groups of people embody lived emotions. What we see is that through those 
experiences, they are positioned for the collective effects of the transference 
of those feelings to the social body. As a product of sociocollective emotions 
generated through social interactions, emotional climates reflect social norms 
that establish how people feel or ought to feel and constitute the affective ter-
rain within which public emotions operate.8 
The study of emotion presumes that such feelings are grounded in particu-
lar socio- moral orders expressed through responses that are deemed ordinary. 
For example, where stigma makes possible the terms for regulating what is ac-
ceptable in relation to what is abhorrent, the imagery and discursive concepts 
that are invoked produce the terms for shared collective sentiments. President 
Kenyatta’s reference to the ordinary aspirations in Kenyan dreams of freedom 
from “imperial domination” was juxtaposed with his suggestion that there 
were “external forces seeking to thwart [their] collective aspirations.” The po-
litical reality of colonial trials (often seen popularly as sham trials) and their 
parallel with Uhuru Kenyatta’s indictment by the icc was conjured to produce 
a key moment of linkage. As he affirmed, “They may be powerful and rich, but 
so were the colonialists.” In this way, Kenyatta attributed the same colonial ar-
mature of subjugation to the icc.9 This did not involve an explicit reference to 
the icc. There was no need to name it. Rather, the point was sharpened with 
the profound declaration, “We have defeated their ilk before,” referring to ex-
ternal judicial bodies such as the icc in which the colonial is tied to the in-
ternational (read: European). Invoking the word ilk to refer to a type or kind 
of imperialist, Kenyatta symbolically equated the colonial subordination of 
black Africans under British imperialism to the known fact that, to date, the 
icc has only indicted Africans. His conclusion: Kenya’s Mau Mau revolution-
aries used constitutionalism to defeat their oppressors, and so will Kenya’s 
contemporary democratic vanguard. 
By comparing his own icc indictment to the arrest and political conviction 
of his father some fifty years earlier, Uhuru Kenyatta attempted to make per-
sonal meaning out of historical and contemporary realities through a cultural 
template of subordination and an emotional process known in psychoanaly-
sis as transference.10 Transference represents the common ascription of one 
person’s emotion to another, or to an object. For Freud, it was connected to 
the process of projecting unresolved issues in one’s primary kinship relation-
ships onto others. I use transference here to link intersubjective cultural fields 
to show how it is used in metacontexts such as crowds and large audiences. 
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Affective transference, as an intersubjective process fueled by emotional re-
gimes, is not only employed by those protesting the presence of the icc in 
Africa. We also see it in the rhetorical practices of those engaged in the anti- 
impunity rule of law movement, such as the members of the icc’s Office of the 
Prosecutor (otp). Key to this analy sis is the understanding that once those 
narratives are articulated within their own component parts where they are 
seen as being socially legitimate, they have the power to mobilize sentiments 
that are shared by others and create new enmeshed alignments in that process.
In the icc’s early days, the court gained popular traction as a symbol of 
protection for victims and as a means of ending impunity. The domain of state 
authority, which had (since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) long dominated 
approaches to sovereignty, began to topple. Theories of a state’s responsibility 
to its citizens transformed with the emergence of a new moral order, which 
took shape with the emergence of the responsibility to protect, or r2p, doc-
trine, as explained in chapter 1. 
Members of the otp, such as Shamiso Mbizvo, remind us that the court 
was set up on behalf of the “international community to intervene when the 
nation- state fails.” As she suggested in a keynote speech at a conference on the 
icc and Africa in The Hague in May 2014:
The final text of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is 
the culmination of almost a hundred years of hard work, unyielding deter-
mination, and stubborn hope on the part of people all over the world, from 
many walks of life, who have all shared the vision of an independent, per-
manent International Criminal Court. The icc exists to hear the voices of 
victims of the most atrocious crimes, when their cries fall on deaf ears. It is 
a Court that was set up to intervene on behalf of the most vulnerable, when 
their own governments fail to hold their abusers accountable.11
Mbizvo’s discussion of the existence of the icc as a culmination of “al-
most a hundred years of hard work” in order to establish a mechanism to in-
tervene on behalf of the “most vulnerable” suggests a historical continuity 
over a longer period of time than the mid- 1990s, when international law was 
instrumentalized morally and politically. Like Kenyatta’s symbolic linkages, 
she described the contemporary icc’s formation metaphorically as a one- 
hundred- year road to Rome culminating in the formation of the Rome Statute 
for the icc. This is a sentimental narrative construction that tells a celebra-
tory story about a long and sustained road to justice that often involves efforts 
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to end the impunity of a perpetrator and to rescue a victim through inter-
national legality. But when the icc is examined dialogically, it becomes clear 
that even though the formation of the Rome Statute for the icc was shaped 
by a range of very limited attempts to hold postwar leaders and commanders 
responsible for war crimes, there was also an absence or suspension of justice 
mechanisms in various colonies in the Global South.12
This chapter reveals the gaps in the production of particular founding 
narratives and their imbrication in legal and historical formulations. We see 
how emotions are deployed through sentimental rejections of the Rome Stat-
ute narrative to replace it, through affective transference, with new originary 
narratives that are used to attribute different meanings of justice. Kenyatta’s 
linguistic strategies highlight the emotional politics of social protest that are 
aestheticized through postcolonial imaginaries of injustice. Illustrating the 
effectiveness of the emotional architectures he built through his particular 
rhetorical practices, informants reported that these narratives were inspired 
by Africa’s colonial history and the subsequent objection that various Pan- 
Africanists have to Western dominance. The embodiment of such imaginaries 
generates a response to domination by rearticulating new histories that fold 
into the present.
Like Kenyatta’s dialogism framed in relation to continuous indictments by 
foreign bodies, Shamiso Mbizvo’s articulation of the histories that led to the 
formation of icc justice is an example of a related set of emotional regimes 
underway. In this case it serves another set of politics. In both examples, the 
retelling of their public histories invented links of significance to present mor-
ally provocative sentiments around which to mobilize action. In these cases, 
the sentimental invocations pointed to many things— the perpetrator of vi-
olence to be held accountable, or the colonial perpetrators who were never 
held accountable, or the degradation and fortitude of those whose struggles 
for justice have been pivotal. All of the sentimental invocations stigmatized 
European colonial injustices to preclude particular readings of contemporary 
violence without attention to the roots of inequality. Ultimately, what we see 
in these examples is the transmission of sentiments of saving and protecting, 
as well as expressions of African redemption from injustice, for they are key 
to the way that references to particular types of violence work in liberal dem-
ocratic speech making. The goal is to show how public speech making is criti-
cal to how affects are institutionalized in international rule of law assemblages 
and how political publics are produced in that process. 
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The Road to Rome
Today, the popular contemporary story of the birth of the Rome Statute and 
its judicial legitimacy is based on a particular history of the icc that sets the 
beginning of the road to Rome in the early nineteenth century. That story, as 
told by various representatives of the icc, often begins with the 1872 found-
ing of the International Committee of the Red Cross, when a permanent court 
was proposed to respond to the crimes of the Franco- Prussian War. And if 
those narrative origins are not emphasized, the attempt of the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles to try German war crimes of World War I or the 1948 Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide are seen as key 
to the founding history of the court. 
In this story, World War I is seen as contributing to the launching of the first 
global effort to use international and domestic criminal jurisdiction to address 
international crimes. Following the war, the Allied and Associated Powers (i.e., 
Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States) convened the Commis-
sion on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement 
of Penalties to inquire into culpable conduct by the Central Powers (i.e., Ger-
many, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire). The commission 
was charged with considering the feasibility of asserting criminal jurisdiction 
over particular individuals, “however highly placed,” accused of committing 
breaches.13 Objectors to this approach, led by a predominantly American del-
egation, claimed that if heads of state and other state actors were held liable 
for collective actions, state sovereignty would be diminished.14 They also took 
issue with the reality that no precedent existed in law for such an approach.15
In 1919, the commission presented to the Paris Peace Conference its final 
report on which crimes should be prosecuted before an international high 
tribunal composed of representatives of the Allied Powers, or before national 
tribunals.16 The United States advanced four fundamental objections to this 
approach, among them that to prosecute a head of state outside of his national 
jurisdiction would violate the basic precepts and privileges of sovereignty.17 
From here, the potential liability for German and Ottoman defendants pro-
ceeded down separate paths.
The Treaty of Versailles ended the war with Germany in 1919 and required 
it to accept full responsibility for causing the war, make territorial concessions, 
and pay reparations.18 It was Article 227 that proposed the establishment of 
an international tribunal composed of representatives from the United States, 
Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to try the former German emperor, Kai-
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ser Wilhelm II.19 By the time the Versailles treaty had entered into force, the 
kaiser had fled to the Netherlands, which refused to extradite him for trial.20 
Article 227 never came to fruition, and the Allies never enforced any other pe-
nal provisions of the treaty.21 In the end, only a few prosecutions took place 
in domestic courts in Germany, and those who were prosecuted received dis-
proportionately low sentences or were acquitted.22
Following World War I, a number of policy makers and lawyers, often de-
scribed as constituting the international community, took action to build in-
stitutions to settle international disputes. The League of Nations announced 
a commitment to safeguard the peace of nations without resorting to war 
and in 1920 recommended the creation of a permanent international crim-
inal court.23 The proposal was rejected as premature; instead, the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice, the precursor to the International Court 
of Justice, was established with civil jurisdiction over states.24 Following that 
narrative trajectory, the most critical period in the development of mod-
ern international criminal law (icl) occurred in the period following World 
War II. Two international tribunals were established for adjudicating interna-
tional crimes that occurred during the war: the International Military Tribu-
nal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals (the Nuremberg Tribunal) 
and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Tribunal).
The Nuremberg Tribunal was established through the London Agreement 
of August 8, 1945, between the four victorious Allied Powers: France, the So-
viet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.25 The tribunal con-
vened from November 20, 1945, to October 1, 1946, during which time it heard 
the matters of twenty- one Nazi defendants.26 The Tokyo Tribunal was, by 
contrast, established by a special proclamation issued by the Supreme Allied 
Commander of the Far East, US General Douglas MacArthur, with the agree-
ment of the Allied Powers.27 The Tokyo Tribunal convened from May 3, 1946, 
to November 12, 1948, and was heavily influenced by the United States, with 
prosecutions led by a single American chief of counsel chosen by MacArthur 
(with associate counsel from the Allied Powers).28 In addition to these two 
tribunals, hundreds of trials occurred before military and civilian tribunals in 
various locales in the zones of occupation of the victorious powers.29
Many scholars of international law argue that it is difficult to overstate 
the significance of the post–World War II period to the field of international 
criminal law. They insist that “these legal proceedings established many core 
principles of the field.”30 Indeed, the establishment of a mechanism in which 
high- ranking state officials could be held individually criminally responsi-
100 CHAPTER 2
ble for international crimes created a set of discourses that were profoundly 
powerful.31 Many scholars have shown that the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribu-
nals made explicit the commitment to holding various officials responsible for 
their orders to lower- ranking officers to facilitate or directly perpetrate vio-
lence. The argument that is often made is that by rejecting the basis for both 
state sovereignty and discarding principles of immunity through a move-
ment that insists on the irrelevance of official capacity, this post–World War II 
movement certainly produced a few examples where those culpable for mass 
crimes were held criminally accountable.32 However, as is well documented in 
the literature, for every instance in which European sovereign heads of state 
were held responsible for violent mass crimes in Europe and South America, 
there were a plethora of other situations where this was not the case. While 
the Nuremberg example provides a mechanism for understanding particu-
lar instances of criminal liability of commanders, British or Dutch or Spanish 
imperial forces, for example, engaged in gross violations with impunity.33 Sig-
nificant populations involved in self- determination or independence strug-
gles in the Caribbean, Latin America, and Africa, and indigenous and First 
Nations peoples, were arrested, indicted, and subjected to violence. Yet, if we 
presume that “international” refers to a wide range of countries and popula-
tions, then the absence of the criminal prosecution of former colonial leaders 
in places like England or even France during twentieth- century independence 
struggles calls into question the often- told narratives about the trend toward 
criminal prosecutions.
The recent history that the otp and many others within the field of inter-
national criminal justice call the road to Rome is one in which the immedi-
ate post–World War II period witnessed the United Nations emerging from 
its predecessor, the League of Nations. This was followed by the emergence of 
an international human rights regime that led to the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights. The codification of icl continued with the development of the 
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.34 And in 1947, the un Gen-
eral Assembly requested that the International Law Commission (ilc) study 
the possibility of establishing an international judicial body for crimes such 
as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.35 As the story is told, 
in the early 1950s the ilc was invited to assess the interest, thus the potential, 
for establishing a permanent international judicial institution. Codifying the 
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Nuremberg and Tokyo principles into a Draft Code of Offenses against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind would provide the subject matter jurisdiction 
for the proposed tribunal.36 But it did this with numerous stops and starts, 
dealing with pressure to abandon it during the Cold War and over various 
ideological and political disagreements over the type of crimes that would be 
under the subject matter jurisdiction of such an institution.
In the early 1990s, a range of parallel developments unfolded. The story 
told is that at the prompting of Trinidad and Tobago and with an emphasis on 
transnational crimes like drug trafficking and money laundering, the General 
Assembly once again prompted the ilc to draft a statute for a permanent inter-
national criminal court.37 This took shape alongside an initiative by Trinidad 
and Tobago to make a concerted effort to address various transnational crimes 
such as drug trafficking and money laundering.38 Also during this period, Res-
olution 780 was adopted on October 6, 1992, by the unsc to establish a com-
mission of experts to document violations of international law.39 In response 
to the commission’s recommendation, as well as to calls from a wide spectrum 
of international actors, on May 25, 1993, the unsc unanimously adopted Res-
olution 827 to create the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, an 
international tribunal to prosecute those responsible for crimes committed in 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991.40 The following year, the genocide in Rwanda 
led to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.41
Additional ad hoc tribunals were later established (out of the unsc) to re-
spond to crimes committed in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Lebanon, and Cam-
bodia. The ilc completed a draft statute in 1994 that formed the basis for 
consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an Inter-
national Criminal Court and then a Preparatory Committee on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court.42 And while this popular trajectory 
was seen by many in the growing rule of law movement as a positive devel-
opment, the ilc’s project and the subsequent General Assembly deliberations 
led to the consolidation of the un’s icl assemblages, resulting in the forma-
tion of the icc.
On July 17, 1998, 120 of the world’s states came together to complete the 
negotiation for the adopted text of the Rome Statute for the eventual estab-
lishment of the icc. By 2002, the Rome Statute came into force and was cele-
brated with a profoundly historical century- old origin story. Yet even some of 
international criminal law’s juridical architects, such as Antonio Cassese and 
Cherif Bassouni, never accepted— empirically, legally, and normatively— the 
dominant road to Rome narrative, because they understood that up until 1993 
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such an institution was not enough to destabilize the modern legal concept of 
sovereignty. The story that is often left out of the road to Rome trajectory is 
the narrative that highlights the way that the moral responsibility to protect 
those victimized by violence led to the viability of the ad hoc tribunals and 
eventually the icc. Also relevant is the reality that the early innovators who at-
tended the conference in Rome and participated in the early negotiations that 
led to the eventual treaty often recognize each other as founding mothers and 
fathers of the statute, invoking familial relationships through which to estab-
lish propriety and recognize its originary prestige. From Nuremberg narra-
tives to Tokyo to Rome to Kampala, these kinship descriptions of first, second, 
and third generations committed to ending impunity for victims and stopping 
perpetrators continue to pervade its discourses. Insistence that never again 
will the world allow impunity to soar without recourse remains at the heart of 
the anti- impunity movement. These sentiments are what make affective jus-
tice a critical domain for the study of the embodied feelings that propel jus-
tice making. This is very different from the linear story above and illustrates 
the process of reattribution at work in this example and throughout the book. 
In Nuremberg and Tokyo, the reality of defeat in war led to the setting of 
the conditions for prosecutorial justice. As Mahmood Mamdani has helped to 
clarify, the hidden prerequisites for trial, in all these cases, were (1) a war, that 
was (2) won decisively by one side, and to which one might add (3) the histor-
ical institution of “unconditional surrender,” which includes the concession 
of sovereign power.43 By contrast, in the African situations that the icc has 
taken up, very different conditions led to the court’s reach. The contemporary 
protection and invocation of justice for victims were related to the inability of 
African states to use decolonization to move toward new frontiers that would 
disrupt spheres of inequality, ethnic patronage, and poverty that prevailed in 
the post- 1960 independence period.
The Road from Rwanda, Not Nuremberg
Violence in the former Yugoslavia and then Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Le-
one led to the formation of new judicial institutions that also contributed to 
a new set of discourses about the icc. These further reinforced the emotional 
contours of international law. From Kenya to South Africa, Namibia to Mo-
zambique, Zimbabwe to Algeria, independence negotiations from the late 
1950s to the mid- 1990s were brokered without attention to criminal prose-
cutions of former colonial powers. Even as various African leaders were stra-
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tegically optimistic about the potential of using international justice in their 
newly independent states, they also knew that unless the roots of inequality 
were addressed, violence would remain a mode for managing law’s failures.
The postwar momentum to develop permanent icl institutions resulted in 
the criminalization of certain forms of conduct, the establishment of partic-
ular types of jurisdiction, and the individualization of criminal responsibility 
in which particular members states and the un, as stakeholders in criminal 
justice, became engaged in advocacy to use criminal justice to address mass 
atrocity violence. However, when various African advocates decried the tim-
ing of such forms of institutionalization, they often commiserated that when 
international criminal justice was needed to intervene in colonial and post- 
1990s periods, there were no judicial institutions available to them. The ab-
sence of international institutions to intervene in wide- scale violence in places 
like South Africa, for example, was seen by many of those concerned with the 
structural inequality of justice as reflecting the same architecture that pro-
duced the Treaty of Rome. From 1948 to 1990, apartheid in South Africa was 
an international crime without an international criminal court to prosecute 
it. However, after the un General Assembly classified it as a crime against hu-
manity in 1966, the Organisation of African Unity (oau) attempted to lobby 
for the establishment of an international penal court in the 1970s to prose-
cute the crime.44 Initially, its stakeholders had hoped that they could establish 
a criminal chamber through the African Charter of Human Rights, but they 
abandoned this when the un Security Council affirmed in 1984 that apartheid 
was a crime. This opened up the possibility of establishing in the late 1980s a 
un international penal court in order to prosecute various apartheid crimes 
on the basis of universal jurisdiction. But the reality was that in order to pur-
sue apartheid as a crime, national states had to enact legislation to prosecute 
individuals through universal jurisdiction.45
When the Rome Statute crimes were negotiated, apartheid offenses were 
eventually dropped as a core standalone crime. Instead, apartheid was col-
lapsed into crimes against humanity and subject to a post- 2002 temporal ju-
risdiction. This meant that the period of brutal domination of South African 
or Kenyan natives was beyond the temporal reach of the court. Instead, the in-
ternational rule of law movement took hold of post–civil rights judicial agen-
das propelled by various agents of change in the US, Europe, and Australia. 
And, as the story is often told, the late 1980s and early 1990s led to the estab-
lishment of new judicial institutions that dealt with a range of crimes in which 
criminal responsibility was narrowly tailored to the present and the future 
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goals of ending impunity. The irony is that when African stakeholders needed 
prosecutorial justice against colonial domination, international law could not 
be mobilized to provide viable solutions because of the temporal framing. 
And although African state brokers participated to varying degrees during 
the Treaty of Rome negotiations, and even as the law was deployed to estab-
lish African independence and membership in the newly changing world or-
der, they were well aware that there were limits to its use as a tool for justice 
against economic plunder in Africa.46 
State actors that were actively engaged in the icc’s success, such as En-
gland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, came to be seen by various Afri-
can state actors as engaging in international lawmaking both as an instrument 
of historical subjugation and as a tool for social change. Kenyan history and 
memory of native subjugation provides a vivid example of this relationship. It 
shows that even as African states signed on to the Rome Statute in response 
to the demands of new democratic forms of constitutionalism, for a range of 
leaders and their publics in the Global South, post–Cold War democracy has 
an internal tension. Structural violence was written out of the icc’s social his-
tory, which the narratives reflected. As discussed in chapter 1, African states 
were often persuaded to ratify the Rome Statute for the icc by institutions like 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and 
various ngos funded by northern governments or philanthropists.47 Instead, 
the icc emerged as a mechanism for protecting other types of “victims”— of 
African postcolonial violence— while the prosecution of northern perpetra-
tors, such as those states that were at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, were for 
some in the North seen as unthinkable. This is because the violence in these 
contexts was either protected by particular state’s nonsubmission to the juris-
diction of the Rome Statute, like the United States, or because between 2002 
and 2017 the crime of aggression was not yet operationalized and therefore 
not justiciable. And with the revision to the crime of aggression, states that 
were parties to the Rome Statute but did not want to submit to the amend-
ment were able to register a reservation. The example is telling. 
At the time of entry into force of the Rome Statue in 2002, Article 5(1) in-
cluded the jurisdiction of the court over four crimes: (1) genocide; (2) crimes 
against humanity; (3) war crimes; and (4) aggression. However, Article 5(2) 
stated that the court will activate jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
only after a definition of the crime and the conditions for such jurisdiction are 
established.48 The Kampala Review Conference in 2010 fulfilled this mandate, 
and over thirty state parties ratified the provisions for the amendment of the 
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original text to include the agreed- upon definition and conditions for juris-
diction.49 The sixteenth session of the Assembly of States Parties in December 
2017 decided on the activation of the jurisdiction of the court over the crime 
of aggression, establishing it in Resolution icc- asp/ 16/ Res.5 by consensus on 
December 14, 2017.50 However, the assembly’s resolution explicitly called for 
it to “enter into force for those States Parties that have accepted the amend-
ments one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accep-
tance and that in the case of a State referral or proprio motu investigation the 
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime of aggression when 
committed by a national or on the territory of a State Party that has not rat-
ified or accepted these amendments.”51 Many describe this icc resolution as 
reflecting a compromised position between the majority of the state parties 
on one side and a small group of northern countries on the other (Britain, 
France, Canada, Japan, and Norway). According to our documentation of the 
negotiations, initially these countries had been calling for further clarity on 
how the amendments in Kampala would be interpreted. As the interpretation 
of the terms for the crime of aggression became clearer, they advocated for 
an opt- out alternative in which they could still remain as parties to the Rome 
Statute but register a reservation for the crime of aggression.52 The result was 
the brokering of the crime of aggression with limited jurisdiction in which the 
crime would only apply to those who ratified the Kampala agreement (thirty- 
five states at the time of this analy sis), thus submitting to the subject matter 
jurisdiction under the crime of aggression.53 
Following the December 2017 Assembly of States Parties, the narrative that 
circulated among significant numbers of African state representatives was that, 
once again, northern countries had found a way to create exceptions to the 
universal application of justice. During the 2018 African Union Summit that I 
attended the following month, on the heels of the icc’s Assembly of States Par-
ties meeting, various narrative explanations and expressions of anger circulated 
about icc states parties that had not ratified the Kampala amendment exercis-
ing what some have called de facto immunity.54 In other words, and except in 
the case of unsc referrals, the stories that circulated clarified what they saw as 
the injustice: by not adopting the amendment and allowing for reservations, 
predominantly European and Asian states were seen as being able to shield 
themselves from the subject matter jurisdiction of the crime of aggression.55 
The ability to opt in and opt out and apply the law at will prevailed in their angry 
discussions about the icc pursuing only African cases— or, as I’ve heard many 
times, “the icc being put in place to shield the West and pursue the rest.”56
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Given these feelings of structural inequality, documenting the persistence 
of these ironies makes it all the more important to examine how global power 
becomes manifest in particular international institutional forms and how 
structures of inequality are not only felt but expressed and circulate through 
particular narrative modes. We see this through the sentimental foundations 
of Kenyatta and others’ anti- icc protest speech or the seductions of the otp’s 
celebration of judicial possibility, and it explains how and why such feeling re-
gimes circulate and are at times taken up uncritically, even as other critiques 
of the African postcolonial state project are launched. These complex affects 
that are embodied and manifest through particular emotional regimes matter 
because they influence the way people understand the rule of law in the con-
temporary period, and thus how people’s perceptions of law’s inequality (or 
promise) drive public engagement.
As I show here, these seductions do not work through preestablished sen-
timental formulations; rather, it is through affective transference that peo-
ple deploy affects and consolidate them with narratives of power. Histories 
of law and its perceived legitimacy or illegitimacy are actively created within 
regimes of meaning and require work to sustain their seductions as ratio-
nal.57 These narrative tropes are often sufficient, then, to provoke actionable 
results.
Feelings of anger, resentment, and the victory of the survivor are made 
real in such anti- impunity circles not through their exacting historical equiv-
alences but through an emotional discourse of the “victim to be saved” that 
works to align like- minded participants. As one interlocutor following Mbiz-
vo’s speech commented, “I may not have agreed with her rendition of the his-
tory, but she’s right. ‘Victims’ need us to carry the torch for our generation.” 
Or as another insisted, “For me, it didn’t matter whether I agreed with her; in 
some ways I didn’t because her rendition of icc history seemed flawed. But 
her speech made me feel victorious all over— all over my body. We all wanted 
to be part of the movement that she described. We wanted to be counted.”
Similarly, in reflecting on Kenyatta’s speech in Nairobi, one attendee shared 
the following: “I’m not a supporter of Kenyatta, but when he gave that speech I 
felt something; there was something inside of me that tingled, that wanted to 
cry, that felt robbed and depressed. That feeling brought us together because 
we all shared that unfortunate [colonial] past.” 
These comments suggest that the intensity of bodily feeling and its con-
nection to particular sentiments perform sentimental work that can constitute 
groups, through what Émile Durkheim referred to as “collective efferves-
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cence,” the simultaneous sharing of thoughts and actions that excite individu-
als and, in so doing, can lead to group unification.58 These processes are social 
but are also emotional and affective. The bodily sensations that people describe 
are connected to their feelings of shared agreement, their sense of victory or 
anger from historical conditions of dispossession, and are key to making sense 
of the emotional manifestations in the afterlife of the law. They call on us 
to ask hard questions that explain why significant numbers of leaders, aca-
demics, members of civil society, and policy makers who may have formerly 
supported the icc’s potential have since advocated withdrawing from its ju-
risdiction and vice versa; why some (such as various members of civil society 
groups in African cities) who were suspicious of the icc have joined the rule 
of law anti- impunity movement because they lost faith in their leaders. These 
shifts in emotional attachments are as elusive as they may be real, but they are 
key to understanding how shared emotional responses help form alliances— 
 even if momentary.
Seeing law through the way that public utterances retell its history of rel-
evance illuminates the connection between affects and political engagement 
and raises questions about what contemporary international criminal law 
 really is, within what terrain it has operated, and what it can do given the 
political constraints within which it exists. Thus, a deeper reflection on the 
speeches delivered by Mbizvo and Kenyatta to their respective audiences can 
shed light on how people’s relationship to the law is tied to the emergence of 
contemporary socio- moral orders through which social formations are con-
stituted and disaggregated and emotional climates regulated. 
Moral orders operate within knowledge regimes that are propelled by the 
justice imaginaries that I go on to explore in this book. By discursively rep-
resenting these figures as moral objects of compassion and retribution, some 
people engaged in what Thomas Laqueur has called “sympathetic passions,” 
which he describes as bridging compassion and action.59 These sympathetic 
passions or emotional calls for action shape the sentiments that its advocates 
deploy. As a way of defining justice through the production of emotional af-
finities, the imbrication of legal encapsulation on contemporary rule of law 
formations has led to particular justice imaginaries with affective valences 
and ordering logics. And yet, tracing assemblages of affects involves tracing 
affects in nonlinear ways— not from cause to effect but in relation to courses 
of events and their materialities, socialities, and aesthetics. This involves 
thinking about how a standing ovation at a public talk or a loud and unified 
roar in a crowd during a political speech crystallizes and solidify stories or 
108 CHAPTER 2
events. What we see is that certain historical lineages articulated through af-
fective transference in public talks become feasible, thinkable, and acceptable 
because of the way justice is articulated. They set tones for emotional climates 
and shape existing fields of justice. Through these processes of public sym-
bolic deployments and emotional community formation, we see how affective 
transference works— not through knowable emotion but through the consti-
tution of emotional camps that are regimented in particular ways.
Legal encapsulation reinforces these discursive practices. As a product of 
technocratic knowledge applied to various campaigns for promoting justice, 
it is seen by those whose feeling regimes are constituted through the anti- 
impunity movement as essential for protecting those victimized by violence 
and holding perpetrators accountable. The constructed figures— “the victim” 
and “the perpetrator”— are key component parts of anti- impunity assemblages 
as they provide the aesthetic icons through which technocratic legal practices 
can be instrumentalized. 
Yet even with these component parts, attempts to counter prevailing jus-
tice narratives abound in the contemporary period. They emerge as narra-
tives that contravene other stories and reflect struggles over the knowledge 
production through which necessary alignments take shape. This process of 
alignment is how reattribution gains its power. For, as a process of resignifi-
cation, it is shaped by controversies around meaning making and contesta-
tions around the power to enforce those meanings. But as we shall see below, 
as affects that are operationalized with others, the process of social transfer-
ence can be known not through actual experiences, but through the way that 
sociopolitical consciousness can be assessed by how subjects articulate justice 
feelings as echoing their past experiences. These descriptions set in motion 
potential futures while also tapping into past experiences of injustice.
Affective Transference and the Remaking of History
Shamisu Mbizvo’s audience included a room full of approximately seventy- 
five scholars of international law, human rights law, and the literature and 
anthropology of law, as well as a range of historians of Africa and the West 
who were committed to various ways of studying international law’s impact 
on and relationship to Africa. Immediately following her speech, she received 
a standing ovation, even from colleagues who remained skeptical about the 
court’s work. Uhuru Kenyatta’s speech was delivered to an outdoor assembly 
of thousands committed to new possibilities for justice through the coalition 
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parties. In both cases, the narratives about international law were framed in 
relation to different historical formations. For both speakers, the past was in-
terwoven with the present to make the contemporary period meaningful.
Like Kenyatta’s narrative, Mbizvo’s retelling of the icc’s past reflected mor-
ally coherent explanations concerning the making of the Rome Statute. The 
moral mission that led to the establishment of the contemporary rule of law 
movement was tied to its judicial inheritance— the protection of victims as 
the basis of its pursuit of judicial accountability. In both speeches, messages 
about interrelationships between the past and the present responded to var-
ious past events and made the present meaningful. Yet the viability of those 
attempts to link past and present is more about the speaker’s ability to use af-
fective transference to communicate sentiments that are meaningful to oth-
ers than they are about real modalities of interconnection or the ascription of 
stigma.
To critique international criminal institutions, Kenyatta identified an on-
going violation to foreground a stigma that demarcates what is or is not ac-
ceptable. He then forged a community of survivors by using language that 
invokes Kenyan citizens as beneficiaries of yesterday’s freedom fighters. From 
the opening, in which the “sacrifice and heroism of many Kenyans . . .  won us 
freedom and sovereignty,” to his later invocations of “our forefather” in order 
to index kinship, we see attempts to constitute a community. Once senses of 
community were constructed, Kenyatta reconciled the substantively disjunc-
tural historical narratives. He decentered the violence of the colonial project 
and brought it into relevance with the icc’s African trials. By grounding his 
intervention in Kenya’s history of colonial violence and the popular percep-
tion of colonial sham trials, Kenyatta engaged in the transmission of feelings 
of resentment— from one person to another, from a leader to his constit-
uency.60 Here transmission is possible through a colloquial knowledge about 
the colonial past and its related subjugation that is embodied in preexisting 
responses to loss, sham trials, and experiences of poverty. Suggestions about 
Africa’s place in an unequal past conjure sentiments that produce parallels 
with the contemporary world order where feelings of anger from past in-
equality prevail. 
Affective transference is possible with the invocation to celebrate the sur-
vivors of that inequality. The reference to “their ilk” highlights how Kenyatta 
is, in turn, stigmatizing colonial institutions whose continuities contribute 
to feelings of anger at play. Transference was possible and effective because 
the histories of colonial violence and its related dispositions were decontex-
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tualized from their earlier historical logic and recontextualized into contem-
porary realities.61 Through the realization of the relevance of the past to the 
present, members of the public gained an opportunity to constitute alliances 
with each other. The message was contingent on knowledge about colonial-
ism, the relegation of colonial trials to sham trials, and African subordination, 
which were critical to the connections that audience members had to make. 
It was the decontextualization and recontextualization that characterized the 
magnetism of the emotional regimes being shaped, that oriented the way 
Kenyatta’s message was received. The achievement of transference allowed the 
sympathetic listener to create mutually linked freedom fighters and revolu-
tionaries out of both Jomo and Uhuru Kenyatta. 
Throughout Kenyatta’s speech, and in response to his passionate utter-
ances, the audience applauded, and large numbers shouted for more. When 
he finished, their applause continued, almost uncontrollably. Affective trans-
ference happened through the rhetorical frenzies elicited in the speeches. 
Passing from person to person and group to group, the forms of collective ef-
fervescence created what Margaret Wetherell refers to as pulses of energetic 
relations.62 By engaging vociferously with the rhetorical link (“their ilk”) be-
tween Kenyatta’s fight against the icc and the larger anti- imperial struggles 
over the past century, the audience that was there that day confirmed the ef-
fectiveness of the conjuncture of like- minded feeling expressions with perfor-
mative displays of agreement.
Eight out of ten of the people we polled confirmed that they were Kenyatta- 
Ruto supporters. They described the moment as one where “the people spoke,” 
or where “Kenyatta and Kenya could be vindicated.” This was in keeping with 
the top- trending hashtag of 2012,  #Kenya Decides. Said one woman to our 
question about the relevance of colonialism to this moment: “It’s true that co-
lonial rule happened long ago but it is relevant today. My family would not be 
poor and without land if it weren’t for the British. Kenyatta can reverse that— 
 Kenya Decides!”
Another agreed and insisted, “Kenyatta is not to be blamed. He defended 
his people. He was like Jesus. And like Jesus, he delivered.”
Through the deployment of certain linguistic tools, the political speech act 
and the sentiments that it conjured reflected people’s application of partial 
concepts while still communicating full ideas about heroism, retribution of 
colonial wrongs, and hopes of reconciliation. The violations present with the 
invocation of colonialism and the historical use of colonial law to oppress the 
Mau Mau fighters were so commonly understood that it was unnecessary for 
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Kenyatta to spell them out. Rather, the listener was made to call on his or her 
own sense of inequality in order to fill the gaps. 
The use of the unsayable is powerful because as a rhetorical strategy in 
justice circles in Kenya around icc issues, it operates within particular feel-
ing regimes that shape alliances. What it enabled out of the experience of 
affirmations on that Hero’s Day was an embodied sense of “Tuko Pamoja”— 
 meaning “we are together.” The sense of history shaping the present emerged 
from senses of displacement and deliverance. Accordingly, past subordination 
becomes a reflection of itself in the present. This is where the violence of the 
colonial past is effectively communicated through the embodiment of subju-
gation. And, as such, notions of justice are made real through the crafting of 
postcolonial narratives that the law is seen as being unable to deliver. Through 
spheres of resignification, representations of icc justice as injustice and new 
histories are mobilized through public speeches, silences, selective memories, 
and referential musings. 
As another attendee, Irene, told me in response to my question about that 
unspoken element in the speech: “It was what he didn’t say that made us all 
come together. Anyone who understood the connection was able to decide 
whose side they were on— the oppressor or the oppressed.” 
When I asked her how she felt and whether she could still say that the pain 
of colonial oppression was embodied, she quickly responded by saying in a 
low and remorseful tone, “As long as people are displaced from their land, 
suffering knows no time.” By this, Irene was suggesting that the infraction still 
continues to be felt in the present and shapes people in particular ways. This 
demarcation of a shared feeling is a product of affects through which particu-
lar alliances with others are being formed. They are powerful not because their 
embodiments are knowable or certain. They are powerful because the feeling 
regimes within which they operate are constitutive passionate alliances that, 
in turn, shape social manifestations. The shaping of the social is therefore not 
about the truth of the feeling. Rather, it is about affective justice— that is, the 
way that the feeling of the moment is produced, embodied, communicated, 
and/ or made to constitute particular relations.
Many of the responses we received from informants led them to construct 
a hero figure out of Uhuru Kenyatta. Not only did they speak of how Jomo 
Kenyatta— the father— sacrificed his life for his people, but they also linked it 
to how the son, Uhuru Kenyatta, mobilized forces to defend his people from 
displacement and violence. These claims were fueled through emotionally af-
fective articulations— through an enthusiastic appreciation for the contribu-
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tion of their leader and his social- familial lineage. Yet not all of those polled 
were traditional Kenyatta supporters. Instead, they were from a range of eth-
nic groups and political party affiliations. They nonetheless reported to us that 
they were taken by the transformative frenzy of the moment. Among those 
who voted for the opposing party, they still reported that they believed that 
it was important to rethink how we understand culpability. For many, collec-
tive culpability was the framework through which to attribute responsibility. 
Time and time again, people spoke of the colonial other, the icc, or other 
forces that were to blame for the postelection violence. Their language re-
flected feelings of oppression, disdain, subjugation, injustice, loss of land, and 
the importance of a deliverer to return their land to them. They acknowledged 
local corruption, Somali- Kenyan terrorism, and so on. And while many com-
plained bitterly about Kenyan politicians and inherent corruption, others also 
articulated the problem of violence as being outside of the conditions of their 
making. One attendee responded to a question about culpability with the fol-
lowing insight: “No, I didn’t vote for Kenyatta  .  .  .   but I believe that he is a 
pawn in a larger game. . . .  The Kenyan mafia is relevant here. . . .  The game 
is also being controlled by the West; back then it was the British, now it’s Eu-
rope and America.”
In the context of the embodied impact of Kenyatta’s speech and the rhe-
torical frenzy that led to chants from the crowds, we see how feelings mediate 
one’s relationship to the past, the present, and the future. For example, narra-
tives of subjugation and violence became embodied through the retelling of 
such histories of subjugation. In the retelling, the narratives passed from per-
son to person, and through the creation of pulses of energetic relations, emo-
tional alliances were formed that become socially relevant.63 And through the 
embodied experience of participating, of being there, of feeling anguish and 
being reminded of the histories that continue to propel Kenyan subjugation, 
people deployed emotional tools to make sense of particular messages and as-
sess the way the message calls them be taken in— to be engaged bodily in ex-
periences of public feeling. These public feelings have the ability to reinforce 
particular assemblages of socialization in which particular expressions, such 
as “We’ve defeated their ilk before,” become more acute. 
Through the circulation of concepts (and slogans, as will be seen in chap-
ter 4) that align with past narratives, invocations of togetherness— however 
fictive— highlight the way that morally coherent causalities can be mobilized 
to produce moral sentiments that do particular forms of momentary work. 
Protest speech or celebratory rhetoric demonstrates these dialogisms. As a 
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partial practice, protest speech is a powerful modality because it makes emo-
tional transference possible in contexts that might be substantively different 
otherwise. Kenyatta’s disjunctural history provided the emotional fodder to 
align the public’s inventory of social feelings with their social alliances. This 
connection between particular types of violence and historical facts that are 
evidently disjunctural can produce new social truths by constituting “the real” 
dialogically through realignments of the social. This happens not because the 
audiences are uninformed but because of the power of available historical 
tropes and icons and their relevance to constituting the meaning of alliance 
and connection. 
What the example of Kenyatta’s public speech shows us, therefore, is that 
substantively disjunct histories can be made real through the iconic construc-
tion of Jomo Kenyatta as hero and freedom fighter, and thus, through the ar-
ticulation of the relevant continuities, Uhuru Kenyatta as inheritor of that 
iconic meaning. The production of the real, therefore, involves the deploy-
ment of histories that are ultimately sustained through subsequent networks 
of socialization. Those histories, as retold, become powerful because of the 
feeling regimes within which the iconic signs invoked operate in relation to 
particular nationalist founding tropes. The success of affective transference 
is possible precisely because icons, narrative tropes, and affective embodi-
ments have the power to demand of publics an opportunity to become aligned 
with others in response to particular momentary and historical feelings. And 
though the feelings may be temporarily unstable, they tell us something about 
the assemblages and alignments at play and not necessarily actual sustained 
convictions over time. Once articulated, these discourses can be sustained 
through particular knowledge convictions, affective practices, and ongoing 
forms of biomediation that can shape the networks of socialization through 
which group alliances are produced and embodied and stories about group 
histories are told.
For her part, Mbizvo’s use of social transference allows her to establish 
icl, the icc, and its actors— the otp— as the heroes and heroines of “vic-
tims” and survivors around the world. Utterances such as, “The icc exists to 
hear the voices of victims of the most atrocious crimes, when their cries fall 
on deaf ears,” can be used to suggest that the judicialization of political issues 
can offer tangible solutions. As such, discourses that might normally operate 
in the unconscious through words such as victims or ending impunity can be 
formulated through a specified inventory of popular references that are more 
socially familiar than they are individually experienced. Themes of long his-
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torical connections establish particular affective resonances and connect so-
cially or institutionally to emotive templates. Accordingly, past subordination 
becomes a mechanism for articulating contemporary inequalities, but the 
past is always signaled dialogically. That is, it is seen as building on the pres-
ent, thereby constituting a reflection of itself in the present. 
Celebratory rhetoric also requires particular affective alliances to congeal. 
For this to happen, the roads of emotional causality must be presented as part 
of a dialogic continuum in which gaps in the social retelling of the past pro-
vide a space for indirect connections to be made between socially relevant 
developments. In Mbizo’s description of icl’s one hundred years of develop-
ment, for example, what we see is the profound imagery of the grand march 
to establish the permanent court as the ultimate evolutionary form of justice 
for all. A plethora of key icl scholars— from Beth Van Schaack and Ronald 
Slye to Kathryn Sikkink, Cherif Bassioni, and Antonio Cassese, to name only 
a few— have popularized these narratives about international criminal prose-
cutions shaping new senses of justice for those victimized by violence.64 The 
related events, people, and the power relations that enable emotional sharing 
contribute to the establishment of the ordinary logic of law’s work. This use of 
sentimentality is emotionally pervasive in the literature. Who wouldn’t want 
to protect those victimized by violence?
Social Transference and the Institutionalization of Embodied Affects
What I have shown in this chapter is that substantively disjunct histories are of-
ten made real not through actual historical equivalences but through the sym-
bolic construction of the “victim” fetish— be it a survivor of election violence 
or a persecuted anticolonial freedom fighter. This type of knowledge produc-
tion involves the deployment of sentiments of compassion and responsibility 
around the protection of victims who are connected to the culmination of a 
one- hundred- year history of judicial strategies that are ultimately sustained 
through subsequent networks of socialization. It is also shown through the re-
signification of the narrative of the “victim/ survivor” of colonialism through 
which particular tropes of imperial justice are used to hold imperialists ac-
countable. What we see in the study of the transference of these passionate 
utterances is how structurally dissimilar phenomena can be decontextualized 
and recontextualized to produce otherwise contested assemblages. 
For the icc’s otp under Fatou Bensouda, this involves the encounter with 
new 1990s moral sentiments in which the promise of the icc’s one- hundred- 
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year historical trajectory demonstrates the construction of international law’s 
moral legitimacy as a crucible for social change. The movement’s mantra that 
“no one is above the law” informs the otp’s invocations of their work as being 
centrally about protecting victims. When understood in relation to affective 
transference, we see how hope for judicial legitimacy— meaning the instantia-
tion of legal processes as viable and with the potential to achieve legal fairness, 
certainty, and predictability— can be breathed into new justice experiments. 
For various African leaders and their publics, alternate notions of judicial 
justice involve articulating new vocabulary for analyzing the historical under-
pinnings of violence and the dialogic presence of the ancestors within. In the 
end, determining which justice mechanisms are appropriate is central to how 
new moral orders are being mobilized to inspire sentimental responses to in-
justice. Notions of justice are made real through the crafting of postcolonial 
narratives that the law is seen as being unable to deliver. Through spheres of 
resignification, representations of Hague justice as injustice and new histories 
are mobilized through public speeches, silences, selective memories, and ref-
erential musings. Their truths become manifest in sentimental attachments 
that accent the cadence of daily life. In the end, such attachments establish the 
moral logic that shapes the way that various publics achieve the feeling that 
justice has been served in the contemporary period. 
In both cases, such passionate utterances are central to the social alli-
ances that are formed— as in a celebration- day crowd or in the spaces, like 
The Hague, in which international justice actors engage in the production 
of affective justice. As we shall see in chapter 3, once the affective domains 
are narratively constituted through particular histories and sentimentalized 
in particular ways, a key component of their effectiveness involves the em-
bodiment of their convictions as demonstrated in various justice campaigns. 
With the increasing relevance of a “victim” through processes of legal encap-
sulation, this embodiment of justice reflects affective justice and is critical for 
understanding the actual making of international justice through its place in 
the life of the law.
CHAPTER 3
Biomediation and the  
 #Bring Back Our Girls Campaign
Making Suffering Visible
In the spring of 2014,  #Bring Back Our Girls was mobilized and quickly popu-
larized by politicians; concerned citizens; celebrities such as Kim Kardashian, 
Angelina Jolie, and Whoopi Goldberg; and the first lady of the United States 
at the time, Michelle Obama. The articulated goal was the return of the more 
than three hundred Nigerian girls abducted from a school in Chibok, Nigeria, 
by Islamic militants in the Nigerian state of Borno— one of twelve states that 
instituted criminal sharia law in 1999. The support of a global network inter-
ested in protecting those victimized by the abductions led to a transnational 
mass mobilization in which governments and citizens committed millions of 
dollars in a short period of time to launch campaigns that would lead to the 
demand for and return of innocent girls to their families and to their dreams 
of postsecondary education.
To briefly recap the events that led up to the  #Bring Back Our Girls cam-
paign: on April 14, 2014, Boko Haram, a militant Islamic group based in north-
ern Nigeria, went to Chibok to kidnap girls boarding at the local school. The 
girls were staying there overnight before taking a national entrance exam to 
gain admission to postsecondary education. Boko Haram first attacked the vil-
lage, then the local military base. Then its militants disguised themselves in of-
ficial government uniforms and at 11:45 p.m. they entered the boarding school 
by announcing to the girls that Boko Haram vigilantes were going to attack 
the school and that they were there to protect them. They then abducted 330 
Christian and Muslim (though predominantly Christian) girls ranging from 
fifteen to eighteen years of age.1
A month prior to the abduction, the schools in the area had closed for fear 
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of terror attacks by Muslim rebels. But the boarding school in Chibok had re-
opened so that the girls could take their final exams. Witnesses say the girls 
were aware of the risks of seeking an education in an environment known to 
have denied that opportunity to girls, but because they wanted to pursue their 
education to one day become doctors, lawyers, and teachers, they took their 
chances to prepare for the national exam.
Boko Haram is an Islamic militant group based in West Africa whose name 
means “Western education is sinful/ forbidden.” The group has been suspected 
of a range of attacks throughout Nigeria (and recently in Cameroon and Chad) 
since 2009, with the goal of establishing an Islamic state. With approximately 
six thousand fighters and control of over twenty thousand square kilometers of 
northeastern Nigeria, the group has emerged as a major force that has pledged 
allegiance to the Islamic state, also known as isis or isil. The militant group’s 
leader, Abubakar Shekau, claimed responsibility for the girls’ abduction, stat-
ing, “Western education should end. Girls, you should go and get married. . . .  
Western education should fold up. I abducted your girls. I will sell them in the 
market, by Allah.”2
Related sources said that the abducted girls were taken into neighbor-
ing Chad and Cameroon and sold as brides to Islamist militants for usd $12 
each. The militant leader said the girls were being held as sexual slaves. In 
response to the kidnapping and potential sale of the girls into sexual slav-
ery, widespread condemnations circulated rapidly on Twitter. In a red- carpet 
interview, Angelina Jolie— Hollywood Academy Award winner and famil-
iar symbol of icc justice— confirmed her pro–prosecutorial justice position: 
“The important thing  .  .  .   is to understand that this happens because these 
men think they can get away with this and they can do this. . . .  We have to 
start arresting people for this, we have to start bringing them to justice and we 
have to start making it an absolute crime that puts fear in these men so that 
they think twice about this kind of action.”3 Similarly, John Kerry, the US sec-
retary of state at the time, spoke at a press conference in Addis Ababa, where 
he declared that the United States would support Nigeria’s efforts to find the 
missing girls: “The kidnapping of hundreds of children by Boko Haram is an 
unconscionable crime, and we will do everything possible to support the Ni-
gerian government to return these young women to their homes and to hold 
the perpetrators to justice.”4
Yet supporting the Nigerian government in holding perpetrators of vio-
lence accountable has been complex. For while Nigeria’s then president Good-
luck was publicly advocating retributive justice for the kidnappers, he was 
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privately negotiating amnesty for Boko Haram militants.5 And over the course 
of October 2016, the first batch of twenty- one girls who were kidnapped were 
released to the International Committee of the Red Cross through a prisoner 
exchange and payment of millions of dollars in ransom. To do this, Switzer-
land’s government used funds from the $321 million that it had been holding 
since Nigeria’s former military dictator Sani Abacha’s rule.6 The International 
Criminal Court began preliminary examinations of the situation of violence 
in Nigeria.7 And by early 2018, further negotiations by international agencies 
to recover more girls were underway, though not yet successful.8 
In this age of Twitter, the news of girls being kidnapped and held as sex-
ual slaves went viral through the hashtag  #Bring Back Our Girls. With millions 
of tweets within a twenty- four- hour period demanding the girls’ release, the 
media coverage of African girls denied an education by militant Muslims led 
to the collection of electronic signatures and millions of dollars in aid from 
leaders, celebrities, and average citizens around the world. Activists in over 
thirty global cities— from New York and Los Angeles to London and Lagos— 
 engaged in rallies demanding that their governments mobilize sufficient mil-
itary support to arrest the “perpetrators” and return the girls. The messages 
were expressed succinctly and with great clarity. The sentiments emphasized 
compassion and focused on rights and entitlements communicated through a 
sense of collective responsibility to make a difference.
Over the past decade, scholars have explored the significance of the mobi-
lization of affect for suffering subjects and have also explored the way that new 
forms of electronic and digital media, such as hashtag activism, are providing 
renewed platforms to defend injustice and domains for what Andrew Ross re-
fers to as “viral expression.”9 This chapter demonstrates how in public activism 
emotional manifestations of human suffering have become decoupled from 
lived spaces through new practices of mediation. It shows how online activism 
can be seen as symptomatic of a more fundamental process of dislocation seen 
through the deployment of bodily and biotechnological advocacy. By detailing 
how messages communicated through large block letters and hashtag activism 
(rather than aesthetic visualizations of suffering children) are constituting af-
fective justice, the chapter focuses on two interrelated themes. First, it examines 
how, by erasing the bodily representation of African girls and replacing it with 
justice messaging, the  #Bring Back Our Girls campaign built an international so-
cial movement in ways that exceeded empathy as the emotional basis for calls to 
protect African girls. Second, in an attempt to shape an anthropology of inter-
national justice, it explores what forms of racial and gendered imaginaries are 
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emerging in the contemporary period and what they tell us about the modes 
of seeing, engaging, feeling, and speaking about justice at this critical junction. 
I ask how those engaged in contemporary justice activism use biomediated ac-
tivism through the decoupling of human suffering from their sites of violence 
and relocate them to the “international community” with the responsibility 
to protect. As a component part of affective justice’s technocratic knowledge 
form, biomediation involves redrawing the boundary of the individual self to 
include media and other electronic technologies.10 This approach to biomedi-
ation represents what I have called affective justice, for it is concerned with the 
biopolitical entanglements with the body— that is, how to understand it, how 
movements mobilize affects to save it, and how to manage its violations. The 
suffering body— materially or symbolically, or the body to be returned, to be 
liberated— as an analytic opens up a space for a robust interrogation of how 
new forms of mediation, in the form of electronic media technologies, are be-
ing used affectively for social justice mobilization. Through the redefinition of 
the biomediated body, we see how concepts and campaign demands as well 
as the tools that transport them are not just manifestations of the social body. 
They are, by extension, stand- ins for the individual body— our subjectivity, our 
power, the constructed essence of “the international community.”
In this chapter we see how affective justice, referenced through the body of 
those victimized by violence, is messaged and exported through digital media 
justice campaigns. In this case, advocacy groups, media outlets, celebrities, 
and publics on Facebook, Twitter, and various web networks harnessed their 
resolve to bring this issue to international attention, with the focus on pur-
suing, arresting, and demanding that Boko Haram correct their actions, and 
with young African girls at the center of the coordinated campaigns against 
sexual violence by those deemed terrorists. The tweets and hashtags needed 
only to combine a few words— “bring back our girls”— to assert the global 
cause of the violated female survivors and personalize the urgency of their 
return. The use of the possessive our highlighted the declaration of a shared 
humanity— that the girls belong to us and that we have a responsibility to pro-
tect them against their captors— while the imperative to bring them back sug-
gested forceful, immediate retrieval by any means necessary.
The emotionally propelled narrative focused on the young girls who were 
victimized by Boko Haram. But the larger structural forms of victimhood 
caused by conditions of economic or political marginalization were relegated 
to the shadows; those impacted by the worst forms of structural violence— 
 the indigent, the landless, those without access to water and health care, for 
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example— were obscured and folded into a discourse guided by the legal re-
sponsibility to protect survivors of physical violence, wherever they are in 
the world. As a form of do- good activism in which one can simply retweet 
a message or sponsor a child to support those victimized by violence, this 
type of advocacy highlights another set of discourses at play in the individ-
ualization of criminal responsibility and the belief that injustice can be pur-
sued through legality.11 It not only reasserted the urgency of ending impunity 
through its temporality of the now but also reinforced the construction of the 
“inter national community” as a significant subject of international law and as 
a critical contributor to the emotional and cultural sensibilities that shape the 
regimes that sustain its networks. 
Anthropologists Richard Wilson and Richard Brown argue that the use 
of humanitarian narratives is critical for the mobilization of empathy.12 They 
suggest that emotional engagement and guilt promote particular types of ac-
tion, and survivors’ narratives are key.13 And while it is true that emotions are 
mobilized through humanitarian campaigns, and narrative is an important 
part of that, it is also true, as I will go on to argue, that new technologies, such 
as Twitter, and online campaigns are leading to the reconceptualization of suf-
fering and are redrawing the body’s relation to other bodies. In considering 
the way that the imagery of a violated body is no longer necessary in global 
campaigns to enlist empathy and constitute support, we can see that today’s 
biomediated social movements can compel action through concepts and buy- 
ins to those concepts as a way of consolidating new human- technology- justice 
assemblages. It is the concept of the “victim” to be saved to which publics are 
becoming newly aligned or from which they are distinguishing themselves. 
And these nonspaces of biomediated connection are becoming sites for the 
formulation of ideological alignments and social positioning and not just the 
manifestation of humanitarian empathy.
The generative capacity of these types of justice campaigns is aligned with 
the foundations of contemporary capitalist logic, in which hashtag advo-
cacy connects with expectations of consumer choice— the choice to support 
a cause, to demand a solution, to donate as needed.14 Not only are the images 
and the block- art posters used in ways that enhance people’s engagement with 
it, they also represent contemporary democratic values that tie the logic of 
freedom to the body to be protected. This body is increasingly being seen as 
a site of global action. In this merger of freedom (produced through techno-
cratic and legal knowledge), the body, and new technologies that invigorate 
emotional responses, we see the packaging of transnational protest discourses 
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that stigmatize particular justice imaginaries. In this example, the stigmati-
zation is articulated through emotional pleas using terms such as barbarism. 
And though I am not interested in defending violence, what is important to 
note here is how in the articulation of “the Other” against the innocence of 
the survivor of violence, the “victim” becomes not just the girls to be saved. 
The girls victimized by Boko Haram become the international community it-
self, represented in block art or hashtags displayed and deployed by celebrity 
citizens. They become each other— an extension of an international justice 
assemblage— whose component parts cannot be separated from the whole.
The most effective aesthetic representation no longer depicts the subject 
who has been violated materially; it is not the survivor around which we lo-
cate ourselves, but a set of relations. Thus, while these forms of do- good ac-
tivism do indeed reflect the articulations of empathy that many scholars of 
humanitarianism, suffering, and social repair explain through the use of so-
cial narrative, it is critical that we extend that analy sis to the rapidly chang-
ing technological modalities that are constituting new publics in postviolence 
contexts today.15 We have entered a new era when international justice as-
semblages have taken on new capacities and responsibilities focused on judi-
cial solutions, especially in the Global South. This chapter, then, is concerned 
with why the  #Bring Back Our Girls campaign and its humanitarian logic was 
so compelling to its audiences, and what it tells us about the biopolitics of jus-
tice and the regimes within which they are circulating in the second decade of 
the twenty- first century.
Saving “Victims”: The Sentimentality of Empathy, Compassion, and Attribution
Two years before the Chibok girls were kidnapped and the  #Bring Back Our 
Girls hashtag proliferated, the  #Kony 2012 campaign was everywhere. The 
group known as Invisible Children produced and popularized a video titled 
Kony 2012 that went viral. Within days, over 120 million had viewed it on-
line, and household names like Bill Gates and celebrities such as Rihanna 
had retweeted it. Inspired by Jason Russell’s travels to Uganda, Kony 2012 
describes the country’s twenty- five- year- old war, its violence, and the con-
sequences of that violence: the death and displacement of millions of Ugan-
dans. The film connects Uganda’s mass violence to Joseph Kony, the leader 
of the Lord’s Resistance Army (lra), and demands that, in keeping with the 
icc’s warrant of arrest, he be held accountable judicially for the violence com-
mitted by the lra. Russell’s narration describes Kony as heading “the Lord’s 
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Resistance Army, a Christian terrorist group which has reportedly abducted 
and forced more than 30,000 children to fight with them since their revolt 
began in 1986.”16 He then discloses that his commitment was inspired by a 
promise he made to Jacob, a young Ugandan boy whose brother was killed 
by Kony’s men. Russell vowed that he was “going to do everything possible to 
stop them.” The rest of the story is about how American political participation 
and stopping a single leader will rectify Uganda’s plight. 
Russell opens the second story line with advice to his young son. “There 
are good guys and bad guys in Africa,” Russell says, and “the way to make Af-
rica better is to stop Africa’s bad guys.” Russell’s simplistic words about the 
nature of African violence and the role of ordinary Americans are energized 
with a compelling narrative about the conditions by which justice can be pro-
cured through international participation. The message resounded clearly 
and mobilized a social movement: by donating money through a simple click 
of a mouse, and buying a kit that would help fund Joseph Kony’s arrest, every 
American could also be part of the solution to help poor Ugandan survivors. 
In addition to the twenty- nine- minute documentary, Russell launched a cam-
paign called Cover the Night. It was a call to post around global cities various 
images of the lra indictee, Joseph Kony. Russell conceptualized the event as a 
moment in time when millions would engage in posting the image of Joseph 
Kony throughout their various communities. 
The simplicity of the Kony2012 message seemed compelling and suggested 
that Africa can be transformed by our philanthropy, through our willingness 
to save Ugandans. The campaign was one of a series of philanthropic, human-
itarian, and justice- seeking gestures communicating that capturing a single 
commander, a “perpetrator” responsible for mass crimes, will solve one of Af-
rica’s most endemic problems: violence. The campaign’s aesthetics centered 
the name and image of the individualized perpetrator, Kony, and used sym-
bolism that depoliticized support for his capture.17 The imagery employed 
suggested that regardless of our political leanings (represented by the Demo-
cratic donkey and Republican elephant), we can come together in agreement 
that Kony is culpable and achieve peace (symbolized by the white dove hold-
ing the laurel).18 It also seems to be specifically enlisting US activist consum-
ers in its use of the Republican and Democrat symbols. Other invocations 
of the activism to stop Joseph Kony insist that the international community 
should “stop at nothing” to apprehend him.19
The campaign was successful in motivating people— from high school stu-
dents to teachers, parents, and celebrities— to circulate that message in the 
BIOMEDIATION AND #BRING BACK OUR GIRLS 123
name of the survivor. Through the invocation of global publics invoking the 
force of the law, the predominant message was that through the arrest of the 
perpetrator we will end impunity. However, though profoundly resonant with 
new justice formulations, the campaign’s message was not powerful in and of 
itself. It was effective in its mobilizations because of its alliance with particu-
lar cultural sensibilities that are sustained by time horizons that work through 
the force of law. With these senses of agitation shaped by particular tempo-
ralities of justice, the  #Kony 2012 campaign contributed to the construction of 
an individualized “perpetrator” (or in this case, a handful of individuals be-
longing to political rebel groups) whose alleged crimes aligned with the icc’s 
post- 2002 threshold for temporal jurisdiction, a time determinant that I refer 
to as legal time. Furthermore, through the attribution of guilt to an individ-
ual for violence committed by groups of Ugandans over long years of social 
unrest, this popular campaign highlighted the workings of retributive justice 
through a particularly sentimentalized discourse that arresting Joseph Kony 
would put an end to the war. This is key to the way that those who see them-
selves representing the “international community” engage in social mobiliza-
tions to demand juridical solutions.
The biomediated  #Kony 2012 campaign prefigured  #Bring Back Our Girls, 
in which a similar use of social media unfolded around a globally significant 
cause in Africa.  #Bring Back Our Girls began as a local Nigerian movement 
and was propelled into the international arena through the emotive advocacy 
of unrelated activist constituencies similarly committed to social change but 
from different social locations. The social media campaign was initiated on 
April 23, 2014, during the opening ceremony of a unesco event honoring the 
city of Port Harcourt, when Obiageli Ezekwesili urged Nigerians to support 
the attempts to return the girls.20 She encouraged everyone not only to tweet 
but to actively participate in mobilizing efforts to “bring back our girls.” In re-
sponse to Dr. Ezekwesili’s call, Ibrahim Abdullahi, a Nigerian attorney from 
Abuja, created and tweeted the hashtag  #Bring Back Our Girls. It was quickly 
retweeted ninety- five times, including by Dr. Ezekwesili, who had 125,000 fol-
lowers on Twitter at the time. 
On April 30, Nigerian protestors called for action by marching on Parlia-
ment in Abuja, which led to further mobilizations around Nigeria and other 
cities around the world. In Nigeria, the forms of mediation and emotional in-
vocations included the embodied images of girls who were missing, dramatic 
figures of suffering, and images that produced the terms for not only empathy 
but also sympathy.
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This type of imagery represents the classic depictions, by justice and hu-
man rights activists in Africa and beyond, of the bodily suffering of those 
victimized by violence. And yet such images, following Roland Barthes, rep-
resent a particular type of horror in which we observe suffering from the 
standpoint of our own ontological freedom:
[The] horror comes from the fact that we are looking at it from inside our 
freedom. .  .  .   Because the creator of the photograph has overconstructed 
the horror he is proposing . . .  we can no longer invent our own reception 
of this synthetic nourishment.  .  .  .   This adds to the reading of the sign a 
kind of disturbing challenge, sweeping the reader of the image into an as-
tonishment less intellectual than visual, precisely because it fastens him to 
the surfaces of the spectacle, to his optical resistance, and not immediately 
to its signification. . . .  The literal photograph introduces us to the scandal 
of horror, not to horror itself.21
Such an image, then, is part of the interplay between the image, the con-
ditions that shape our reading of the image, and its alterity— the hyper- 
resemblance of the original.22 It is the materiality of suffering that both 
movements indexically reference. In the case of the US- based movement, the 
advocacy had a different aesthetic. 
The story of the girls and the protest movement captured the attention 
of Ramaa Devi Mosley, an American commercial, music video, and feature 
and documentary film director based in Los Angeles. She actively promoted 
the social media campaign to create national awareness in the United States, 
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3.2 #BringBackOurGirls logo.
and 230,000 likes by July.23 On May 7, 2014, cnn interviewed her to discuss the 
abduction of the Nigerian girls. Her campaign caught the attention of many 
US and international celebrities, who helped to propel the message further. 
Designed by Mosley and other US- based digital activists, this campaign 
was characterized by a different aesthetic of victim suffering that involved a 
specific form of biomediation. Though they used the same hashtag,  #Bring 
Back Our Girls, as the Nigerian- based campaign, the message and imagery of 
the international call to social action were both depersonalized and celebri-
tized. Using email, Twitter, and various online formats, they developed four 
steps for activist mobilization: (1) establishing the brand and posting it on 
the main website, (2) articulating the mission and goals on the main website, 
(3)  determining the tools for communicating the message (websites, Face-
book, Twitter, Instagram), and (4) developing actions/ advocacy (rallies, no-
tification of target group, letter writing, petitions, vigils, commercial sales, 
production of materials, fund- raising). The Twitter and email campaigns were 
only minimally coordinated. Activists only needed to insert their association’s 
location and their particular details— date and time of march/ rally, contact 
email information— and the networks of alliance could easily grow without 
prior knowledge of the particularities of the issues. Regardless of their loca-
tion or affiliation, those interested in advancing this cause were able to access 
the same official informational templates, use the same block art or petitions, 
and adopt the same formats. 
This imagery uses bold statements in white block letters on a bright red 
background instead of evocative pictures of the suffering African child. The 
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red calls our attention and signals a visual alarm of danger; the contrasting 
white letters in all caps, commonly understood to indicating shouting, alert 
us to the missing girls and their need to be rescued. The red also emphasizes 
the imperative to return the girls in the name of fairness and signifies passion: 
the conviction and love that drives the call for action. The use of white, as de-
scribed by social movement activists, also signifies the innocence of the girls 
who risked their lives for educational knowledge and personal advancement. 
These color and design aesthetics articulate a transforming relationship in in-
ternational justice organizing between the signifier and the signified. They 
are the aesthetics of a new mobilization strategy being made relevant through 
the communication of an ideological message that is actively constituting the 
contemporary “international community.” That message is that there is an in-
ternational commitment to freedom, liberty, and a pro- education democracy 
in which “no child” is to be “left behind,” and we, the “international commu-
nity,” have a responsibility to protect those victimized by exclusions from such 
universal rights.24 The visual symbolism of representing the kidnapped girls 
as an idea— a hashtag message, a red poster with block letters— has taken on 
new significance in this period: the poster art with its relentless demands, the 
hashtag and its centering of the person posting it, the petition as a representa-
tion of democratic participation. Here, the temporal urgency of a worsening 
problem, as emphasized in the Twitter messages I discuss below, is reflected 
in their appeal for action and in the campaign imagery. 
The campaign was catapulted to international significance once Michelle 
Obama joined the cause in May 2014. She tweeted a photo of herself holding 
a sign with  #Bring Back Our Girls written on it and through the symbols of her 
power— African American, woman, wife of the president of the United States 
of America— her buy- in propelled significant support. This practice of sign 
holding is a common way for people to publicize their personal feelings about 
an issue or event on social media. The meme spread, with celebrities from 
Malala Yousafzai to Ellen DeGeneres posting pictures of themselves holding 
similarly handwritten signs. 
These images should also be seen as an example of a certain type of biome-
diation in which the sign holder mediates the message of those victimized by 
mass atrocity violence with her own body, instead of that of the girls. In Mi-
chelle Obama’s case, in foregrounding her own black (American) body, we can 
read an attempt to make an emotional appeal by subjecting her body to the 
cause. Her expression is stern yet concerned; the image is seemingly simple yet 
powerful. Michelle Obama wears symbolically American red, white, and blue 
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flowers that bloom hope. Showcasing her straightened hair swooped in big, 
bountiful, and performatively feminized curls, makeup and manicured nails, 
a wedding ring, and large silver earrings, the photo, taken in one of the White 
House sitting rooms, depicts a performance of freedom and liberty, leisure and 
power. Such a replacement of the suffering girl’s body represents a fetishization 
of the “victim.” Here we can see how this type of visual, bio mediated advocacy 
can highlight Western agency over the cause of those victimized. The decen-
tering of those victimized by violence and the recentering of those supporting 
the cause has led to a radical form of justice encapsulation in which affective 
3.3 Michelle Obama, former First Lady of the United States 
of America. 
3.4 Ellen DeGeneres, on the Ellen DeGeneres Show.
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justice of the contemporary period is as much about publicizing one’s emo-
tional alliances as it is about demanding action. This was clear through their 
creation of emotive expressions such as “Me too,” or “I’m with her.” For exam-
ple, the photo of Michelle Obama displaying the  #Bring Back Our Girls hashtag 
was taken on the day that she delivered the president’s weekly address, just a 
few days before Mother’s Day 2014 in the United States.25 Her recorded address 
began with a sentimental condolence to the families who lost their girls in the 
Chibok kidnapping: “Like millions of people across the globe, my husband and 
I are outraged and heartbroken over the kidnapping of more than 200 Nigerian 
girls from their school dormitory in the middle of the night. This unconscio-
nable act was committed by a terrorist group determined to keep these girls 
from getting an education— grown men attempting to snuff out the aspirations 
of young girls.”26
She continued by reassuring the world of the president’s resolve to inter-
vene. “I want you to know that Barack has directed our government to do 
every thing possible to support the Nigerian government’s efforts to find these 
girls and bring them home.” As an act of empathy and a complex form of both 
racial and universal solidarity, she likened the girls to her own, to the daugh-
ter of any human. “In these girls, Barack and I see our own daughters. We see 
their hopes, their dreams, and we can only imagine the anguish their parents 
are feeling right now. Many of them might have been hesitant to send their 
daughters off to school fearing that harm might come their way. But they took 
that risk because they believed in their daughter’s promise and wanted to give 
them every opportunity to succeed.” As a call to action, she ended her address 
by emphasizing themes of resilience, bravery, and hope.
Right now more than 65 million girls worldwide are not in school. Yet 
we know that girls who are educated make higher wages, lead healthier 
lives, and have healthier families. And when more girls attend secondary 
schools, that boosts their country’s entire economy. So education is truly a 
girl’s best chance for a bright future not just for herself but for her family 
and her nation. . . .  These girls embody the best hope for the future of our 
world and we are committed to standing up for them not just in times of 
tragedy and crisis but for the long haul.
The humanitarian message— sentimentalized through a Western mother’s 
pain— tells us how critical it is for any child to have a Western education in or-
der to have social mobility in a capitalist democracy contingent on social con-
nections and market competition. This education reflects the liberalist dreams 
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of objectivity, fairness, and a diversity of approaches in ways that emphasize 
agency, autonomy, and individual power. But this message erases the particu-
larities of the education that is on offer and deemed a girl’s birthright. It does 
not highlight that it is a particular Western (read: universal) education that 
is assumed, in which other knowledge forms and the inequalities embedded 
in them are obscured. For example, the idea that the Chibok girls represent 
the “best hope for the future of our world” is actually incongruent with the 
Obama girls, for whom the possibility of realizing hopes and dreams of West-
ern education represents a gold standard. Her message also carries unspoken 
stereotypes of the Nigerian north as backward and irrational while validating 
tropes of “Muslim girls needing to be saved” or girls having to be “brought 
back to the West,” all made viable through the demand for the return of the 
kidnapped and uneducated girl as “the victim.”
Once Michelle Obama posted the photo on her Twitter account, a range of 
celebrities rallied around the social media movement— from Angelina Jolie to 
Mia Farrow, Alicia Keys, Ellen DeGeneres, and so many more— and tweeted 
messages with similar themes. For example, on the importance of education, 
Whoopi Goldberg posted, “Fear of education 4 girls in any country condemns 
the future of that country. why hurt your own future  #Bring Back Our 
Girls.”27 Ian Somerhalder focused on hope: “Empowering our youth through 
education is the true key to hope— let’s use our voices, innovation&collective 
power to  #Bring Back Our GirlsNOW!!!”28
Expressions of outrage, tragedy, and demands for immediate action, of-
ten in the form of arrests, pervaded these celebrity tweets, as this abbreviated 
sampling attests:
– Mia Farrow: “A serious search for Nigeria’s stolen girls has taken way 
too long”29
– Iman: “Let’s not forget them! Pls repost #bringbackourgirls”30
– Reese Witherspoon: “Sending prayers to Nigerian families who are 
missing their daughters. It’s time to #bringbackourgirls”31
– Gina Carano: “Let’s bring awareness to the  #Bring Back Our Girls 
campaign to get these girls back to their families.”32
– Rashida Jones: “ #Bring Back Our GirlsNOW.”33
– Kim Kardashian: “Heartbreaking! Let’s all raise awareness!  #Bring Back 
Our Girls”34
– Cara Delevingne: “Everyone help and raise awareness #regram #repost 
or make your own!”35
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– Kendall Jenner: “This is heartbreaking. please help raise awareness! 
let’s  #Bring Back Our Girls”36
– Kerry Washington: “Amen. ‘@ABCWorldNews: Michelle Obama joins 
 #Bring Back Our Girls movement on Twitter’”37
– Naomi Campbell: “ #Bring Back Our Girls!!! President GoodLuck do 
something !!!”38
– Paula Abdul: “200 girls still missing 2 weeks after being abducted. 
Keep this in the news  #Bring Back Our Girls”39
– Queen Latifah: “Its time 2  #Bring Back Our Girls & put a stop 2 
violence!”40
– Mary J. Blige: “President Obama addresses kidnapping of Nigerian 
girls. See what he had to say:  #Bring Back Our Girls”41
– Daisy Fuentes: “This an outrage & a tragedy. The world must demand 
immediate action.”42
– Stacey Dash: “Why the hell does it takes 3 weeks and a trendy hashtag 
to get world’s ‘leaders’ to care about 300 kidnapped girls?!  #Bring Back 
Our Girls”43
– Chelsea Clinton: “more girls have been kidnapped in Nigeria on top of 
200+ schoolgirls already missing. They need our voice.”44
– Ellen DeGeneres: “It can’t happen soon enough  #Bring Back Our Girls”45
In these tweets and demands for international action, we can see how 
new publics are forming around the concept of “the victim”— “our girls”— 
 as opposed to the black suffering body. These assertions, articulated not only 
through our social agreement that every child should be free from violence 
but by the idea of freedom itself, highlighted by a shift from the emphasis 
on an embodied materiality of victimhood to the importance of justice as 
law (communicated through ideas tied to justice— democracy, entitlements, 
rights).
The act of replacing visible African bodily suffering with embodiments of 
digital social protest movements highlights yet another way that the category 
of the victim is being encapsulated in the contemporary period. In these new 
international justice formations, association with the helpless is subverted; the 
material representation of suffering is no longer necessary to compel sympathy. 
Increasingly, justice no longer depends on our association with bodily suffer-
ing and our acts of pity. Today, the rise of this form of judicialization of justice 
can be seen through the way that we, the “international community,” become 
proxy “victims” through hyper- embodied representations by celebrities, activ-
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ists, lawyers, and judges. This formulation requires our agency to demand the 
immediacy of solutions and to create solidarities through the idea of suffering. 
Because of the encapsulation of the victim to be saved, there is no need to high-
light abject suffering and othering. Rather, the resignification of abjection is ac-
commodated by the need to affectively attribute new values and bring our girls 
into our fold. The idea of “our children” and Michelle Obama’s acceptance that 
the kidnapped girls could be her girls, our girls, represent this shift.
In responding to what online protesters saw as human trafficking of the 
worst kind— sexual violence against women— select celebrity  #Bring Back Our 
Girls tweets about Boko Haram’s violence highlighted what they saw as the 
barbarism of the girls’ abduction:
– Jessica Biel: “This is barbaric. Human trafficking needs to end now”46
– Teresa Palmer: “Take a stand with me!  #Bring Back Our Girls it’s 
absolutely barbaric and inconceivable that over 200 woman have been 
kidnapped whilst at school in Nigeria. Sadly this apart of a worsening 
problem.”47
– Poppy Delevingne: “I can’t believe we live in a world where this 
happens . . .  #bringbackourgirls”48
Here we see how the idea of the control of females by radical Islamic men 
is made real through the sentimental plea for freedom from sexual violence. 
With sexual freedoms at the backdrop of women’s rights to life and education, 
the social grammar of anti- impunity activism went beyond legal accountabil-
ity. Rather, tropes of barbarism were deployed, and international law’s civiliz-
ing function took center stage with social media mobilizations against extreme 
forms of human trafficking and sexual violence. The materiality of the suffer-
ing African child or the girl to be saved is overturned, and what we get is the 
repackaging of humanitarianism through the agency of an activist- consumer 
making choices about principles they can rally around— justice for women 
and girls, sexual and educational freedom for women, freedom from sexual 
violence. These principles are made recognizable through words, block art, a 
hashtag, and so on (see figure 3.2), rather than earlier aesthetic visualizations 
of the suffering child, girl, woman, or boy (see figure 3.1) that once required our 
empathy. Today, by replacing suffering with an aesthetic resignification of vic-
timhood, we see how people see barbarism as the opposite of abject suffering.
Various American celebrities, with their moral influence on social media, 
began to mobilize support based on empathy for the violated girls, but that 
quickly transformed into the hyperembodiment of “the victim” popularized 
132 CHAPTER 3
through the symbolic resignification of suffering through Western bodies. If 
we can see that these contemporary justice- for- victims discourses produce il-
lusions (or fetishes) that compel people, then the issue articulated as simply 
“our girls to be saved” should be seen as fictions that blind them and allow 
them to construct Boko Haram as the Barbaric Other and the girls as Ours, 
thereby erasing other relations.49 What we see, following Hernandez Reguant, 
is that the aesthetic repackaging of suffering produces it as a condition to be 
overcome— in which their victimhood is symbolically also our suffering, so-
cial suffering. Through clicktivism, using the technological tools of the cap-
italist order to go online, as agents of change, we can make the decision to 
support a cause. This modality of humanitarian aid works through the tem-
porality of the now and the imperative to make those demands, not simply 
in the name of democracy articulated through the international community, 
but also through the backing of the military- industrial complex. In the case 
of the latter, the responsibility to protect those victimized by violence has be-
come a legal responsibility of the state and actionable through its citizens. Yet 
this new form of justice exists within deep inequalities. When designations of 
barbarism are deployed to comment on practices that are perceived to trans-
gress civility, they reinforce a hierarchy in which particular discourses, such 
as ending the impunity of Boko Haram violence, emphasize the consequences 
of violence over the realities of the colonial and postcolonial condition. How-
ever, as I will go on to show, it is important to acknowledge how postcolonial 
inequalities in the Muslim North have shaped contemporary Islamic radical-
ism today and are thus central to the underlying conditions of violence being 
obscured by such popular expressions of affective justice.
Histories of Islamic Inequality in Nigeria, an ICC Situation Country 
The spread of Islam, predominantly in northern Nigeria, but later in the 
southwestern region, began a millennium ago. The creation of the Sokoto Ca-
liphate in the holy war of 1804–1808 brought most of the northern region and 
adjacent parts of Niger and Cameroon under a single Islamic government. 
However, it did not encompass the Kanem- Bornu Empire, where most of the 
Boko Haram–related violence has taken place. The extension of Islam within 
the area of present- day Nigeria dates from the nineteenth century and resulted 
in the consolidation of the caliphate, and competition over governance of that 
region continues to be at the heart of Boko Haram’s demands.
During the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate, the steady trade of slaves across 
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the Sahara Desert and the Atlantic Ocean (approximately 3.5 million people) 
accounted for tremendous social strife. Between 1650 and 1860, a steady stream 
of slaves was held by the Sokoto Caliphate as well as among the Igbo and the 
Yoruba, which resulted in the creation and sustenance of their ethnic empires. 
With slave raiding, ethnic and religious distinctions became more pronounced 
as a form of protection against being sold based on identifiably different asso-
ciations, such as various types of scarification to distinguish group belonging 
in particular ways. Conversion to Islam and the spread of Christianity was in-
tricately associated with slavery and efforts to promote political and cultural 
autonomy through the reinforcement of ethnic and class hierarchies as well as 
the emergence of various forms of gender dominance. With the encroachment 
of warring forces from the north and the consolidation of military might from 
the coast, the British annexed land and eventually colonized the increasingly 
fragmented region. These distinctions further embedded the seeds of struc-
tural violence.
After British conquest in 1903, the consolidation of the northern and south-
ern territories into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria led to Nigeria’s 
amalgamation in 1914. As a colony under British rule, the new Nigeria was re-
constituted through the goal of resource extraction. Out of 250 to 400 ethnic 
groups and languages, three dominant ethnic groups— the Hausa in the north, 
the Yoruba in the west, and the Igbo in the east— emerged through such im-
perial processes. These three regionally dominant ethnic groups would later 
become the basis for state organizational logic and public policy. Despite at-
tempts to solidify such heterogeneity into homogeneity, these processes fur-
ther concretized tensions and divisions that cross- cut concerns about religious 
values, governance, and resource distribution.50
British colonialism contributed to the production of deep structural in-
equalities that shaped the changing forms of political power in various Af-
rican polities.51 Though it lasted only sixty years, colonial rule in Nigeria 
contributed to rapid change, ranging from the development of extraction 
economies to the expansion of agricultural products and consumption pat-
terns and the production of particular cultural and moral orders, which grew 
alongside new educational formats aligned with a modern form of capital-
ism that distorted economic growth. The creation of new territorial bound-
aries and the development of roads, laws, and new forms of political order 
that reinforced British colonial interests led to the emergence of deep regional 
inequalities within the colony. Those in the south and the east in closer prox-
imity to extractable resources, in particular oil, developed greater intimacies 
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with British rule and benefited from its ideologies of Western capitalist or-
der. After independence in 1960, minimal attention was given to developing 
state institutions and equalizing them between the north and the south. A 
highly centralized federal body with little to no accountability formed to re-
place the colonial administration and further reinforced the development of 
late twentieth- century structural violence. This pattern was repeated across 
the continent. Over the years the Nigerian south has benefited from local re-
sources, infrastructure, and general economic development. To this day, the 
north lacks the type of economic resources, the infrastructure, and the ad-
ministrative and social institutions enjoyed by the south.52
It is these structural inequalities between the Nigerian north and south 
that have produced the conditions in which the radical Boko Haram free-
dom fighters emerged. As an Islamic militant group based in West Africa, 
Boko Haram has led violent attacks against both the state and ordinary peo-
ple as part of what its members believe to be a divinely guided war for Islam. 
Since 2009, military attacks by Boko Haram in Borno State and military in-
cursions in neighboring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon have contributed to the 
uprooting of more than 2.5 million people in the Lake Chad region. Boko Ha-
ram’s tactics of plunder and pillage have inflicted widespread suffering and 
reduced large swaths of population to utter poverty. Visible as they are, the 
atrocities perpetrated by Boko Haram forces against local populations have 
become the object of widespread condemnation in popular and academic dis-
courses. On the other hand, the systematic ways in which ordinary Nigerians 
are harmed or otherwise disadvantaged by social and political arrangements 
that are rooted in the country’s long history of disparity between the north 
and the south are far less visible. Though it works in subtle fashion, structural 
violence is no less effective in the way it puts individuals and, in some cases, 
entire populations in harm’s way.53
The postcolonial Africanist literature has detailed the way that tropes con-
cerning the rejection of Western education have been articulated through dis-
courses of civility versus backwardness by those engaged in the formation of 
colonial education. This form of colonial education was meant to craft citi-
zens of the state to reproduce colonial governance. To that end, such forms 
of colonial education reproduced discourses of primitivity and backwardness 
and fueled the epistemic violence that eventually became characteristic of Is-
lamic militancy in contemporary Nigeria. These narratives made their mark 
publicly in the early formation of the Nigerian nation- state through early mis-
sionary writing and colonial arguments about the native savage.54 And their 
BIOMEDIATION AND #BRING BACK OUR GIRLS 135
effects— the assumption that Islam is backward, antirights, antifeminist— 
 continue to circulate in the contemporary public sphere through electronic 
technologies, videos, talk shows, nightly news captions, and congressional 
hearings, where through the invocation of legality they are further concret-
ized in a world deemed secular and without religious bias.
In sum, colonial rule created extreme forms of inequality. Coupled with 
the creation of a cash economy, a corresponding development infrastruc-
ture, the development of religious categories and alliances, and dependence 
on a national state, the new Nigerian state struggled to meet the demands of 
statehood, its citizenry, and membership in an international community. As 
a postcolonial state, Nigeria is, thus, an invention of the modern era whose 
roots reflect histories of violence, difference, and disparity between the north 
and the south. The result has been the persistent construction of the people 
of the northern region as ideologically backward— especially in relation to 
women and girls. Viewing the kidnapping of the Chibok girls and the related 
violence inflicted by Boko Haram in the context of the differences between 
the southern and northern parts of Nigeria, as well as Boko Haram’s edict 
about Western education, reveals the present absence of politics in judicial 
and social mobilization language. Highlighting these erasures points to the 
fetish manifested in the figure of the victim. For not only does its demand 
for instantaneous action preclude the possibility that different forms of pol-
itics could be worked out, but it leaves the constituted “international com-
munity” with the moral authority to act in particular ways and not in others. 
Therefore, short- term action— such as signing petitions in order to mobi-
lize government, donating ten dollars, coordinating bake sales and fund- 
raisers— becomes the basis for actions deemed appropriate, as opposed to 
longer- term structural reorganization, boundary discussions, and shifts in 
the types of educational values we agree are appropriate for contemporary 
global citizens.
In the aftermath of violent situations like the abduction of the Chibok girls 
or the displacement of Ugandans by the lra, the emergence of the figure of a 
“victim” to be saved and the “perpetrator” to be held accountable has compli-
cated the way that many in the anti- impunity movement understand the value 
of lives worth protecting. The discourse then becomes one of rights, freedoms, 
and rescuing a girl’s future. Empathy may be deployed performatively— as 
a way of inciting us to feel the girls’ pain. However, it is the Chibok girls’ 
rights— meaning bodily rights and educational entitlements— demanded by 
the international community that are presented as the immediate solution. 
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Yet when our lens for justice is the interruption of an emergency, or the 
pursuit of arrests or a trial, then justice is possible only through the achieve-
ment of those demands, and structural inequality can persist. In other words, 
if the Chibok girls were all brought back and saved, there would still be no 
justice per se, as it would not solve the other forms of structural and excep-
tional violence. Here I am not justifying Boko Haram’s violence. I am suggest-
ing that erasing the enabling histories of violence disconnects the plight of the 
girls from other histories of struggle and instead undermines those politics 
through the call for the liberal dream of equality and education for all. It is 
our recognition of a social harm and our sense of that harm as our responsi-
bility to address within particular moral and juridical platforms that compels 
the idea that we can be and are the agents of immediate change. According 
to this social justice imaginary, it is irrelevant that Boko Haram’s violence is 
related to the historical struggles between Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim 
north and Christian south.
Through declarations such as “Bring Back Our Girls” that speak to the 
unity of victimhood, we see the effect of erasing the conditions that produce 
structural violence. These forms of mediation rely not only on intermediar-
ies who articulate and internalize new signs and symbols, but also on codes 
and perceptions that shape the meanings that are evoked through brief, emo-
tionally infused Twitter utterances. Through these formats, the declarative 
demands preclude complex understandings about the nature of inequality 
and align particular practices with sentimental declarations of abhorrence. 
Through these speech acts, not only are hierarchies of acceptability estab-
lished, but the nature of their logic is disassembled from the political condi-
tions and histories that constituted this logic in the first place.
Yet the postcolonial struggles that unfolded in Nigeria following indepen-
dence did not simply reflect the problem of radical Islamic violence beget-
ting more violence, as one would think in relation to the mobilization against 
Boko Haram. The discovery and extraction of natural resources like oil, dia-
monds, and gas has compounded situations of armed conflict across the Af-
rican continent. Following the discovery of oil and a related brutal civil war, 
Nigeria was plagued with military coups between the north and the south to 
control the economic power at the center of the federation. The country ex-
perienced ten successive military coups beginning in 1966, just a few years af-
ter independence and immediately following the discovery of its oil reserves. 
The struggle to control Nigeria’s government has always been in large part a 
struggle to control its resources. Minimal attention was given to developing 
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state institutions and equalizing them in the north and the south. Instead, a 
highly centralized federal body with little to no accountability formed in its 
place. This pattern has repeated across the continent. So it is not surprising 
that the race for political control in many African countries has led to extreme 
forms of violence, military coups, or rebel groups vying for political influence 
to control various extraction industries.
The ultimate erosion of state capacities to build viable economies for citi-
zens, to command and regulate access to resources in the domestic economy, 
and to build innovative mechanisms capable of incorporating indigenous cul-
tural traditions to direct future action all represent a more tragic set of reali-
ties related the actual violence of inequality.55 These postcolonial realities call 
into question modes of liability for violence and question what justice might 
be if we overlook its fetishes and explore not just the forms of narratives that 
are deployed but the changing technologies through which new moral forma-
tions are taking root. These new strategic modes of mobilization that invigo-
rate emotional strategies in the pursuit of justice are critical for making sense 
of how the process of encapsulating justice with legality makes structural in-
equality unintelligible. As a result, the conditions that produce the need for 
legality— such as structural inequality and spheres of colonialism, imperialism, 
and racism— are pushed to the margins and erased, while new forms of social 
alliances are made possible through technologically propelled messaging. This 
disappearance of a particular type of politics has made Boko Haram leaders’ 
contestations of Western encroachment on northern practices inconceivable. 
The  #Bring Back Our Girls mobilizations have taken shape in response to 
the symptoms of violence. The use of digital technologies to facilitate chang-
ing spheres of protest and engagement clarify how in new advocacy non-
spaces, such as hashtag mobilizations, new social commitments are being 
mobilized. Emotions that connect liberal sensibilities of equal gender rights, 
sexual freedoms, and the importance of Western education reflect that. I con-
clude, then, by suggesting that the rise of the construction of an “international 
community” committed to immediate solutions to social issues has produced 
a particular constituency motivated by gender justice that is not unrelated to 
the war on terror— Nigeria’s Boko Haram network being a part of the larger 
deployment of such international war offensives and thus tied to the White 
House’s military interests in the region. Given these alliances, it is important 
to see such social movement formations not simply as innocent forms of con-
temporary activism but as reinforcing particular ideological commitments to 
Western democratic liberal values that are not always shared by all. 
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Biomediated Alignments and Contemporary Justice
Thus far, this chapter has explored the way that everyday people, celebrities, 
and activists are working with networks of advocacy groups to mobilize social 
action around rights discourses. By examining the role of popular practices in 
mobilizing social action, we see how concepts such as freedom for kidnapped 
girls or the education of all girls can be invoked as a solution to a much deeper 
problem. We see that what is articulated as the real work involves enlisting 
ourselves, as actors, as agents of change. As I have been developing in these 
early chapters, the “victim to be saved” has become a critical fetish that serves 
as the basis for contemporary justice. That imagery is not only symbolic and 
ahistorical but, depending on its alliances with particular publics, can also 
elicit affective responses in ways that generate social action. It compels our 
convictions and motivates our compassion. The relationship between our sol-
idarity in defending the vulnerable and our agency to demand the immediacy 
of resolutions through the pursuit of those deemed criminally culpable is a 
reflection of the power of contemporary emotional regimes, our technocratic 
knowledge domains, and the role of technological practices. The consolida-
tion of these component parts constitutes new publics through the articu-
lation of particular moral positions that bind groups of otherwise unrelated 
people to each other. The portability, immediacy, and rapid circulation of dig-
ital technologies have given rise to this proclivity and require that we remain 
analytically vigilant in our assessment of the alliances that take shape around 
suffering. We must make sense of when, under which conditions, and who in-
vokes bodies that require our sympathy and when mass mobilizations around 
biomediated imagery are deployed and how.56 We also must look at how the 
suffering body is being displayed and why, how, and when bodies disappear 
and are sublimated to ideas about our social norms. 
The  #Bring Back Our Girls movement and the actual declaration “Bring 
Back Our Girls” propelled a discourse surrounding our legal responsibility 
to act, to defend, or to threaten military action as a key component of inter-
national justice. This call for action is a discursive mechanism through which 
contemporary meanings of justice are being conflated with legality. As a re-
sult of these twenty- first- century, technologically driven, affective justice mo-
bilizations, international rule of law and humanitarian circles are calling into 
question the relevance of empathy to describe the nature of public expressions. 
Instead, from shifting narratives of suffering and images of bodily dismem-
berment, new mainstream publics are being enlisted to rally around liberal-
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ist values. These developments are shaping global justice advocacy around 
rights and entitlements and are becoming as much about the emotional ex-
pressions of protection of those victimized by violence as they are about the 
nature of contemporary international assemblages in online nonspaces.57 At-
tending to these formations allows us to think about how the idea of suffering 
can exceed itself and become something else. In this case, the something else 
expands to become a larger idea around individual entitlements and rights 
through which new publics are brought into international relevance. And this 
is critical to how we understand the emergence of international justice in the 
contemporary period— a site for the deterritorialization of suffering and its 
relocation in the interest of social change. 
By considering these formations in the construction of the international 
community and the role of the individual engaged in the immediacy of pro-
tection as a modality of politics, new online campaigns have become another 
way to use reattribution to conflate justice and the body with legality. This 
chapter demonstrates how the legal encapsulation of the victim and perpetra-
tor has successfully created an international community that has internalized 
the responsibility to protect, but the problem remains that the type of com-
munity of action that this generates is rooted in the temporality of the now. 
The effect of this is a new form of justice in the twenty- first century that ne-
gates the relevance of inequality embedded in much deeper histories of vi-
olence, and instead focuses on justice demands as urgently actionable and 
facilitated by new digital technologies as sites for new domains for deterrito-
rialized technocratic knowledge—in this case, biomediation.
CHAPTER 4
From “Perpetrator” to Hero
Renarrating Culpability through Reattribution
Where all are guilty, no one is.
— Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment
If the  #Kony 2012 and  #Bring Back Our Girls campaigns contributed to the 
popularization of a particular figure of the African “perpetrator” to be held 
accountable and the figure of the “victim” to be saved, in neighboring Kenya 
a campaign with the opposite ideological angst emerged through the figures 
of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto. Despite being indicted by the icc and 
deemed by those in the anti- impunity movement to be perpetrators of Ken-
ya’s 2007–2008 electoral violence, these men were resignified and reframed 
in relation to modes of responsibility that raised the importance of articu-
lating Kenya’s violence in the context of the country’s history. This treatment 
of historical context and the role of temporality in attributing culpability are 
in direct contrast to the approach of international justice campaigns, though 
equally manipulative. Through the deployment of Kenyatta and Ruto as brave 
leaders attempting to settle age- old disputes, the two came together as presi-
dential and deputy presidential contenders for the Kenyan federal elections. 
Their campaign, with its highly produced and compelling message, merged 
two unlikely collaborators through the rebranding of Kenyan nationalist nar-
ratives using sentimental articulations that worked against the growing legal 
encapsulation trend.
The slick UhuRuto 2013 campaign, introducing the newly merged polit-
ical party, the Jubilee Coalition, celebrated a new story of national unity by 
critiquing Europe’s ongoing interference in Africa. As symbolic figures of the 
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new postcolonial Africa, Kenyatta and Ruto were made to represent a differ-
ent story through the Swahili slogan “Tuko Pamoja” (We are together) and 
with the top- trending hashtag  #kenya decides. Adamant about not letting 
the West interfere, its message responded to President Obama’s warnings— 
 shown nightly on Kenyan news stations— that Kenyans should not elect icc 
indictees as the country’s leaders. But the refrain prevailed: Kenyans had a 
right to decide for themselves who their leaders would be.
Through the merger of the names of both leaders, the campaign spear-
headed the symbolic unification of historically competing voting blocs to sup-
port two leaders now rebranded as figures who would defend against external 
forces. The resignified image from perpetrator to African freedom fighter was 
effective (as suggested in chapter 2) because of what Joseph de Rivera refers 
to as particular historical emotional sensibilities and contemporary emotional 
climates.1 As social domains that produce emotional cultural sensibilities, they 
engage in the socialization of practices and attitudes and create acceptable 
meanings out of particular political contexts. In this light,  #kenya decides went 
viral and was the highest trending hashtag of Kenya’s 2013 election period.
4.1 UhuRuto political 
campaign poster.
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Tuko Pamoja was deployed as a cultural symbol of unity between two his-
torically competing parties. It was translated into forty- two tribal languages 
and signaled the diversity of the governing coalition and the coming together 
of historically fractured political groups. Invocations of Tuko Pamoja on the 
campaign trail— through speeches, utterances, and salutations— led to the 
mobilization of grassroots constituencies who prayed and anointed their lead-
ers in defense of what they portrayed as the persecution of Africa’s leaders 
by the icc. The party’s new colors— yellow, red, and black— drew from both 
Uhuru’s National Alliance (tna) party (red and white) and Ruto’s United Re-
publican Party (yellow and black) and was characterized by two hands to-
gether with the slogan “Our fate is in our hands.”
The Jubilee Coalition’s campaign tapped into pro- Kenyan desires for post-
colonial justice and succeeded in turning the electoral conversation away 
from the icc trials and toward the need for a new agenda for change that ad-
dressed the historical roots of inequality in Kenya. This message highlighted 
the violence of the colonial past and the importance of reckoning with Kenya’s 
contemporary struggles through a sense of the longue durée of violence that 
produces structural inequalities.2 Thus, in contrast to the icc’s focus on in-
dividualized criminal responsibility and strict notions of legal time, this nar-
rative draws on emotional reactions to historical and ongoing inequality and 
appropriates the discourse of reattribution to reassign blame.3 But this narra-
tivization could not unfold without the major support of a mediation strategy.
In 2012, Kenyatta hired a British public relations firm (located in the for-
mer colonial center) to conduct the relevant strategic market research to un-
derstand what they needed to do to win the election. The National Alliance 
adopted the dove as their symbol and “I Believe” as their slogan. He then hired 
another UK- based company, btp Advisers, with a network in European, Afri-
can, and emerging markets, to develop a campaign that would pull in support 
and offer a more youthful and dynamic image of the candidates. According to 
their website, btp staff see themselves as creating and executing “political and 
profile- raising campaigns for individuals, candidates, organisations and com-
panies to change hearts, minds and laws and deliver upset and unexpected 
victories.” This company harnessed key sentiments already central to the lives 
of Kenyans to achieve their main objective.4 As their website explains, “Our 
full- time team of consultants, embedded on the ground with the campaign, 
helped to develop a set of messages that turned Kenyatta’s image around. By 
exposing the weak and flawed nature of the icc case against him, we made 
the election a choice about whether Kenyans would decide their own future 
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or have it dictated to them by others. We demonstrated that only Kenyatta 
understood the concerns of ordinary Kenyans and would defend Kenyan val-
ues.”5 Mark Pursey, one of the btp advisers who led the campaign, outlined 
that his media strategy involved excessive monitoring of social media and in-
formation gathering on their opponent, with the goal of improving Uhuru’s 
image while presenting the icc process as the machinations of the Western 
powers.6
The campaign message highlighted Uhuru’s call to foreign powers to stop 
interfering with Kenya’s internal affairs. This trope, familiar in its form and 
content, alongside the merger of two traditionally opposed parties, produced 
a winning package. With input from Kenyatta’s defense attorney, the well- 
known international lawyer Stephen Kay, extensive and detailed commen-
taries, op- ed pieces, consistent strategic responses to inquiries, and active 
creation of a positive public- relations message btp masterminded the Jubilee 
Coalition campaign to redirect the impact of the icc’s indictments. Central 
to this was their reorienting of the way that the general public understood is-
sues of criminal culpability— especially the collective nature of culpability— 
 as it relates to who was actually responsible for Kenya’s postelection violence. 
And it worked. Despite the charges of Ruto and Kenyatta’s culpability on the 
international stage, in 2013 a majority of the Kenyan people democratically 
elected Kenyatta and Ruto to be Kenya’s president and deputy president. This 
democratic election followed the reign of President Mwai Kibaki (2002–2013), 
who succeeded Daniel Moi’s (1978–2002) twenty- four- year dictatorship. The 
message that the icc process is deeply political and reproduces older patterns 
of European colonialism in African affairs, while ignoring Europe’s responsi-
bility for its part in Kenya’s contemporary violence, continues to resonate and 
circulate throughout the Kenyan press.
This approach involved contemporary forms of mediation deployed affec-
tively to ignite hearts and minds with the injustices of Europe’s violent past 
and to set new terms for how issues of culpability were understood. But when 
we deconstruct the hero symbol that the campaign highlights, we see that part 
of what hastens the transformation of Kenyatta and Ruto from “perpetrator” 
to “hero” is made possible by clever branding, alliances and complicity with 
transnational capital, the importance of Kenya- Western trade relations, and 
the cunning of the untold story of the Kenyan mafia. Indeed, there are few he-
roes in this story— particularly from the perspective of people who have lived 
through and survived violence inflicted on them by various African leaders. 
In talking with ordinary people, even as they complained of the injustices 
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of the African state, we also saw how the reattribution of the individualized 
“perpetrator” figure by the icc often led to feelings that international justice 
has also failed them. Time and time again we witnessed people then dealing 
with those feelings by shifting the parameters of culpability— a process that I 
have referred to as reattribution. In this case, reattribution takes the form of 
reclassifying the basis for culpability through temporality.
As we have seen, the figure of the African “perpetrator” to be held ac-
countable for mass violence committed within a legally limited period of 
time, or in the context of legal time, has emerged as both a bold symbol of 
anti- impunity and a key force for social resistance. This chapter builds on a 
discussion I began in previous chapters about the rhetorical resignification 
of the figure of the “perpetrator” but looks specifically at counterattributions 
of culpability in relation to law’s temporality. As my research showed, var-
ious African leaders use this strategy to deflect blame, protest icc indict-
ments, and win elections, and African stakeholders, including survivors, also 
use it to harness such strategies as well. The act of reattribution highlights a 
genuine ambivalence about international justice prosecutions for mass vio-
lence. When the relevance of structural inequalities— and thus the culpabil-
ity for violence that implicates colonial settlers and authorities or proximate 
 actors— is ignored, the icc’s perpetrator figure functions as a mode of era-
sure rather than an example of prosecutorial justice cascades, as scholars 
such as Kathryn Sikkink may suggest.7 This case, thus, shows how particu-
lar sentimental responses to the icc perpetrator figure and the relevance of 
legal time have inspired counter- icc sentiments that are shaping new ways 
to measure justice in the contemporary period. This happens through the re-
thinking of culpability.
Culpability is the cornerstone of criminal law and refers to the degree to 
which one can be held responsible for a particular act or set of results. Rooted 
in American and European legal traditions, individual culpability treats indi-
viduals as autonomous agents who are able to either obey or violate the law, 
and to bear the consequences of a violation of the law. In the Anglo- Saxon le-
gal tradition known as the liberal justice model, culpability requires the exis-
tence of a criminal act (actus reus) coupled with the intentional commission 
of such an act (mens rea).8 As I explained in the introduction, notions of in-
dividual culpability introduced to international law in Nuremberg and re-
vived in the 1990s with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ictr), and later the icc, 
remain a cornerstone of international criminal law today. However, collec-
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tive violence— as a key feature of international criminal law— has meant that 
prosecutors in international criminal trials have had to find ways to ascribe li-
ability for collective crimes to high- ranking leaders. They have grappled with 
ways to establish the linkages between particular actions (or failure to act) of 
the accused and a given set of acts.
This issue of how to attribute individual guilt for collective crimes has 
proven difficult in international criminal law circles and among the constit-
uencies and publics expected to internalize such principles. The difficulties 
have been centered around liberal legalism and the challenges with advocat-
ing for direct, individual criminal responsibility— the principle that individu-
als must be held accountable for their own crimes and not for those of others.9 
In these contexts, legal agents such as the icc’s judges and prosecutor also 
maintain a threshold of July 1, 2002, for the icc’s temporal jurisdiction over 
contemporary violence. This narrow temporal sense of admissible time places 
responsibility for violence in the hands of those who gave the orders, encour-
aged violence, or did not prevent it. However, others take the long history 
of colonial and postcolonial injustices into account when assigning guilt for 
present- day actions. Some of those who experienced or lived through the vio-
lence were more likely to hold responsible the proximate actors who inflicted 
the physical and emotional violence— the police, the head of police, the mil-
itary, and the foot soldiers— rather than a leader deemed responsible for the 
actions of his subordinates.
Through this disjuncture we can look for openings to understand how 
affects and emotional alliances are used to narrativize culpability for the 
collective violence in 2007–2008. I begin by mapping the circumstances sur-
rounding the violence that erupted following Kenya’s 2007 presidential elec-
tion alongside legal arguments made by the icc about the leaders’ culpability. 
We then see how the resulting sentimental defiance of those indictments by 
some Kenyan constituencies takes the form of reattribution, in which cul-
pability for mass violence is redirected through historical and experiential 
senses of collective culpability. These seemingly different approaches contex-
tualize the temporal and juridical frames through which Kenyatta and Ruto 
were indicted and the forms of popular refusals that are experienced differ-
ently that led to their support and election. Ultimately, these figures are in-
vested emotionally with meanings that map onto either compressed juridical 
temporalities (the indicted perpetrator) or longer historical narratives (the 
anticolonial hero), but neither results in feelings of justice being served. For if 
we see these various anti- icc sentiments as regulatory responses that buttress 
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feelings against histories of Western domination rather than as ephemeral 
emotions, then it is what these anti- icc sentiments do within international 
rule of law assemblages that is critical for making sense of how the icc is un-
derstood as an extension of European colonialism.10 
What is relevant is that the history of technocratic imposition of colonial 
laws in Africa and their related violence exists alongside Africans’ bitterness 
about the role of their African leaders in furthering such problems. For while 
people’s perception of African leaders’ abuse of power and the prevalent feel-
ings about corruption and violence with impunity continue to shape the com-
plexities of African landscapes, both the anticolonial and the anti- impunity 
discourses circulate as social goods that serve to reinforce particular social 
norms. In so doing, they provide the template for particular behaviors and 
set new domains for the regulatory ideas around which justice inspires new 
ideals. Both groups of sentiments are emancipatory in different ways and are 
shaped by the feeling regimes at play.
Individual Criminal Responsibility and the Case against Kenyatta and Ruto
Adherents to the principle of individual criminal responsibility perform par-
ticular sentiments that support the idea that certain types of liability (such 
as aiding and abetting and conspiracy) can be reconfigured into new modes 
of responsibility and within strict conceptualizations of temporality. Such re-
configured forms of international legality rely on affective responses to cer-
tain narratives, such as the “victim to be saved” or the “perpetrator to be held 
legally responsible,” and are sustained by legal provisions in the Rome Stat-
ute. Article 28, in particular, stipulates that a military commander or a per-
son acting as a military commander with effective command and control over 
their forces shall be individually, criminally liable for the criminal conduct 
of their subordinates, provided they knew (or should have known) that the 
forces were committing or were about to commit such crimes.
Article 28 also concerns a commander who fails to take all necessary mea-
sures to prevent or suppress the commission of these crimes. The material el-
ements of the crimes must occur within the temporal jurisdiction of the court 
(from July 1, 2002, onward) and be committed with knowledge and intent. Such 
a doctrine of hierarchical criminal or command responsibility— established 
by The Hague Conventions (IV) and (X) of 1907 and first applied during the 
Leipzig War Crimes Trials after World War I, and then later at Nuremberg— 
 involves the reassignment of the guilt of thousands who committed violent 
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acts to a single chief commander and a few top aides.11 It highlights a relatively 
recent development of command responsibility outside of military command 
structures.
The Nuremberg solution of individualizing criminal responsibility for col-
lective crimes was a moral intervention that was seen to reflect what Gerry 
Simpson calls the “triumph of liberal legalism and individual responsibility 
over vengeful politics and collective guilt.”12 This precedent of individual re-
sponsibility was heavily influenced by the formation of late twentieth- and 
early twenty- first- century international criminal law. Yet the challenge is that 
individualism, as a concept rooted in Western legal traditions, stems from the 
understanding that a person is only culpable to the extent of their own free will 
or guilty mind (mens rea). Individual guilt permeates Western legal cultural 
traditions over concepts such as collective guilt (a people’s guilt or historical/ 
 structural guilt) or even metaphysical guilt (the notion that a person is guilty 
simply by existing). It represents what Antonio Cassese has described as the 
central idea behind individualized liability— a core feature of liberal legality: 
no one should be held accountable for criminal offenses that were perpetrated 
by other persons.13 And though this point was further affirmed with the deci-
sion of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 
which held in the Tadić case (written by Judge Cassese) that “the basic as-
sumption must be that in international law, as much as in national systems, the 
foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: 
nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he 
has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena sine 
culpa).”14 This conception forms one of the key foundations of international 
criminal law. Thus, Cassese and a range of other innovators contributed to the 
popularization of a contrary formulation that was propelled by the notion of 
attribution. The move to attribution through the individualization of criminal 
responsibility has actually been seen by many in the Global South as contra-
dicting the foundational principle that no one should be held accountable for 
the acts of others, because many see the process of attribution as insufficient 
in addressing issues concerning collective liability for violence. This disagree-
ment not only shows some of the pitfalls of ascribing agency based on military 
structures to actions among civilians, but also the way in which international 
criminal law has developed through the authority of (nonbinding) case law be-
tween tribunals. We see the precedents applied in the Rwandan genocide trials 
of civilian command responsibility as well as the Charles Taylor case.15
In 2006, an extradition request was issued for the former Liberian pres-
148 CHAPTER 4
ident, Charles Taylor, to be extradited from Nigeria to the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. This set a precedent for international law norms for a sitting 
president. Taylor was charged for crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed during Sierra Leone’s civil war between 1991 and 2002 by another 
institution that preceded the icc, the Special Court for Sierra Leone. He was 
not charged because he was seen as committing those crimes himself; instead, 
the charges assumed that as a commander he should have prevented such vi-
olence (he had command responsibility) or that he was complicit through 
modes of joint criminal enterprise.16 These legal developments related to 
command responsibility are normalized through precedent, but as we will 
see, they may not map well onto how affected communities understand the 
causes of violence.
With the individualization of criminal responsibility firmly established 
as a form of legality for procuring justice for those victimized by violence, 
the notion of the representative perpetrator indicted by an international tri-
bunal has— since the Nuremberg Tribunal and Adolf Eichmann’s trial in 
Jerusalem— propelled a particular international imaginary of those whose ac-
tions (or inaction) contributed to mass crimes that shocked the human con-
science. These perpetrators— represented as military leaders, coconspirators, 
heads of state, and warlords— embodied an individualized presence to be held 
accountable in various postviolence situations today. At stake in the icc case 
against Kenyatta and Ruto were their alleged roles in postelection violence.
On November 26, 2009, the prosecutor for the icc requested authorization 
from Pre- trial Chamber II to investigate violence following Kenya’s 2007–
2008 elections. The Office of the Prosecutor (otp) argued that it had reason-
able grounds to believe that “crimes of murder, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence, deportation or forcible transfer of population and other inhumane 
acts” had been committed in Kenya during 2007–2008.17
On December 15, 2010, the Pre- trial Chamber granted the relevant per-
mission to indict Ruto, Kenyatta, and others using the conception of superior 
responsibility. This legal frame involved the doctrine of hierarchical account-
ability, wherein expectations of supervision pertain to a related liability for the 
failure to act and were, therefore, further established through the doctrine of 
command responsibility.
Citing the gravity of the acts of violence and the absence of national pro-
ceedings, the prosecutor argued that the cases originating from the investi-
gation of violence during 2007 and 2008 involving the culpability of various 
high- ranking Kenyan leaders should be admissible before the icc.18 The Ken-
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yan government challenged this. Simultaneously, the African Union, in part-
nership with the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation team, under 
the leadership of former un secretary- general Kofi Annan, recommended 
that the government establish the Commission of Inquiry into Post- Election 
Violence.19 Known as the Waki Commission, it recommended that a spe-
cial tribunal for Kenya be set up within a given time frame to investigate 
and prosecute suspected perpetrators of crimes committed during the cri-
sis period.20 In October 2008, the report indicated that a meeting was held 
in the state house to coordinate revenge on members of the Luo and Kalen-
jin ethnic groups; it cited the then- minister, Uhuru Kenyatta, as being crimi-
nally responsible for financing and mobilizing electoral support through the 
Mungiki.21 Similarly, the Luos and Kalenjins purportedly mobilized their sup-
port to attack the Kikuyus (the ethnic group Kenyatta belongs to). The Afri-
can Union–sponsored Waki Commission recommended that if the Kenyan 
government failed to set up a tribunal to investigate and adjudicate the cases, 
then the icc should take over.
In early 2009, amid increased ethnic party tensions, Kenyan parliamentar-
ians tried to bring forward a bill to establish a special tribunal. In the end, it 
received limited support and was defeated on two different occasions.22 Par-
liamentarians from across the Orange Democratic Movement (odm, led by 
Raila Odinga) and the Party of National Unity (pnu, Kenyatta and Kibaki’s 
party) united to defeat it under the slogan “Don’t be vague; let’s go to The 
Hague.” The public statements made by various odm and pnu politicians re-
vealed their interest in seeking legal accountability for the other party. The 
prevailing argument was that no special tribunal in Kenya could be trusted 
to deal independently and impartially with issues of legal accountability for 
postelection violence.23
On March 8, 2011, the icc issued summons for the suspects to appear be-
fore the court.24 The prosecutor named six persons (known as the Ocampo 6) 
suspected of bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes committed during 
Kenya’s 2007 postelection period. The six were divided into two sets of cases 
representing two historically opposed factions divided along ethnic lines. On 
one side was Major General Mohammed Hussein Ali, a Somali Kenyan who 
had been the commissioner of the Kenyan police during the postelection vio-
lence; Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu), then the deputy prime minister and minis-
ter for finance, as well as the chairman of President Kibaki’s pnu; and Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey (Kalenjin in ethnicity), former minister for industrializa-
tion and a member of the National Assembly as well as the chairman of the 
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odm.25 The opposing side included three political agents representing pre-
dominant people aligned with the Meru and Kalenjin ethnic group: Francis 
Kirimi Muthaura, the head of public service, cabinet secretary, and chairman 
of the National Security Advisory Committee; William Ruto, the minister for 
higher education, science and technology, and odm member of the National 
Assembly for Eldoret North; and Joshua Arap Sang, the head of operations at 
the Kalenjin- language radio station kass fm and a radio host at the time of 
the postelection violence.26 
Ruto was charged with (1) “Murder constituting a crime against human-
ity,” (2) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population constituting a crime 
against humanity,” and (3) “Persecution as a crime against humanity.”27 For 
his part, Kenyatta was charged with (1) “Murder constituting a crime against 
humanity,” (2) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population constituting a 
crime against humanity,” (3) “Rape and other forms of sexual violence con-
stituting a crime against humanity,” (4) “Other inhumane acts constituting a 
crime against humanity,” and (5) “Persecution as a crime against humanity.”28
Ruto was alleged to have held a series of meetings in which he distrib-
uted money and arms with the goal of commissioning the crimes of murder 
and displacement of supporters of the pnu (led by Mwai Kibaki, sitting pres-
ident at the time). Following this, these activities correspondingly fomented 
the violence following the 2007 election. Ethnic tensions ostensibly worsened 
when, amid accusations of election rigging, competing parties— the pnu and 
the odm— both claimed electoral victory.29 When Kenya’s Electoral Commis-
sion announced that Mwai Kibaki was the winner of Kenya’s 2007 elections, 
violence broke out throughout Kenya—particularly in pro- Odinga areas: the 
slums of Nairobi, the Rift Valley (Eldoret), and Nyanza (Kisumu)—lasting 
two months.30 In the end, rioting, excessive use of force (by police and secu-
rity forces), burning, looting, sexual violence, and murder left 1,200 people 
dead and displaced thousands.31
The prosecutor alleged that Kenyatta organized meetings with various gov-
ernment leaders, the police, and the leadership of the outlawed Mungiki sect, 
in which he supposedly provided funding, uniforms, and weapons to various 
pro- pnu youth to carry out their attacks. The Mungiki, whose name means “a 
united people” in the Kenya Kikuyu language, is known as a mafia- oriented 
organization and is notorious for its participation in the 2007 postelection vi-
olence. Kenyatta is said to have mobilized their support for the purposes of 
defending Kikuyu interests, leading the icc to consider him criminally re-
sponsible for the violence the Mungiki perpetrated.32
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In January 2012, the Pre- trial Chamber judges confirmed the charges of 
crimes against humanity against only four of the six indictees for Kenya’s 
2007–2008 postelection violence.33 The chamber did not find that the evi-
dence against Mr. Kosgey met the necessary evidentiary threshold, so the 
charges against him were not confirmed. In Mr. Ali’s case, the judges did not 
find that the evidence provided substantial grounds to believe that the Na-
tional Police participated in the attacks in Naivasha and Nakuru, so the charges 
against him were also dropped, leaving Ruto and Sang versus the prosecutor. 
By summer 2013, due to various setbacks in the prosecution’s evi dence, such as 
the loss of key witnesses for the Muthaura case, the charges against him were 
dropped, leaving only three indictees overall, with only Kenyatta left in the 
second case. Though the mode of liability initially confirmed for Kenyatta/ 
 Muthaura was indirect coperpetration, after the charges were dropped against 
Muthaura, the charge against Kenyatta was connected to his being individu-
ally responsible for the violence in Naivasha on January 27 and 28 and in Na-
kuru on January 24 and 27 of 2008. By May 2016, all charges were dropped 
against all Kenyan indictees because of lack of evidence to convict.
The Limits of Legal Time
When time is juridified, it becomes a matter of concern for law. Operating 
within the limits of legal time, the icc cannot see retrospectively beyond its 
own coming into force in 2002. It is compressed and dehistoricized, bounded 
by temporal jurisdiction— such as the start date of the icc’s founding statute 
or the temporal scope of the punishable offense. It also has a substructure in 
time based on the perceived supremacy of the legislative, constitutional or 
treaty doctrine. This substructure brings to life the basis on which original in-
tent of legal documents can be determined in time and establishes the basis 
on which looking backward is permissible. This substructure shapes the basis 
for the type of legal reasoning through which fundamental values are estab-
lished.34 In this case, the Rome Statute for the icc set out substantive laws and 
procedural rules through which to address violence. It ascribes guilt based on 
a particular period within the temporal jurisdiction of the court and high-
lights questions of responsibility in individualist terms. The icc examined its 
temporal jurisdiction over potential cases against Ruto and Kenyatta when it 
granted the prosecutor permission to commence an investigation of the sit-
uation; these considerations are also apparent in the temporal scope of the 
asserted crimes in relation to the evidence provided to cover the entire time 
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period included in the prosecutor’s initial charges.35 In the end, the icc’s tem-
poral jurisdiction over the Kenyatta and Ruto cases was legally limited by Ar-
ticle 11 of the Rome Statute ( jurisdiction ratione temporis), which provides that 
the “Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the 
entry into force of this Statute.”36
The Prosecutor submits that, since the Republic of Kenya ratified the Rome 
Statute on 15 March 2005 and, pursuant to article 126(1), the Statute entered 
into force for that State on 1 June 2005, the crimes allegedly committed fall 
within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction. . . .   The Chamber concurs with 
the Prosecutor that the crimes allegedly committed after 1 June 2005, as 
they appear from the available information, fall within the jurisdiction ra-
tione temporis of the Court.37
Each of the charges asserted by the prosecutor against Ruto and Kenyatta 
covered the period from on or about December 31, 2007, to January 31, 2008. 
However, the icc narrowed the scope of those charges, finding that the pros-
ecutor had provided sufficient evidence to support the charges only for spe-
cific dates. Specifically, in the case of Kenyatta, the icc held, “Regardless of 
the broader temporal parameters of the charges, the events of relevance in 
the present case are exclusively those for which the Prosecutor alleges the in-
dividual criminal responsibility of the Suspects, i.e. those that form part of 
the attack by the Mungiki on the odm supporters between 24 and 28 January 
2008.”38 Eventually, in the case against Ruto, the demarcated period was Jan-
uary 1–4, 2008, and involved violence allegedly committed in the greater El-
doret area.39 For Kenyatta, the charges were based on his supposed command 
of murders committed in Naivasha on January 27 and 28, 2008, and in Na-
kuru on January 24 and 27.40
Two aspects of the icc’s decision to narrow the time are worth noting. The 
icc decision was based not on a lack of temporal jurisdiction but on the pros-
ecutor’s failure to present sufficient evidence to cover the entire time period 
included in the initial charges. Second, the articles of the Rome Statute that re-
quire the icc to confirm the asserted charges do not expressly require that the 
icc parse the time period in days, months, or any other temporal measure, or 
to otherwise confirm that the time period is sufficiently confined.41
The temporal scope of the charges against Ruto and Kenyatta is especially 
narrow when compared to the scale of the violence that triggered the prosecu-
tor’s investigation. As described in the prosecutor’s November 26, 2009, Re-
quest for Authorization of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15:
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The scale of the post‐election violence resulted in a reported 1,133 to 1,220 
killings of civilians, more than nine hundred documented acts of rape and 
other forms of sexual violence, with many more unreported, the internal 
displacement of 350,000 persons, and 3,561 reported acts causing serious 
injury. In addition, the social and economic structures of the local commu-
nities were largely affected by the widespread looting and wanton destruc-
tion of residential and commercial areas. Crimes have been committed in 
six out of eight Kenyan regions, and particularly in the country’s most pop-
ulated areas, including the capital city of Nairobi, the Rift Valley, and the 
Nyanza and Western provinces.42
In many cases, the multiple crimes had been organized and planned within 
the context of a widespread and systematic attack against selected segments 
of the Kenyan civilian population. Groups, and persons belonging to these 
groups, were stigmatized and deliberately targeted on the basis of distinctive 
ethnic features and/ or presumed political affiliations. Typically, the perpetra-
tors attacked, killed, and displaced members of minority ethnicities in those 
areas.
One of the most challenging examples of how courts wrestle with prob-
lems of strict temporality can be seen through attempts to address continu-
ing and composite crimes, as they force courts to address conduct over a long 
time rather than in more singular crimes such as murder. A continuing or 
composite crime is one that necessarily occurs over an extended period, such 
as apartheid. Unlike murder, apartheid does not occur in a single instant.43 It 
involves legal policies, state action, social control, and prolonged practices of 
exclusion and separation. Continuing and composite crimes also include spe-
cific, discrete acts that, by definition, must occur over a longer time frame. 
For example, the Rome Statute outlaws murder as a crime against humanity. 
By definition, to be a crime against humanity, the act of murder must occur 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.44 In 
contrast, when addressing regular crimes such as murder that occur in a dis-
crete temporal instant, courts rarely if ever address the importance of tem-
poral limits. However, with continuing and composite crimes, courts must 
regularly address the temporal scope of the conduct being prosecuted.45
The Rainbow Warrior case, one of the most famous examples in inter-
national case law concerning continuing violations, set a precedent in shap-
ing how continuing violations are understood. The case is important for the 
history of international tribunals recognizing continuous crimes. In this case, 
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two French agents were convicted by a New Zealand high court of assisting in 
the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, a Greenpeace ship docked off the coast of 
New Zealand (which was going to protest French nuclear testing in the Pacific 
Ocean). France refrained from detaining the two agents and returned them 
to Hao, a French Pacific island, in violation of its agreement with New Zea-
land. In determining France’s culpability for refusing to detain the agents, an 
international arbitration tribunal did not measure France’s liability from the 
moment the agents were removed. Rather, the misconduct was deemed con-
tinuous and ongoing, and it included each day the agents remained outside of 
New Zealand’s control.46
Continuing and composite crimes force courts to address conduct that 
continues over longer time periods than simpler crimes such as murder. They 
create legal dilemmas, not just for questions of jurisdiction but also around 
questions of evidence and admissibility. In Prosecutor v. Musema, the ictr 
allowed the prosecutor to present pre- 1994 evidence in order to establish the 
mens rea needed for genocide. Thus, the ictr jurisprudence allowed pre- 1994 
evidence of intent but “not of conduct.”47 In this case as well as subsequent 
ictr cases, we see an example where the court allowed the introduction of ev-
idence from outside the jurisdictional temporal window.48 But this contrasts 
with Prosecutor v. Jean- Bosco Barayagwiza, in which the court interpreted its 
jurisdiction restrictively, holding that no facts predating or postdating 1994 
could be used to support a count in the indictment.49 This case resulted in the 
conviction of a former Rwandan journalist for incitement to commit geno-
cide as a crime against humanity.50 It led to the court’s attempt to focus on 
conduct— direct and public incitement— leading to a conviction rather than 
considering pre- 1994 conditions of colonial and postcolonial subordination 
that fostered the development of extremist Hutu ideologies.51
In the last two cases we see inconsistencies in how the ictr dealt with 
measures for intent, but what is interesting is that conduct remained within 
the remit of the court’s narrowly prescribed jurisdictional window. The his-
torical and current cases identified here address the limits of legal time and 
represent compelling examples of how courts wrestled with problems of strict 
temporality. In the icc cases relating to postelection violence in contempo-
rary Kenya, a close reading of the icc’s charges reveals the tension between 
specific instances of criminality (violence) on the one hand, and histories of 
inequalities and injustices that have occurred over extended periods on the 
other hand. With this dynamic at play, what we see is how anti- impunity af-
fects are used to shape notions of culpability through the application of legal 
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time and how other senses of responsibility are expressed through the reattri-
bution of such measures of culpability.52
The Longue Durée of Structural Violence: Recontextualizing Culpability
In February 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta announced the launching of the Jubilee Co-
alition with a speech that established the landmark creation of tna— the polit-
ical party that was taken over by Uhuru Kenyatta and rebranded to create an 
alliance of various democratic forces. With a discourse of togetherness, Ken-
yatta began by highlighting the challenges and opportunities the Kenyan na-
tion was facing. The former had to do with the cycles of violence that caused 
death and destruction to Kenyans following the ebbs and flows of each elec-
tion cycle— the most serious being the 2007–2008 violence in which over 1,300 
Kenyans died and more than 300,000 were displaced. Central to this violence 
is the question of land. Shifting the core problems to pre- 2002 structural vio-
lence, Kenyatta’s narrative began with the displacement inherent in the British 
colonial disenfranchisement of Kenyan natives. As Kenyatta explained:
You all know that when the colonial government established itself in Kenya 
it created three categories of land ownership. First was the land taken by 
the colonial government for its own use, which was called Crown Land, 
second was the land given to settlers as private land, and lastly what re-
mained was assigned to Africans as Native Reserves. Back in 1954 under 
the Swynnerton Plan some Native Reserves saw a process of adjudication, 
consolidation, and registration that gave titles to Africans. At indepen-
dence our Government inherited Crown Land and renamed it Govern-
ment land, today this accounts for 13 percent of the country’s total land 
mass. Native Reserves became trust land vested in local county councils.
Even after independence the settlers kept their land under private title, 
or sold it to Africans on a “willing buyer, willing seller” basis. And today 
private land is something bought and sold like any other commodity. . . .  
Private land accounts for 20 percent of our country. Land in those Re-
serves that were not adjudicated and given back to Africans is now called 
Community Land under the new Constitution and is to be managed by the 
National Land Commission. This category of land presently accounts for 
about two- thirds, 67 percent of the total land in Kenya.53
The speech was full of campaign promises that outlined a range of op-
portunities tied to the land question and ensuring that the nation would re-
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cover from violence. “Our nation must heal. Our people must come together, 
with the realization that— as difficult as it may seem— we need each other. The 
solution should be obvious to all; we must learn to live with one another, trust 
one another, to respect one another as Kenyans, love one another.”54 
Later he clarified how this might happen by proposing to provide eco-
nomic opportunities so that people could procure land viable for agriculture: 
“As a government, we will provide wider economic opportunities so that peo-
ple, especially in rural areas, do not feel that the only way they can make a liv-
ing is tilling ever- smaller parcels of land using a jembe and a panga. We aim 
to reverse the process of fragmentation and instead institute a process of re-
consolidation that will create viable land holdings. While our policies will be 
deliberate, the process of reconsolidation will be voluntary and driven by the 
availability of better opportunities across the country.”55
From the discussion of government land to private land to community 
land, he articulated a plan for how his government might help citizens own 
the land on which they live: “The new Constitution recognizes that there is a 
problem but it does not provide a solution. My Government will be commit-
ted to finally giving the Land Answer. . . .  My Government will be committed 
to giving people the title to their own land. . . .  Kenyans deserve to have that 
process completed. . . .  We will do this not just in rural areas but also in urban 
areas where informal settlements abound.”56
The history to which Kenyatta referred takes us to July 1, 1895, when the 
region that is now known as Kenya was declared a British- East African Pro-
tectorate.57 British colonialism in Kenya produced a situation of uneven land 
distribution and a related problem of elite patronage. The colonial government 
forcefully evicted Africans from their ancestral lands and relocated them onto 
what became known as the Native Reserves. The confiscated lands were re-
ferred to as the White Highlands and represented some of the most fertile 
regions of Kenya. The British colonial administration imposed laws that also 
forced Kenyans to labor on European farms with poor social services. They 
imposed taxation laws, instituted racial segregation, restricted movement 
through the kipande identification system, and curtailed basic freedoms.
Despite their displacement, land and ritual oathing continued to be im-
portant for the unification of various Kenyan social groups.58 Land was not 
merely a means of economic production but was seen as a divinely inherited 
blessing that connected them to their ancestors. In response to dispossession, 
the Mau Mau struggled to reclaim their land and promote equality in the re-
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gion. The struggle began as early as the late 1940s, though it was most intense 
between 1952 and 1957, as the Mau Mau intensified their mobilization to es-
tablish the conditions for Kenyan independence. With a majority of members 
from the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru communities, other Kenyans from various 
groups— such as the Akamba, Maasai, Abaluhya, Abagusii, and Luo, as well 
as various Kenyan Indian trade unionists— also participated in what became 
a movement.59 With Jomo Kenyatta as a symbolic member, significant so-
cial pressure for self- determination led to Kenyan independence in 1963, with 
Kenyatta as the first president.60
Independence came with great expectations around the rectification of 
past colonial injustices. Kenyatta’s government was expected to address land 
inequalities through a new land redistribution policy. Hundreds of thousands 
of Africans— mainly Kikuyu— were living either as squatters on European 
farms in the Rift Valley or in relatively unproductive Native Reserves away 
from their ancestral lands. Many hoped that Kenyatta’s government would 
resettle them in their ancestral lands. However, instead it instituted a land 
reconsolidation policy that vexed many of the poor squatters, peasants, and 
workers. Kenyatta eventually developed a series of strategies for the continual 
investment of European interests in Kenya while also brokering a deal for the 
transfer of land to native Kenyans. In order to implement this plan, he bor-
rowed money from the British government to buy back land from European 
settlers. Instead of overhauling the agrarian inequalities that were established 
during the colonial period and redistributing land among the majority of Af-
ricans who were either landless or land poor, Kenyatta’s government intro-
duced the infamous land policy known as “willing buyer, willing seller,” which 
required Africans to buy back their land.
Many saw this postindependence policy as unjust because the majority of 
Africans were poor squatters, workers, and peasant farmers with very little 
capital at that time. The popular assumption was that only those who worked 
closely with the British and earned an income were able to accumulate the 
necessary resources to buy land or secure bank loans. Thus the early forms of 
stratification were seen as producing unfair advantages for those who were on 
the colonial government’s payroll during the Mau Mau struggle. 
The policy also caused feelings of injustice in many who felt that the terms 
for buying back land that was initially procured illegally were unfair. Accord-
ing to many of the Mau Mau veterans that we spoke with in Kenya in 2013, this 
inequality reflected how they understood justice as being about recovering 
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land that had been stolen from them, not holding an individual perpetrator 
accountable. “Ultimately we have not received any form of justice because the 
main purpose of our struggle was land and freedom and we have not gotten 
land. And we are going to demand this land and even if we die our children 
will continue to demand for this land until justice is done and we have been 
given what is rightfully ours which is each and every freedom fighter to get 
the piece of land he fought for in this country.”
According to many, issues of culpability must go back to much earlier 
periods:
We fought against the British colonizers in order to get our land, and at in-
dependence the colonizers all left Kenya and went back to their own coun-
try. But now the huge plots of land they owned were taken over by black 
European, black colonizers and now our struggle today is against these 
black Europeans, these black colonizers who continue to horde huge plots 
of land in this country and we will continue to fight and struggle until we 
get back this land from these black Europeans who own a majority of land 
in this country.
“Black Europeans” or “colonizers” refers to the home guards— those black 
Kenyans seen as working closely with the colonial powers, who then took over 
the bureaucratic governance of the country once the colonizers left.61 Others 
in the group we interviewed agreed. One woman, attributing blame specifi-
cally to the home guards, added, “They stole our land, they stole our cattle, 
they stole our chickens, they stole everything that we had and that’s why since 
then we have lived in abject poverty. And it is these home guards, these black 
Europeans who were working on behalf of the colonial government, of course 
being overseen by their white supervisors, it is they who have put us in all this 
mess for the decades we have lived in this country from that period of time 
from this Mau Mau struggle.”
Over time, the emergence of landless squatters unraveled and took on an 
ethnic dimension, especially during the twenty- four- year reign of Daniel arap 
Moi. Both Kikuyu squatters and those who acquired land legally in the Rift 
Valley were seen as foreigners who needed to be forcefully evicted. The reality 
that various members of the Kikuyu elites— who eventually became known 
as the Mount Kenya Mafias— had acquired immense wealth and power in 
 Kenya’s postcolonial period only made matters worse for those deemed to be 
foreigners in the Rift Valley. To contextualize the violence that erupted follow-
ing the December 30, 2007, elections, one must consider the events leading to 
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the elections, which seemingly reveal a nation fractured along ethnic- tribal 
lines, especially the way that a discourse of evicting the foreigners became a 
rallying cry for Rift Valley politicians at election time.
Thus, understanding the interethnic consolidation of Ruto’s United Re-
publican Party with Kenyatta’s tna, which came together to produce the Jubi-
lee Party and its victory, is central to grasping how accused “perpetrators” of 
Kenya’s 2007 postelection violence, according to the icc, could facilitate the 
consolidation of historically opposed ethnic groups, whose candidates then 
won Kenya’s 2013 presidential elections. On one hand, the histories of land 
dispossession during and following British colonialism produced the condi-
tions through which Kenyatta and Ruto’s Jubilee Coalition could be perceived 
as settling a more than fifty- year- old history of injustice. On the other hand, 
since Kenya gained independence, political and economic power in govern-
ment has circulated among the Kikuyu and Kalenjin elite to the exclusion of 
other ethnic groups, such as the Kamba, Maasai, and Borana, and religious 
groups, such as Muslims. The recognition of these two realities suggests that 
the violence actually attests to the way that histories of dispossession became 
sedimented along various patronage lines. Thus, the attacks against the Ki-
kuyus represented the mobilization of particular ethnic patronage networks 
to try to change the Kikuyu and/ or Luo and Kalenjin monopolization of 
power in postcolonial Kenya. It is the realization of the deep- seated complex-
ities of culpability playing out through a sense of communal responsibility to 
protect that has contributed to the recognition of the centrality of proximity 
and patronage.
The sensibility of collective responsibility— instantiated through oathing, 
but later sedimented through patronage— thus informs the production of a 
popular national imaginary in which Ruto and Kenyatta are not widely seen as 
“perpetrators” awaiting icc indictment but as national heroes to be protected 
and celebrated. My informants’ answers to the question of who should be held 
accountable for the violence instead highlights the extent to which collective 
responsibility is relevant. According to Ngogi, a local Kenyan activist,
The financing of that violence involved the entire Kikuyu diaspora as well 
as [the] domestic population. People from southeast London to Texas were 
holding meetings and sending cash to support the cause. They were plan-
ning meetings all over this city. There w[as] supposed to be at one point a 
huge incident in Umoja and Eastlands where especially Luos were going 
to be flushed out of the houses that they allegedly occupied. Kikuyu shop-
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keepers in Umoja raised a lot of cash and it just so happened that the peace 
deal came before they were able to carry out the plan.
Here we see not only the complexity of Kenyatta and Ruto possibly financ-
ing violence as part of its coperpetration, but a duality where the act of fi-
nancing the arming of others was seen as a response to the call to protect the 
collective whole— the Kikuyu against Raila’s supporters, the Luo, and others.
Accordingly, what the otp saw as Kenyatta’s legal culpability was actually 
seen by various members of the Kikuyu elders as a necessary act of commu-
nal responsibility in which he— as well as others in Kenya and throughout the 
diaspora— were perceived as taking critical steps to protect his community 
from ethnic- inspired violence and to ensure Kikuyu prominence and domi-
nance in Kenyan politics.
Further, Uhuru Kenyatta’s rapid rise to power may indicate the importance 
of the notion of collective responsibility, meaning that Kenyatta was obligated 
to contribute to the financing of the violence in order to protect his commu-
nity against other ethnic forces set on displacing them from their land. With 
this rationale, the sentiment that Kenyatta is a “freedom fighter” and not a 
“perpetrator” supports a celebratory popular image of him as protecting the 
collective and not culpable for violence.
Furthermore, admitting to Kenyatta’s participation and the role of others 
in actually financing the violence would be seen as a legal admission of collec-
tive guilt during the designated postelection period. Instead, Kikuyus vaguely 
described Kenyatta’s actions as collectively appropriate. Statements such as, 
“Uhuru stepped in because Mwai Kibaki was asleep.” Or “Kibaki was too weak, 
Mwai Kibaki was useless,” and “Uhuru is our hero because he took responsi-
bility when it  really mattered.”62 These claims— with their legal implications— 
 speak to the affective sentiments of solidarity and alliance through which 
contemporary Kenyans are asserting a new narrative about political violence 
in their country.
According to interview participants, because of reprisal violence on the part 
of Luos against any ethnic group they felt had supported the Kibaki victory, 
the Kikuyus, in coordination with their elders, were seen as having mobilized 
forces to protect themselves in various places; hence the mobilization of the 
Mungiki forces. Actions taken in the Ruto camp, and by extension the Kalenjins 
(and Kenyatta through his Kikuyu networks), in terms of mobilization— that 
is, financing and executing violent acts— were ultimately seen by participants 
as supporting two principle players: Kibaki and Odinga. The compromise re-
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lated to this standoff eventually resulted in the creation of a new position, dep-
uty president, as part of the power- sharing agreement in which historically 
opposed parties came together.63 Thus, many people saw Kibaki and Odinga 
as the ones who were most invested in the postelection violence; therefore, 
though they were not seen as engaging in proximate violence, when respon-
dents were pressed to parse responsibility according to principles of interna-
tional law, many argued that Kibaki and Odinga should be seen as bearing the 
greatest responsibility, not Kenyatta and Ruto. When the icc narrative is over-
laid onto Kenyan national politics, we see how what appears in one framework 
as individual criminal accountability can be reframed as communal responsi-
bility based on a different conceptualization of culpability. Looking after the 
interests of a people in a complex set of attacks and reprisals cannot be resolved 
simply through a decontextualized attribution of criminality. It reveals an im-
portant paradox— an ambivalence in the data concerning who is held account-
able (Kibaki and Odinga rather than Uhuru and Ruto), or whether looking 
beyond legal accountability may be an attractive way of settling the political 
foundations of the conflict, which are manifestations of deep- seated responses 
to structural injustice. This paradox leads to mutual erasures. The first is a legal 
time erasure that renders insignificant the longue durée of structural violence 
that continues to be experienced and articulated through daily practice. The 
second is an experiential- historical time erasure that displaces the encapsu-
lation generated by legal time and instead produces in relation to it the terms 
through which historical conceptualizations of collective responsibility are ex-
perienced and lived. I take up the latter below.
Proximity and the Redirecting of Culpability
Our ethnographic research in Kenya showed that the very survivors of vi-
olence that international judicial institutions seek to protect protest the 
designations of criminal responsibility strictly in relation to individual re-
sponsibility, especially when there is an understanding that longer histories 
of imperial land disenfranchisement created (and were not products of) such 
forms of contemporary violence. According to a report by the International 
Center for Transitional Justice, though victims understood that in icc judi-
cial contexts greater responsibility is borne by those who gave orders that led 
to violent outbreaks, more than half of those who responded to the question 
“Who should be prosecuted?” identified direct perpetrators or “foot soldiers” 
of violence as being directly responsible.64 Though supportive of the icc con-
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cept in principle, many of those in Kenya classified as “victims” also felt that 
local and national mechanisms were preferable to pursuing a lengthy icc pro-
cess in order to achieve compensation for violence and property loss.65
In a 2013 survey that we conducted with survivors of 2007–2008 post-
election violence in Nairobi’s low- income Kibera neighborhood, an over-
whelming majority of residents insisted that criminal responsibility needs to 
be understood clearly through notions of collective guilt, the role of the po-
lice in postelection violence, and the way that the British colonial settlement 
of the Rift Valley led to the demise of both the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic 
traditional networks. Thus, individualized criminal responsibility and an ex-
panded perception of time were important. Despite this perception on the 
ground, international criminal law prioritizes command and superior respon-
sibility rather than holding proximate perpetrators accountable; the expecta-
tion is that direct perpetrators will be dealt with under domestic criminal law. 
Accordingly, for some, the law falls short. This is not only because perpetra-
tors of proximate violence are not being prosecuted in the national context 
but also because international courts cannot situate crimes historically.
Many of my respondents insisted that focusing temporally on the narrow 
2007–2008 postelection violence period as way to measure culpability fails to 
attend to deep- rooted historical and political issues. Recall that Kiamu, a young 
Kenyan human rights advocate quoted in chapter 1, maintains, “We’ve had vic-
tims in this country since the colonial times, so if you’re going to address the 
system of victims of political violence in Kenya we do it holistically. We begin 
with the day the British landed here, the evictions that the settlers did— today 
the biggest land owners are settlers. . . .  My reference point is in the eighteenth 
century. . . .  The icc has no capacity to address that, so I’ll not waste time on it.
Here we see not only a strong conviction about the limits of individual cul-
pability as a framework in international criminal law but also a critique con-
cerning the inability of legal time to adequately encompass historical forms of 
violence. Despite these other conceptualizations of guilt, it is unlikely that the 
icc will permit itself to consider activities that occurred prior to its tempo-
ral jurisdiction, thereby violating basic principles of legality.66 Set against this 
vexed juridical backdrop, who should be held responsible for contemporary 
crimes of violence?
Despite the articulation of culpability by the icc and deep- seated senti-
ments that supported historical hostilities against warring ethnic groups and 
parties, public discourses surrounding icc activity shifted the terms of en-
gagement about justice, increasingly narrating its measure through the longue 
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durée. John, a well- known Kenyan journalist, insisted that in 2007–2008 nei-
ther Kenyatta nor Ruto were heads of state, so it is not clear why they would 
be seen as bearing more responsibility than others.
Neither of them were running for president. I don’t think there was [re-
sponsibility] if you look at the violence and protest in odm strongholds. I 
think you would see “No Raila, No Peace,” not “No Ruto, No Peace,” and 
especially in Kalenjin strongholds. So how on earth do you then begin to 
design these cases against the two of them? I think that it is possible to fin-
ger Uhuru Kenyatta for postelection violence in Naivasha and Nakuru; I 
think that it is possible. It is much more difficult to [connect him] to the 
North Rift.
By referring to the slogan, “No Raila, No Peace,” John was explaining that 
those who supported Raila were fighting for his presidency and not for Ruto’s 
(who was in the odm leadership). After the election results and the announce-
ment that Kibaki had won again, it became clear that Raila, through his odm 
supporters, mostly from the Luo ethnic group in the odm strongholds (like 
Kibera), refused to accept a situation in which Raila was not going to be in 
power. Much of this was connected to the problem of the concentration of 
power among a few families and ethnic groups. From the time Jomo Kenyatta 
took office from the colonial Home Guards in 1963 to the last election, power 
was seen as remaining within a very tightly sealed vacuum in which the Ki-
kuyu and the Kalenjin constituted a small community that governed all oth-
ers and shielded their political and economic elite from accountability to the 
people and to the law.
The violence of 2007–2008 was, in many ways, seen as a response to the un-
willingness of others to concede to the monopolization of power by particular 
members of the elite once again, which carried over from the transfer of inde-
pendence. Yet many blamed the media for contributing to the production of 
the concept that a perpetrator could be responsible for postelection violence by 
depicting the situation as ultimately being about the ethnic Kalenjin mobiliz-
ing against the Kikuyu. As Bornu, a Kenyan political analyst, explained:
Some say the Kalenjin rose up as a community, though it’s not true at all! If 
you just go back to reports of the violence, the violence was up and down 
the railway line. There was looting and violence in Mombasa, there were 
Kikuyu and Kisii evictions in Maasai Land; there was no violence in Cen-
tral Highlands but Nairobi and going all the way to the border! So the 
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idea that the Kalenjin were some  .  .  .   atavistic, blood thirsty Others just 
served to demonize them. . . .  The ignorance about the Kalenjin was mind- 
blowing. I mean the Kalenjin were organized so effectively. . . .  But when 
you talk to people in Nakuru or Kikuyus who had family or whatever in 
Nakuru, there was a point at which the Kalenjin were invading and there 
was just utter fear. [Because of their fear, people didn’t] know what kind 
of monster [was] coming to attack [them]. But the reality was that the vi-
olence was across the board and along party lines and also along a very 
anti- Kikuyu level. Then you’d have to provoke the question of why is ev-
erybody standing up, rising up against the Kikuyu? What is going on? But 
the Kalenjin were very insistent that that violence was spontaneous, and 
were very insistent that any form of planning or organization happened af-
ter the announcement of the election results, not before.
Bornu’s statement highlights that there was not only a sense that the vio-
lence was perpetrated across the board by many actors— police, local people, 
outside forces, militia, gangs— but also that it was inspired by deep- seated 
histories of disenfranchisement and the monopolization of power through-
out Kenya. The icc’s focus on command responsibility not only overlooks the 
guilt of those who actually engaged in criminal conduct, but in the Kenyan 
cases it also overlooked the temporality of collective responsibility for age- 
old political problems. In Kiamu, John, and Bornu’s statements, we can begin 
to see that at the heart of the sentiments being articulated are reattributions 
of culpability in which guilt for crimes of mass violence is understood in re-
lation to sentimental passions about ethnicity, land, and historical injustices. 
Culpability is reinscribed onto other bodies, other motives, other actors; the 
individualization of those acts is delegitimized in favor of addressing such vi-
olence through the political settlement of long- standing inequality.
When we asked Marcus, a villager from Kibera, whether he thought Ken-
yatta was most responsible, he, like many, responded by insisting that many 
Kenyans believed that Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo was interested in prose-
cuting those on the Waki Commission’s list because the otp was outsourcing 
a significant number of its investigations to ngos and others whom many dis-
credited as being incompetent and far from thorough. As Marcus elaborated:
So, how do these guys end up at the icc? If not through a process of a kind 
of political roulette, how does he end up there? That is completely arbi-
trary; you have twenty people or twenty- plus people fingered for the vio-
lence by Waki. . . .  I think a lot of people will be asking questions about why 
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isn’t so- and- so and why isn’t so- and- so on the list, but I don’t know by what 
logic somebody like John Michuki could have escaped. He was internal se-
curity minister, the one who directly banned any type of street demonstra-
tions. He was very much involved at the National Security, nsac, and on 
top of that Michuiki had said on multiple occasions he was directly order-
ing the police to shoot to kill Mungiki. But if you are not going to touch 
Mungiki, I don’t know how then you are going to deal with reprisal vio-
lence in the north. The other person who should be at the icc, I mean one 
would think, would be Maina Njenga [the head of the Mungiki] himself.
By referring to the perception that the otp accepted the names outlined in 
the Waki Commission report, Marcus was suggesting that the logic was polit-
ical and, in some cases, arbitrary. He continued, “If you are talking about the 
criteria for these kinds of charges to warrant a case at the icc, I think one of 
the things that Luis Moreno- Ocampo has been at pains to show is that there 
was a structured violence, that there was an organization with a hierarchy and 
so on. It is called Mungiki and his head is Miana Njenga. In many ways one 
can then begin to understand that there is something legitimate about the an-
gle of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto.”
Yet despite this concession about the plausibility of guilt, a range of actors, 
such as the police chief, members of the police force, and Mungiki gangs were 
also seen as contributors to violence but were actually dropped from the list. 
And, as my informant explained, the police were part of this process, too.
The existence of the police also raises questions about why the icc’s prose-
cution did not pursue the head of the Kenyan police force. Here the presump-
tion was that the violence should not be attributed to one or two commanders. 
The planning for the violence was said to precede the elections and was mobi-
lized as part of the defense of the Kikuyu. The reality is that there is not only 
a sense that the violence was perpetrated across the board by many actors— 
 police, local people, outside forces, militia, gangs— but also that the violence 
was inspired by deep- seated histories of disenfranchisement in which various 
persons saw themselves as carrying out their obligations to protect their com-
munity. But despite the recognition of the responsibility to protect, the point, 
ultimately, is that they, not Kenyatta and Ruto, were the ones engaged in in-
flicting proximate violence. Here Marcus maps out the forms of proximate vi-
olence relevant to the Mungiki phenomenon:
There are a number of men that were targeted because of their ethnic lean-
ings, and the link between those ethnic groups to certain political lean-
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ings. And because of that they were attacked in certain sex- selective ways. 
You know having their penises amputated, or having them sodomized, and 
because then when you think about them from the political reasons why 
it happened, then they qualify as gender crimes.  .  .  .   Sexual and gender- 
based crimes postelection have been downplayed. They’re taken as serious 
crimes related to the election violence. The police have been implicated 
and other security agents that some victims have described in detail, that 
it is for sure the people that raped them were security agents that had been 
deployed to that area or to those places during the period of the chaos.
So, for instance, in Kibera a number of victims have described the attire 
that the men that raped them were in, and for some of them they describe 
it in detail; they talk about the way the tear gas canisters were dangling and 
making noises. Those are some of the noises they remember. So we were 
concerned that our own security agents have been implicated and that the 
government has not done anything.
As we see, the realities of intimate violence— rape, castration, sodomy— 
 remain part of the ways that those victimized by violence are also conceptual-
izing guilt. Those responsible for violence against their bodies are those who 
actually committed the crimes: the man who raped, the boy next door who 
killed his neighbor, and the foot soldiers of the security forces who maimed. 
Yet the problem for many is that because of the icc indictment, it is the Ken-
yan government, through the figures of Kenyatta and Ruto, that is being held 
responsible for those alleged perpetrations of violence, instead of the police 
and security forces.
In response to our question about whether Kenyatta and Ruto should as-
sume responsibility for the 2007–2008 postelection violence, the journalist 
Ngugi asks,
Responsibility for what? Some of the worst violence happened in Western 
Kenya and, yes, it is often mentioned that Kisumu [is] burning, but it’s ac-
tually not considered a media epicenter of the violence. And in both cases 
[they] let the state security forces off the hook. In Kakamega, Bungoma, 
in Kitale, the vast majority of people that were killed were killed by police 
bullets usually found in [their] back; they were running away. If you omit 
that, then all the violence becomes is a long- held ethnic dispute. You know 
all the rhetoric that influenced— is it called Agenda 4 items?— it is absolute 
bullshit.67
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Here Ngugi is referring to part of the national dialogue and reconcilia-
tion efforts that took place after the 2007–2008 violence. Four agendas were 
proposed to address the way forward for Kenya. The fourth and final agenda 
was to address “long- term issues and solutions” and included points such as 
land reform, national unity, and so on that have to do with further long- term 
peace- building concerns. The Agenda 4 items were the last ones agreed to in 
the Annan- brokered peace agreement. But Ngugi’s point is that the issue is a 
lot more complex than simply ethnicity and land. It is also about the percep-
tions of narrative erasures and false narratives that are seen as being part of the 
maintenance of state power. He goes on to suggest that the violence was not 
simply routine ethnic violence, as it was often framed. He insists that the se-
curity forces— those in proximate relation to daily citizens— were actively in-
volved, and people from the Western region were being targeted. “I spent a lot 
of time, January and part of February, in the North Rift, in places like Kiptere, 
just around Eldoret town in the outskirts of Eldoret. I was scooping spent car-
tridges, G3 cartridges. I mean the cops had gone completely amuck .  .  .   be-
cause even the security forces . . .  were divided along party and ethnic lines.”68
He emphasizes how ethnically segmented the divisions became:
If you went to the police station in Eldoret town— I remember the first time 
I went there on a Sunday and a policeman comes striding out. I am coming 
into the compound and she is coming out, and she is loudly announcing, 
“This is an odm zone, so understand where you’re coming.” I needed secu-
rity to go into a place called Munyaka, which was a Kikuyu settlement, and 
she told me, “Eh, listen, my friend, this not the place, and now you have to 
make special arrangements. You are not going to find people here that are 
going to go in there.” The cops, General Service Unit, Administrative Po-
lice, and so on who were shooting up the place in Kiptere and so on were 
imported, and it was very specific because they were Kenyan police and— 
 again according to locals, again another narrative that’s never discussed— 
 Ugandans. But if you went to Moi referral hospitals and you found anyone 
who was working at Moi referral hospital in January–February 2008, [they 
say] there was an invasion by Administrative Police–looking types of the 
hospital at one point, and they said these people could not speak Kiswahili. 
That is one of the stories you will also hear in Kisumu.69
In this passage, Ngugi counters what he saw as false narratives— or mas-
sive omissions of facts— in which the proximate role of the police, the security 
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forces, and the use of foreign forces like the Ugandans was underplayed. He 
insisted, rather, that the state security machine played a major role in the vio-
lence and was in fact the largest perpetrator. He argued that when you remove 
these major players from the story, the violence begins to look like a long- 
standing ethnic dispute. It involved a range of actors engaged in intimate kill-
ing whose affiliations were conveniently segmented along ethnicity and party 
alliances; but some of the worst forms of violence involved police and security 
forces from nearby states who were imported to perpetrate violence. The im-
plications debunk Kenyatta and Ruto’s criminal responsibility for the perpe-
tration of violence by suggesting that Kibaki had requested assistance from 
Museveni, who responded by sending security forces from Uganda to parts of 
the Rift Valley and western Kenya. The report that the “police- looking types” 
did not speak Kiswahili was taken as further evidence that they were not Ken-
yan and had been imported. He also seems to suggest that even Kenyan secu-
rity forces were stationed in different areas, or at least imported into certain hot 
spots like Eldoret, based on ethnicity and political affiliation. Given the way the 
security forces were “divided along party and ethnic lines,” the Kibaki govern-
ment was calculating in its deployment of the forces. Thus, Ngugi suggests that 
there was more at play than different ethnic communities fighting each other.
The key point is that the violence was based on much more than ethnic 
patronage. It was about the fight to take over government— at all costs— or 
for the Kibaki government to maintain governmental power and the embod-
ied affects that fueled those struggles. The most pronounced redirections of 
culpability— from Ruto and Kenyatta to the police, security services, or neigh-
bors accused of stealing— were for the most intimate forms of violence: sexual 
violence ranging from rape to castration and sodomy. This is one way of as-
signing guilt to perpetrators of violence through interpretations of proximity, 
not command responsibility. Another, as we have seen, is through expanded 
notions of time that reflect the attribution of sentiments about the colonial 
past and the way the icc has come to occupy these historical structures of 
power and exploitation in the eyes of those involved.
Whose Perpetrator, Whose History? Emotional Regimes and the Politics of Attribution
While chapter 3 emphasizes a notion of justice directly tied to advocacy that 
insists on the immediacy of social action (the temporality of the now), this 
chapter highlights particular notions of time that not only order the way that 
legal justice is rendered (legal time), but also make viable the possibilities for 
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understanding culpability in longer temporal periods. These sense- making 
processes are dialogic, as we saw with the acts of affective transference in 
chapter 2, and enable people to consider a range of measures for determin-
ing culpability. Senses of justice can also be shaped by particular articulations 
of guilt and innocence that are understood through expectations of patron-
age, ethnicity, and land inequality. But more importantly, they are propelled 
through emotional climates, though shared differently and at times con-
structed and even engaged duplicitously, that produce collective experiences 
in relation to hegemonic signs. These signs may be historical or contempo-
rary; they may motivate those irate responses that appear to represent anger, 
or joy, or sadness— all experienced differently perhaps— but what is key is that 
they are part of an emotional climate that shapes a given experience. It is this 
experience that contributes to affective community formation and cross- cuts 
race, gender, nationality, and so on, even as it exists in tension with it. Thus, 
dissatisfaction about inequality constitutes the way that particular emotional 
climates are experienced. These feelings punctuate the way that claims and 
counterclaims are made.
Through reattribution, those engaged in various pro- Pan- African forma-
tions deploy particular judgments and narratives in order to undermine the 
post- 2002 linear determinants of legality by which particular foot soldiers, 
not political leaders, are deemed culpable for violence. Those attributions also 
have their own institutional and social histories through which regimes form 
and then are deployed to propel particular narratives for particular purposes. 
Through claims of guilt or heroism, people attribute culpability. And through 
this process the figure of the individual “perpetrator” can transform into the 
figure of the freedom fighter— as seen with Uhuru Kenyatta. For what we see 
is that these iconic symbols are articulated through particular cultural and 
emotional lenses that shape judgments, capacities, and moral expressions. As 
embodied thought, sentiments that shape the meaning of these symbols an-
imate cognition in ways that make interpretation meaningful according to 
various sociocultural rules. Here various constituencies see the postcolonial 
condition in contemporary Kenya as fundamentally related to the West and 
its colonial past. In their attribution of guilt through the longue durée of co-
lonial violence, these Kenyan responses to the icc’s legal designations reflect 
how definitions of violence and culpability are sentimentally and socially 
charged and rely on particular conceptions of time as they relate to justice. 
And through nationalist sentiments and ethnic sensibilities, notions of re-
sponsibility are communicated through speech acts, ritual practices, voting 
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behavior, popular campaign icons, and so forth. Ultimately, this is import-
ant because perceptions of legal time and histories of colonial and postcolo-
nial degradation can shape ethical horizons for Western legality even as they 
shape the terrain by which others protest those determinations.
According to one former African head of state who had been in office 
during the negotiations of Liberian president Charles Taylor’s extradition re-
quest and who witnessed the subsequent icc indictments of African leaders, 
“If I had known then what I know now about extradition and these European 
courts, I would never have allowed my country to sign on to the icc [Rome 
Statute]. Signing on has enabled these extraditions. It’s almost like allowing 
them to take us to the ship, once again.” When I asked this leader to explain 
more about the slave ship metaphor and the idea of external forces controlling 
African bodies, he likened it to other types of extractions, like “the unfair pil-
fering of resources, age- old treaties that can’t be changed. . . .  [They] look like 
colonialism once again.”
The leader’s invocation of unknowing consent was echoed in other re-
sponses I gleaned from leaders engaged in extradition discussions. On one 
level, the figure of the African body being extradited to Europe conjures sig-
nificant responses from those in the West aware of the politics of racialization 
and its impact on the global order. The imagery of the slave ship speaks to the 
history of the removal of the black body from Africa and evokes African and 
European collaborations in historical removals and control of black bodies, as 
happened during the transatlantic slave trade, as well as the imperial control of 
Africans through European colonialism. From international legal actors con-
doning slavery and then later prohibiting it long after its destruction of African 
societies, to the subsequent colonization of African social, political, and eco-
nomic life, to the contemporary control of global economic and political insti-
tutions, feelings of structural injustice are continually frustrated by new forms 
of extraction, such as resource extraction, economic extraction, and the gen-
eral history of external control of Africa’s interior. They are part of the dehu-
manization of African bodies. In addition to the history of the stratification of 
human value and the sentimental responses to it, the dynamics at play are tied 
to the existence of an ambiguous set of political exclusions that are in tension 
with aspirational possibilities of equality through international legality. For the 
claims of geographic and political selectivity— the idea that some forms of vi-
olence are legally actionable by international criminal law instruments and 
some are not— incite a prevalent emotional response that is also tied to how 
we understand the place of history and time in shaping questions of culpability.
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Though not new to legal anthropology, the notion of legal time is scarcely 
interrogated in Western jurisprudential circles, particularly with regard to dif-
ferences in international law (which limits how notions of legal time are con-
ceptualized) and criminal law (which focuses on strict understandings and 
demarcations in time, rather than reflecting on historical developments or 
broader root causes). Continuing crimes (such as colonialism or apartheid) 
lend themselves to less stable assertions about who is a “perpetrator” and cre-
ate multivalent legal dilemmas. Such questions of jurisdiction, admissibil-
ity, and evidence further complicate the parameters by which reattribution 
responds to encapsulations of justice. Thus it is important to clarify ethno-
graphically what the realm of the social can tell us about contemporary social 
processes around which notions of time are understood and responses to it 
registered.
Attributing guilt through strict understandings and demarcations of time 
is critical to anti- impunity formations in international criminal law. Rather 
than reflecting on historical developments or broader root causes, icc juris-
prudence has adopted a relatively strict view of temporality with the recog-
nition that nonretroactivity or the principle of nullum crimen sine lege— no 
crime except what is proscribed by law— is one of the central tenets of law. 
The criminalization of acts occurring over long periods of time is seen as po-
tentially threatening this principle because it is hard to define what precisely 
is being punished and when exactly the conduct becomes criminal. But this is 
where the problem lies, for the legal presumptions of temporally relevant re-
sponsibility and the growing grassroots conception of who, over what period 
of time, is actually criminally responsible for acts of violence highlight a hier-
archical or vertical disjuncture. This is due to the limitations of attributing the 
conduct of one person to another— distinguishing between foot soldiers and 
“those most responsible”— and the problem of legal time as it relates to strict 
applications of the temporality of violence.
I am not suggesting that those who are responsible for mass violence 
should not be held accountable for their role in wrongdoing. What I am high-
lighting here, however, is that competing attributions of culpability reveal 
substantive differences between social and legal justice in shaping varying 
understandings of guilt as affective formulations of culpability. They highlight 
the afterlife of the disappointment with the failure to balance power histori-
cally in postcolonial Kenya, set alongside the articulated failure of the law to 
rectify histories of human dispossession from their ancestral land. We also see 
how fraught with meaning the assignment of culpability is— especially in con-
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texts in which postcolonial states have failed to adequately address the needs 
of those victimized by violence.
In the Kenyan political landscape, the individualization of criminal re-
sponsibility does not account for the deep histories that produced the con-
ditions under which police violence, ethnic rivalries, and land dispossession 
were made possible.70 Rather, there is a realization that the inscriptions of 
power in colonial Kenya were central to the play of power in postindepen-
dence Kenya. And since independence, power has never been balanced or 
distributed beyond those ethnic groups— the Kikuyu and Kalenjin— who in-
herited control of statecraft. In postcolonial Africa, the afterlife of imperi-
alism, colonialism, and the violence of dispossession persist deeply in the 
psychic life of social justice. Alongside historically constituted ethnic divi-
sions there is also an awareness of the ways that imperial injustices remain 
part of the postcolonial reality— a continuity of structures of economic, legal, 
and political power. And while the image of the African perpetrator as war-
lord and killer has been constructed through the law to produce a narrative 
of the merciless mercenary, the African head of state as perpetrator has been 
subject to another moral imaginary that represents a new shift in the consoli-
dation of panethnic alliances.
The Kenyan cases pursued by the icc demonstrate this point and capture 
the affectivities already in place that the pr firm btp Advisers used so effec-
tively in their campaign. What they show us is that the attribution of cul-
pability of an African leader to a particular historical moment can actually 
be explained through affective sentiments of solidarity; not only do Africans 
want to end violence, impunity, and the abuses of the postcolonial elite, but 
they also want to reassert a new narrative about the political nature of contem-
porary violence in Kenya. The Jubilee Coalition victory of 2013 demonstrates 
how social justice can exceed the legal- political and how an individual’s in-
ternal feelings manifest in group sentiments about justice and culpability. On 
one hand, the Uhuru- Ruto Kenyan campaign team was able to implement a 
publicity strategy that nationalized ethnicity, leading to a merger and consol-
idation of the Jubilee Coalition and its deployment of a strategic narrative of 
victimhood. On the other hand, it led to the emergence of a different moral 
imaginary in which the emotional regime of nationalism galvanized new so-
cial domains for supporting the Uhuru- Ruto party. This process highlights 
the importance of understanding how notions of culpability, circumscribed 
through temporal frameworks, shape the basis upon which justice is under-
stood and, therefore, on which other alliances are formed.
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Justice Corrupted?
Articulating culpability through terms like “superior responsibility” limits the 
representational life of those deemed most responsible for violence. As I have 
been arguing, international criminal legal concepts of culpability rely not only 
on rational reasoning for clarifying the line of command; they depend on 
a particular production of the guilty “perpetrator” without whom violence 
would not be possible. But these assertions of culpability and their temporal 
reconfigurations are not enough to make sense of the deep roots of violence. 
There is an affective dimension to justice— an emotional connection to it in 
relation to various time horizons that remain part of the postcolonial condi-
tion and which is sustained by the socialization of particular practices and at-
titudes. These realities highlight the complexities of different understandings 
of justice— redistribution (dealing with land and structural injustice) versus 
anti- impunity— articulated through criminal accountability. Their compet-
ing claims raise questions related to how justice can be about individual cul-
pability as well as larger forms of structural injustice. Through highlighting 
processes of reattribution, we can see that some determinations of historical 
inequality are understood as corruptions of justice, while other feelings of in-
justice produce new legal innovations to end impunity. Where mainstream 
constructions of liberal democratic social orders presume the existence of 
fairness and freedom as the norm, expressions of disappointment point to the 
problem that without redistributive politics as the basis for justice, a legal or-
der that fails to address inequality can be seen as a corruption of justice.
Similarly, discursive strategies that deploy Pan- African signs of justice 
through the mythic domain of the freedom fighter, for example, also have the 
ability to erase acts of violence that evade accountability. In postcolonial Af-
rican contexts, like that which we witnessed during Kenya’s 2007–2008 vio-
lence, acts of physical violence were deployed by the very peacekeepers and 
police and enabled by the very leaders that are expected to protect the people. 
When those controversies unfold, they often manifest various forms of pro-
test speech that openly contest certain discourses about justice and displace 
old emotional norms. Those sentimentalized speech acts operate alongside 
power relationships.
Rather than recognizing the role of the structuring order and its dual fic-
tion as an objective tool, designations of “justice corrupted” depend on the 
classification of corruption as atypical, as an abberation. But to claim that the 
failure of justice is an anomaly is to continue to fetishize justice as a veil that 
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hides other relations. Legal time is an example of the fetish of justice; the tem-
porality of the law hides the basis upon which social inequality can be under-
stood. It narrowly circumscribes the possibilities for what justice is and can 
be and highlights how particular forms of temporality can contribute to the 
exclusion of other temporal worlds, even as it presumes to be liberatory and 
justice producing. In other words, the very legal framework that designates 
culpability temporally can be a tool for exclusion, and justice is legible only 
within that which is legal. Those formulations that fall outside of liberalist 
temporal constructions of culpability are rendered unintelligible, thus unten-
able. The resulting exclusions contribute to the production of fissures in the 
social order.
Liberal legalist frameworks emerge through particular ways of organizing 
subjects and then erasing the processes by which such formations take shape. 
It is accompanied by a belief in the objectivity of the frameworks that serve the 
law, but these frameworks produce objectivity out of subjectivity. Often, those 
engaged in this process do not necessarily recognize the constructed tempo-
ralities that shape judicial order; they disavow them, instead, because they 
signal subjectivity. However, if we recognize that the pursuit of justice is fun-
damentally about domains of inequality, then we can see how feelings about 
it are mobilized differently yet produce similar results. As we have seen, these 
developments are differentiated through reattribution, which in some cases 
leads to refusals of legally circumscribed justice encapsulations, as well as feel-
ings that justice, as the domain for distributive possibilities, has been cor-
rupted. The invocation of corruption may emerge conveniently as a discourse 
for evading culpability. Or it may be shaped by other time horizons that people 
identify as the source of the infractions that led to mass violence. Legal time 
and the longue durée of structural inequality provide the frameworks through 
which people assess the social order and how justice operates within it.
Ultimately, notions of the culpability of the “perpetrator” or the righteous-
ness of the Pan- African “hero” are made real through the fiction that justice 
corrupted is an anomaly. On either side of the perceptions of such notions of 
justice, people engage in reframing law’s temporality in order to shift the mo-
dalities through which culpability is understood. These processes are at the 
center of the emotional work of international justice, and it is in the fissures of 
perceived injustice that legal temporalities are actually made visible. It is these 
struggles over meaning making and the power to shape and define justice that 
I go on to explore in chapter 5 through the examination of Pan- African insti-
tutions as further examples of reattributions of justice.
PART I I
Affects, Emotional Regimes, 
and the Reattribution of 
International Law
This page intentionally left blank
CHAPTER 5
The Making of an African Criminal Court  
as an Affective Practice
The year 2013 marked the Golden Jubilee of the founding of the African Union. 
At the celebratory event in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African leaders adopted 
the “50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration” in which they acknowledged past 
challenges and successes while rededicating themselves to Africa’s progress in 
technological and economic development.1 Part of the rededication involved 
a ritual process in which they articulated eight ideals or pillars of progress for 
the future. The event was deeply symbolic and emotionally charged. 
Sentimental reflections on Africa’s unique place as both the cradle of hu-
manity and the locus of dehumanization by slavery, deportation, disposses-
sion, apartheid, and colonialism punctuated the profundity of the moment as 
the leaders read out the “50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration” in unison:
We, Heads of State and Government of the African Union assembled to 
celebrate the Golden Jubilee of the oau/ au established in the city of Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia on 25 May 1963 . . .  Reaffirming our commitment to the 
ideals of Pan- Africanism and Africa’s aspiration for greater unity, and pay-
ing tribute to the Founders of the Organisation of African Unity (oau) as 
well as the African peoples on the continent and in the Diaspora for their 
glorious and successful struggles against all forms of oppression, colonial-
ism and apartheid;
Mindful that the oau/ au have been relentlessly championing for the 
complete decolonization of the African continent and that one of the fun-
damental objectives is unconditional respect for the sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity of each of its Member States; 
178 CHAPTER 5
Stressing our commitment to build a united and integrated Africa; 
Guided by the vision of our Union and affirming our determination to 
“build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven and managed 
by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international 
arena”;
Determined to take full responsibility for the realization of this vision 
. . .
acknowledge that: The Organisation of African Unity (oau) over-
came internal and external challenges, persevered in the quest for conti-
nental unity and solidarity; contributed actively to the liberation of Africa 
from colonialism and apartheid; provided a political and diplomatic plat-
form to generations of leaders on continental and international mat-
ters; and elaborated frameworks for Africa’s development and integration 
agenda through programmes such as nepad and aprm. . . .2
In addition to acknowledging the goal of an integrated and clear vision for 
their union and a quest for peace, they articulated their declaration of prior-
ities: African identity and renaissance; the struggle against colonialism and 
the right to self- determination of people still under colonial rule; the integra-
tion agenda; the agenda for social and economic development; democratic 
governance; determining Africa’s destiny and place in the world; and peace 
and security. The agenda of peace and security was more punctuated than the 
others, declaring:
On peace and security— Our determination to achieve the goal of a 
conflict- free Africa, to make peace a reality for all our people and to rid 
the continent of wars, civil conflicts, human rights violations, humanitar-
ian disasters and violent conflicts, and to prevent genocide. We pledge not 
to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans and 
undertake to end all wars in Africa by 2020.3
They then itemized the steps that they would take to ensure peace and secu-
rity, from addressing root causes of violence to eradicating emerging sources 
of conflict to emphasizing conflict prevention. And like all head- of- state 
events, every part of it was ritualized. But what stood out was the profoundly 
performative passion that emerged while they read in unison. Bodies moving, 
words emphasized, but symbolically declarative.
Shortly after this event, and in the spirit of the “50th Anniversary Solemn 
Declaration,” the African Union Commission (auc) convened a subsequent 
event— this time a high- level retreat in Durban, South Africa, on April 29, 
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2014— in which they discussed one of the core issues that emerged as a prior-
ity in the establishment of the au’s vision of integration, prosperity, and peace. 
The gathering was called Silencing Guns in Africa: Building a Roadmap to a 
Conflict- Free Continent. According to an au press release on the gathering, 
Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma called on experts to engage in frank 
and open discussions to develop concrete and innovative solutions to vio-
lence. As she stated, “Unless we silence the guns and bury the machetes, the 
au vision of building an integrated, prosperous and conflict- free Africa will 
remain an abstract goal.”4 Attendees dedicated the meeting to reflection on 
best practices in the realm of good governance and conflict and crisis resolu-
tion. They also highlighted emerging trends of concern ranging from Africa’s 
changing demographics to environmental threats and their potential to either 
incite violence or catalyze solutions. This gathering and its outcomes should 
be understood as a continuation of decades of transnational contestation over 
the architecture of peace and justice in Africa. 
With the au’s fiftieth- anniversary celebration and the related campaign, 
the au leadership has mobilized emotional regimes and Pan- African histories 
to produce juridical, democratic, and economic opportunities on the African 
continent. They also presented a new platform for African growth, Agenda 
2063, a fifty- year strategic plan for Africa’s socioeconomic acceleration, trans-
formation, and progress, following the au’s vision to “build an integrated, 
prosperous and peaceful Africa, an Africa driven and managed by its own 
citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena.”5 To put 
this fifty- year continental process in place, the auc is working with the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development Planning and Coordinating Agency 
and is being supported by the African Development Bank and the United Na-
tions Economic Commission for Africa. This long- term project is presented 
as “a program of social, economic and political rejuvenation that links the 
past, present and the future in order to create a new generation of Pan Afri-
canists that will harness the lessons learnt and use them as building blocks to 
consolidate the hope and promises of the founding parents for a true renais-
sance of Africa.”6 
Though still in development, in Agenda 2063 we can see a deliberate use 
of the concept of Pan- Africanism, but tied to the more market- oriented lan-
guage of productivity, growth, entrepreneurship, and transformation. In 
many ways, Agenda 2063 is part of the African renaissance propelled by Pan- 
Africanist principles, which calls for changes in attitudes and mind- sets to 
inculcate particular African values, or what I have been calling emotional re-
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gimes driven by various Africanist feeling rules: discipline, honesty, integ-
rity, transparency, hard work, and love for Africa and its people. It provides 
the opportunity for Africa to break away from the syndrome of “always com-
ing up with new ideas but [having] no significant achievements.”7 And since 
the popular trope of the corrupt African leaders is inundated with criticism 
about selfishness, elitism, and turning a blind eye to Africa’s poor, the fiftieth- 
anniversary campaign and its various side events were structured as a coun-
ternarrative to such  failure-laden imaginaries. Instead, they made clear how 
Pan- African affects are actually being institutionalized as a counterresponse 
to the icc indictments, most significantly the campaigns by its anti- impunity 
movement activists in Africa and elsewhere. They did this by highlighting 
themes of belonging to a continent long managed by external forces that is 
now focusing on recovery, regional integration, democracy, and good gover-
nance, and Africa’s entitlement to the fruits of its labor. 
The following does not attempt to measure their success. Rather, in this chap-
ter I am interested in the way that affective justice techniques are strategically 
deployed by Pan- Africanists who are working toward Africa’s renewed future. 
In this case, what we see is the way that Pan- Africanism is not used to reference 
African unity but instead, through embodied feelings of racial subordination, 
assigned historically to the black body. In this regard, it is important to recognize 
how critical these racialized imaginaries are in the navigation of inter national 
justice. For the ghosts of subordination— the after life of subjection— live in the 
imaginary and draw on history, materiality, and the manifestation of those inte-
riorities to produce templates for African meaning making. What we see is that 
the racial imaginary is not simply about skin color— black skin versus white-
ness, for example. This racial imaginary is about the construction of difference. 
It is about the way that distinctions based on construction of the black body, 
the West, and even conceptions concerning culpability or Africa’s development 
converge to produce organizing tropes around which various racial imaginar-
ies are made visible and real. In this regard, Pan- Africanist justice attributions 
are playing out through the invocation of various slogans, the particularities of 
their application, and the agreed- upon meanings that shape the way we under-
stand contemporary developments. This process of psychic self- making is part 
of the geosocial landscape in which internal feelings about Africa and its peo-
ple merge with various exteriorities in the coproduction of African geographies 
of justice. But affects, as more than internal feelings brought into being by ex-
ternalities, reflect structures of emotion imbricated along a zone that intersects 
with the past, the present, and aspirations for the future.8
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Though these justice goals are not exclusively Pan- African, nor exclusively 
racial, when taken together they form the component parts of the au’s new 
Pan- African assemblage that seeks to overcome histories of exploitation and 
inequality and reassert Africa’s place in the world. As we shall see, sentiments 
of recovery, overcoming exploitation and hardship, and taking control of Af-
rica’s future and its membership in global communities are all part of what is 
being articulated as the Pan- African renaissance. This demonstrates a return 
to the foundational principles of self- determination that were necessary to 
extricate African countries from colonial domination, now with sentiments 
that propel its agency in creating new solutions for its people. It is a move 
to a more development- focused agenda involved in the shaping of regional 
integration priorities through principles of Pan- Africanism and African re-
naissance. These principles are now being deployed in spatially contingent 
geographies and are creating possibilities for rethinking what justice is from 
other sites of meaning making. These new au spheres are reenvisioning jus-
tice in the twenty- first century, embedded in a transitional justice framework 
that considers foundational structural inequalities while also addressing po-
litical and juridical solutions endemic to Africa’s histories of violence: struc-
tural, psychological, material, economic.
In relation to this strategy, on paper, Agenda 2063’s Pan- Africanist frame-
work seems impressive to its onlookers, and much has been accomplished 
in the first ten years since its inception— at least in relation to norm setting. 
However, many of the principles that undergird the institutionalization of Af-
rica’s new frontiers remain aspirational— as I will demonstrate through the 
Hissène Habré case— the first international justice case managed by the au to 
adjudicate international crimes committed by a former head of state on the 
African continent. This development of African justice, managed within a re-
gionally contextualized transitional justice framework, is as much about de-
sire, hope, and aspirations as it is about the fears that inaction will lead to the 
eventual demise of Africa’s future. Yet African justice aspirations sit uncom-
fortably next to the paradox of African development— the realization that the 
very global capital being sought to build and integrate African economies is 
also leading to its demise through the displacement of small-scale traders and 
farmers.9 With this paradox in the shadow, this chapter is not an evaluation 
of the au’s strategic goals or the feasibility of Africa’s growth and peace plans. 
It is an analy sis of the emotional work that goes into producing and inciting 
strategic action. In particular, it focuses on African governance concerns over 
injustice and inequality in the global order and the use of Pan- Africanist emo-
182 CHAPTER 5
tional regimes to address them. These affects reside alongside a particular set 
of ontologies that are embedded in the shadows of the colonial past, as previ-
ous chapters have been illustrating, and African aspirations to determine its 
own future. 
What is compelling about the use of Pan- Africanist affects as a way to 
respond to the West are the inherent contradictions that it juggles. On one 
hand, these Pan- African affects are shaped by messages that are touted as lo-
calized and African; yet, on the other hand, it has been well established in the 
literature that not only are African traditions inventions of complex social en-
counters with customs and politics elsewhere, they are constituted by the very 
domains of power that they disavow, such as the European legal systems and 
its related educational structures.10 It is this paradox that makes the emotional 
work of Pan- Africanism an interesting site for the study of feelings and what 
they do to compel social action. And it is this puzzle that makes the tensions 
at the heart of Pan- Africanist responses to the icc even more challenging 
because, as we saw with Kenyatta and Ruto’s campaign branding, emotion-
ally driven institutional sensibilities about justice in Africa are being rerouted 
through reformulated imaginaries. These imaginaries shape Pan- Africanist 
emotional domains and histories to produce juridical, democratic, and eco-
nomic possibilities in Africa. 
As strategic formations, the feeling domains that are produced in response 
to the icc’s anti- impunity approach are not unrelated to the peace and justice 
strategies in Africa being articulated as an African approach to international 
law. They are similarly deployed by a cadre of international lawyers, activists, 
judges, scholars, policy makers, governments, and survivors of violence who 
are engaged in building strategies to end violence on the African continent 
and to control the terms through which it is managed. Since its transforma-
tion from the oau, the African Union, a continental intergovernmental body, 
has demonstrated a renewed energy and growing capacity to resolve conflicts 
around the continent using particular peace and justice sequencing strategies. 
Today, the interplay between peace and justice remains one of the most diffi-
cult debates concerning international justice in Africa. Some would argue that 
if peace and a functioning government cannot be achieved, the effort to cre-
ate a fully functioning state and judiciary will also fail.11 The range of peace 
and justice debates in the literature extends from more fundamentalist ap-
proaches to justice, ranging from a deep belief that retributive justice prevents 
impunity to a more conciliatory and gradualist presumption that political set-
tlements for politically based problems are more appropriate.12 For example, 
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some have argued that courts, as tools available to political actors (the au) 
to intervene in conflict situations, can play but a limited role in contributing 
to the reestablishment of peace, stability, and reconciliation by prosecuting a 
small number of perpetrators, while others have insisted that because more 
basic institutions are likely to emerge in contexts in which the guidance avail-
able from institutions in a consolidated democracy is missing, in transitional 
postwar contexts where the political stakes are higher than in a consolidated 
democracy, keeping the conflict between peace and justice afloat is import-
ant.13 And yet others insist on the reality that there is no binary choice be-
tween peace on one hand and justice on the other.14 For while the range of 
approaches is often characterized conceptually as either peace or justice, the 
two are not mutually exclusive. Peace strategies that end violence can be seen 
as justice producing, and judicial strategies that punish violence can be seen 
as advocating peace. That is, the peace- justice tension is more appropriately 
described as a paradox that is built on two sets of contradictory approaches.15 
These ideological differences and conceptual slippages have contributed to 
the controversies at hand. The problem is the antinomy of two competing 
principles. One presumes that in order to establish a legitimate and function-
ing civil society, one must pursue prosecutions for the crimes of the past. The 
other assumes that in order to secure stability and a functioning government, 
it is sometimes necessary (and morally acceptable) to forego the judicial pur-
suit of past crimes.16 
Thus, the making of an African court with international criminal jurisdic-
tion offers us a lens through which to explore new cartographies of African 
justice as a symbolically Pan- African question concerned with the particu-
larities of justice on the African continent. It is also a domain of political- 
emotional regulation. Here, as in previous chapters, we see how particular 
feeling regimes are deployed to shape new political projects. In particular, I 
turn to the Malabo Protocol for the African Court, which extended the juris-
diction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (acjhr) to cover 
individual criminal liability for serious crimes committed in violation of the 
international law and matters concerning general jurisdiction. I demonstrate 
how the drafters of the Malabo Protocol for the acjhr sought to gain author-
ity over the sequencing of peace and justice interventions by discursively re-
calling the deep inequalities in Africa’s histories and infrastructures, while 
innovating new ways for political actors to navigate judicial contexts. 
What is compelling about a case study of the Malabo Protocol and the 
practices involved in its making is that it features various new institutional 
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formations through the technical construction of legal authority, but it also 
features what Connal Parsley has called the “afterlife of the imaginary.”17 The 
afterlife of the Pan- African imaginary helps us to articulate the way that the 
new Pan- African renaissance is shaping the authors and the spectators of Af-
rican social formations. While the making of an African court with criminal 
jurisdiction is being shaped by a wider institutional campaign around Pan- 
African histories and struggles, it is also a response to the lack of judicial ac-
tivity in African jurisdictions for crimes of slavery, imperialism, colonialism, 
apartheid, and subsequent forms of economic plunder set against the contem-
porary anti- impunity campaigns that target individual Africans for criminal 
responsibility for crimes that operate within the afterlife of those spheres of 
structural inequality. 
As I have demonstrated thus far, the anti- impunity campaigns have been 
driven by the emergence of particular publics whose authority is affirmed 
through the existence of a victim to be saved and by internationally driven 
judicial authorities holding the perpetrators of that violence accountable.18
As a response to such formations, figure 5.1 highlights the way that the at-
tribution movement symbolized by African geographies of justice reflects the 
afterlife of the Pan- Africanist imaginary in which conceptualizations of jus-
tice require understanding how the colonial past set in place the conditions of 
underdevelopment that led to the need for its constituents to find new ways 
to adjudicate the aftereffects of colonialism. What emerges is a particular ar-
rangement of sociopolitical life in which the theater of au action is not only 
shaped by the production and institutionalization of new ideas about justice, 
but temporally driven by an urgency and responsibility to act in a way that is 
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commensurate with anti- imperial, antiexploitative struggle. As we will see, 
the introduction of economic crimes and criminal corporate responsibility 
reflects how contemporary forms of Pan- Africanist reattribution is haunted 
by histories of extraction and violence that are brought into the biopolitics of 
international justice in Africa.
The Afterlife of Pan- African Sentimentality in the New African Union
The Twenty- Second Summit of the African Union held in Addis Ababa in Jan-
uary 2014, where the au presented its fiftieth anniversary platform, extended 
the themes of Pan- Africanism and the African renaissance with themes of Af-
rican solidarity using the refrain “I am African, I am the African Union.” With 
posters, T- shirts, and images of Pan- Africanist leaders alongside ordinary Af-
ricans, the celebratory campaign took on a life of its own in au discourse. The 
campaign launch had taken place back in March 2013 at the Sheraton Hotel 
in Addis Ababa, where various au commissioners, representatives from dip-
lomatic missions, African ambassadors, and civil society organizations began 
work to popularize the au. The goal was to broaden public awareness of what 
the au is and does and to encourage citizens of African countries to get en-
gaged. From the Department of Political Affairs to the chair of the Coalition 
Governance Team, au representatives described the campaign as a platform 
for citizen participation in au affairs and for interaction between member 
states, the au, and African citizens. Central to the message was the impor-
tance of advancing from the ratification of various au instruments to their 
actual implementation so that citizens could reap the practical benefits that 
could emerge from the aspirations that inspire treaty making in the first place. 
The “I am African” campaign was meant to evoke particular emotional re-
sponses by connecting Africa’s histories of oppression and colonial rule with 
future aspirations of resilience reflected in a new narrative of African leaders 
taking control by creating a prosperous Africa. Its green imagery is described 
by its designers as having been characteristically about African freedom. The 
au’s governance commitment of African solutions to African problems lo-
cated its message in the embodiment of its people— commissioners, leaders, 
helpers, ordinary people— whose images were displayed alongside the “I am 
African, I am the African Union” declarations. 
These declarations were posted in the summit halls, in the town square, 
on the literature and paraphernalia, and on T- shirts that were distributed and 
worn by young people throughout Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. The 
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Pan- Africanist sentiments of the campaign articulated a reconceived Africa 
whose mobilizing narrative flowed from Africa’s anticolonial struggles, to its 
political freedom, to its contemporary road to economic and political inte-
gration. Its message of perseverance and survival meant to work not simply 
through its declarations but through the emotive sentiments it conjured in 
turning injustice to justice. The campaign focused on visual elements of Afri-
can participation to establish the identity of the au. 
The opening speech at the January 2013 au summit by its chairwoman, 
Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, best marks what the “I am African, I am the 
African Union” campaign would articulate as its vision for the future:19
Africa is increasingly seen as the continent of the future, as a place of enor-
mous possibilities, thanks to a young and growing population, our natural 
resources, but also because of the improving business climate and oppor-
tunities, and the strides made in the consolidation of democracy and gov-
ernance. . . .  We do however still have challenges that need to be overcome 
urgently and collectively. Our continent still has to contend with huge in-
frastructure backlogs, backlogs in education, health and other basic ser-
vices, including responding to rapid urbanization, youth development and 
the need for food security. At the same time, it is a matter of concern that 
negotiations on global trade issues and climate change have almost col-
lapsed, with very serious consequences for Africa. It is therefore important 
that Africa remains resolute and determined to overcome these challenges. 
Central to this, is the institutional [as well as] other capacities to imple-
ment our plans at national, regional and continental levels.20
Following this opening, Dlamini Zuma, dressed in African garb, proceeded 
to map the various components of critical importance to the continent, such 
as building human capacity, promoting economic development, building a 
people- centered au, and strengthening strategic partnerships. In this state-
ment the past was invoked to reflect on ideological and political movements 
as uplift discourses to shift the narratives from African suffering to contempo-
rary regional integration strategies. The assumption was that Africa needed to 
return to the Pan- Africanism of fifty years ago and use those founding prin-
ciples to invigorate its future. In articulating this history, she paid homage to 
the great leaders who made tremendous sacrifices and led their nations to in-
dependence, ranging from late “Mwalimu” Julius Nyerere and former presi-
dent Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, to Nelson Mandela, Sam Nujoma, Samora 
Machel, Agostinho Neto, and Amílcar Cabral. And as much as these names 
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mark a particular moment in African independence struggles, they are neces-
sary precursors for setting the moral conditions by which contemporary Af-
rica can join the West in development partnerships. 
However, as an ideology, Pan- Africanism was mobilized over the late nine-
teenth and throughout the twentieth century to encourage the solidarity of 
Africans in Africa and its diaspora, insisting that the fate of African peoples 
is intertwined with a common history and shared destiny. Though originated 
in the African diaspora with an aim to forge a sense of oneness and political 
belonging between its various communities. Pan- Africanism was dedicated 
to establishing independence for African nations and cultivating unity among 
black people throughout the world. There was a sense that “uncritical absorp-
tion of Western ideas would destroy the distinctive personality of Africans.”21 
It is no surprise that the father of Pan- Africanism, Edward W. Blyden— an ed-
ucator, politician, and diplomat— insisted on particular approaches to Pan- 
Africanism, as noted in his 1881 presidential address during the opening of 
the Liberian College: 
The African must advance by methods of his own. He must possess a 
power distinct from that of the European. It has been proved that he knows 
how to take advantage of European culture and that he can be benefited by 
it. Their proof was perhaps necessary, but it is not sufficient. We must show 
that we are able to go alone, to carve out our own way. . . .  We must not be 
satisfied that, in this nation, European influence shapes our polity, makes 
our laws, rules in our tribunals and impregnates our social atmosphere.22
It was this sense of indignation that provided the organizational impetus 
around which Pan- Africanism took shape and that ultimately led to the for-
mation of the oau. 
The oau— a regional Pan- African organization set up to meet the goals 
of African decolonization— was established in 1963 with these basic princi-
ples to ground its work. Its charter reflected many of the key tenets of Pan- 
Africanism. For instance, the preamble makes mention of “the inalienable 
right of all people to control their own destiny” and “the fact that freedom, 
equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the 
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples.” In addition, the preamble states 
that the charter is a response to “the aspirations of our peoples for brother-
hood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differ-
ences.”23 The oau saw itself as providing the moral authority for the promotion 
of self- determination. Thus, as a discourse to harness natural and human cap-
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ital on the continent and enhance the progress of all African peoples, the Pan- 
Africanism of the 1950s and 1960s took a new turn. From its predominance 
outside of Africa and in relation to various diasporic communities, it came to 
be popularized by two of Africa’s towering independence leaders: President 
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who 
famously emphasized on a number of key occasions, such as the founding 
of the oau in Addis Ababa in May 1963, that “Africa must unite or perish.”24 
At that time, thirty- one African heads of state signed the charter of the oau, 
formed to create the conditions for African independence by building human 
and resource capacity for the general enhancement of African people. And al-
though the Pan- Africanism of Nkrumah and Nyerere represented a moment 
of defying the political, economic, and psychological violence of European 
colonialism in Africa, truth be told, the new Pan- Africanism today represents 
the same impetus for regional integration but in the face of new challenges for 
a continent plagued with unresolved land distribution issues and widespread 
structural inequalities.
After the Cold War, the security paradigm shifted from a focus on national 
security (of the state) to issues such as food and water security, land, and en-
vironmental concerns— in other words, a concern with internal root causes of 
conflict. This shift has had a particular impact in Africa, and has led African 
leaders to expand the mandate of the au far beyond that of the oau to activi-
ties in the realms of peace and security, human rights, democratization, good 
governance, and humanitarian assistance.25 While the oau was set up in May 
1963 to allow independent African states to end the vestiges of colonialism 
and apartheid, to intensify development, and to safeguard sovereignty follow-
ing un principles of international cooperation, the oau Charter specifically 
provided for a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of states.26 Sep-
tember 9, 1999, marked the end of the mandate of the oau and the beginning 
of the new mandate of the au. It was formally established on May 26, 2001, in 
Addis Ababa and launched on July 9, 2002, in South Africa. 
The au’s Constitutive Act was used to transform the original oau and estab-
lish nine organs within the union that would work to ensure the development 
of the au as an engaged body able to ensure the protection of life. The or-
gans include the Assembly; Executive Council; Pan- African Parliament; Court 
of Justice; Commission; Permanent Representatives Committee; specialized 
technical committees; Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and financial 
institutions.27 Article 6 of the Constitutive Act identifies the Assembly as be-
ing composed of heads of states and government and their representatives, as 
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the apex decision- making body of the union. The Assembly is seen as the de 
facto executive of the union and its functions and powers are often identified 
as making and monitoring the implementation of the common policies of the 
union. Other functions also involve receiving, considering, and making deci-
sions on reports, considering recommendations from the other organs of the 
union, and ensuring the compliance of member states and appointing key of-
ficeholders to organs of the union. Through relevant organs and institutions, 
it is also seen as being responsible for overseeing the management of conflicts 
and emergency situations and the restoration of peace and security.28 
A key organizing principle is unity and a common approach to policy ar-
eas such as defense; peace and security; economic integration; the free move-
ment of people, goods, and capital; food security; development; and poverty 
reduction. The new au marked a shift in promoting both African continen-
tal integration and global economic and political membership, and conflict 
resolution is at the heart of current au policy concerns.29 This new form of 
Africanness articulated through African claims to the new world order may 
be otherwise read by some as un- African, but the new 190- million- dollar 
building that the Chinese government gifted to the au, the dependable and 
ongoing availability of electricity facilitated by the Italians and French, the 
organizational structure mapped out in the rotunda with all fifty- three states 
represented and eligible to vote (like a typical un General Assembly), are all 
representative of what Jim Ferguson has insisted are not attempts to be what 
Africa is not, but claims to power and membership in the global community.30 
This reconceptualization of the au represents the complexity of Africa as 
being as much about the Other as it is about itself; it represents the desire, 
hope, fear, anger, and joy of modernity that sits neatly next to specters of anti-
colonial struggles. These affectivities reside alongside a particular set of ontol-
ogies, or ways of conceiving of existence; for while the shadows of the colonial 
past still structure Africa’s place in the world, so does the aspiration of signif-
icance, of potential, of power. The signs of struggle and survival make hope 
possible, and power is being claimed in the affective geography of justice, for 
it offers the promise of a new future. But the signs of struggle being deployed 
by these new Pan- African campaigns draw on a symbolic, historic framework 
that is very unlike the roots of the au’s formation. Thus, we must take seri-
ously the ghostly realities of structural violence and how they produce com-
plex political subjects and the actions they take.
The fervor of Pan- Africanism and African geographies of justice in the 
contemporary period is also shaped by the emotional responses to the failures 
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of international justice to intervene in Africa long before the icc was a real-
ity. The idea of an African human rights convention and an African court of 
human rights modeled on the European and Inter- American Court was first 
proposed in 1961 at the Lagos Conference on Primacy of Law.31 This proposal 
resurfaced in 1969 at the un Seminar on the Creation of Regional Commis-
sions on Human Rights, with specific reference to Africa, held in Cairo. The 
un’s recommendation to the oau went unimplemented.32 Several other ini-
tiatives and seminars were held over a period of ten years to discuss and ad-
vocate for the establishment of an African commission on human rights or an 
African court.33 The call for the oau to adopt a human rights instrument was 
reiterated on every occasion.34 A symposium convened by the un in Mon-
rovia, Liberia, in 1979 adopted a strong position on the need to create such a 
body, which reportedly influenced the decision by the oau Assembly. A se-
ries of political events (particularly human rights violations in several Afri-
can states, such as Uganda and the Central African Republic, that attracted 
global attention), as well as a concerted campaign to create an African com-
mission, led to the oau’s decision at its February 1979 summit to request that 
the secretary- general convene a meeting of experts to draft an African charter 
on human rights.35 It was here that they proposed the establishment of rele-
vant bodies for the protection of human rights in Africa.36 
By the late 1990s, the histories of various international legal mechanisms 
that cross- cut state boundaries soon seemed to offer possibilities to many 
on the African continent seeking redemption through international law. Be-
fore becoming the au, the oau sought to prosecute the crime of apartheid in 
South Africa in the 1970s. From 1948 to 1990, apartheid was an international 
crime without an international criminal court to prosecute it. However, when 
the un General Assembly classified it as a crime against humanity in 1966 and 
then the un Security Council affirmed it in 1984, the oau attempted to mo-
bilize around the establishment of an international penal court to prosecute 
the crime.37 Initially, its stakeholders had hoped that they could establish a 
criminal chamber through the African Charter of Human Rights, but they 
abandoned the effort when the possibility of establishing a un international 
penal court arose in the 1980s in order to prosecute various apartheid crimes 
on the basis of universal jurisdiction. However, with the consolidation of the 
un court with the International Law Commission’s project to establish a per-
manent independent criminal court, the apartheid offenses were eventually 
dropped from the subject matter jurisdiction of the international court proj-
ect, and instead apartheid was collapsed into crimes against humanity and es-
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tablished within a post- 2002 time limit. The result was that in order to pursue 
apartheid as a crime, state actors eventually had to enact legislation to prose-
cute individuals through universal jurisdiction.38 Ultimately, it was a political 
settlement that ended apartheid, not prosecutorial justice. 
This political solution had the effect of absolving apartheid’s perpetrators 
from decades of violence but also provided the terms for sociopolitical re-
building through legality. The violent histories that were part of South Afri-
ca’s nonjudicial settlements were not unlike the histories of Europe’s first and 
second world wars— exclusion, racism, and brute violence. But the legal solu-
tions were different. In South Africa, as in the rest of Africa, the only forms 
of violence that became legally actionable by international institutions were 
those that began after various international criminal courts gained jurisdic-
tion. For example, the fallout with international judicial forms was evident 
with the International Court of Justice’s South West Africa (now Namibia) 
case when many on the African continent lost faith in that institution. Follow-
ing Germany’s loss of territories after World War I, South Africa undertook 
the administration of South West Africa under Article 22 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations. This gave South Africa full power to administer the 
territory under the League rules. However, when the un took over the League 
of Nations in 1946, it worked to grant transitional independence status to Eu-
rope’s colonies. South Africa refused to surrender its trusteeship mandate of 
South West Africa. In 1966, Ethiopia and Liberia brought a complaint against 
South Africa’s presence in the region, and the un revoked South Africa’s man-
date; but South Africa continued to rule the region. Its attempts to admin-
ister racially segregated policies led to the development of black opposition 
to South African rule and the formation of a Namibian pro- independence 
movement known as the South West African People’s Organisation.
By 1971, the International Court of Justice issued a legal advisory opinion 
demanding that South Africa withdraw its interests from Namibia. It still re-
fused and delayed Namibian independence until 1988, when the Brazzaville 
Protocol was signed and led to the formation of a Joint Monitoring Com-
mission with the Soviet Union and the United States as observers. Given the 
entrenchment of a racially hierarchicalized region with flagrant uses of state 
violence with impunity, the potential for deploying international law effec-
tively waned. Here, again, the icc’s post- 2002 jurisdiction prevented such his-
tories of violence from being legally actionable. Instead, European universal 
jurisdiction requests lingered, with various activists concerned with violence 
being perpetrated by various African postindependence leaders. 
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Keeping these tensions in mind as part of the emotional frameworks of ex-
pectation that shape au responses to the icc, alongside the au’s refusal to co-
operate with growing icc- Africa indictments, I now seek to clarify the newly 
unfolding au structure in relation to the way that emotional, cultural, Pan- 
Africanist sensibilities are being deployed to propel new au agendas. By the 
end of 2013, the au popularization movement had reached its height, yet it 
was also mired in contestation. For while Equatorial Guinea’s Press and Infor-
mation Office reported that the campaign was meant to emphasize the auton-
omy of Africans and their ability to take charge of their destiny, the irony was 
that many ngos complained that the “I am African” campaign was part of a 
moment of au retooling in which citizen participation was actually restricted, 
not expanded. These African civil society advocates complained bitterly about 
restricted access to the au; because such civil society groups were often seen 
as being funded by external donors from the West, their legitimacy as advo-
cates of African interests was constantly under attack.39
I go on to examine two processes that occurred at roughly the same time 
and influenced each other: first, the development of African governance and 
transitional justice policies, and second, the effort to expand the criminal ju-
risdiction of the African Court through the Malabo Protocol— and through 
it to clarify the larger transitional justice framework through which to opera-
tionalize commitments to peace and justice sequencing. In light of the history 
of failure around international justice in Africa, I look at what type of future 
is being imagined when the reorientation of African geographies of justice in-
vokes particular Pan- Africanist philosophical principles alongside forms of 
counterencapsulation. These reattributions bring together legal and political 
subjects through encounters in which treaties and peace and justice deals are 
created and negotiated in order to help them imagine new spaces of justice.
Pan- Africanist Justice Regimes
In its Strategic Plan of 2009–2012, the auc committed to help facilitate the 
“establishment of appropriate architecture for promotion of good governance” 
as part of its continuing work “to achieve good governance, democracy, hu-
man rights and [a] rights- based approach to development including social, 
economic, cultural and environmental rights.”40 To achieve its core objective, 
the Assembly and the Executive Council have been engaged through coor-
dinated action with one of its branches, the African Governance Architec-
ture (aga). Alongside the Assembly, the Executive Council houses African 
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leaders and key decision making.41 Both organs— the Assembly and the Ex-
ecutive Council— are served by the commission and constitute the au’s ex-
ecutive bureaucracy. The aga is the au’s institutional framework established 
to coordinate action undertaken by au organs, institutions, and the Regional 
Economic Communities (recs) to support member states in strengthening 
democracy, governance, and human rights.42 The rationale for the aga was 
that while there are several governance instruments, frameworks, and insti-
tutions at the regional, subregional, and national levels, there is little to no 
effective synergy, coordination, and harmonization among them. These insti-
tutions work mostly in silos and do not benefit adequately from each other, 
even at the level of sharing information and coordinating their activities for 
effective performance.43 As such, it is anticipated that the aga will provide the 
process and mechanism for enhancing policy dialogue, convergence, coher-
ence, and harmonization among au organs, institutions, and member states 
as a way of speeding up the integration process on the continent.44 
George Mukundi, at the time the head of the aga Secretariat, noted, “The 
aga complements the African Peace and Security Architecture (apsa), which 
addresses the au’s peace- and- security agenda. The aga and apsa were de-
signed to bring together principles of democratic governance, peace, and se-
curity as interrelated and mutually reinforcing.”45 The ultimate aim of the aga 
is to facilitate “the convergence of governance policies, programmes, [and] 
processes,” such as reinforcing the capacity of au organs and enhancing co-
ordination among them to support members states to strengthen democracy 
and governance; undertaking action to enhance popular participation in gov-
ernance and democratic processes across the continent; researching and dis-
seminating information relating to governance, democracy, and human rights 
across the continent; and implementing shared African values as well as deci-
sions and recommendations of various au organs and institutions. 
Differently articulated, the aga processes can be seen as providing pre-
ventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building, sanctions, 
transitional justice mechanisms, protection of human rights (commissions 
of inquiry and fact- finding missions), and humanitarian intervention. The 
aga is an evolving mechanism composed of three principal pillars: a vision 
and agenda; organs and institutions; and mechanisms or processes of inter-
action among au organs and institutions with a formal mandate in gover-
nance, democracy, and human rights.46 The African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights is one of the institutions critical to the second pillar, which 
will give operational expression to the vision for African governance.47 Sim-
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ilarly, the acjhr can be viewed as a key institution charged with promoting 
democracy, governance, and human rights in Africa at a regional and conti-
nental level. These components are expected to lead to fully functioning po-
litical action.48
In May 2009, the au- commissioned Panel of the Wise presented a report 
titled “Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation in Africa: Opportunities and Chal-
lenges in the Fight against Impunity.” The panel is a diplomatic instrument for 
dealing with violence in Africa, consisting of five members chosen from west-
ern, eastern, northern, southern, and central regions of Africa— two former 
presidents of African countries, a president of a national constitutional court, 
a former secretary of the oau, and a head of an independent electoral com-
mission. The detailed report recommended the formation of a Transitional 
Justice Policy Framework for Africa, which included a range of strategies for 
dealing with mass violence in Africa. The goal was for au member states to 
work toward the establishment of measures that would ensure the protection 
of those victimized by violence throughout the African continent. As stated 
in the report, “Justice, peace, good governance, and reconciliation . . .  thrive 
where sturdy and stable democratic values and impulses prevail, and where 
there is a culture of constitutionalism to constrain arbitrariness and abuse of 
power.”49 The report stressed that the approach taken in Africa should involve 
the articulation of common values around the protection of human rights and 
the development of an institutional architecture with transitional justice at its 
core. Transitional justice consists of both judicial and nonjudicial measures 
address the afterlife of human rights violence.
As noted in chapter 1, central to the Panel of the Wise’s recommended strat-
egies is the balancing of various forms of judicial accountability with transi-
tional justice goals, as well as sequencing diplomatic, nonjudicial approaches 
with judicial ones. Recommended strategies included (1) transitional justice 
and various forms of judicial accountability; (2) balancing of transitional jus-
tice goals; and (3) sequencing of these strategies with the presumption that 
the au and various political and legal actors should play leadership roles in 
the articulation of an African transitional justice framework. What is critical 
here is that sequencing as a core strategy speaks to the place of temporality in 
how justice is conceived by its stakeholders. It works contrary to the princi-
ples of the anti- impunity movement’s temporality of the now and its singular 
concern with judicial accountability. From the violence of traditional empires 
to colonial imperial rule to contemporary postcolonial struggles, the recom-
mendations of the Panel of the Wise highlighted the history of violence in Af-
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rica and its resolve to use politically relevant solutions to address it, even as 
transnational institutions seek to carve out new domains of territorial, legal, 
and social reordering.
African- Led Transitional Justice: Peace and Justice Sequencing
Best seen through a set of radically shifting frameworks through which to re-
think our approaches to justice, the au Transitional Justice Policy Framework 
presumes the importance of an interrelated justice architecture that includes 
economic justice, political justice (entailed in constitutional and other legal 
reforms), and justice for crimes committed from the perspective of criminal 
and reparative justice.50 Today, the au Transitional Justice Framework under 
development is seen as a viable approach to applying sequencing strategies, 
with several options for determining which au organs can take action to pro-
tect human rights. Its actors see the framework not only as a mechanism for 
establishing the norms and modalities for state responsibility to its citizens, 
but also for assisting state actors in recognizing and implementing their ob-
ligations. These obligations are not simply to protect those victimized by vi-
olence using judicial accountability mechanisms after the fact; they exist to 
address societies traumatized by various inequalities, such as what we saw in 
chapters 1 and 2 in Kenya, or chapter 3 in Nigeria with Boko Haram.
New international judicial mechanisms, such as the African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights, have also been designed to implement practices 
that can help to manage violence strategically. Such forms of action might, 
at times, exceed judicial accountability but involve other modes of action 
that are seen as involving preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, 
peace building, sanctions, transitional justice mechanisms, protection of hu-
man rights (commissions of inquiry and fact- finding missions), and humani-
tarian intervention. These strategies include a range of biopolitical approaches 
that include redistributive politics, the building of respect for institutions and 
rules that constrain leaders and make them accountable to their constituen-
cies, and relevant steps deployed for domesticating, monitoring, implement-
ing, and pursuing judicial mechanisms. 
Since its transformation from the oau, the au (and its components de-
scribed above) has demonstrated a growing capacity to resolve conflicts 
around the continent using particular peace and justice sequencing strategies. 
In 2002 the au implemented its first peacekeeping mission in Burundi with 
the African Mission in Burundi.51 Since then, it has tried to establish itself as 
the intracontinental governing body that will attempt to de- escalate conflicts, 
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monitor ceasefires, or negotiate power- sharing agreements following the ces-
sation of hostilities. After the deployment in Burundi, the au fielded a num-
ber of missions, including African Union Mission in Sudan, au Mission for 
Support to the Elections in the Comoros, au Mission in Somalia, au Electoral 
and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros, au Military Observer Mis-
sion in the Comoros, United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur, the 
African- led International Support Mission in Mali, and the African- led Inter-
national Support Mission to the Central African Republic, which transformed 
into the un Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission to the Central 
African Republic.52
From the violence of traditional empires, to colonial imperial rule, to con-
temporary postcolonial struggles, the recommendations of the Panel of the 
Wise highlighted a resolve to continue using politically relevant solutions 
to address violence in Africa even as transnational institutions seek to carve 
out new domains of territorial, legal, and social reordering. Since the report’s 
release, there have been a series of consultations to create a comprehensive 
strategy to go beyond the establishment of norms and address problems of in-
equality in Africa. The African Union has innovated a strategy of peace and 
justice sequencing that accommodates a limited function for the icc while 
asserting the primacy of African states and institutions in the larger project 
of creating justice and peace. This approach allows for significant nationally 
driven, postviolence closure toward the establishment of peace. Courts, as 
tools available to political actors such as the au, can be used to intervene in 
conflict situations by prosecuting a small number of perpetrators, but they 
play only a limited role in contributing to the reestablishment of peace, sta-
bility, and reconciliation. Key here is the implementation of various strategies 
that do not involve immediately pursuing judicial action before the end of 
hostilities. One might consider the strategy of using a commission of inquiry 
as one of a range of sequenced strategies for brokering peace. 
The response to violence committed in the ongoing conflict in South Su-
dan is one example that highlights how the au’s attempts differ from the icc’s 
approach to the case, as I discussed in chapter 1. Instead, for the first time in its 
history, in 2013, the au formed a Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan that 
was charged with investigating, documenting, reporting, and recommending 
solutions for peace through diplomacy and negotiations.53 Some five years 
later, in 2018, the au, with the financial support of the US government, began 
to set up the Hybrid Court of South Sudan. This court is provided for under 
chapter V(3) of the agreement reached by the South Sudanese parties as an 
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African- led and African- owned legal mechanism to investigate and prosecute 
individuals bearing responsibility for violations of international law and ap-
plicable South Sudanese law committed between December 15, 2013, and the 
end of the transitional period.54 It is to be expected that the Assembly and the 
Peace and Security Council (psc) will establish such commissions of inquiry 
in the future before triggering the jurisdiction of the African Criminal Court. 
In a previous situation called an unconstitutional change of government in 
Guinea, the psc had endorsed an earlier call by the Economic Community of 
West African States (ecowas) for the establishment of an international com-
mission of inquiry to probe the killing of civilians on October 28, 2009.55 
Following ecowas’s request, the un subsequently established such a commis-
sion, which rendered its report on January 13, 2010, in which it concluded that 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity had 
been committed.56 Guinea has since been under preliminary examination by 
the otp at the icc.57 
Humanitarian intervention is seen as another option on the continuum 
ranging from diplomacy to military intervention in response to human rights 
violations. The conflict in Libya provides a different example. On March 17, 
2011, the un authorized military intervention in Libya to protect the coun-
try’s civilians as a result of violence between Libyan government forces and 
domestic opponents that had erupted the previous month. Two days after the 
authorization, nato initiated the intervention, including establishing a no- fly 
zone and launching aerial attacks on government forces. In October 2011, af-
ter seven months, Libyan rebel forces conquered the country and killed the 
former authoritarian ruler, Muammar al- Qaddafi. Western media and pol-
iticians praised the intervention as a humanitarian success for averting a 
bloodbath in Libya’s second largest city, Benghazi, and replacing Qaddafi’s 
dictatorial regime with a transitional council pledged to democracy.58 
Some would say that nato succeeded in Libya. They say it almost certainly 
saved tens of thousands of lives. It conducted an air campaign of unparalleled 
precision, which, though not perfect, was seen by some as greatly minimizing 
collateral damage. It enabled the Libyan opposition to overthrow one of the 
world’s longest- ruling dictators. And it accomplished all of this without a sin-
gle allied casualty and at a cost— $1.1 billion for the United States and several 
billion dollars overall— that was a fraction of that spent on previous interven-
tions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.59 Indeed, many experts now cite 
Libya as a model for implementing the humanitarian principle of responsibil-
ity to protect.60 However, such arguments are also seen by some African lead-
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ers as not providing a full and accurate account of events. There are convincing 
arguments that the violence was actually initiated by protesters and that Qad-
dafi’s government responded to the rebels militarily but never intentionally tar-
geted civilians or resorted to indiscriminate force, as Western media claimed.61 
Scholars like Alan Kuperman argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong in 
asserting that nato’s main goal in Libya was to protect civilians.62 Rather, evi-
dence shows that nato’s primary aim was to overthrow Qaddafi’s regime, even 
at the expense of increasing the harm to Libyans.63 The biggest misconception 
about nato’s intervention, according to Kuperman, is that it saved lives and 
benefited Libya and its neighbors. In reality, when nato intervened in mid- 
March 2011, Qaddafi already had regained control of most of Libya, while the 
rebels were retreating rapidly toward Egypt. Thus, the conflict was about to 
end, barely six weeks after it started, at a toll of about a thousand dead, includ-
ing soldiers, rebels, and civilians caught in the crossfire. By intervening, nato 
enabled the rebels to resume their attack, which prolonged the war for another 
seven months and caused at least seven thousand more deaths.64
In considering these complex political dynamics in relation to disagree-
ments over how African violence is to be managed, it should not be a surprise 
that affects and emotional manifestations have been operative in shaping how 
people position themselves and in what regimes of expression they engage. 
In reflecting on constituencies who were against nato intervention in Libya, 
they argue that in the midst of the civil war, in June 2011, the icc prosecutor 
brought an indictment against Muammar Qaddafi and two top deputies and 
that this action reflected the usual Western imperialist interventions.65 In sup-
porting such claims, Robert Mnookin argued that the indictment of Qaddafi 
in the middle of a civil war was a mistake because it precluded diplomatic op-
tions that might have ended the bloodshed earlier, and it hampered the West’s 
ability to offer Qaddafi exile in order to end the conflict.66 In contrast, human 
rights organizations applauded the prosecutor’s actions for underscoring, in 
their opinion, that dictators could now be held legally accountable under the 
Rome Statute, and the indictments bolstered the rebels’ morale.
People’s emotionally charged pushback against the nato intervention in-
sisted that the indictments may have cut off certain routes to a negotiated 
solution and an earlier end to the conflict. As early as March 3, 2011, two weeks 
into the violence, Qaddafi embraced Venezuela’s offer of mediation, and on 
April 11, Qaddafi accepted the au proposal for an immediate ceasefire to be 
followed by a national dialogue. The rebels refused to consider a ceasefire un-
til Qaddafi left power.67 In this regard, scholars like Kuperman maintain that 
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it is impossible to know if Qaddafi would have honored a ceasefire or the 
promise to negotiate a political transition; however, if nato had sought pri-
marily to protect civilians, it would have conditioned its aid to the rebels on 
their sincerely exploring the regime’s offers. There is no evidence that nato 
ever sought to use its leverage in this manner.68 
There is evidence to suggest, however, that nato’s approach to the situa-
tion in Libya further strained the relationship between the au and institutions 
perceived as Western, such as nato and the icc. Yet, although the nato op-
eration in Libya was legalized by the unsc resolutions, the organization’s pre-
vious involvement in other conflicts in Africa, such as Darfur and Somalia, 
had been predicated on requests made by the au.69 Since the Darfur crisis in 
2005, the principle of au request has become the norm in au- nato coopera-
tion on Africa’s peace and security issues, and for the first time, nato’s inter-
vention in Libya was not based on an au request.70 The different approaches 
adopted by the au and nato with regard to the Libyan crisis created a clash of 
positions. This was the first time that nato had engaged in actual combat in 
Africa, and yet it excluded African decision making because the au preferred 
mediation to military intervention and took a strong position on the need to 
use diplomacy to resolve the conflict.71 
Of course, the Constitutive Act of the au provides for “the right of the 
Union to intervene in a Member State . . .  in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, if it is determined 
necessary by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.”72 The au psc 
is to be guided by, among other principles, humanitarian intervention in the 
circumstances mentioned above.73 However, there is lack of precision on the 
scope of the principle of humanitarian intervention, and African state agents 
have wanted to claim responsibility for the management of violence on their 
own terms.
These sociopolitical dynamics highlight more instances in which contem-
porary interventions are seen as resembling colonial and imperialist action 
and are not unrelated to the form that embodied responses to icc indictments 
take. For example, the chair of the auc, Jean Ping, argued, “Some interna-
tional players seem to be denying Africa any significant role in the search for 
a solution to the Libya conflict” and vowed that “Africa is not going to be re-
duced to the status of an observer of its own calamities.”74 Even if the au and 
nato could not have reached consensus, some argue that a middle- ground 
approach relying on limited use of force and intensive diplomacy may have 
fostered a closer collaboration between the au and nato.75 
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As the above example illustrates, emotionally propelled forms of reattri-
bution emerged from a sense that reliance on criminal prosecution as the 
main or sole response to conflict is at best inadequate. Such conflict- laden re-
sponses led African states to take action against prosecutorial indictments in 
the midst of au peace talks. In 2013, the au proposed an amendment to Arti-
cle 54 of the Rome Statute, which refers to the duties and powers of the pros-
ecutor as it relates to investigations, so that certain otp decisions could be 
subjected to a decision- making process.76 This led to disagreements between 
icc and au agents, particularly in relation to the situation in Sudan.77 These 
contexts on the African continent clearly point to how various au stakehold-
ers felt a need to pursue action beyond the prosecution of crimes to address 
economic justice and political justice, and to approach individual perpetra-
tors with an eye toward reparative as well as criminal justice, when sequenced 
appropriately.78 
The official report from the au High- Level Panel on Darfur has stated that 
“an outcome which would promote national justice and reconciliation pro-
ceedings is . . .  required. . . .  Criminal justice will play an important role, but 
not an exclusive one, and must be underpinned by procedures that allow for 
meaningful participation of victims, as well as reparations and other acts of 
conciliation. Within the criminal justice system, the investigations, prosecu-
tions, defence and judiciary must work in tandem, or in smooth sequence. 
Weaknesses in any one element of the criminal justice process would under-
mine the prospects of a successful outcome.”79 
This report goes on to propose a hybrid court that fuses domestic and in-
ternational criminal justice procedures and that works in collaboration with 
complementary domestic alternative justice mechanisms that may function in 
tandem with various prosecutions— including the icc when necessary. This 
approach acknowledges that different institutions and processes have their 
own distinct roles to play, but need to coordinate and cooperate to achieve the 
best overall results for peace and justice. Various transitional justice measures 
underway that have involved truth and reconciliation commissions or institu-
tional reform, including bottom- up traditional or “ethno- justice” approaches, 
have provided scaffolding for the way that au and other transitional justice 
actors are pursuing strategies in the face of anti- impunity constraints.80 The 
strategy includes a compilation of transitional justice goals that are embedded 
in a sequenced temporality relevant to the political foundations of African vi-
olence. These strategies speak to the realization that addressing the deep roots 
of violence in Africa requires more than just judicial accountability. It empha-
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sizes the need for institutional restructuring as key to the foundations of in-
equality in Africa. 
Now, the passage of the Malabo Protocol in 2014— and the effort to ex-
tend the criminal jurisdiction of the African Court and bring it into force— 
 has raised a new set of issues related to how to address the interplay between 
various peace and justice dilemmas in postviolence contexts. This involves 
conceptualizing the African Court as one aspect of a wider institutional 
framework for enhancing human rights, accountability, democracy, and ac-
cess to justice on the continent as whole. One way to conceptualize this is 
through the recognition that au actors are deploying Pan- African discourses 
strategically to put in place a differentiated approach to justice that involves 
the creation of an institutional framework designed to strengthen coordina-
tion and collaboration among existing institutions at regional, subregional, 
and national levels.81 This differentiated approach involves the shaping of sev-
eral transitional justice principles relevant to the African context.82 These in-
clude the urgency to pursue peace through inclusive negotiations, rather than 
through force or military struggles; the suspension of hostilities and protec-
tion of civilians to provide enabling conditions for participation in dialogue 
and the search for meaningful peace and justice; and, importantly from the 
perspective of the African Court, a broader understanding of justice to en-
compass processes of achieving healing, equality, reconciliation, obtaining 
compensation and restitution, and establishing the rule of law.83 
By defining transitional justice to include a range of processes and mech-
anisms associated with mitigating conflict, ensuring accountability, and pro-
moting justice, the framework proposes a definition that goes beyond current 
understandings of transitional justice. This broadening includes the consoli-
dation of peace, reconciliation, and justice in Africa. The list is voluminous, 
ranging from activities involving the preventing of impunity, helping end re-
pressive rule and conflicts, nurturing sustainable peace with development, 
social justice, human and peoples’ rights, democratic rule, and good gov-
ernance. Other activities involve drawing lessons from various experiences 
across Africa in articulating a set of common concepts and principles to con-
stitute a reference point for developing and strengthening peace agreements 
and transitional justice institutions and initiatives in Africa, as well as devel-
oping au benchmarks for assessing compliance with the need to combat im-
punity. With these priorities in mind, it is possible to situate mechanisms such 
as the African Court and the aga within the framework of African solutions 
to African problems, and to see these structures not simply as an example of 
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the spread and expansion of prosecutorial justice norms but as integral to 
a continent- wide transitional justice approach and process aimed at dealing 
with past conflicts and securing sustainable forms of justice going forward.
Mobilizing Institutional Values: The Malabo Protocol for the African Court
The Pan- Africanist “Silencing the Guns” and the “I am African, I am the Af-
rican Union” campaigns were both launched during and after the African 
Union’s fiftieth anniversary, at the same time as the African Court’s Malabo 
Protocol was being debated and negotiated. The strategies around the celebra-
tion of the fiftieth anniversary of the oau/ au point to the way that the mes-
sage of an African renaissance is mobilizing present action. This celebration 
provided its stakeholders with the opportunity to reflect on Africa’s history 
and its struggles against decolonization in order to create the terms for a new 
political, social, economic, and legal platform in a changing world. As noted 
in the “Report on the Preparations for the Commemoration of the 50th An-
niversary of the oau/ au”: 
The oau has served its time with distinction and tribute is hereby paid to 
the founders and the vision they pursued with unity. Its greatest success 
was in relation to decolonization. . . .  The most important achievement of 
the oau is definitely the liberation of several of its Member States from the 
yoke of colonialism. At its foundation, only 32 countries were independent 
and many others were still under foreign domination. Through its Libera-
tion Committee operating from Dar es Salaam since its creation, the oau 
has rendered decisive support to Liberation Movements from countries 
that were still dominated by foreign powers and helped in the attainment 
of their independence.84 
The shadows of past Pan- Africanist movements were embodied in the au’s 
slogans and invoked principles. Remnants of past anticolonial Pan- Africanist 
movements are uneasily present, always disappearing and reappearing in 
au declarations and slogans. While the Pan- Africanism of the past was cen-
trally concerned with resistance against the European enemy, today, the fight 
against this articulated yoke of imperial power is less evident. In its struggle to 
consolidate Africa’s diverse past, the new au Pan- Africanism being mobilized 
in the twenty- first century is desperately committed to economic and politi-
cal power in African terms, but represents the afterlife of struggle against an 
obvious colonial oppression. 
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As noted in the words and speeches of African leaders pushing back against 
icc indictments, today the enemy is seen in the very international system in 
which African states are embedded. Thus, the campaigns that are launched to 
highlight membership in Africa’s past and a shared reorientation of its future 
demonstrate how African political decision makers engage discursive strate-
gies that account for this presence and absence of power. And where there is 
a force constructed as non- African and external, such as the icc court indict-
ments, the politics of Pan- Africanism are mobilized to turn inward to facili-
tate the management of some of the most extreme forms of Africa’s violence 
on its own terms— within African geographies. The au’s proposal to extend 
the criminal jurisdiction of the African Court represents an example of this.
As I have been arguing throughout this book, the rise in prosecutorial jus-
tice is unfolding within international rule of law assemblages fueled by em-
bodied affects and, therefore, the affective work that produces or unravels 
these justice projects matters. The journey to establishing the Malabo Proto-
col for the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights is part of 
a long, complex journey that has taken and continues to take many years; and 
each of the three sections of the court— general jurisdiction, human rights, 
and international criminal law— has a separate history that predates the pro-
cess of vesting the court with both general and international criminal law ju-
risdiction.85 As I recounted in the previous section, with the transition from 
the oau to the au in 2000, several organs were created by the au Constitutive 
Act, among them the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)
and the African Court of Justice, both precursors to the African Court of Jus-
tice and Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The African Court of Justice (acj) was envisioned in the constitutive act 
to be the principal judicial organ of the au. It was seen as a body with juris-
diction over general international law disputes. The protocol establishing the 
acj was adopted in 2003, and eighteen African states subsequently ratified the 
protocol, with the effect of bringing the protocol into force.86 However, its for-
mation was superseded by a decision to merge the acj with the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established in 2004 
and became operational in 2008. At the time of this writing, the court sits in 
Arusha, Tanzania, and has jurisdiction over the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and other human rights instruments that were ratified by 
the relevant states.87 Since 2008, twenty- three applications for hearings have 
been brought before the achpr with only two judgments being delivered, 
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which continued to raise questions about its effectiveness.88 This led to the 
push to establish an African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights 
which was motivated, in part, by the desire to establish a judicial mechanism 
in Africa with not only the ability to function with authority with binding ef-
fect, but with international criminal jurisdiction. The eventual proposal to 
merge the African Court of Justice with the human rights court was propelled 
by the need to strengthen the African human rights system by enhancing its 
capacity to engender positive responses from states through binding deci-
sions, given that the decisions of the achpr are mere recommendations. This 
was driven by the eruption of the contentious debate in 2008 on universal ju-
risdiction following the indictment of Rwandese officials by courts in France 
and Spain, coupled with the controversy over the icc’s indictment of Pres-
ident al- Bashir in 2009. These developments complicated the path to rati-
fication of the African Court of Justice, and the application of technocratic 
lawmaking was redirected to the expansion of its jurisdiction.
By this time, the African Court on Human Rights that had been inau-
gurated in 2006 was engaged in setting up its structures and negotiating a 
working relationship with the African Commission. During the meeting of 
experts, ministers of justice, and attorneys general held at the au headquar-
ters in Addis Ababa in April 2008, the merger protocol known as the Proto-
col on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights was considered and 
approved— also taking into account the need for cost- cutting measures. Then 
the au Assembly adopted the Protocol of the Merged Court at its Sixth Or-
dinary Session in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, in July 2008 and urged member 
states to proceed with speedy ratification.89
Within months of the adoption of the protocol establishing the merged 
court, and certainly before the merged court could come into force, the As-
sembly of Heads of State and Government, during its Twelfth Ordinary 
Session, held February 1–3, 2009, in Addis Ababa, requested the auc (Secre-
tariat), in consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, to examine 
the implications of the court being empowered to adjudicate international 
crimes. Thus, at the close of its Thirteenth Ordinary Session in Sirte, Libya, in 
July 2009, various African leaders urged the au Assembly to speed up the pro-
cess and to aim for “early implementation” of its February decision.90 
However, in late 2009, the Office of the au Legal Counsel commissioned the 
Pan African Lawyers Union (palu) to prepare a draft protocol on the African 
Court of Justice, Human Rights, and Criminal Justice. The draft was subject to 
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a series of reviews and discussions over the next five years, culminating in the 
July 2014 adoption of what is often called the “Malabo Protocol for the African 
Court” (because it was adopted in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea). As a move fol-
lowing the au’s renewed commitment to Pan- Africanism and a more African- 
centered dispensation of judicial decisions, the protocol amends the merger 
protocol to add a third jurisdictional chamber— the international criminal law 
chamber— and also proposes other substantive changes, including renaming 
the court the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights.91
As I noted above, these developments unfolded alongside the au’s assess-
ment of the deeply political nature of violence in Africa and the need to hone 
a range of tools not only to address them but to gain legal authority to manage 
them. And the development of an African court that includes criminal juris-
diction is one prong of the strategy, for it attempts to shift the understanding 
of the nature of violence by broadening the crimes of concern to Africa to in-
clude economic crimes and the modes of liability for perpetrators of such vi-
olence to include corporations.
In 2009, the palu submitted the first draft to allow the African Court to 
adjudicate international crimes committed in Africa or against Africans. Well 
aware of the play of international politics, and in response to Africa’s realities, 
the palu, under the leadership of Donald Deya, drafted the protocol for the 
criminal jurisdiction of the African Court, including fifteen crimes in the first 
draft because they were seen as key drivers of violence that reflect the core 
challenges of African social realities.92 The protocol also considered forms of 
conduct and modes of liability as well as corporate criminal responsibility for 
international crimes, introduced following the perceived failure of the icc to 
address it in the Rome Statute for the icc. 
As the story is often told in the icc context, France was credited for pro-
posing that the definition of responsibility for the crimes under its jurisdic-
tion should also include responsibility over “juridical persons,” defined as the 
“corporation whose concrete, real or dominant objective is seeking private 
profit or benefit.”93 Accordingly, there were significant disagreements in Rome 
over this proposal and inadequate time during the negotiations to secure its 
inclusion. That the drafters of the Malabo Protocol for the African Court re-
turned to matters of criminal corporate responsibility highlights their interest 
in making the connection between the commission of economic crimes and 
the responsibility of corporate actors who are seen as also contributing to or 
enabling some of the most violent crimes of our times. In reflecting on this is-
sue, one of the key drafters shared with me the following reflections:
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Frankly, this was simply about developing a legal strategy. We wanted to 
figure out how to return to some of the basic principles agreed to already in 
treaties and agreements previously signed by African states. This involved 
figuring out how to capture all of the relevant crimes. We asked ourselves, 
what are the various modalities on the continent? And the answer we kept 
on coming up with was that there should be many enforcement mecha-
nisms operative. . . .  We needed to make those buggers [take] responsibility 
for their part in Africa’s violence. 
When I asked him whether this was a revolutionary intervention, he answered, 
It’s not about sixteenth- to- eighteenth- century colonialism, no. But I guess 
you can say that this is [a] Pan- Africanist vision that is tied to who we are. 
I see it as creating possibilities in modern Africa. . . .  We did have the sense 
of how we are going to contribute to creating an Africa that can build it-
self and take care of itself. I know about the international system and it has 
a role. But if you look strictly at the constitutional issues in Africa and the 
need to rebuild state and juridical capacities, the mission connected to this 
work is all the more important. We saw ourselves as enabling Africa and 
Africans with a strong legal instrument relevant to the continent. 
Later, in reflecting on how it might be done in terms relevant to African re-
alities, he added, “We needed an African governance architecture for the treaty 
just like we need other international provisions, or various annual democracy 
assessments that could be used to make this instrument relevant to our needs. 
We were committed to that— making sure that the vision matched the African 
architecture underway. . . .  This is important because of how much the conti-
nent has suffered and how much we have misunderstood its suffering.”
Here we see the drafter’s vision of the African Court’s Malabo Protocol 
for the new court as being both a response to African inequalities and an ex-
pression of the ambitions to make a difference on the African continent in 
ways that international law has been ineffective. The structure and logic of the 
crimes replicate the logic of those seen in the Rome Statute for the icc, but 
what is important is that the geographical location is in Africa and not Europe 
and that the aspirations reflect the inclusion of crimes that are seen as enabling 
violence as well as the culpability of corporate actors in contributing to Afri-
ca’s violence. As such, the palu draft of the Malabo Protocol and the resultant 
design of an African Court should be understood in relation to the affective 
terrain that was also unfolding at that time and that eventually led to the in-
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stitutionalization of particular emotional sensibilities about the icc as a neo-
colonial institution that was targeting Africans and not necessarily addressing 
the core foundations of violence. As noted in earlier chapters, the controversy 
revolved around the icc prosecutor’s indictment of President al- Bashir of Su-
dan on two charges of war crimes and three charges of crimes against human-
ity in May 2008.94 The first arrest warrant was issued on March 4, 2009, while 
the second, relating to the crime of genocide, was issued on July 12, 2010. It was 
connected to au actors’ emotional responses to the refusal of the icc to suc-
cumb to au pressure not to proceed in issuing arrest warrants that have the 
potential to result in regime change. In its February 2009 decision, the au had 
argued for an “accommodation” to allow the continental body more time to 
find a negotiated solution to the armed conflict in Darfur, cautioning that these 
efforts could be undermined by the indictment of President al- Bashir.95 In this 
regard, the au Assembly at its summit in Sirte, July 1–3, 2009, “expressed its 
deep concern at the indictment issued by the Pre- Trial Chamber of the icc” 
against al- Bashir.96 In its view, the indictment had prejudiced its efforts to find 
peace in Darfur. It noted, with grave concern, “the unfortunate consequences 
that the indictment has had on the delicate peace processes underway in The 
Sudan and the fact that it continues to undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at 
facilitating the early resolution of the conflict in Darfur.”97
It is also clear from the Sirte decision that the au’s concerns over the 
al- Bashir indictment directly influenced its decision to call on relevant au or-
gans to speed up work on its request made in February 2009 to investigate the 
prospects of vesting the acjhr with a criminal mandate. This is when experts 
were asked to construct a draft proposal to merge the African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights with the African Court of Justice (in Arusha, Tan-
zania), thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the African Court to include 
criminal matters. But, as the trial of Hissène Habré illustrates, anti- impunity 
frameworks are taking shaping in African geographies of justice as well; emo-
tional regimes that make prosecutorial justice viable are operating alongside a 
range of other complexities related to the management of violence in Africa.
A Broader Bid for African Justice 
Human rights organizations have popularly dubbed Hissène Habré Africa’s 
Pinochet because of the widespread human rights abuses that he commit-
ted from 1982 to 1990. When the European Parliament demanded that Sen-
egal, where Habré had been in exile for seventeen years, extradite him to 
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Belgium for trial, Senegal refused.98 The realization that former heads of state 
and high- ranking leaders could be tried by a domestic court in Europe ig-
nited feelings of anger throughout predominantly African diplomatic circles. 
By 2006, the au’s institutional affects led to a united call on Senegal to prose-
cute Habré. There was a profound insistence that it was not just the “victims” 
of violence in need of justice but additionally, Africa’s reputation that was in 
need of Habré’s extradition and adjudication. In response to the expressed Eu-
ropean interests, the au began to take action to address Habré’s order of ex-
tradition by establishing a court at the Palais de Justice de Dakar to adjudicate 
the case against him. This example of an African international trial led by the 
African Union highlights the working of institutional affects in the shaping of 
political actions. But it also illustrates the limits of an approach that focuses 
on individual culpability, even when carried out on African soil. 
The Directorate of Documentation and Security (dds), which was directly 
attached to the Office of the President, was a principal organ of repression and 
terror in Chad, and this institutional monster was a product of a widespread 
mechanism of dictatorial governance that Western states also created.99 The 
5.2 The Palais de Justice de Dakar, location of the trial of former president 
Hissène Habré.
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court found that Habré used the dds, which distinguished itself through 
its cruel deployments of all kinds of torture, to manage state security after 
he seized power.100 With the reality of oil and prospects of a pipeline at the 
heart of Chad’s development, Habré’s dominance in the region was enabled 
through Western attempts to stave off Libyan interests in Chad’s oil.101 Tes-
timony during the trial revealed that the dds was propped up by a range of 
countries— Zaire, Iraq, France, and Egypt, with the United States in the lead. 
The United States is known to have contributed to the training, support, and 
growth of the dds. With additional support from the other states, they all 
provided cooperation and training for the dds up until Habré’s departure in 
1990.102 The dds was trained to arrest, terrorize, and squash all those who ei-
ther threatened Habré’s military regime or refused to participate in the Na-
tional Union for Independence and Revolution— the state party created in 
1984 to promote Habré’s rule. Through the direction of the president and the 
party, the dds spread fear in the Chadian people by arresting, interrogating, 
and torturing large numbers of the population. 
These techniques of governance reflected the vulnerabilities of the post-
colonial African state. But, as my interlocutors made clear, it also reflected 
something far more insidious about the problem with the individualization 
of criminal responsibility and celebration of the indictment of a single former 
leader. What they expressed is that while the Habré trial makes a statement 
about Africa’s willingness to fight brutality by making one man criminally 
responsible, it says very little about how to address impunity through its 
widespread institutional forms. This example shows us about the feeling re-
gimes that are operative is that the anti- impunity sentiments within the in-
ternational criminal law assemblage operates within domains that are seen 
as negating the relevance of history and politics in shaping how we attribute 
culpability.
However, another arena of action that both responds to these erasures and 
reflects these African geographies of justice is the expansion of the criminal 
jurisdiction of the African Court to include a range of political and economic 
crimes that are seen as enablers of violence. Of course, the Malabo Protocol 
includes familiar provisions. The subject matter jurisdiction includes all of 
the Rome Statute crimes; the logic and organization of the court is to be com-
plementary to national courts; it is imagined as coexisting with other inter-
national courts; and rather than having mandates and jurisdictions similar to 
African national courts, it will take effect if states are unable and unwilling to 
act. The drafters saw the maintenance of the corpus of the current structure 
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of international legal norms as a way to ease any problems with intelligibility 
that may emerge. But what is explicit and distinctly different is that the Ma-
labo Protocol for the acjhr is seen as a mechanism for facilitating the end of 
violence in Africa using a Pan- African vision and an expansion of the crimes 
and modes of liability specifically relevant to the region. 
Working alongside multiple legal and political actors and in concert with 
those engaged in transitional justice, the palu drafters indicated that they 
saw this as an opportunity for African states to contribute to the making of a 
legally binding instrument. Others said that they felt that it was necessary to 
produce strong African judiciaries that allow Africans to try their own cases. 
All saw their mission as groundbreaking, as articulated by Donald Deya, the 
lead drafter, who asserted that they see the project as “creating possibilities in 
modern Africa.” This idea, which Deya expressed forcefully with conviction 
and fist waving, was followed by the statement that this is what they felt would 
contribute to “creating an Africa that can build itself and take care of itself.” 
These affective expressions reinforce the mantra of “African solutions for Af-
rican problems” that shaped the terrain within which the African Court’s own 
version of attribution is occurring. During the many meetings that I attended 
and the interviews that I conducted, these claims were punctuated by the af-
firmation that the au and African Court project are responding to the need to 
“rebuild state and juridical capacities” and the conclusion that the palu saw 
themselves as “enabling Africa and Africans with a strong legal instrument 
relevant to the continent.”
This articulation clearly highlights legality as one of many options for deal-
ing with the unique predicaments in Africa. When asked whether he felt it was 
an opportunity for leaders to evade impunity, Deya responded emphatically:
Various heads of state may have been motivated by other incentives and I 
cannot speak for them. But what I know is that this will take years to be 
operationalized. So if al- Bashir wants to use it to avoid the icc, he’ll have 
to use another route. If the Gbagbos want to use it to save their situation, 
they’ll have to look for another route. If Habré is hoping it will be used for 
his case, he’ll have to continue looking. . . .  Just the fact that this was ad-
opted in principle signals something and will force African leaders, inter-
national corporations, and others to change the way they do business in 
Africa.
The court was not designed as an escape route for current indictees by the 
icc. It was seen as a space of alternatives for the application of solutions to 
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Africa’s complex histories of structural violence— including imperial plunder 
and subsequent inequalities that demand innovative solutions. This is innova-
tive in the same way that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
in 1981, was seen as a space for the incorporation of concepts such as “the 
right to development, peoples’ rights, [and] the duties of individuals,” which 
were introduced to distinguish issues relevant to African peoples from other 
European legal principles. My interlocutors constantly reiterated that there 
was very little that was radical or revolutionary about the request to include 
crimes relevant to Africa’s violence. They pointed out that the subject matter 
crimes were already codified in the treaties and protocols of the au and of the 
rec, and were similarly central to basic crimes in international law. As one 
told me, if there was anything radical, it was the recuperative move to include 
African- specific crimes that were omitted from the Rome Statute for the icc 
because they were seen as too controversial to form the basis for widespread 
agreement among states.103 
After a range of meetings, delays, and amendments, in May 2014 a draft 
was submitted before a ministerial session of a meeting of the Specialized 
Technical Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs in Addis Ababa.104 The 
draft protocol had remained unchanged for two years until that 2014 meet-
ing, when it was revisited and adopted at the Twenty- Third Ordinary Session 
summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in July 2014. There, the Heads of State 
and Government Assembly of the au adopted a Protocol on Amendments to 
the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(the Malabo Protocol), which suggested the addition of a third section to the 
proposed African Court, which would have jurisdiction over fourteen inter-
national crimes.105 
The Malabo Protocol thus created the African Court of Justice and Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, which has three sections: general affairs, human rights, 
and international criminal law.106 The approved protocol extended the juris-
diction of the acjhr to cover individual criminal liability for serious crimes 
committed in violation of international law. It also expanded the terrain of 
punishable crimes to include new transnational offenses. This was done by in-
cluding crimes whose subject matter jurisdiction exceeded that of the Rome 
Statute— genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression— to address other more pointed political- economic crimes, such 
as piracy, mercenarism, terrorism, corruption, illicit exploitation of natu-
ral resources, money laundering, and the trafficking of drugs and hazardous 
waste. The inclusion of these crimes has implications for going beyond the 
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icc framework, often seen as insufficient for addressing criminal responsi-
bility for Africa’s violence. It represents the rectification of concessions made 
during the negotiations of the Rome Statute for the icc to eliminate those 
crimes that were seen as too controversial to include, yet for many were key to 
addressing Africa’s violence.107 
In this sense, the palu’s draft protocol to expand the criminal jurisdiction 
of the African Court should be seen as an affective Pan- African project, borne 
of colonial subjugation and contemporary inequalities tied to Africa’s place in 
the world, but structured to redefine the nature of violence in Africa as em-
bedded in multiple forces of plunder and economic inequalities and multiple 
actors ranging from individual perpetrators to leaders of multinational cor-
porations and terrorist and gang networks. And though it seems that there is 
something substantively different about the African Court, the reality is that 
it is envisioned as operating within a legal realm that is quite similar to other 
courts elsewhere. Even so, the African Court’s Malabo Protocol should be un-
derstood in relation to what Deya has called an “African ecosystem,” and what 
I articulate as within particular sociocultural and political ecologies of justice 
in the context of a range of other mechanisms through which African solu-
tions to African problems are implemented. This approach— which spans ju-
dicial and nonjudicial options, alongside sequencing considerations for when 
such strategies are applied— is an affective form of attribution that highlights 
the relevance of geographical place in legal decision making. 
Various au peace and security representatives reported to us in a press 
conference in 2013 that they had a growing disillusionment with the efficacy of 
the global security architecture and the icc. They described these disappoint-
ments as contributing factors in shaping their efforts to develop a new peace 
and security framework driven by the need to find appropriate and speedy re-
sponses to African security challenges. As Deya clarified for me during one of 
our many discussions— this time in a room with a number of colleagues who 
were engaged in the drafting process:
We see courts, especially those within the continent, as part of an eco-
system of African institutions with which African citizens and their gov-
ernments are pursuing various goals of mutual interest, including faster 
economic, social, and political development, and greater unity and inte-
gration that is based on a set of shared values. These shared values include 
a constant and consistent fight against impunity in all its manifestations; 
development of democracy, good governance, and a just rule of law; and 
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promotion and protection of human and people’s rights. These courts and 
tribunals ought to be looked at in the context of a number of mechanisms 
ranging from the African Governance Architecture, the African Human 
Rights Strategy, the African Peace and Security Architecture, and the Pro-
tocol on Relations between the African Union, and the Regional Economic 
Communities.108 
Yet, currently, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
is the only functioning tribunal. The criminal chamber is not yet active be-
cause not enough ratifications have been made to establish either the Afri-
can Court of Justice or the merged court.109 The protocol will come into force 
thirty days after its ratification by fifteen member states. However, this pro-
cess takes time, and as of April 2019 only twelve states have signed the Malabo 
Protocol, and none have ratified it.110 If it enters into force, the new protocol 
is expected to work as part of the overall African human rights system and 
protective sphere, developed over the last two decades, in which the current 
human rights organs exist. This system is expected to operate alongside the 
aga and the apsa. The current and future court has been conceptualized as 
operating within a system that includes several other institutions, which col-
lectively ensure the protection and promotion of human rights and an end to 
impunity in Africa.111 
The passage of the Malabo Protocol— and the ensuing effort to extend the 
criminal jurisdiction of the African Court and bring it into force— has raised 
a new set of issues of how to address the interplay between various dilemmas 
of peace and justice in postviolence contexts. Despite the move to expand 
the criminal jurisdiction of the African Court, the reality is that in drafting 
the protocol, au actors were more focused on the substantive crimes them-
selves and on ensuring that the prosecutor was not given too much political 
power than on centering deliberations concerning how legal provisions might 
guarantee fairness. The actual process by which this unfolded precluded open, 
public deliberations. Instead, the Malabo Protocol was expedited following 
the indictments of President al- Bashir and Kenyatta and Ruto before him. 
This is, of course, unlike the process by which the ad hoc tribunal that adju-
dicated the Habré trial unfolded. In many ways, the success of the Habré trial 
being adjudicated in Africa and, as Kristiana Powell has argued, the un’s fail-
ures in the face of some of Africa’s most profound security challenges— the 
Rwandan genocide, the genocide in Darfur, the crimes in Sierra Leone, and 
child soldiering in the Democratic Republic of the Congo— have reinforced 
214 CHAPTER 5
a desire for greater autonomy and an internal approach to peace and security 
on the continent.112 Similarly, Bruce Jones has written, “It is not entirely un- 
coincidental that the two places where we have seen the most development of 
regional options— Europe and Africa— have been the site of the un’s greatest 
failures in the 1990s.”113 
As the controversy surrounding the indictment of African leaders demon-
strated, it appears that the push to create an African criminal jurisdiction is 
explained by this perceived failure on the part of the icc as much as it is a 
search for a mechanism by which African states would exert more control 
over Africa’s future— however that might look. In this regard, palu was con-
tracted to adopt a broad and long- term approach regarding the development 
of international courts and tribunals in Africa, whether these courts function 
at a bilateral, regional, continental, or global level. Stakeholders in the au see 
the advent of the African Court with criminal jurisdiction as critical to Afri-
ca’s future. Yet what is important to note is that the deliberations that led to 
the production of the Malabo Protocol for the acjhr arose from innovations 
that prioritized diplomacy and other political action before prosecutorial ac-
tion. It is useful to consider these constructed institutional and political com-
ponents as ecologies of the broader bid for African justice. The idea of a new 
African Court with criminal jurisdiction represents the au’s attempts to craft 
new modalities of justice according to contemporary needs for Africa’s fu-
ture. In this case, the new Pan- Africanist struggle is a central component of 
the affective life of an African Court with criminal jurisdiction, envisioned as 
a way to remake justice within Africa through particular Pan- Africanist his-
tories of struggle.
African Court as a Sentimentally Pan- African Project
The existence of a treaty to erect an African Court with criminal jurisdiction 
represents a counterjudicial narrative that encompasses political concerns 
at the heart of African inequalities. The affective work related to extending 
the criminal jurisdiction of the African Court highlights the way that Afri-
can political decision makers engage strategies that account for both the pres-
ence and seeming absence of power. As shown, the presence is in its sovereign 
possibility— the assertion that power is also about its exercise, its ability to 
mobilize in one’s image. It is the potential to mobilize power and affectively 
attribute it in particular ways. Its absence is in the feelings of inequality and 
racial oppression that remain illegible before the law. The reality of former 
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Rwandan president Paul Kagame’s anger that the icc “has been put in place 
only for African countries, only for poor countries,” and that “Rwanda can-
not be part of colonialism, slavery and imperialism,” quoted in the introduc-
tion, points to the problem of inequality and its ability to define new futures. 
As an uplift strategy, the contemporary approaches to au justice are deeply 
tied to the afterlife of colonialism around which new transitional justice 
 mechanisms— relevant to African geographies— are being shaped in ways 
that reflect conceptualizations of justice writ large. The conundrum of con-
temporary au Pan- Africanism is that alongside deep- seated conceptions of 
the Pan- African liberatory past is actually a deep desire to participate in con-
temporary neoliberal power, in global power. The resistance to extradition 
and the anti- icc mobilizations are expressions of this and are connected to 
what many psychologists have been known to dismiss as externalities, or what 
political scientists have dismissed as internalities, but when the affectivities 
that shape those are combined, they are actually central to new Pan- African 
sentiments as they are imagined on the African continent.114 These affective 
geographies create ambivalences that cannot be simply understood genea-
logically and mapped out with precision. The recognition of the violence of 
marginalization operates like ghosts in the present, even as there is a dueling 
struggle to become part of that which it marginalizes.
For a time in the post- 1980s period, Pan- Africanism was seen as either 
passé or too politicized to be relevant, but as an emotively propelled dis-
course with significant political power it is being revived today with great 
moral fortitude. It has come to be revived through the specter of deep- seated 
African unity, referencing old and new ways, and as a way to make claims 
to global membership and global capitalism. With free- market capitalism 
and the entrenchment of international economic interests throughout Afri-
can economies, political contests are seen as explicitly internal. The au— as a 
supranational institution committed to ensuring the maintenance of African 
democracy, peace, and security— is now claiming to be just as committed to 
economic development. Yet the shadow of colonialism is useful for under-
standing affective justice practices as ontological and as informed by the past 
alongside the present. The call for an African renaissance is a call to reckon 
with the spirit around which Pan- Africanism became a survival strategy for 
African states. And today, the struggle being indexed is one in which Afri-
can worldviews, and Africa, are seen as being eclipsed by external agendas, 
including those that are often deployed through international human rights 
principles. This is leading to a gap between imposed structures and actual 
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lived realities transformed through their own structures of logic, and in terms 
of their own situated struggles and points of tension. In the case of African 
leaders making decisions about which crimes, when, why, who, and under 
what conditions the icc has the power to indict, Pan- Africanist frameworks 
of expectations are shaping the basis on which African states engage with icc 
anti- impunity justice formations. 
The Africa being invoked by lawyers, leaders, civil society, and everyday 
people is an Africa with long- standing and deep patronage commitments to 
discourses of anticolonial struggle, suffering, and senses of self- determination. 
What we are seeing today through au change makers’ actions, such as the de-
velopment of transitional justice and sequencing, is actually the playing out 
of a reattributive politics working toward the management of Africa’s vio-
lence on their own terms— albeit not always effectively, given the enmesh-
ment of violence within other component parts of the international justice 
assemblage. When various au stakeholders invoke Pan- Africanism as a new 
Africanist strategy, they are also pointing to domains of affective spatialized 
control in which neoliberal participation in new globalizing orders is being 
framed in Pan- African terms. It is through such articulations of African jus-
tice that we see how the African Court, as a symbol of African geographies 
(or ecologies) of justice, constitutes new feeling rules in which the prestige of 
the past is couched in Pan- Africanist historical domains through which in-
equality, racial subordination, and structural violence are being rectified. In 
this way, justice operates through emotional frameworks of expectation and is 
institutionalized through an assemblage of agents who function with particu-
lar forms of authority, desire, dispositions, and imaginaries. Through these as-
semblages, political actors function, on one hand, as what Hannah Appel calls 
individuals with unitary will, but it is through their practices through and in 
relation to the management of violence in African contexts that particular 
conceptions of justice are affectively articulated.115 Chapter 6 explores these 
articulations through various emotionally laden reattributions by the au: the 
refusal to arrest and surrender African heads of state, and the refusal to com-
ply with particular renditions of international law that are seen as not being 
in keeping with Pan- African aspirations.
CHAPTER 6
Reattributions: The Refusal to Arrest and 
Surrender African Heads of State 
In October 2016, Burundi became the first country to commence the process 
of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the icc. This move was vindicating 
for those who felt that a rectification of the all- African focus of icc cases was 
needed. But it also led to an international outcry by anti- impunity advocates. 
When the icc’s Office of the Prosecutor began to speak of launching a pre-
liminary examination into the violence that occurred in Burundi the previous 
year, Burundian leaders accused the icc of acting as an “instrument” to desta-
bilize “poor [African] countries.” Leaders also insisted that the icc’s prelim-
inary examination could contribute to “potentially negative forces and their 
cronies” committing acts of violence. “Consequently,” they noted later, “the 
government considers that maintaining Burundi as a party to the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court cannot be justified.”1
Following claims that the icc’s actions support a Western regime- change 
strategy, President Nkurunziza signed the withdrawal legislation on Tuesday, 
October 11, with overwhelming support from Burundi’s lawmakers. Later that 
week his office submitted a letter of notification to the un secretary- general, 
and according to the rules of Rome Statute withdrawal, they had to wait one 
year before the separation from icc jurisdiction was formalized. Burundi has 
now withdrawn from the icc, while in South Africa there has been an in-
terim decision to stop the withdrawal process at the time of this writing.2 Pan- 
Africanists committed to rethinking justice in terms of structural inequality 
and those who are engaged in reattributions of justice within and outside of 
African countries are celebrating this move as a welcome restorative action 
that responds to inequality in the international system.3
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The context for the icc’s investigation included the deaths of four hun-
dred people, followed by 168 more, in the capital in mid- April 2015, as well 
as the subsequent displacement of 310,000 Burundians following politically 
related violence when the president of the country attempted to amend the 
constitution and petition for a third term. Given the claims that it was the 
government’s security forces that perpetrated these acts of violence, anti- 
impunity groups have supported the icc’s investigations and have insisted 
that the only way that such acts will stop is by holding accountable those who 
bear the greatest responsibility for those crimes. The chairman of Burundi’s 
national coalition for the icc voiced similar concerns and invoked “victims” 
when he said, “This vote is a terrible setback to a country that is facing a se-
rious violent and political crisis. It comes at the very moment that thousands 
of Burundians thirst for fair, effective and independent criminal justice— as 
demonstrated by the families of victims that broke their silence and seized the 
icc when their cries for justice were ignored by the national justice system.”4
This was not a singular development. The next week, the South African 
parliament also submitted relevant paperwork to the un, notifying them of 
their decision to withdraw from the Rome Treaty, followed by an announce-
ment of Gambia’s intentions to withdraw.5 The Gambian minister charged, 
“Despite being called International Criminal Court, [it] is in fact an Interna-
tional Caucasian Court for the persecution and humiliation of people of co-
lour, especially Africans.”6
Similarly, a particular high- ranking South African government official 
complained to the media that “every person tried by the icc has been African,” 
while many other African leaders have echoed Kenyatta in claiming the icc is 
“biased against Africans.”7 Interestingly, South African officials were very early 
supporters and trailblazers of judicial accountability for mass- atrocity crimes, 
which led to the conceptualization and building of the icc. They were also the 
first to produce and implement legislation in Africa that allowed South Africa 
to incorporate the Rome Treaty into its constitution. However, South Africa’s 
clash with the court and the subsequent pushback began when President al- 
Bashir of Sudan visited the country for a summit, and the South African gov-
ernment refused to arrest him. It insisted that all heads of state were entitled to 
immunity under customary international law (cil).
A number of South African government officials reiterated the point that 
it does not want to carry out icc arrest warrants because they are basically 
“calls for regime change.” In response, anti- impunity activists declared South 
Africa’s exercise of treaty withdrawal unconstitutional and enlisted passionate 
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responses to protest this action. Invoking the figure of Nelson Mandela, ac-
tivists like William Pace, the head convener for the coalition for the icc, de-
clared, “With its history of injustice, South Africa under Nelson Mandela was 
a driving force behind the establishment of the icc. Any withdrawal from the 
Rome Statute would reverse years of human rights progress. Opposition to the 
icc has grown as it has implemented its role, mandated by 124 countries, to 
bring those most responsible for grave crimes— including high government 
officials— to justice.”8 Pace then went on, “Victims across Africa have called for 
justice time and again, either through national judicial systems or, when they 
fail, through the icc. The Zuma government is demonstrating a terrible disre-
gard for victims and the powerless in South Africa, throughout Africa and the 
world.”9 By invoking the figure of Nelson Mandela and the significance of the 
icc for survivors, Pace aligned anti- impunity agendas with the heroic figure of 
Nelson Mandela while insisting that South Africa’s participation in the icc was 
critical to the moral significance and priorities of the country.
Justice Richard Goldstone concurred: 
I am concerned and disappointed at this regrettable action by the South 
African Government. The withdrawal is quite inconsistent with the provi-
sions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, No. 27 
of 2002 and hence unconstitutional and unlawful. . . .  I am confident that a 
South African court will so rule. It is an act that is demeaning of our Par-
liament and of the people of South Africa. From a moral standpoint, it de-
tracts from the inspiring legacy of the administration of President Nelson 
Mandela that so strongly supported the icc and all of the mechanisms of 
international justice.10 
Gambia was the third African country to announce its intention to with-
draw from the Rome Statute. Its president, Yahya Jammeh, blamed the deaths 
of over five hundred Gambians (over a five- year period) on the “very danger-
ous, racist and inhuman behavior of deliberately causing boats carrying black 
Africans to sink.”11 He called for an icc investigation of the “manmade sink-
ing” or intentional capsizing of boats carrying African migrants across the 
Mediterranean Sea to Europe. In an attempt to deflect the attribution of vio-
lence from Africans to agents of European nations, he suggested, “If it is not 
done deliberately, [then] how is it possible that each time a vessel is capsizing, 
there is the Italian navy to rescue only a few people.”12
Later, President Jammeh announced, “We have a right to call the icc to 
investigate not only cases of Gambians but the case of thousands of African 
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young people who have died on the European coast under unusual circum-
stances.”13 But these expressions were then followed by retractions from the 
new Gambian president and the South African parliament. In the fall of 2016, 
Jammeh was ousted from his twenty- two- year rule of the country, and in early 
2017, he was replaced by former opposition leader President Adama Barrow, 
who subsequently overturned many of Jammeh’s policies, including the ac-
tion to withdraw from the Rome Statute for the icc.14 In South Africa, the 
constitutional court revoked President Zuma’s withdrawal notice, finding it 
“unconstitutional and invalid,” and noting that the high court should not have 
pursued the action without parliamentary approval.15 
Arguing on behalf of South Africa, South African scholar and former legal 
advisor Dire Tladi insisted that the icc position on immunity ignores the In-
ternational Court of Justice (icj) decision in Arrest Warrant, which holds that 
state officials may be prosecuted before international courts under certain cir-
cumstances.16 According to Tladi, a more fundamental problem exists with 
the au’s postulation that the immunity of state officials, whether personal or 
functional, under cil means, in essence, immunity from the jurisdiction of 
courts of foreign states.17 This immunity, he argues, is an extension of state 
immunity from the jurisdiction of other states based on the principle of sover-
eign equality of states.18 Since international tribunals such as the icc and the 
African Court are not foreign states, the rationale for immunity of states and 
their officials (i.e., the sovereign equality of states) does not apply.19 
As a multilateral treaty, the Rome Statute, by definition, is understood as 
binding only those states that ratify it.20 Accordingly, the Rome Statute is seen 
by various au advocates as not being able to “impose obligations on third 
States without their consent.” Officials of nonmember states thus normally 
retain all of their immunities even in proceedings before the icc.21 In the al- 
Bashir case, however, the icc has held that where the Security Council refers 
a situation in a nonmember state to the court, the entire Rome Statute— 
 including its immunity provision— applies to the nonmember state and that 
its officials therefore have no immunity before the icc.22 Because of this rul-
ing, the debate over whether the immunity provisions of the Rome Statute 
can be applied to nonmember states in cases before the icc highlights a rag-
ing debate, because various au officials insist that even if that interpretation 
is correct, many states, as well as the au, have argued that Article 27 only lifts 
immunities before the icc itself, and does not affect the immunities that such 
officials enjoy in domestic courts.23 Under this interpretation, cil immuni-
ties of state officials before domestic courts— recognized in the Rome Statute 
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itself— remain in place, preventing states from arresting al- Bashir, even if that 
arrest is on behalf of an international tribunal.24 In response, Sudan began ag-
gressively mobilizing au member states to weaken support for the icc in Af-
rica. The au called upon the unsc to invoke Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
to defer the icc proceedings against Bashir on the grounds that prosecuting 
the president could impede prospects for peace in the region.25 But because 
of the Article 16 trigger that gives the council the power to make a referral, 
the unsc sustained its position and failed to act on the au’s request to defer 
icc proceedings.26 As explained in the introduction, the au directed all of its 
member states to withhold cooperation from the icc in the arrest and surren-
der of al- Bashir.27
In contrast to the forms of reattribution taking place in the al- Bashir case, 
the rulings by icc judges over immunities have reflected policy positions that 
Article 27 lifts immunities not only before the icc, but also in any domes-
tic proceedings on behalf of the court, because otherwise Article 27 would 
be rendered ineffective.28 For that reason, Article 98 is seen by African states 
as not being implicated.29 Moreover, even if Article 98 applied, Sudan is re-
quired to waive any immunity it has under the terms of the Security Coun-
cil’s referral, which requires the government of Sudan to cooperate with the 
court.30 According to various icc spokespersons, there is thus no impediment 
to the arrest of a sitting head of state such as al- Bashir in a national court, and 
all state parties are expected to cooperate with the icc’s arrest and surrender 
requests.31 In refusing this position, a number of state representatives from 
mostly African countries, namely, Malawi, Chad, Kenya, Nigeria, Djibouti, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (drc), Uganda, and South Africa, as 
well as Jordan, decided not to execute the icc’s arrest and surrender order 
of Mr. al- Bashir while he was in their territory. Chad did so three times, and 
Uganda twice. These countries then submitted to the icc their reasons for 
their nonexecution of the arrest warrant, and in all six cases the icc found 
that the countries failed to comply with the cooperation request issued by the 
court with respect to the arrest and surrender of al- Bashir, violating their obli-
gation under the Rome Statute. With the exception of South Africa, the court 
referred all the other countries to the unsc and the Assembly of States Parties 
(asp) for noncompliance with the court’s request. 
At the thirteenth au summit, African states agreed to seek an advisory 
opinion from the icj on the question of head of state immunity and the re-
lationship between Articles 98 and 27, thereby seeking a decision on state 
entitlement to sovereign decision making. In spring 2018, the icc invited in-
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terested parties as well as the au to make a submission on immunity. And, 
in July 2018, the African Group in the General Assembly, led by the chair, 
Ambassador Lazarus Ombai Amayo of Kenya, requested an advisory opin-
ion of the icj on the “consequences of legal obligations of States under differ-
ent sources of international law with respect to immunities of Heads of State 
and Government and other senior officials. These issues are still underway.”32 
In keeping with ongoing disagreements over state entitlements to sovereignty 
and responsibility for international treaties, disagreements over executive ac-
tions reflect the most recent developments in the controversies that this book 
has been tracing. The response to the icc’s indictment of sitting Sudanese 
president Omar al- Bashir and continuing efforts to secure an advisory opin-
ion from the icj are examples of attributions of justice that follow a particular 
domain of logic that has a particular history and operates within complex af-
fective justice assemblages. 
The issues leading up to the withdrawal from the Rome Treaty go back to 
the 2010 summit of African heads of state when Malawian president Bingu 
wa Mutharika raised concerns about threats to state sovereignty in the con-
text of the al- Bashir case. As he said, “To subject a sovereign head of state to 
a warrant of arrest is undermining African solidarity and African peace and 
security that we fought for so many years. . . .  There is a general concern in 
Africa that the issuance of a warrant of arrest for . . .  al- Bashir, a duly elected 
president, is a violation of the principles of sovereignty guaranteed under the 
United Nations and under the African Union Charter. Maybe there are other 
ways of addressing this problem.”33
Then there are the indictments of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto of 
Kenya, detailed in chapter 4, making Kenyatta the first serving head of state to 
appear before the icc. Add to the list the June 2011 issuing of arrest warrants 
for Muammar al- Qaddafi, then president of Libya, his son Saif al- Islam Qad-
dafi, and his brother- in- law Abdullah al- Sanussi for the commission of crimes 
against humanity.34 At its July 2011 summit, the au Assembly held that the 
arrest warrants seriously complicated efforts aimed at negotiating a political 
solution to the crisis in Libya, deciding “that Member States shall not coop-
erate in the execution of the arrest warrant” against Qaddafi.35 At subsequent 
summits, assembly decisions have continued to call for solidarity among au 
member states in their opposition to the proceedings launched against al- 
Bashir, and to call on the unsc to defer the icc’s prosecutions of al- Bashir, 
Kenyatta, and Ruto under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.36
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This all led to what would be the first formal call at the October 2013 sum-
mit in Addis Ababa, by some au member states, for all signatory African states 
to collectively withdraw their membership from the Rome Statute.37 The as-
sembly also formally decided, through a declaration of nonextradition, that 
“no charges shall be commenced or continued before any International Court 
or Tribunal against any serving au Head of State or Government or anybody 
acting or entitled to act in such capacity during their term of office.”38 This 
was the first declaration by the au to institutionalize opposition to icc indict-
ments of African leaders, and it would eventually be codified in the controver-
sial Article 46A bis of the Malabo Protocol.39 But first, the initial declaration 
was followed by the introduction of reforms to the Rome Statute, especially 
relating to Article 16 (proposed by South Africa) and Article 27 (by Kenya), 
one year later at the November 2014 asp meeting. Kenya also proposed a num-
ber of other amendments— one to the preamble highlighting the recognition 
of regional bodies by the icc and another to Article 63 on trial in the presence 
of the accused. But the most controversial was the proposal to amend Arti-
cle 27, as a key aspect of the deteriorating relationship between the au and the 
icc concerns the applicability of the immunity provision under that article.
Many au agents approach Article 27 of the icc statute as a treaty whose 
rules should be applicable only to state parties. They argue that for nonstate 
parties, the rules of cil relating to immunities should remain intact.40 This 
position presents Article 27 of the icc statute as an exception to the rules of 
cil— a position that informed au state decisions not to cooperate with the 
extradition of al- Bashir, the leader of a country, Sudan, that is not a party 
to the Rome Statute. This was illustrated by an Ethiopian diplomatic official 
who explained his irate feelings about the court’s hypocrisy: “Sudan is not 
a party to the Rome Statute. As a sitting president, Bashir enjoys immunity 
from prosecution on the basis of customary international law. There is no ob-
jective reason why as a nonparty to the treaty a judicial body should be able to 
still exercise jurisdiction and demand the extradition of another black man.”41
Both the place of politics and the relevance of blackness and inequality 
emerge time and time again, and they shape the feelings of indignation and the 
perception that African leaders are being unfairly targeted. Here, emotional 
climates are enforced through legal interpretation and the recognition of prec-
edents operating within a field of unequal political practices. Among those 
practitioners engaged in international legal decision making, technocratic 
practices in international law, based on two primary sources.42 The first is trea-
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ties, and the second is Customary International Law (cil). Treaties represent 
international law agreements that reflect “expressly accepted obligations” and 
mostly bind states that are parties to that treaty. In cases where treaty princi-
ples may legally bind states that are not party to particular treaties, it is usually 
under conditions where the key principles of the treaty are transformed into 
customary international law. By insisting on the legitimacy of law based on two 
measures— widespread and uniform practice, and engagement in that practice 
based on legal obligation— many of its anti- impunity practitioners deem cil 
legally acceptable if a given set of norms gain uniform and widespread accep-
tance. Where various legal principles play key roles in establishing the basis for 
the legal legitimacy that states adopt, feeling regimes also shape the positions 
that state actors take.
As I have argued throughout this book, and what most scholarly work 
on Africa and the icc dismisses, is the importance of understanding these 
formations in relation to perceptions of justice— including the deep- seated 
structures of feeling that emerge within complex assemblages and shape jus-
tice alignments. For not only do forms of affective justice take shape within 
various forms of international legality and through the emotional regimes 
that shape what is acceptable, but also, particular regimentations are repro-
duced within the international criminal law assemblage that include compo-
nent parts within African domains. The examples in this final chapter, like 
the previous, highlight how alternative formulations of individual responses 
to structuring histories find their expressions in both legal and sociopolitical 
forms of action. The formation of these expressions, however, should not be 
assessed in relation to the production of fixed and temporally consistent iden-
tities. Rather, forms of affective justice, manifest in practices, such as treaty 
withdrawals, are acts that, while legally allowable, are shaped by emotional re-
sponses that people, as agents, also choose to embody, within particular con-
ditions of the possible, as they take up particular causes. When these causes 
take the form of legal and extralegal questions, the result can be alienating for 
various camps searching for particular rules of order through which to or-
chestrate justice. This is because legal practices are not simply technical ar-
ticulations of objective certainty; they are affective and are fueled by histories 
and assumptions about what one values and presumes, what they mean, and 
the best steps through which to achieve the goals of justice. Such an approach 
to technocratic law making highlights how legal practices involve life worlds 
in affective registers that actually constitute law.
One legal manifestation in the ongoing debate over whether African lead-
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ers and heads of states should enjoy immunity has been the emergence of 
African states that were party to the Rome Statute lobbying for the amend-
ment of Article 27 so that it expressly provides immunity to heads of state.43 
Given the profound sentiments of protest around not surrendering heads of 
state, African states have hoped that their contrary practice will develop into 
a regional custom. For law has both an instrumental and expressive func-
tion. When we go beyond the instrumental uses of treaty formation, imple-
mentation, and decision making, we can recognize that while contestations 
of treaty provisions have the potential to unravel the sacred bundle that is 
seen as emanating from Nuremberg and manifest in the form of the Rome 
Statute, claims of noncooperation and withdrawals not only contest the foun-
dational principles on which the treaty was envisioned but also do some-
thing more profound. They provide the terrain on which social actors can 
articulate their concerns in relation to it. This domain is expressive and un-
folds through what I refer to as reattribution— an affectively propelled site 
of refusal and redirection that is embodied and constitutes alliances through 
vivid emotional registers. The reattribution of legal frameworks and produc-
tion of social, political, and legal alternatives provide the basis on which emo-
tional expressions take place and new spaces of possibility are opened up. 
In this regard, many insist that international law is as dynamic as daily life 
and that African states have a right to engage in its formation. As chapter 5 
recounts, from 2010 onward, au mobilizations led to the expansion of the 
criminal jurisdiction of the African Court in order to shift the terms for the 
management of African violence, often articulated with the refrain, “African 
solutions for African problems.” And, in keeping with this sensibility, one of 
the most controversial attempts to manage African violence has involved the 
formation and inclusion of international criminal jurisdiction for an African 
court, not simply because it stands as a parallel court to the icc but also be-
cause of Article 46A bis.
This provision for individual criminal responsibility in the Malabo Pro-
tocol advocates the maintenance of personal and functional immunities for 
heads of state. While it is true that personal immunity for heads of state and 
high- ranking officials in government does not apply before international 
criminal tribunals, it continues to apply before domestic courts, unless a 
waiver from the state concerned is obtained.44 Advocates in the au insist that 
personal immunity applies where domestic prosecutions are concerned. The 
au has defended the need for the immunity provision from a doctrinal per-
spective on the grounds that immunities provided by international law apply 
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not only to proceedings in foreign domestic courts but also to international 
tribunals, and states cannot circumvent such obligations by establishing an 
international tribunal.45 They point to a central concern that there is a con-
flict between Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute in which African states 
have competing obligations. While Article 27 removes immunity, Article 98 
establishes that the court cannot request that a state act inconsistently with 
its international obligations with respect to state or diplomatic immunity and 
must obtain cooperation for the waiver of the immunity. These officials insist 
that with respect to official immunities for President al- Bashir, cil allows Af-
rican states to opt to adhere to au decisions as well as to decide not to com-
ply with the arrest and surrender of the president of Sudan. This issue was far 
from resolved for the icc’s July 6 Pre- trial Chamber II decision that states 
that have ratified the Rome Statute, such as South Africa, and find President 
al- Bashir on their territory are required to arrest and surrender him to the 
icc.46 However, the International Law Commission has concluded that there 
are no exceptions to immunity rationae materiae for heads of state, heads of 
government, and ministers of foreign affairs.47 
The discourses surrounding the immunity provision have arisen out of a 
concern for the integrity and capacity of an African leader to govern and, as 
such, an insistence that heads of state should be protected from prosecution 
while working to maintain peace and stability within their countries. This ar-
gument is seen as especially acute in the African region. For despite the dele-
gitimation of political solutions by members of the anti- impunity movement, 
various au advocates see the Malabo Protocol as a mechanism that allows for 
peace and justice sequencing, by which personal immunity is relevant only 
while a leader remains in power. Supporters insist that in allowing immu-
nity to expire after a leader is out of office, African regional legal modalities 
can then provide uniquely impactful ways to manage violence on the African 
continent through the sequencing of peace and justice. Both sets of positions 
on the irrelevance of national capacity have been vigorously debated among 
the opponents of this anti- impunity movement— most significantly by those 
from African states.
It is also worth paying attention to the call by African states for a differ-
entiated regional interpretation of the nonsurrender of incumbent heads of 
states to international tribunals and courts. They have mobilized to argue that 
the state practice of immunity for heads of state, foreign ministers, and other 
high- ranking officials is in keeping with principles in cil that provide for per-
sonal and functional immunities for government officials, and there is no in-
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ternational custom that sets out a contrary rule of surrendering incumbent 
heads of states. The practice of not surrendering heads of state may also re-
flect the development of a regional consensus on the rule of nonextradition, 
which, in keeping with the icj advisory opinion request, has become critical 
at the time of this writing.
The question of immunity, therefore, deals with issues concerning Afri-
can states as legitimate domains for ensuring the protection of citizens. But 
it is also an attempt to retain some of the terms of an older order (immunity 
for heads of state) deemed inappropriate for a global order set on establishing 
new terms. The implication of Articles 27 and 98 as they apply to nonmem-
bers of the icc has been the subject of disagreement not only among scholars 
but among different chambers of the icc. In a decision that was highly crit-
icized by au leaders and other prominent commentators, the icc’s Pre- trial 
Chamber I ruling on whether Malawi and Chad were noncompliant when 
they failed to arrest al- Bashir, found that “the principle in international law is 
that immunity of either former or sitting Heads of State cannot be invoked to 
oppose a prosecution by an international court. This is equally applicable to 
former or sitting Heads of States not Parties to the Statute whenever the Court 
may exercise jurisdiction.”48
The icc brought its next noncooperation case against the drc, heard be-
fore Pre- trial Chamber II. Here the icc took a different interpretive approach. 
The chamber recognized there might be instances where the personal immu-
nity of a head of state of a nonstate party may justifiably be raised before the 
court and that “the solution provided for in the Statute to resolve such con-
flicts is found in Article 98(1) of the Statute.”49 It argued that in the case of 
al- Bashir, because the Security Council resolution imposed on Sudan the duty 
to cooperate, his immunity was waived, per the requirement of Article 98(1).50 
In the next matter, against South Africa, Pre- trial Chamber II argued that 
the obligation of state parties to arrest and surrender individuals for whom an 
arrest warrant is issued by the icc emanates from Article 27(2) of the statute 
and the referral of the situation by the Security Council.51 The chamber ar-
gued that Article 27(2) does not only exclude the application of immunity in 
proceedings before the court, as South Africa and the au contended. Rather, 
it referred to the arrest of such individuals.52 The court found that where the 
Security Council refers a situation to the court, Article 27(2) would be equally 
applicable to nonstate parties. The court rejected the need for Sudan or the Se-
curity Council to waive al- Bashir’s immunity, as provided under Article 98(1), 
since it was already removed by Article 27(2).53 
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What this debate demonstrates is how the icc is articulating institutional 
assumptions about the power of the un and— by extension— the icc. Yet Afri-
can state actors are pushing back by asserting claims for their sovereignty and 
making new regional declarations about the practice of immunity for heads of 
state and high- ranking leaders, in an attempt to set new terms for new justice 
formations that include economic sovereignty and claims to global member-
ship. These various public positions reflect particular emotional sensibilities 
that are sustained by legality and its socialization practices.
In chapter 5, we saw how particular Pan- Africanist feeling regimes were 
deployed to shape the institutionalization of an African transitional justice 
agenda that included its own court to adjudicate crimes. This final chapter ex-
tends that conversation to explore how, with the icc’s refusal to amend vari-
ous articles in relation to areas seen as contributing to structural inequalities, 
African leaders are reattributing the scope of international justice practices by 
shaping a new set of regional norms to better address the long history of vio-
lence in the region and provide new opportunities for justice. The proposed 
amendments to the icc treaty were seen as setting the groundwork for Afri-
can state parties to refrain from withdrawing from the icc, but the failure to 
adopt those amendments has led to threats and now letters of intent— the first 
official step— to formally withdraw from the court or to refer the matter to the 
icj. Though Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Zambia, Nigeria, Malawi, Senegal, and 
Botswana were among the African states that countered the withdrawal noti-
fications by pledging their continued support of the icc, as we will see, acts of 
withdrawal, referrals to higher bodies, public statements, declarations, and re-
fusals to comply with extraditions are expressions of particular political posi-
tions that have an impact on emotionally shaped alignments. Such alignments 
not only join particular state leaders that have articulated their rejection or 
disapproval of the icc, but also constitute anti- impunity alliances through 
pledges of icc support. What I am arguing here is that while the emotional 
states of leaders or negotiators is unknowable, we need to pay attention to 
the alignments involved in the political jockeying and strategies around with-
drawals of support. This can help us understand how complex and contro-
versial actions shape constituents whose emotional worlds are aligned with 
a position that is produced and socialized through particular emotional re-
gimes. They are constituted not simply through ethnic, national, linguistic, 
and gender identities, but through embodied feelings about inequality and 
injustice that shape how international law is perceived and how justice is ex-
perienced affectively.
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Debating Justice: The ICC’s 2013 Assembly of State Parties
In response to the au’s request, the icc’s Assembly of States Parties (a stake-
holders’ meeting convened annually by the president of the icc and all states 
that have ratified the Rome Statute) convened a special November 2013 ses-
sion titled Indictment of Sitting Heads of State and Government and Its Con-
sequences on Peace and Stability and Reconciliation. At this meeting, state 
representatives, academics, and members of various civil society groups came 
together to debate the immunity question. Both the declaration of nonextra-
dition and the proposal by African states to seek clarification on and amend-
ments to Article 27, regarding the irrelevance of official capacity, came to a head 
at that Twelfth Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute.54 
The asp special session was moderated by the permanent representative of 
Jordan to the un, Prince Ra’ad Zeid Al- Hussein, and panel speakers included 
au legal counsel Djenaba Diarra, professors M. Cherif Bassiouni and Charles 
Jalloh, and the Kenyan attorney general, Professor Githu Muigai. Multiple 
sides of the debate were argued. Governments and members of civil society 
offered input, eventually resulting in the articulation of a range of positions. 
The then- acting legal counsel of the au, Djenaba Diarra, welcomed the asp’s 
decision to hold the debate and to accommodate the au request. She started 
with conviction, reminding those in the thousand- seat auditorium that “Af-
rica was left alone to deal with the consequences of Rwanda.”55 This, she said, 
was why African states took such a prominent role in the establishment of the 
icc and form the largest group in the membership.
In saying this, she made a profoundly self- assured statement that the au 
has a commitment to peace, stability, justice, and good governance. She ex-
plained that the au had moved from the principle of noninterference in a 
neighboring state to the principle of nonindifference— in other words, agree-
ing that a member state has the right to intervene in another member’s state 
internal affairs (to respond to specific crimes, unconstitutional change of gov-
ernment, etc.). It was in that light that the au had called for the universal rat-
ification of the Rome Statute, she reminded everyone.
Diarra’s central message was that the au was concerned with some of the 
working methods of the icc, namely the selective approaches to justice in the 
way it targets some locations of crimes, like Africa, and not others. Prelimi-
nary examinations were opened in Afghanistan, Korea, and other countries 
years ago, yet there has been no move to trial in those situations, while moves 
to trial in Africa have been swift. She ended by assuring the asp that these 
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concerns were genuine and that in the interest of peace, stability, and recon-
ciliation, Africa needed to trust the international community. As she noted, 
“Africa is worried; we need to be listened to, need to be trusted, in the interest 
of peace, stability, and reconciliation.”56
As Diarra ended her remarks, she then sat down with stern defiance and 
various constituencies in the audience whispered quietly. I sat in the audi-
ence next to a group of African statesmen who spoke among themselves in 
support of her call that Africa needed to be listened to. As I listened to them 
and watched them nod affirmatively and reflected on how empowered they 
seemed as they smiled. The emotions that they performed aligned with Di-
arra and her official au position, which she articulated clearly and communi-
cated with vehement passion. And yet, as I looked over to the section where 
I had sat earlier that day, I saw various members of civil society sigh and roll 
their eyes in what seemed to be disbelief. Their responses seemed skeptical of 
the au’s motives. When I interviewed some later that day, they confirmed my 
rendering of their response to Diarra’s comments; with body language and 
frowns, they charged that “the au was full of shit.”57 This response articu-
lated the domain of agreement or nuance that— with further conversations— 
 clarified how emotional responses constitute international justice formations.
These two sets of actors— au officials and various members of interna-
tional civil society groups— represent two social alignments that are part of 
larger assemblages that have been at the heart of this book. Though complex 
and messy, these emotional responses align feelings about developments in 
international justice circuits whereby activists, state agents, donors, academ-
ics, and others articulate their relations to each other through emotional ex-
pressions of agreement, disagreement, or even neutrality. What is fascinating, 
however, is how such alignments are regulated through emotional regimes 
produced through people’s participation in particular emotional communi-
ties. The next presentation supported this.
Kenya’s attorney general, Githu Muigai, conveyed Kenya’s belief that the 
icc is a court of last resort that should complement domestic and regional ef-
forts, but its practice of indicting heads of state is actually doing the opposite:
We intended it to bring to trial those most responsible. The court was to 
promote justice and promote peace. We intended that the court in general, 
and the prosecutor in particular, should act in a professional fair manner— 
 we did not expect that they would handle themselves at standards lower 
than those we expect to see at our level. This is not a license to behave 
irresponsibly— politically, socially, legally. Over the past five years, we have 
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cooperated fully with the court. This is a unique situation. The indictment 
of sitting heads of state is unprecedented and must be approached as such. 
Allowing for the indictment of sitting heads of state is a threat to the con-
stitutional order and stability in a state— we are not talking of immunities 
to shield an individual, but immunity to allow a state to continue being 
a state.
Kenya is the lynchpin in the security of eastern Africa. It is not a coun-
try with which the international community should play Russian roulette. 
We stand with the international community in the fight against terror, 
against piracy, against drug trafficking, against human trafficking. Yet the 
sc [Security Council] declined to take seriously our request. Immunity 
for heads of state is well established and understood in other jurisdictions. 
We have created a problem within international jurisprudence by allowing 
double standards to take root.58
Muigai pointed to reports on violence unleashed in Gaza and in Sri Lanka, 
as well as the use of drones by the United States, asking if these situations 
did not constitute international criminal offenses. His rhetorical strategy gar-
nered the support of those African statesmen and women who felt discrim-
inated against by what they saw as the icc’s selectivity of cases that focus on 
Africa and not on other states, especially powerful ones. In a passionate ut-
terance that emphasized discriminatory practices, he clarified that “they were 
not being pursued with the urgency they deserve.”59
Through this claim, Muigai reflected on Kenya’s role as one of the most 
important actors in maintaining peace and stability in Africa, and pointed 
to the prevalence of terrorism and piracy in the region. With a deeply ani-
mated and authoritative rhetorical style, he clarified that the icc trials had a 
negative impact on Kenya’s ability to address the consequences of the 2007–
2008 postelection violence (as noted in chapter 4). He argued that immuni-
ties for sitting heads of state exist in many domestic jurisdictions, and that 
this should also apply at the international level.60 At the end of the day, the 
icc had the potential to negatively impact reconciliation and stability. As he 
clarified, “Reconciliation and healing are fundamental; the people must go 
back home and find a way of living together. When lawyers and judges and 
diplomats have gone home, the victims are the ones who must live with the 
consequences.”
Muigai’s invocation of the icc’s selectivity and the realization that the icc 
had failed to produce reconciliation and stability, thereby failing those im-
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pacted by violence, reflected an attempt to disavow the icc’s work. He did this 
through the rhetorical production of relations of inequality resulting from 
the icc’s selectivity practices. This clarification works through a pro- African 
strategic position that demands the application of fairness by icc advocates. 
Those in the audience who were aligned with such concerns shared grum-
blings and support with Muigai.
Attuned to the frustrations of the Kenyan official, the next speaker, Cherif 
Bassiouni, a key scholar and architect of the Rome Statute, responded that the 
discussion about amending Article 27 is not about political issues but about 
rules. He stated emphatically, 
Immunities for heads of state were removed within the Rome Statute 
framework; this was a conscious choice. There is nothing much to argue 
about that. You can argue as to the wisdom of that position, but it is a 
choice made by the drafters. And if, in hindsight, we consider this to have 
been an unwise decision then we would have to adjust the statute.
Article 27 of the Rome Statute does not reflect customary international 
law where head- of- state immunity is well established and generally ac-
cepted, so what prevails? With respect to icc states parties, what the treaty 
says. But to nonstates parties, customary international law prevails. This 
means that the applicable standards for states parties are higher. How does 
this influence the policy consideration? Does this persuade states not to 
become states parties? The immunities afforded to heads of state under 
customary international law simply relate to the timing of prosecutions/ 
 indictments— legal proceedings can commence after an official has left of-
fice. . . .  In Rome, the drafting committee submitted a package that could 
not be unraveled. There are a lot of imperfections. We needed to conclude 
in a five- week period. But, we can now reexamine, [and] reflect on correc-
tions. This is the nature of the beast; the statute is complex. These things 
need to be revisited . .  .   in an institution that we all hope will be a long- 
lasting institution.61
Similarly, the next speaker, Charles Jalloh, professor of international law 
at Florida International University, reinforced the pragmatic position by re-
minding everyone that Article 27 reflects the manifestation of a “key convic-
tion [that] has taken root in international criminal justice that insists that the 
law shall apply equally to all persons— the office of the person shall not lead to 
any form of immunity.” Through that entry point he reinforced the point that 
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Paragraph 1 of Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides that “official capacity 
of an individual will not be a factor for the purpose of establishing criminal 
responsibility. Nor will it be considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing. 
It denies a defense of ‘official capacity’ to several categories of officials: Head 
of State or government, members of government or parliament, elected repre-
sentatives, and government officials.”62
Like Bassouni, Jalloh was not alone in his insistence on the norms, context, 
and spirit of the wording of Article 27. The icj also held that “an incumbent 
or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceed-
ings before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdic-
tion.”63 As such, many au practitioners see state practice as confirming that 
the rules on personal immunities ensure that high- ranking officials and gov-
ernments accused of international crimes should be prosecuted before inter-
national criminal tribunals.64 This development has established the erosion of 
functional immunities and has contributed to the circulation of the discourse 
of ending impunity for the “most serious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community.” Such immunities are seen as being derived from diplo-
matic agreements and customary state practice, as well as treaties.65
Both of the law professors, one central to the Rome Statute’s drafting and the 
other an important African diasporic international criminal law scholar, spoke 
on the legal logic and importance of norms. Their alignments agreed with the 
goals of the irrelevance of official position and the goals and history that im-
munity represents. Standing behind a tradition of institutionalism to protect 
against generations of impunity and decades of violence without recourse, the 
academic call aligned emotional rationalities toward institutional change.
In a prerecorded message, Ambassador Rolf Fife, Norway’s minister of for-
eign affairs, started his comments by reflecting on the early days of the draft-
ing of the Rome Statute. In the last days at Rome, with the final package on 
the table, there was a sense of universality; they were united in a general com-
monality of purpose, yet there was respect for diversity. Any new propos-
als at that point would have unraveled the package. The exercise had a truly 
cross- regional thrust. Close working relationships, and even friendships, had 
formed in what Fife called a Band of Brothers. “We had become a melting pot 
of legal cultures with input from all corners of the world.” He also described 
the willingness to listen and discuss the pros and cons of ideas as character-
istic of the moment. He asserted that the icc legal system was built around 
the idea of effectiveness, with a goal of removing cultures of impunity for 
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mass atrocities; restricting immunities for heads of state was part of that. He 
also noted that there was an understanding that the court would not exist in 
a vacuum and a discussion about how to integrate the court with the status 
quo— in other words, what the role of the unsc in peace and security should 
be. Another core principle is that one is innocent until proven guilty. He re-
flected on whether the position of an individual also warrants respect and a 
recognition of the dignity of the post held. This is not to say, he clarified, that 
this must equal outright immunity, but should result in practical measures 
to recognize and take into account the dignity of the highest office in a par-
ticular state. Ultimately, justice and a functioning judicial institution are key 
for trust and predictability in a given society. With the spirit of that founding 
moment in mind, his closing message was that he hoped they would work to-
ward such basic values.
Ambassador Fife’s message aligned with the last two messages, where par-
ticular social norms and their recognition and incorporation in the spirit of 
the law were central. Overall, history, politics, and a deep commitment to the 
spirit of ending violence were all part of what would shape international crim-
inal law. But this conviction had its limits with some members of the plenary 
and among some in the convention hall. Their emotional expressions and reac-
tions coupled disappointment in the failure of the assumption that no one was 
beyond the law with a realization that this core principle did not reflect how 
international law was working in practice. This is so, they argued, because the 
very values of objectivity that were understood to accompany that commit-
ment failed to guarantee fairness and the universal application of its principles.
The chairperson then opened the floor to commentators. In articulating 
disappointment and suggestions of race- based selectivity, the representative 
from Namibia repeated the dominant refrain: “Justice should not be based on 
selective application. Justice should apply to all continents, to all perpetrators, 
to all races and to all sexes. Any selective application ceases to be justice and is 
likely to undermine the objective of the international community in preserv-
ing international humanitarian law.” He, like Kenya’s attorney general, spoke 
of the similarity of current manifestations of international justice and the all- 
too- familiar history of colonial domination over African livelihoods.
Through these various remarks, we see attempts both to question what 
some saw as double standards and to rethink icc legality through the prism of 
politics and histories. These comments reflect attempts to clarify international 
justice through alternate sensibilities. In that case, various au spokespersons 
suggested that the future of accountability in Africa must include both legal 
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and political solutions. These arguments were made not just through the in-
vocation of legal and political logic, absent affective armature; indeed, the af-
fective appeal to histories of inequality or the need to protect survivors are 
central to the contours of international justice that continue to play out. Fur-
thermore, as I discussed in chapter 3, while the anti- impunity movement fe-
tishizes the victim as life to be protected, discussions about the immunity of 
sitting heads of state also evoke questions of biopolitics and bare life, espe-
cially in the context of state sovereignty.66
But there is certainly no consensus among African stakeholders, as shown 
by the opinion that “the au was full of shit.” On the day in question, those af-
filiated with African civil society organizations chose to challenge the public 
assertions by African and non- African state officials by invoking the critical 
importance of the law in solving African problems. Several representatives of 
Kenyan organizations and governmental agencies delivered powerful public 
submissions. Njonjo Mue spoke on behalf of Kenyans for Peace with Truth 
and Justice, a coalition of Kenyan civil society organizations, and argued that 
immunity effectively means impunity, reminding everyone of the importance 
of international law for the weak— the victims of violence. George Morara, of 
the Kenyan Human Rights Commission, argued that survivors of the post-
election violence in Kenya still support the icc process, and cautioned that 
providing immunity to heads of state would contravene the very reason the 
court was created— to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for 
the world’s gravest crimes. He also warned that providing sitting heads of state 
with immunity would create an incentive for them to hold onto power, threat-
ening to entrench dictatorship and impunity.
George Kegoro of the International Commission of Jurists–Kenya warned 
against amendments to the Rome Statute and expressed concern that they 
could compromise the icc and render it no longer worth having. Yet immedi-
ately following Kegoro’s appeal for the integrity of Article 27, Keriako Tobiko, 
Kenya’s director of public prosecutions, responded dismissingly and with 
knowing authority. He reiterated Githu Muigai’s assertion that Kenya has, to 
date, cooperated with the icc and will continue to do so. He stressed that the 
rhetoric that Kenya has disregarded international law and that it has failed to 
cooperate and take seriously its international obligations misrepresents the 
truth, disputing the claims of civil society representatives. Rather, he offered 
a plethora of examples of ongoing cooperation as well as evidence of Ken-
yan domestic efforts to put in place measures to prosecute those responsible 
for the postelection violence. Part of his message involved pointing to 1,200 
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domestic cases that have been taken to the Kenyan courts. But he ended by 
clarifying that complementarity should be a two- way street. Kenya has been 
cooperating with the icc, but the Office of the Prosecutor has refused to co-
operate with or furnish evidence to Kenyan authorities investigating postelec-
tion violence. Tobiko’s defense of domestic adjudication was communicated 
through an emotional response to misrepresentations and inequalities in the 
international system.
Many individual states submitted comments that afternoon, drawing atten-
tion to the relationship between peace and justice, clarifying that the quest 
for justice cannot be allowed to jeopardize peace and security. There was a 
general consensus that something must be done to address the au’s concerns; 
however, many states also said that the integrity of the Rome Statute cannot 
be compromised, that the independence of the icc as a judicial institution is 
paramount, and that Article 27 of the Rome Statute is an untouchable corner-
stone of the icc system. Some state agents reiterated that there is a need to find 
practical solutions to the problems facing the icc, while others suggested that 
these solutions already exist within the law, particularly the Rome Statute and 
the rules of procedure and evidence. What this debate highlighted was the ex-
tent to which varying architects of the au position were seen as contravening 
founding Rome Statute principles. But because Africans have become the sole 
subjects of the icc, contravention is precisely what the au intended. Interna-
tional lawmaking, public speeches, protest declarations, and public campaigns, 
as this book has detailed, provide the context within which shadows of the past 
manifest to articulate visions and aspirations for the future. They reflect the 
ordering principles of the past and the grammar of the present, and they clar-
ify the terms on which particular forms of knowledge are seen. Invocations of 
past solidarity movements help to make legible various social imaginaries, as 
chapter 5 argued. The Africa that is imagined is indelibly shaped by a history 
fraught with struggle against an outside colonizer or unjust ideology. It is an 
Africa that is in crisis— the impunity of leadership, the failure to sustain insti-
tutions that can serve the poor. And through affects embodied and emotion-
alized through political responses, speeches, and social action, we see that the 
contemporary present cannot be separated from it. It follows that emotional 
responses to those political developments constitute alliances. They shape con-
stituencies through the feeling rules that emerge in passionate utterances.
After this meeting, stakeholders aligned with Pan- Africanist positions em-
phasizing structural inequality continued to protest, while those who asserted 
the need for standards for anti- impunity insisted on the indefensibility of im-
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munity. Such dueling narratives not only set the stage for regulating particular 
principles about the reach of the rule of law, but also were propelled through 
invocations of sympathy for survivors or protest against structural injustice. 
Critical events like these have led to requests for unsc deferrals of cases un-
der Article 16 and— because of their lack of progress— proposals for particular 
amendments to the Rome Statute.
Amendments as an Affective Practice
Many arguments have been made regarding the systemic imbalance in inter-
national decision- making processes. Their inherent politics result in the un-
reliable application of the rule of law. P. S. Rao, a distinguished international 
lawyer from India, argues, “The decisions of the Security Council by design are 
manifestly political decisions. Accordingly, there is no guarantee that the deci-
sions of the Security Council will reflect either the requirements of law or jus-
tice of the world at large. They are essentially reflective of the self- interests of 
its permanent members, as perceived by their governments, which may or may 
not coincide with the interests of the parties concerned. Decisions of the Secu-
rity Council are often questioned for their selectivity and double standards.”67
Indeed, questions about which states are under the icc’s jurisdiction and 
the processes of selectivity, as well as the role of the unsc and its referral 
and deferral mechanism under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, have raised is-
sues about the fairness of the international system. Under the United Nations 
Charter, the Security Council’s primary responsibility is to uphold interna-
tional security and peace.68 Composed of fifteen members, ten rotating and 
five permanent (the United Kingdom, China, France, the Russian Federation, 
and the United States), the Security Council is responsible for determining 
the existence of threats to peace and taking the appropriate action, be it diplo-
matic or military, to control the conflict.69 In addition, under Article 24 of the 
un Charter, the Security Council is responsible for representing all members 
of the United Nations to “ensure prompt and effective action,” while adhering 
to the purposes and principles of the un and its charter.70 Because of their key 
role in the establishment of the United Nations, the five permanent states on 
the unsc can both vote and veto decisions.71 They have been granted special 
overseeing, decision- making status on peace and security in global affairs. Be-
cause no African countries currently sit on the unsc, African state represen-
tatives see themselves as lacking fair and equal representation in one of the 
most powerful international bodies.
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On the other hand, the un General Assembly has long been identified as 
the main “deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the un.” A 
total of 193 members make up the General Assembly, each of whom is al-
lowed one vote on “designated important issues— such as recommendations 
on peace and security, the election of Security Council and Economic and So-
cial Council members, and budgetary questions.”72 It is essentially the assem-
blage of member states that “discusses and deliberates on policies, situations, 
and other international matters,” and all decisions related to important issues, 
such as peace and security, admission of new members, and budgetary mat-
ters require a two- thirds majority.73 Decisions on other questions are decided 
by a general majority.74
Considering the systematic disadvantage that African nations face in unsc 
decisions, being legally bound by a unsc decision to a statute (in this case, the 
Rome Statute) that a country has not even ratified is not seen as acceptable.75 
As outlined, the case of President al- Bashir in Sudan has been cited as illus-
trating this seeming inequality, resulting in calls for the unsc to also defer, 
under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the icc’s prosecutions against not just 
al- Bashir but Kenyatta and Ruto as well. When that was unsuccessful, South 
Africa, in a meeting on November 3–6, 2009, in Addis Ababa, decided to pro-
pose an amendment to the Rome Statute with respect to Article 16 to address 
situations where the unsc was unable to decide on a deferral request. This is 
the original wording of Article 16:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with 
under this Statute for a period of twelve months after the Security Coun-
cil, in a resolution adopted under the Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be 
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.
South African officials proposed adding the following two revisions:
2. A State with jurisdiction over a situation before the Court may request 
the un Security Council to defer the matter before the Court as 
provided for in (1) above.
3. Where the un Security Council fails to decide on the request by the 
state concerned within six (6) months of receipt of the request, the 
requesting Party may request the un General Assembly to assume 
the Security Council’s responsibility under paragraph 1 consistent 
with Resolution 377 (v) of the un General Assembly.
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Key to this proposed amendment is a larger set of issues related to the de-
sire to address the power disparities of the unsc through the call for reform. 
The power vested in the Security Council is controversial, as it allows coun-
tries to refer cases to the prosecutor concerning countries that have not sub-
mitted to the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute themselves. And coupled with 
the unsc’s referral for President Omar al- Bashir, a sitting head of state, in 
2005 under Resolution 1593, South Africa, joined by a predominant number 
of African states that had ratified the treaty, felt it important to move to an 
amendment that asked the asp to take action if the unsc did not respond to a 
deferral request within six months of being notified of it. The request not only 
asks the icc to reconfigure how the referral system works but also calls for the 
un system to address a structural inequality problem. The unwillingness, thus 
failure, to address these claims has led to the creation of an African Working 
Group on icc Amendments to discuss further reforms, which I attended over 
successive asp meetings and informal gatherings.
During the various meetings of the Working Group on Amendments in 
2014, Kenyan representatives introduced a proposal to amend Article 27 of the 
Rome Statute. The original article states:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction 
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of 
State or Government, a Member of a Government or parliament, an 
elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt 
a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, 
in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of Sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international 
law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such 
a person.
The first two paragraphs in Article 27 fulfill different functions.76 Para-
graph 1 denies a defense of official capacity. It concerns functional immunity 
and is derived from texts in the Nuremberg Charter, the Genocide Conven-
tion, and the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. In contrast, Paragraph 2 outlines 
that no exception exists for “core crimes” under personal immunity. Para-
graph 1 of Article 27 provides that official capacity of an individual will not 
be a factor in establishing criminal responsibility, nor will it be considered 
a mitigating factor in sentencing.77 It denies a defense of official capacity to 
several categories of officials: head of state, member of government or parlia-
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ment, elected representatives, and government officials. Article 27(1) concerns 
immunities rationae materiae, or functional immunities that attach to official 
acts. According to Gaeta, Article 27(1) “excludes the availability both of the 
international law doctrine of functional immunity for official acts and of na-
tional legislation sheltering State officials with immunity for official acts in the 
case of crimes within the jurisdiction of the icc.”78
Functional immunities extend from the doctrine of state immunity, par 
in parem non habet imperium or “equal has no power over an equal,” under 
which no state can exercise jurisdiction over another. Functional immunities 
serve two purposes: (1) to prevent interference with state affairs through law-
suits, and (2) to protect state agents from individual liability for official state 
acts both at home and abroad.79 Since this type of immunity attaches to the 
official act, serving state officials and former officials may rely on it with re-
gard to official acts they performed while in office.80 Such immunity does not, 
however, exist with regard to international crimes (e.g., genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity) on the grounds that such acts cannot be con-
sidered performance of official acts.
The icj held in its 1951 advisory opinion regarding the Genocide Con-
vention that the principles underlying the convention, including the prin-
ciple of irrelevance of official capacity, were a matter of state practice and 
cil.81 This view has subsequently been upheld in various domestic and in-
ternational courts. In 1962, the Supreme Court of Israel held in Eichmann 
v. Attorney- General of Israel that Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter and all 
of the Nuremberg principles “have formed part of customary international 
law since time immemorial.”82 In 1998, the English House of Lords ruled on 
whether Augusto Pinochet could be extradited to Spain for acts of torture 
perpetrated while he was the head of state of Chile.83 By a three- to- two ma-
jority, the House of Lords held that functional immunity cannot coexist with 
international crimes.84 Wirth notes that this amounts to state practice in the 
UK, and also in Spain, Belgium, and France, which all requested Pinochet’s 
extradition.85
Paragraph 2 of Article 27 concerns immunities in cil, and that protect 
heads of state and other senior officials by virtue of their particular office or 
status. Article 27(2) concerns immunities rationae personae, or personal im-
munities that attach to an office or status. This type of immunity is limited to 
only a small group of senior state officials, especially heads of state, heads of 
government, foreign ministers, diplomats, and other officials on special mis-
sion in foreign states.86 These immunities are conferred on those with primary 
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responsibility for the conduct of the international relations of a state, and they 
are possessed only as long as the official is in office.87 During that time, state 
officials are immune from prosecution for both official acts and those car-
ried out in their private capacity, whether the act in question was committed 
while the official was in office or before his or her entry into office.88 Such im-
munities stem from the recognition that state affairs are hindered by judicial 
interference from foreign governments, and the view that immunities are nec-
essary for the maintenance of peaceful cooperation and coexistence among 
states.89 Ultimately, Paragraph 2 amounts to a renunciation, by state parties 
to the Rome Statute, of the immunity of their own head of state to which they 
are entitled by virtue of cil but have agreed to waive. It concerns personal im-
munity and is without precedent in international criminal law instruments. It 
outlines that the statute applies “equally to all persons without any distinction 
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State of 
Government, a member of a Government of parliament, an elected represen-
tative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this statute.”90
Kenya’s proposed amendment suggested adding a third paragraph as fol-
lows: “Notwithstanding paragraph 1 and 2 above, serving Heads of State, their 
deputies and anybody acting or is entitled to act as such may be exempt from 
prosecution during their current term of office. Such an exemption may be re-
newed by the Court under the same conditions.”91 They later proposed to the 
icc committee on amendments: “Notwithstanding paragraph 1 and 2 above, 
serving Heads of State, their deputies and anybody acting or [who] is enti-
tled to act as such may be exempt from prosecution during their current term 
of office. Such an exemption may be renewed by the Court under the same 
conditions.”92 
With regard to the proposed amendment, the Working Group Report, led 
by a Kenyan representative, stated, “The objective of [our] proposal was not 
to grant immunity to Heads of State, their deputies and persons acting or en-
titled to act as such, but only to ‘pause’ prosecutions during their term of of-
fice. It was therefore to be understood as a ‘comma’ rather than a ‘full stop.’” 
Several delegations expressed their appreciation for this clarification but had 
additional questions and comments with regard to the text of the proposal, 
notably concerning the meaning of the expressions “current term of office” 
and “anybody acting or [who] is entitled to act as [a head of state or their dep-
uty].” Moreover, some delegations requested further clarification regarding 
the term “may” as it was not clear to them who would be entitled to make the 
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decision and on the basis of what criteria. Several delegations recalled that Ar-
ticle 27 was the cornerstone of the Rome Statute and that they were not willing 
to modify it. There was agreement that discussions need to continue after the 
thirteenth session of the assembly.93
Accordingly, au stakeholders insisted that in real- world situations, the 
temporary granting of immunity to sitting heads of state is not antithetical 
to human rights, as many have argued.94 The reality is that since no statute of 
limitations exists for war crimes and crimes against humanity, the eventual 
prosecution of those guilty of particular violations covered under the juris-
diction of the African Court is a reasonable prospect. They viewed the ju-
dicial process as part of a larger political process that needed to also involve 
peace negotiations and legal accountability sequencing as a strategy, as we 
saw in chapter 5, that could potentially protect more Africans from repression 
and violence than international prosecution could ever hope to achieve. As a 
result, a number of public declarations have shaped particular claims of the 
significance of African heads of state in some of the most volatile countries 
in the world, and that to delay investigations against them while they are in 
office would contribute to the necessary protection of people in the relevant 
region at risk. But articulating immunity as a pro- justice act involves employ-
ing particular sentiments of legitimate state entitlements, protectionism, and 
obligations of responsibility that are particular to the postcolonial state and 
its people.
Declarations that highlight these sentiments not only produce legally sig-
nificant determinations, but, by signaling the aspirational direction of Pan- 
Africanist institutional practices, they establish certain emotional climates 
through which particular collective feelings are loosely established. Their 
protests reflect the recognition of a systemic imbalance in the international 
system that continues to drive international lawmaking in the contemporary 
period. As we will see, the assumption was that if the amendment strategy 
failed, an African Court that respects immunity for heads of state would be 
implemented, and discussions of treaty withdrawal from the icc would fol-
low. However, structural compatibility issues related to the icc and the Af-
rican Court remain at the time of this writing. For even though the icc and 
the International Criminal Section of the African Court of Justice and Hu-
man Rights (acjhr) will exercise overlapping subject- matter jurisdiction, the 
Malabo Protocol, which created the African Court, does not recognize the 
Rome Statue.95 Due to the political climate prevailing during the making of 
the Malabo Protocol, substantive matters of cooperation with the icc were 
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not considered. Instead, the African Court only considers cooperation and 
relationships of complementarity between the African Court and African na-
tional courts on the one hand, and regional bodies, known as Regional Eco-
nomic Communities, on the other hand.96 Similarly, at the time of its drafting 
and well after its coming into force, the icc did not recognize regional judi-
cial bodies such as the African Court. It only gives primacy to national states, 
and sees itself in complementary relationships with those states. Thus, the 
frameworks of the statutes that created both courts do not allow for flexible 
cooperation. Because survivors of violence deserve commitments to a global 
system that is effective and productive, the stakes are higher than ever before. 
The lack of a framework for cooperation between the two courts raises sig-
nificant challenges for those involved. The Rome Statute’s obligations require 
state parties to “ensure that there are procedures available under their na-
tional law for all of the forms of cooperation.”97 Accordingly, all state parties 
are required to carry out arrest warrants issued by the icc should the suspect 
be in their territory, for example. Yet, as I have shown, the icc has faced chal-
lenges with state parties refusing to execute these obligations. It is no surprise, 
then, that this has led to protests against the consequences of icc strategies in 
the form of amendments, noncooperation, and even withdrawal. 
The expansion of the criminal jurisdiction of the African Court that led to 
the crafting of 46A bis is a further manifestation of the emotional regimes I 
have been examining throughout this book. As we will see, the claims of in-
equality and perceptions of selectivity that have prompted the proposed and 
controversial amendments to Article 27 of the Rome Statute, as well as the icc 
withdrawal actions, are central to the relatively late introduction of an im-
munity provision to the Malabo Protocol, and the justice sentiments that ac-
company them. This reveals how affects contribute to social alignments that 
influence perceptions of justice, and how those perceptions shape the way that 
justice is achieved.
Innovating Immunity and Reshaping an African Regional Custom  
as a Form of Refusal
Article 46A bis of the Malabo Protocol is key to addressing the failure to ac-
cept the proposed amendments to the articles on extradition and irrelevance 
of official capacity in the Rome Statute, as described above, because it explic-
itly ensures immunity for heads of state. As it notes, “The Court shall uphold 
the immunities provided for under international law. In particular, no crimi-
244 CHAPTER 6
nal proceedings shall be initiated or continued against a Head of State or Gov-
ernment during his/ her term of office.” Thus, the ratification of the Malabo 
Protocol by fifteen states to bring it into force and the subsequent operation-
alization of the court would, as chapter 5 began detailing, open an alterna-
tive avenue for dispensing justice. The strategy involves identifying regional 
champions— such as Uganda, Kenya, and Ghana— seen as supportive of the 
African Court to drive the ratification enlistment of African states.98 This is 
not simply a legal process. 
This process involves securing strategic commitments and a belief in au 
policy positions through rhetorical performances, ideological commitments, 
and strategic moves that align policy positions with legal actions as reattribu-
tive acts. For example, at a range of meetings held at different times over the 
two- year period when I observed various treaty- making negotiations, I doc-
umented various African stakeholders calling on “fellow Pan- Africanists who 
love freedom to take justice in their own hands.” Some passionately urged 
states to recognize that colonialism is long over. As one said, “We need to act 
against European courts that continue to target Africans and their leaders.” 
This linking of the possibility of justice to regional consolidation and treaty 
making engages a regional domain of African justice that also involves the 
invocation of vindicating sentiments through which justice is reattributed as 
spatialized and expressed as a form of Pan- African freedom.
The existence of such dynamics requires that we not dismiss such prac-
tices because of implied disappointments in the workings of the postcolonial 
African state. Rather, it demands further analy sis of the way that refusals and 
redesignations are taking place in the contemporary period and of the cri-
sis of the postcolonial state. In the case of the au- supported immunity pro-
vision, protests around not surrendering African heads of state highlight the 
role of various political aspirations that are fundamentally tied to structures 
of inequality and propelled by particular feeling rules that align the brother-
hood of the African statesman with histories of European imperial subjuga-
tion. For some of the architects of the au- supported immunity provision, the 
Malabo Protocol’s Article 46A bis is not just about the will for impunity. It is 
an expression of the goal to establish a contrary regional custom around in-
ternational treaty norms that have rendered immunity for heads of state ir-
relevant in some cases (for Africans) yet relevant in others (for Western and 
various Asian powers). Unlike the current trends in international treaty juris-
prudence to make immunity obsolete, for some African stakeholders, like 
those discussed earlier in this chapter, cil has long provided personal immu-
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nities for heads of state, and African leaders responding to structural injustice 
insist that there is no reason why the current developments with the African 
Court Protocol should not be decided according to existing state practice in 
cil. This was the South Africa’s position when they refused to arrest President 
al- Bashir of Sudan.
As representatives of South Africa argued in one of the closed meetings 
that I attended, “We will not promote regime change by arresting and extra-
diting another sitting head of state.” The reality, they insist, is that cil provides 
immunity for heads of state and high- ranking senior state officials, and sepa-
rate provisions have also been upheld that address treaties for the immunity of 
diplomatic agents, consular officials, representatives of states to international 
organizations, and state officials abroad on special missions. Similarly, the au 
position is that regional customs are norms that develop from practices of 
states in particular regions of the world. In addition to the role of customary 
law in the application of personal immunity as a form of international state 
cooperation, there is a key threshold that for a regional custom to be estab-
lished it must be continuously and uniformly executed. 
The lead authority, the Asylum Case decided by the icj in 1950, highlights 
the issue, and many of those engaged in getting icc or icj judges to consider 
the relevance of this claim point to that landmark case. With impassioned 
logic, various au negotiators insisted that in the case between Peru and Co-
lombia, the icj accepted that regional customs existed in international law, 
even if it rejected their relevance in that particular instance. The court stip-
ulated that it relied on an alleged regional or local custom peculiar to Latin 
American states. Following the court’s argument, they concluded that the state 
that alleges the existence of a custom must prove clearly that such a custom 
exists and that other states in that region, against which the contested custom 
is asserted, accept that custom.99 They also insisted that under Article 98 of 
the Rome Statute, “The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender 
or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently 
with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or dip-
lomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court 
can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the im-
munity.” Accordingly, states have a sovereign right to determine how to deter-
mine how to balance their state responsibility to treaty obligations while also 
considering their sovereign rights and protections.100 As noted in the open-
ing of the chapter, the au Office of Legal Counsel saw their position regarding 
the amendment of Article 27 as justified and couched it in a legal form— that 
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of their recognition of Africa’s development of a regional norm on immu-
nity. Through resolute expressions and impassioned declarations offstage, a 
number of people supportive of the au’s position insisted to many of us that 
the au’s legal argument rests on the need for different regional customs, thus 
practices. They are seeking to develop a regional custom that carves out a lim-
ited exception from prosecution of a leader while holding office. This is a crit-
ical manifestation of African geographies of justice. It is a refusal to accept the 
emergence of a particular international legal norm and instead to articulate a 
regionally differentiated practice. It is what I have called reattribution. 
Interestingly, this attempt to reshape the basis for African state prac-
tice runs counter to early positions held by many African states and Pan- 
Africanist national liberation movements of the 1940s–1970s, which refused 
to use international law for strategic purposes. Rather, African leaders of 
newly decolonized states in the early postcolonial period argued— often with 
great success— that general rules of cil (as opposed to regional rules) were 
only relevant to Europe, or were Euro- American constructs typically gen-
erated behind their backs and foisted upon them without consideration of 
whether non- European actors had actually given their consent (expressly or 
tacitly). This argument was exceptionally powerful and far- reaching in inter-
national investment law, international human rights law, and (before long) 
inter national environmental law. But what is interesting here is that in the 
contemporary period, African stakeholders are claiming the tools of cil to fa-
cilitate the establishment of new regional customs. Through the communica-
tion of these legal positions, which are often articulated with feelings of anger, 
the notion of differentiated African practices is being harnessed to institu-
tionalize new contours of lawmaking using Pan- Africanist refusals.
However, although au heads of state participated in the universal decla-
ration of noncooperation with the extradition of President al- Bashir, behind 
closed doors there is actually no regional consensus on the rule of nonextradi-
tion and immunity. If the private debate is an indication of this, we could say 
that African regional alignments share the affective commitments to equality 
of states, but they are not aligned with how that should play out. The ethno-
graphic interviews that we conducted in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia demon-
strated this point. From Francophone to Anglophone to multilingual and 
multiethnic Africans, from the desert to the oil- rich regions, and from the 
predominantly Christian to the predominantly Muslim or animist, unified 
decision making has not been easy to achieve. African differences are vast, as 
are their varied positions on the nonsurrender of heads of state. Furthermore, 
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not all African stakeholders agree with the expansion of the jurisdiction of the 
African Court and the incorporation of Article 46A bis. Nor do they all agree 
with the call for au noncooperation with the icc. 
One of the key disputes over the au’s immunity provision concerns 
whether the one that deals with personal immunity is in violation of cil— 
 one of two types of immunity in cil.101 This immunity attaches to the of-
fice or status of a very limited group of senior state officials and is conferred 
only as long as the official remains in office. The second type, functional im-
munity, attaches to official acts carried out on behalf of the state. It extends 
to a broader group of officials and covers them while in office and after they 
leave office. However, during heated debates between different stakeholders— 
 members of African civil society, various international ngos, academics, and 
state representatives— many have raised questions about whether this form of 
functional immunity covers those acts performed in an official capacity. 
The legal questions have been innovative and contested, as have been pub-
lic responses, through heated debates, that if African state leaders acted re-
sponsibly and protected their citizens, there would be no need for claims to 
immunity. In keeping with this trend in favor of the irrelevance of national 
capacity, over the past twenty years we have witnessed situations in which 
national courts have chosen not to apply functional immunity to officials ac-
cused of an international crime. Examples include cases against Qaddafi, for-
mer Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, and Charles Taylor.102
In May 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
rejected Charles Taylor’s preliminary motion in which he claimed immunity. 
In doing so, the court emphasized its “truly international” legal status, de-
spite the absence of chapter 7 powers, and found that it was an “international 
criminal court.” It then went on to hold that because of its nature as an inter-
national criminal court, not a national court, the paragraph in its statute that 
denies immunity to officials is “not in conflict with any peremptory norm 
of general international law and its provisions must be given effect by this 
Court.” The judges concluded that the “official position of the Applicant as 
an incumbent Head of State at the time when the criminal proceedings were 
initiated against him is not a bar to his prosecution by this Court.”103 The im-
portance of the distinction between national and international courts for the 
immunity issue was derived from the icj’s Arrest Warrant case (although the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone came to an opposite finding). By pronouncing 
authoritatively on the Arrest Warrant case, the icj determined whether Con-
go’s minister of foreign affairs enjoyed immunity following Belgium’s issuance 
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of an international arrest warrant for crimes committed in Congo.104 The icj 
ultimately rejected Belgium’s argument that there was an exception to immu-
nity for incumbent officials in cases of alleged international crimes. In terms 
of legal rhetoric, the icj could not deduce such a rule from state practice (case 
law and national legislation), nor could it derive a position from the relevant 
rules contained in the legal instruments creating international tribunals; ac-
cording to the court, the latter rules only applied to the specific international 
tribunals and could not lead to the conclusion that similar rules applied in 
prosecutions in national courts.
Various au legal advisors have argued that it is important to see that im-
munity, though discussed through law, has its greatest relevance in its ability 
to speak to African realities. Some suggest that because tribal sentiment can 
lead to electoral violence, not giving heads of state immunity could have a 
critical impact on how and when one proceeds with judicial action in cases of 
mass atrocity violence where peace settlements are underway. As one south-
ern African leader told me during my fieldwork, “Weak African states chal-
lenged by civil war or political strife need a framework throughout Africa to 
address how to deal with violence and leaders.” And as another high- ranking 
au interlocutor explained to a colleague and me during a research meeting:
We need to be innovative about the immunities issue. The debate is com-
plex, but we need to be much more creative about violence in Africa. What 
this means is that we need to be active agents in the making of interna-
tional law. The icc emphasis has been on African leaders. Customary in-
ternational law focuses on state practices in order to articulate norms. 
These opinions are binding. The way we deal with personal jurisdiction 
needs to be more creative. We need to think about reshaping international 
law in ways that look at the issues amongst African leaders. . . .
The innovation is that as a region, African states can play a critical role 
in generating new customs. African states can play a central role in the de-
velopment of international norms and the creation of complex lawmaking 
relevant for African changing circumstances.  .  .  .   If we consider Africa’s 
role in reshaping international law in ways that look at issues amongst 
leaders in relation to their ability to generate new customs that are relevant 
to Africa’s uniquely different circumstances, then our approach to the Ma-
labo Protocol, such as provisions like 46A bis, for example, requires that 
we think about personal immunity not in relation to [the] venue/ national 
and  international courts division but in relation to nature of the crime. 
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Why should venue be what is important in African regional contexts? Is it 
the venue that matters or is it the actual crime— the nature of inter national 
harm?
The insistence that the actual crime, not the venue, should be the basis for 
determining immunity is a point that international law scholar Sarah Nouwen 
has argued: international law should be the same, regardless of the kind of tri-
bunal in which it is applied.105 While functional immunity is clearly incom-
patible with the concept of individual responsibility for international crimes, 
and therefore of no avail to former officials charged with crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes, it has been harder to prove the emergence of such a 
rule in cil with respect to procedural immunity of serving officials. This is be-
cause personal immunity is founded on a different principle: granting immu-
nity to certain officials because of the office they hold.106 She concluded that 
despite this disregard for the type of crime, there have been several develop-
ments that the Special Court could have used as a foundation for finding such 
a rule, which could have denied former president Charles Taylor procedural 
immunity while at the same time advancing the emergence of the customary 
rule— immunity based on the type and severity of crimes.107 The au’s former 
legal counsel has adopted this intellectual reasoning as a possible direction 
for the its future lawmaking and speaks to the emotional commitments to le-
gal innovation that are central to new possibilities in international relations. 
As one of my au interlocutors said, “Africa is tired of the dichotomy be-
tween national and international crimes,” mimicking that emotional exhaus-
tion in his delivery. With the Malabo Protocol, Africans are saying that they 
are committed to the subject matter instead of the venue. The argument is 
that if immunity does not apply in national courts for some offenses, then it 
should not apply at all in international courts for those particular offenses. 
Instead, the au legal counsel’s argument, like Sarah Nouwen’s, considers the 
nature of the crime a better route to pursue. This reattribution of legality 
through other modalities such as peace- justice sequencing and personal im-
munity for heads of state and high- ranking leaders highlights new possibili-
ties for managing violence through the desire to apply the historical contexts 
that are relevant to Africa’s realities. The au’s work to build alternate models 
for managing African violence on its terms has been relevant to the au legal 
office’s logic maintaining that peaceful international relations require a more 
temporary approach to peace through the institutionalization of personal im-
munity while a head of state is in office. These measures are seen by au ad-
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herents as reflecting “African solutions to African problems” and they speak 
to the socialization of particular cultural sensibilities and practices that are 
transforming the way that states address violence on the African landscape. In 
other words, the response to the immunity debate is not just about legal doc-
trine and actionable domains of law. The au’s engagement can be seen in rela-
tion to a particular reading of Africa’s role in setting new international norms 
and, in so doing, attending to the forms of political inequality that are seen as 
deeply pervasive, thereby leading to regimes of inequality. 
However, as I indicated above, not all au actors agree with this perspec-
tive, and the incorporation of Article 46A bis has received extensive criticism 
from civil society groups and activists in Africa and around the globe, who 
similarly argue that such a provision would be a setback in the fight against 
impunity for international human rights abuses.108 Some argue that the draft 
protocol is simply advancing the ideals of the icc to ensure justice for interna-
tional crimes peculiar to Africa.109 Others insist that the draft protocol for the 
African Court includes a laundry list of crimes and is a project that is not fea-
sible and cannot be effectively implemented.110 Some scholars of inter national 
law, such as du Plessis, have insisted that the au responses are simply exam-
ples of African fraternity; in other words, they represent Africa’s elite protect-
ing their own in the midst of mass violence and lack of accountability.111 And 
yet others argue that these concerns are purely strategic and serve to derail 
particular icc indictments of African leaders.112
In May 2014, more than thirty civil society and international ngos ap-
pealed to a meeting of African ministers of justice and attorneys general not 
to include Article 46A bis in its draft of the Malabo Protocol. Organizations 
including Human Rights Watch, the International Bar Association, the In-
ternational Federation for Human Rights, Amnesty International, the South 
African Litigation Centre, the New York City Bar Association, and many oth-
ers have released statements sharply criticizing the provision as retrogressive 
and inconsistent with ensuring that perpetrators are held to account.113 Ad-
ditional criticism has stemmed from the argument that the protocol contra-
dicts Article 4(h) of the au’s Constitutive Act, which asserts “the right of the 
Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly 
in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity.”114
Those engaged in such criticism argue that if Article 4(h) is strictly applied, 
the au should be able to intervene despite declarations of immunity. Some 
have pointed to additional contradictions with specific articles, including Ar-
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ticle 4(o), which obliges member states to respect the sanctity of human life 
and condemn and reject impunity. For example, they have suggested that the 
inconsistencies will make it difficult for the au to be seen as procuring justice 
in its regional court— as shown through the victim/ perpetrator construction 
in earlier chapters.115 Some have argued that where immunity attaches to an 
officeholder, it can create an incentive for that person to remain in office to 
avoid prosecution. For Idayat Hassan, “Based on the antecedents and attitudes 
of some African leaders, we can expect immunity for heads of state and their 
officials to create an atmosphere of impunity for perpetrators of human right 
violations, thereby encouraging perpetrators to hold onto power for a long 
time to enjoy the immunity.”116
This disagreement with immunity for African heads of state may indeed 
encourage state leaders to stay in office. However, it is important that we see 
the Malabo Protocol’s heads of state immunity as what Ademola Abass calls 
a “protest treaty.”117 In other words, 46A bis is not an objective legal doctrine 
but an emotionally relevant statement about inequality in global affairs. In 
this regard, Chidi Odinkalu distinguished immunity in relation to de jure and 
de facto immunity, in which states that have not submitted to the legal con-
straints of the Rome Treaty have de facto immunity— that is, immunity in fact. 
And those that have erected the Malabo Protocol have de jure  immunity— that 
is, immunity in law.118 Relatedly, and as this book has worked to show, law, 
formalized through treaties, is a form of expression that has force in particu-
lar contexts. But legal norms are not the only way to understand how partic-
ular practices are deemed legitimate. In reality, law is negotiated and disputed 
using legal reasoning in ways that structure what its products become. When 
we recognize how international law works in the absence of a statecraft and/ 
 or police force to compel action, it is important to understand the underlying 
emotional regimes that shape the nature of affective justice. Expressions of 
justice through conceptual or narrative reattributions or political protests are 
critical communicative forms by which law gains its power. To miss this is to 
misrecognize the place of affects in the life of the law.
As chapter 5 illustrated in relation to the making of the African Court, the 
debate over immunity and African heads of state is not simply a disagreement 
with the principle that no one should be beyond the law. It is fundamentally 
related to the problem of power and history and the emotional regimes that 
structure the acceptability of particular responses. In the case of the icc arrest 
warrants for African leaders, this is seen as happening alongside the violence 
of economic plunder and structural inequalities that operate in Africa with-
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out judicial hindrance. The existence of these perceptions of inequality make 
it all the more important to explore the making of new international regional 
mechanisms, not only in relation to their doctrinal formations but also in re-
lation to the sociocultural sensibilities that shape and sustain them.
Treaty Withdrawal as Affective Alignments of Protest
To understand the events that have led to treaty withdrawal as an emotionally 
affective practice requires that we detail the way that the above recent histor-
ical developments led to the contemporary forms of political protest that un-
folded following the January 2016 summit.119 At that time, the lack of progress 
with the amendments to the Rome Statute led various key African state actors 
to speak on behalf of states like Kenya, Burundi, Namibia, and South Africa 
requesting a withdrawal strategy. The au tasked the Open- Ended Commit-
tee of African Ministers on the icc, formed in 2015 by representatives from 
various regions of Africa, with the urgent development of a comprehensive 
strategy, including a collective withdrawal from the icc. The committee was 
charged with communicating their strategy to au member states that are also 
parties to the Rome Statute. They were also expected to submit their strategy 
to an extraordinary session of the executive council mandated to make deci-
sions on the next steps.120
Once the committee was established, they considered proposals by the 
au’s Office of Legal Counsel as to what the withdrawal strategy might look 
like. The committee proposed multiple approaches, including the option of 
a collective withdrawal from the Rome Statute if particular reforms did not 
take place. In proposing the various approaches, the Open- Ended Committee 
outlined: (1) the need for continental and country- level ownership of inter-
national criminal justice through strengthening national judicial systems and 
working toward the ratification of the African Court; (2) the importance of 
engaging with the unsc and clearly communicating that no referrals of par-
ticular situations on the African continent should be made without deference 
to au Assembly; (3) the need for a robust strategy to enhance the ratification 
of the Malabo Protocol expanding the jurisdiction of the African Court of 
Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights to include international crimes; and 
(4) because of the slow pace of possible icc reforms, the need for timelines for 
withdrawals. The ministerial committee insisted that the auc should develop 
the comprehensive strategy as soon as possible. They emphasized the impor-
tance of soliciting input from various delegations and that a draft copy should 
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be submitted to the ambassadors for consideration at the June 2016 meeting. 
In the end, two successive meetings were scheduled with the unsc, and both 
of the formal meetings were canceled. Instead, representatives met informally 
and discussed the possibility of articulating new strategies through which to 
produce more equitable results for African states.
Key to the au strategy laid out by the Open- Ended Committee meetings 
was the delivery of justice in a fair and equitable manner that allows for the 
regionalization of international criminal law on the continent. Without that, 
state withdrawals were understood as being the only viable mode of rectify-
ing the way that law was encapsulating the terms for justice. They spoke of the 
need to create viable political solutions to structural inequalities and work to-
ward building African judicial institutions within Africa. Protests in the form 
of prioritizing the peace and security of the countries that these leaders guard, 
resisting extraditions, and presenting new legal and political alternatives are 
also critical to the concept of reattribution at the core of this book.
In the domain of international lawmaking negotiations, a treaty is an agree-
ment entered into by actors (such as international organizations and sovereign 
states) who give consent to assume obligations among themselves. Because the 
creation of a treaty involves painstaking negotiation and reflects a compromise 
among states regarding mutual obligations, the assumption is that the ratifi-
cation of such treaties by states represents their acceptance of being bound by 
not just conditions of the treaties but their restrictions on termination or with-
drawal. Thus, state consent is seen as an overarching principle governing the 
design and operation of all treaty exit clauses.121 In guiding these rules, the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets out the conditions under which 
state parties can unilaterally withdraw from treaties and under which treaty 
obligations can be suspended and terminated.
The Rome Treaty for the icc provides for withdrawal. The withdrawal ques-
tion raised by African member states falls on Article 127, which is open ended 
in its execution: “A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The with-
drawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, 
unless the notification specifies a later date”— as seen with the Burundi with-
drawal.122 Central to the discussion of treaty withdrawal from the icc by Af-
rican states is the creation of a new notion of collective withdrawal as a way to 
demarcate their dissatisfaction with perceived inequality through selectivity.
Withdrawal from a treaty, according to Helfer, “can give a denouncing state 
additional voice, either by increasing its leverage to reshape the treaty to more 
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accurately reflect its interests or those of its domestic constituencies, or by es-
tablishing a rival legal norm or institution together with other like- minded 
states.”123 We saw such developments over the course of the twentieth century 
when the League of Nations began to collapse, precisely when a large number 
of states— from Costa Rica and Brazil (in 1925 and 1926, respectively) to Japan 
and Germany (both in 1933) and then a host of other states in the late 1930s— 
 withdrew from the organization. Such withdrawals were not necessarily coor-
dinated, but they were also not coincidental or mutually indifferent. However, 
as a formal category of action, the notion of collective withdrawal has no for-
malized precedent. Rather, notions of “denunciation and withdrawal are . . .  
fundamentally unilateral acts.”124 They are not understood as collective acts, 
though when done within a region by successive states, in political terms they 
are actually seen as indicators of regional dissatisfaction. In this regard, while 
states have banded together to propose different legal alternatives to the dom-
inant regimes, they have done so unilaterally by invoking the notice proce-
dures established in the various treaties they were denouncing.
Collective withdrawal “by a smaller number of treaty parties may indi-
cate an attempt to shift from an old equilibrium that benefits some states and 
disadvantages others to a new equilibrium with different distributional con-
sequences.”125 States can sometimes band together to challenge international 
legal rules they perceive as unfair and objurgate international institutions that 
enforce those rules. The collectiveness of the action has the potential to “rad-
ically reconfigure existing forms of international cooperation.”126 This devel-
opment raises questions about the norms that should shape international law 
and remains one of the most difficult of our time, thus the profound potential 
of such issues to create fissures and produce new alignments. While there are 
guidelines that establish treaty rules, customary rules are not static and pro-
vide an opening for social change. In this regard, once a general rule of cil 
is established, continued opinio juris and state practice are necessary to pre-
serve it.127 Existing jurisprudence raises the uneasy question of whether state 
conduct that runs contrary to an existing rule, or reliance by states on a new 
principle, signifies the emergence of a new international norm, or whether it 
constitutes a breach of an existing rule— a strategy that describes one of the 
au’s legal directions.128
Members of the International Law Association, which is seen as being au-
thoritative in international legal determinations, acknowledges that contrary 
state practice to which other states acquiesce can lead to changes in cil.129 As 
a result, it is possible that withdrawals of au states and attempts to end icc 
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treaty obligations that do not follow conventional procedures set out in the 
Rome Statute, the Vienna Convention, and the broader customary law frame-
work for ending treaty obligations could actually lead to a shift in those rules. 
This highlights the potential that such affective responses can have in chang-
ing norms. However, the prevailing thought in international law circles is that 
until conduct such as collective withdrawals and their associated acquiescence 
become sufficiently widespread to form a new rule, it will likely continue to 
be seen as a violation of existing international law or will need to be procured 
through individual state withdrawals.130 And that is what has happened. State 
withdrawals from the Rome Statute for the icc were part of a three- step strat-
egy advanced by the African Union’s ministerial group, established to report 
back to au constituencies on Africa- icc relations. The steps involved (1) re-
form of the Rome Statute, (2) reform of the unsc referral system, and (3) rat-
ification of both the Protocol on the Statute of the acjhr and the Protocol on 
the Amendments on the Statute of the acjhr by au member states (the Ma-
labo Protocol). They reflect au attempts to promote equality in the interna-
tional system and create new regional customs. Alongside these formations, 
concurrent withdrawals are also embodiments of political protest. 
Such formations emerged from the au’s interest in being a shaper of in-
ternational law rather than being shaped by it. In continuing this work, an 
important au ministerial meeting in 2016 was concerned with African state 
party icc withdrawals that resulted in a lack of consensus on the collective 
withdrawal of African states. Instead, individual states agreed to pursue with-
drawal within a condensed time period, and one by one they began to submit 
their declarations of withdrawal to the un secretary- general. First it was Bu-
rundi, then South Africa, then Gambia. In response, states such as Botswana 
and Senegal began to speak out against the withdrawal efforts. These acts of 
dissent were meant to ensure explicit recognition of the absence of consensus 
among African states. For it is well known among international law actors that 
“a small group of nations within a given region can threaten to object vocally 
to, and thereby derail, [its] attempts . . .  to deviate from existing cil rules.”131 
What remains unclear is what fraction of states “need to explicitly object in 
order to prevent a new rule of cil from forming,” but ongoing legal commen-
taries about this matter suggest that “the fraction of nations that needs to ob-
ject to bar the formation of a new cil rule is significantly less than a majority, 
but greater than a handful.”132 These ambiguities have shaped the backdrop 
by which some au states have sought to articulate their withdrawal strategy 
in relation to the possible and eventual formation of a new regional custom.
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This chapter has considered the African Court’s extension of its crimi-
nal jurisdiction and related forms of judicial action and protest in relation 
to the emotional and cultural sensibilities that sustain networks, shape prac-
tices, and transform attitudes around Africa’s future. As we saw, au represen-
tatives have responded to legal encapsulation through strategies that support 
African visions for a fair international system and new regional customs that, 
while contradictory and messy, shape alliances in critical ways. What we see 
is that bringing international law into African landscapes is about codifying 
various practices shaped in Europe and making them relevant to African life-
worlds. This importation of codified jurisprudence promoted through legal 
technocratic practices is not simply about the unimpassioned mimicry of Eu-
ropean governance projects. It is also about intentional attempts to partici-
pate in biopolitical governance in the management of African lifeworlds while 
also refusing those forms of legality deemed not useful or irrelevant. Instead, 
it involves adapting and vernacularizing the law to put in place forms of le-
gality that can be instrumentalized for African contexts in relation to very 
different histories and conditions of state formation. But with this comes 
 emotionally-propelled innovations that respond in extreme ways to what is 
seen as structural injustice— such as Article 46A bis. 
The introduction of Article 46A bis is an extraordinary act that reflects 
affective reattributive practices that are propelled through particular Pan- 
Africanist tropes and highlight African self- determination. Though they re-
flect core tenets of Europe’s logics and traditions, these instrumentalizations 
of international law should also be seen through their relative forms of tech-
nocratic protest and the affective spaces that are opened up by some of the 
African elite, as no cultural practices are without tenets from other places. Jus-
tice making emerges out of rhizomatic formations, and through that messi-
ness it reinscribes structural and emotional complexity. 
With attention to the complex processes by which such projects are pro-
pelled, we have seen how issues that lie at the core problematic of the icc and 
the formation of the African Court— struggles over inequality and selectivity 
— shape the emotional embodiments of affective justice that have propelled 
the formation of new institutions. To dismiss affective actions like reattribu-
tions, amendments, and withdrawals as irrelevant because they contravene 
international legality is to ignore the critical role of affective justice in the 
making and unmaking of international law.
Epilogue 
Toward an Anthropology of International Justice
Something that transformed the way that I understood justice in my life? . . .  
In that book there’s a part where this young boy was running after this young 
girl for some money [that] somebody had given them for helping to carry 
some luggage. And the girl had escaped with this money and the guy was 
chasing [her] when this old woman stepped in to stop this fight.
The old woman said, “Why do you do this?” So the boy went through this 
explanation and at some point the old woman asked the young boy, “Where 
is your dad?”
And the young man said, “My dad is dead.” And the old woman asked, 
“How did he die?” The young man explained that he was working in this 
industry and his hand was chopped off and they could not provide medical 
treatment for him.
And then the woman said something to the young man, and this is what 
 really influenced my life, having gone through the conflict [in Sierra Leone] 
when I lost my dad.
So the woman said to the young man, “The day you ask yourself why your 
dad died, you need to ask yourself: Why was it possible for him to die? And 
then ask yourself: What should I do that another will not die under such cir-
cumstances? That day you will become a man.” 
I do what I do now to make sure that others do not go through what I went 
through.
— Interview with activist and survivor of violence, Sierra Leone
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This story, told to me with emotive bodily expressions and accentuated vocal 
fluctuations by a prominent African civil society activist, represents one per-
son’s take on what justice means, apart from its judicialization. It emphasizes 
the perspective that the circumstances of structural injustice related to the 
death of the boy’s father are not insignificant when it comes to understanding 
notions of culpability and justice. What it also highlights is that these symbols 
and manifestations of justice are not communicated without particular bodily 
affects. What I have shown is that meanings of justice circulate through var-
ious biopolitical instruments but are also embodied, felt, and communicated 
in particular ways. People take those circumstances into account when con-
sidering not only how inequality should be addressed, but how justice should 
be realigned, and what social action to take— aesthetically, performatively, 
discursively. This message, then, highlights the issues at the heart of this book. 
Throughout the chapters I have demonstrated how justice is constructed 
through affective formulations that are tied to various component parts that 
interact, converge, and diverge. The various component parts highlighted 
throughout the book constitute an international criminal law assemblage that 
comes together within that which is loosely called international justice. In these 
enmeshed spaces are the production, uses, and rethinking of justice as well as 
the emotions and regimes that propel its meanings. And though various tools 
to instrumentalize justice (such as laws, policies, rules), it has also become clear 
that international criminal law is not just about what the law says— it’s not just 
about its black- letter manifestation. Law is not a tool that creates justice in and 
of itself. Law operates within unequal fields of power and governance. It repro-
duces the power that shapes it and also embodies spaces where global inequality 
can play out. It embodies social relations, and, at times, can be deployed strate-
gically within those very unequal fields of power. For while the law is meant to 
protect the social contract as well as to address breaches in it, it can also enable 
their reproduction— for positive and negative.1 As this book has shown, this 
dynamic is not new in the Global South— especially in Africa— where interna-
tional law is being imaginatively inserted and engaged in daily life.
After decolonization in African states, new institutions of governance and 
regulation determined the way that postcolonial laws in Africa were struc-
tured. This was one of the ways that global inequality was reproduced. Law 
was deployed not just as an instrument of rules and norms, but also as a for-
mulation of what law would be in new postcolonial domains. As we see in 
this book, law is a cultural artifact that embodies inequalities. As such, the 
story of justice in the African postcolony is a story about colonial and im-
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perial law and the contemporary order of things. It is a story about political 
and economic restructuring made to align earlier forms of effective colonial 
control to the contemporary management of an international domain within 
which Africa’s violence can trigger icc action. As I have shown, this hap-
pens not because the court and its actors are targeting Africa. This happens 
because of the conditions of inequality in contemporary modernity. These 
forms of inequality are not just structural. They are biopolitical and operate 
through particular regimes of practice. Various instrumentalities and embod-
ied modes of expression play a role in structuring what Michel Foucault called 
the conditions of possibility.2 The rest is embedded in the afterlives of mo-
dernity, which is where affects, bodies, technologies, and governance effects 
come into sharp relief. For example, the racial imaginaries that have emerged 
at this junction of international justice and that are prominently displayed in 
relation to who the icc indicts and who the victims of violence are, not un-
related to the modes of seeing, engaging, feeling, and speaking that are part 
of international rule of law assemblages. These affective modes of being shape 
the way that emotions produce particular institutional materialities and, as 
such, they invigorate the technocratic tools that circulate in the making of in-
ternational criminal law. 
Understanding these processes allows us to make sense of how affective 
states can be used to redraw lines of alliance and disjuncture. They highlight 
the way that figures and imaginaries, narrativized in particular ways, can con-
tribute to the intensification of responses or the undermining of feelings. Here 
law is not just shaped by instrumental tools to be used by those who are for-
mally trained in its logic. Law is also shaped by those engaged in its refusals, 
as well as those formal and expressive acts, such as renouncements, treaty 
withdrawals, and Twitter objections. These engagements with law highlight 
the way that protest speech can be deployed to subvert particular legal rela-
tionships and can reconfigure the terms by which it takes shape. Ultimately, 
we see how these affectivities that extend to technocratic knowledge and doc-
trine are ultimately tied to materialities that have real- world impact. One such 
afterlife is concerned with the residual life of the law and the pronounced or 
latent feelings that it instigates.
I have shown that to make sense of these dynamics we need to understand 
the life of the law through studying what various international and regional 
courts and their actors do. By studying their technocratic afterlives we can go 
beyond the black- letter language of the law to explore the technologies, gover-
nance, discourses, edicts, and emotional regimes that play key roles in estab-
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lishing and legitimating meanings of justice. These justice formations produce 
alignments with particular symbolic regimes of power, which determine how 
and under what conditions such affective justice takes shape. 
What we see is that affective justice shapes how justice feels, how justice is 
manifest in the everyday, and how it is decoupled from place and relocated in 
new feeling spaces. Through this process, the components that connect with 
such productions and circulations are fundamentally intertwined with the af-
fective and sociocultural universes that shape it. So just as law is also what 
people make of it, how they see it, and how its force or pronouncements feel, 
justice is also about the production of meaning in the context of bodily and 
emotional responses to the social condition. But the processes of the produc-
tion of law and justice are where the conflict lies, for not only are legal differ-
ences socially constituted, they are also constituted by and within particular 
structures of inequality. These logics contribute to the materialities of feeling 
and the domains within which they circulate and are rendered legible. For ex-
ample, the icc was created to respond to situations in postviolence states with 
decimated legal systems that cannot indict their own leadership or in places 
where violence is so widespread that a sense of collective responsibility per-
vades. But it is the conditions under which African stakeholders are in this 
predicament that raises fundamental questions about the place of inequality 
in our world. And further, those victimized by mass atrocity violence at the 
heart of icc actions are often those who live in poverty and whose govern-
mental officials have failed to protect them— whether in Africa or elsewhere. 
These structures of inequality exist alongside micropolitics of possibility and 
biopolitical domains that shape the resultant feelings that emerge.
Emotional invocations of and responses to injustice become the space for 
the materialization of justice, but their articulations are embedded in particu-
lar histories and power relations, providing the grammar through which social 
norms are instantiated and imaginaries brought to life. It is through the rein-
forcement of emotional regimes, which operate within particular frameworks 
of expectations and are propelled through various political and economic 
campaigns, that international justice is articulated. These articulations— often 
taking the form of protest campaigns, treaty withdrawals, photo imagery, 
or affirmations of values— reconstitute international publics through social 
movement campaigns and are supported by new technocratic tools such as 
international legal provisions and advocacy strategies. These modalities work 
through emotional expressions that become the basis for narrativizing justice 
TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 261
imperatives and creating new social imaginaries of feeling that are expressed 
and regulated in particular ways. 
While these imaginaries travel and often become decontextualized from 
their local cultural domains, they are then recontextualized in particular 
components of assemblages. The power to articulate narratives of justice or 
spheres of judicial or nonjudicial action is not benign. Rather, it operates in 
keeping with particular time and space horizons that are produced as relevant 
to the political mission of justice— and it is here that locating the effectiveness 
of the structures of emotion that shape social geographies of justice is critical. 
As such, looking at justice in relation to judicial and nonjudicial spaces re-
veals the relevance of history and politics in shaping the emotional meaning 
of social location. Judicial spaces operate within particular affective realms 
rooted in histories, memories, and experiences. Regardless of whether various 
stakeholders or audiences experienced those histories, the conditions of judi-
cial possibility can be rationalized alongside shadows of the past— memories 
of colonialism, realities of economic disparity, complexities of violence and 
racial exclusion. For some, the vestiges of colonial inequalities, the work-
ings of racialization, and the modernity of contemporary power operate and 
structure the postcolonial conditions within which individuals make seem-
ingly free decisions. These decisions are shaped by psychic worlds and beliefs 
as much as they are by judicial constraints, political and economic consider-
ations, and new digitized possibilities.
Justice making has also become increasingly accessible and therefore im-
mediately sharable. Biomediated campaigns enable new forms of meaning 
making that transform the workings of the social imaginary. This reality calls 
on us to rethink the way that we privilege national state decisions to comply 
or not comply with international treaty provisions. Instead, through a range 
of competing ideations beyond the state or modern ontologies, it is import-
ant to render relevant the rhizomatic interrelations between state institutions, 
leaders, and everyday people. 
Beyond the complexities of actors, spatiality and temporality are also crit-
ical. Affective Justice has made a case for understanding the relationships 
between space, time, modernity, and justice. In relation to various African 
encounters with the icc, it makes a difference that the geographical spaces 
and persons under scrutiny by the court are African or from the continent of 
Africa. In the case of the au, the Pan-Africanist pushback is about the politics 
of determining which crimes, committed when and why, by whom, and un-
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der what conditions are deemed relevant to the African continent, to African 
geography. It is also about the power to submit to the jurisdiction of one’s own 
courts as well as to create new spaces in which the psychic life of possibility 
and change are forged. By focusing on these affectivities, especially in relation 
to the complex politics of protest in response to law’s hegemony, nowhere is 
this more accentuated than in various parts of postcolonial Africa, in which 
both the law and its constituting political order are at play.
What we are seeing today through the icc- au pushback, then, is actually 
the playing out of a politics of recognition in which the legitimacy of various 
African stakeholders managing Africa’s violence is negotiated in contempo-
rary terms using the tools of global governance like the un and the icc. The 
key analytic challenge in making sense of the icc, the au, or the logic of an 
African Court in the twenty- first century is to understand the ways in which 
various multiply inspired commitments to justice imaginaries relate not to 
age- old senses of identity but to emotional performances and their regimen-
tation. This involves making sense of the ways that relationships and emo-
tional responses structure and are structured by feelings that have the power 
to command particular social relations and engage with the reality of the 
inter nationalization of daily life.
It behooves us to understand the way that Pan- Africanist forms of re-
attributive initiatives are being crafted spatially. The recognition of these reali-
ties requires that we take seriously the complexities of the politics of the social 
and the affective life that informs those decisions. That is to say, we must take 
seriously which economies, moralities, social imaginaries, and psychic mean-
ings shape decision making and how those decisions are legitimized with the 
moral force of the past. For they are part of the play of power that structures 
future possibilities in particular ways, all while exacerbating preexisting in-
equalities and psychic differences in responsibility, obligation, and histories. 
They are closely related to what Siba Grovogui has argued are age- old con-
cerns about the future of Africa and Africans in relation to global governance 
and international morality.3 And as such, they are tied to a more expansive 
domain by which to understand contemporary Pan- Africanism: through the 
social histories of European imperial power in Africa and broadening po-
litical economic and moral reparative aspirations. But it also means under-
standing the affective life of twentieth- century violence in Europe and the 
recognition that the anti- impunity fervor that has characterized the contem-
porary period refers to the desperate desire to make perpetrators of violence 
accountable to humanity. This reality however is not unrelated to the condi-
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tions of structural inequality that shape the conditions of possibility for vi-
olence in the first place. Recall the opening vignette where the old woman 
asked how the boy’s dad died. The conclusion was that the boy’s dad’s death 
was a result of larger conditions of structural inequality— he was working in 
an “industry and his hand was chopped off and they could not provide med-
ical treatment for him.” 
The story concludes with the woman asking the young man the key ques-
tion: Why was it possible for him to die? The woman’s answer was that the day 
you realize that justice is not just about addressing theft and violence through 
the law but that justice is about addressing the larger conditions within which 
theft and violence happen, is the day that your understanding of justice rep-
resents the issues at the core of the human condition. 
Thus, my goal here has been to keep in tension these complexities of jus-
tice as a way to rethink the anthropology of international justice through the 
recognition of injustice. I have been interested in examining the multiplicities 
of contestations at the heart of the intertwined spaces between legal power 
and social displacement, and the challenges brought to bear on the condi-
tions of modernity that make social reality legible, that is, the way that cer-
tain things are encapsulated by the law as legal, and made legible, while other 
things are seen as unrelated and dismissed as illegitimate. The reality is that in 
postcolonial Africa, as in other parts of the world, the judicial is one of many 
domains for ordering and performing power. But of particular interest here 
is the way that the judicialization of African politics increasingly occupies a 
space in the imagination as a site of international control. Interestingly, the 
production of the image of the African “victim” and the male “perpetrator” 
of violence, as well as a notion of an “international community” are part of 
the forging of international justice imaginaries whose work is being propelled 
through the social life of the law, which itself is dynamic. Its greatest power is 
in its commanding of order and objectivity. But this production is also part 
of the discursive power of its encapsulation through which certainty, fairness, 
procedural regularity, and an overriding sense of objectivity are produced. 
Its greatest effects are in its ability to produce a totalizing ideological order 
through which other logics are displaced— rendered marginal or irrelevant to 
the juridical order.
My concluding thoughts dwell in the middle space of the international 
rule of law assemblage, between the concerned recognition by African lead-
ers, various African voting publics, Pan- Africanist activists, and intellectu-
als of the many harsh and contradictory realities on the African continent, 
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the spaces of violence and social movements to rectify it, and the realities of 
international demands to create a world in which we can hold perpetrators 
of violence accountable. This middle space is where the affective life of law 
dwells— where alignments are made and others unraveled. Law’s meanings 
and forms emerge from and constitute these emotional spaces, which are reg-
imented according to the practices and aspirations of law’s liberatory project.
Law’s possibilities are found in emotional aspirations for social change, 
not in its core instrumentality. And this is where the key issues are about how 
we feel and what we do about what we feel. And these feelings are not absent 
from the historical and contemporary deployment of power. They are about 
determining the conditions under which the law is deployed, with what insti-
tutions, under whose jurisdiction, and in which geographical spaces— that is, 
the power to submit to the jurisdiction of one’s own courts as well as to cre-
ate spaces in which the psychic life of possibilities is forged. Indeed, one of 
the popular conceptions of the crisis of the African postcolony today is that it 
stems from a problem with the incorporation of things African. This involves 
disjunctures between imposed or legislated understandings and familiar cul-
tural values and practices that are not always central to the development of 
new norms. And just as the understanding of rights in the West unfolded 
according to its own contested and unforeseeable logic so that, for instance, 
rights that once pertained to property- owning white men were made to in-
clude others, so it is the case on African terrain. Any number of African insti-
tutions continue to be reworked and reshaped.
There is no reason to think that notions of Pan- Africanism or other princi-
ples deemed sufficiently African cannot be mobilized to play increasingly crit-
ical roles in addressing the harsh realities of human rights violations. The key 
analytic challenge, however, in defining the work of agents engaged in the Af-
rican Union or the icc for the twenty- first century is to understand the ways 
in which multiply inspired commitments produce social imaginaries and re-
late to other institutions, treaties, or international justice institutions. This in-
volves making sense of the ways that relationships and emotional responses 
structure affects that are deployed to build social institutions and erect poli-
cies that set social values and expectations. 
For once we take on the core problem of affective justice— the reality that 
justice is not necessarily about the absence of injustice but its complex mobiliz-
ing assemblages— we see that as long as various stakeholders continue to en-
capsulate political histories and social problems and replace them with the 
rule of law, then a central part of justice processes will involve reattribution, a 
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counterresponse that reinscribes justice in different terms. By expanding the 
juridical domain beyond the legal, we can see how surrender requests and 
their refusal or desires for compliance have political histories, the effects of 
which can be seen in a number of key attachments and social pacts mobilized 
through expressions of compliance or refusals to comply. But at the center is 
the power to decide to submit to the jurisdiction of one’s own courts and to 
assert the tenets of its content in ways particular to one’s life worlds. By fo-
cusing on technocratic legal knowledge, affects, and the emotional regimes 
through which they travel, we see how those engaged in African political de-
cision making and social change mobilizations live in a space where feelings, 
reactions, and histories all come together to explain practice. It is where con-
temporary history is being forged, where cultural institutions and interior 
motives shape outward practices that are as dynamic and transforming in Af-
rica as they are elsewhere. Making sense of this in relation to practices and 
power and the embodied responses it conjures— in Africa and beyond— is a 
challenge for twenty- first century social thought.
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